1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use ln::channelmanager::{CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
277 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
278 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub mon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
443 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
742 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
744 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
745 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
746 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
750 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
752 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
753 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
754 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
755 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
761 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
763 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
765 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
766 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
767 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
768 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
769 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
771 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
772 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
774 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
776 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
777 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
779 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
780 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
781 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
782 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
783 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
784 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
786 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
787 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
789 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
790 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
791 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
792 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
793 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
795 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
796 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
798 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
799 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
801 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
802 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
803 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
804 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
810 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
811 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
813 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
814 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
815 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
820 macro_rules! secp_check {
821 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
824 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
829 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
830 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
831 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
832 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
834 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
836 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
837 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
838 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
840 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
843 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
845 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
848 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
849 /// required by us according to the configured or default
850 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
852 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
854 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
855 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
856 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
857 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
858 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
861 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
862 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
863 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
864 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
865 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
866 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
867 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
870 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
871 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
874 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
875 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
876 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
877 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
878 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
879 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
880 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
881 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
886 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
887 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
888 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
889 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
890 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
891 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
892 // We've exhausted our options
895 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
896 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
900 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
901 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
902 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
903 outbound_scid_alias: u64
904 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
905 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
906 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
908 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
910 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
911 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
912 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
914 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
917 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
920 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
921 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
922 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
924 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
927 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
928 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
929 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
930 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
931 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
934 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
936 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
937 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
938 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
939 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
942 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
943 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
945 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
946 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
949 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
950 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
951 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
958 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
959 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
960 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
961 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
966 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
968 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
969 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
970 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
972 channel_value_satoshis,
974 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
977 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
978 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
980 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
981 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
984 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
985 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
986 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
987 pending_update_fee: None,
988 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
989 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
990 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
991 update_time_counter: 1,
993 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
995 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
996 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
997 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
998 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
999 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1000 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1002 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1003 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1004 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1005 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1007 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1008 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1009 closing_fee_limits: None,
1010 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1012 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1014 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1015 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1016 short_channel_id: None,
1017 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1019 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1020 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1021 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1022 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1023 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1024 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1025 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1026 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1027 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1028 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1029 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1031 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1033 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1034 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1035 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1036 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1037 counterparty_parameters: None,
1038 funding_outpoint: None,
1039 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1041 funding_transaction: None,
1043 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1044 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1045 counterparty_node_id,
1047 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1049 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1051 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1052 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1054 announcement_sigs: None,
1056 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1057 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1058 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1059 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1061 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1063 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1064 outbound_scid_alias,
1066 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1067 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1069 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1073 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1074 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1076 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1077 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1078 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1079 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1080 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1081 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1082 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1085 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1086 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1087 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1088 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1089 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1090 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1096 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1097 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1098 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1099 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1100 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1101 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1102 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1103 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1104 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1107 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1108 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1110 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1111 // support this channel type.
1112 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1113 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1117 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1121 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1122 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1123 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1124 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1125 // publicly announced.
1126 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1127 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1131 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1135 channel_type.clone()
1137 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1139 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1143 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1144 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1145 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1146 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1147 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1148 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1149 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1150 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1153 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1157 // Check sanity of message fields:
1158 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1161 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1164 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1167 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1168 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1171 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1174 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1177 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
1179 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1180 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1183 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1186 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1190 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1191 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1194 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1197 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1200 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1203 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1204 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1206 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1209 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1213 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1215 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1216 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1221 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1222 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1223 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1224 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1227 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1230 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1231 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1232 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1234 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1238 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1239 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1240 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1241 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1242 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1246 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1247 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1248 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1249 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1253 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1254 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1255 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1256 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1257 if script.len() == 0 {
1260 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1263 Some(script.clone())
1266 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1267 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1273 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1274 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1277 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1278 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1283 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1284 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1286 let chan = Channel {
1289 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1290 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1292 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1297 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1299 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1300 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1301 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1304 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1307 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1308 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1310 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1311 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1312 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1314 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1315 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1316 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1317 pending_update_fee: None,
1318 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1319 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1320 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1321 update_time_counter: 1,
1323 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1325 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1326 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1327 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1328 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1329 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1330 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1332 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1333 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1334 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1335 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1337 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1338 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1339 closing_fee_limits: None,
1340 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1342 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1344 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1345 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1346 short_channel_id: None,
1347 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1349 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1350 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1351 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1352 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1353 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1354 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1355 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1356 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1357 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1358 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1359 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1360 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1362 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1364 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1365 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1366 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1367 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1368 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1369 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1370 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1372 funding_outpoint: None,
1373 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1375 funding_transaction: None,
1377 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1378 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1379 counterparty_node_id,
1381 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1383 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1385 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1386 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1388 announcement_sigs: None,
1390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1391 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1392 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1393 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1395 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1397 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1398 outbound_scid_alias,
1400 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1401 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1409 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1410 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1411 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1412 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1413 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1415 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1416 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1417 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1418 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1419 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1420 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1421 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1423 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1424 where L::Target: Logger
1426 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1427 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1428 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1430 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1431 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1432 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1433 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1435 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1436 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1437 if match update_state {
1438 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1439 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1440 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1441 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1442 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1444 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1448 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1449 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1450 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1451 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1453 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1454 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1455 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1457 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1458 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1459 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1460 transaction_output_index: None
1465 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1466 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1467 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1468 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1469 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) {
1470 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1471 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1473 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1474 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1477 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1478 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) {
1479 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1480 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1482 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1483 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1489 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1490 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1491 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1492 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1493 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1494 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1495 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1499 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1500 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1502 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1504 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1505 if generated_by_local {
1506 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1507 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1516 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1518 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1519 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1520 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1521 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1522 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1523 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1524 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1527 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1528 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1529 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1530 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1534 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1535 preimages.push(preimage);
1539 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1540 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1542 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1544 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1545 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1547 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1548 if !generated_by_local {
1549 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1557 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1558 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1559 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1560 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1561 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1562 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1563 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1564 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1566 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1568 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1569 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1570 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1571 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1573 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1575 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1576 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1577 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1578 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1581 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1582 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1583 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1584 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1586 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1589 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1590 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1591 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1592 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1594 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1597 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1598 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1603 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1604 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1609 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1611 let channel_parameters =
1612 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1613 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1614 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1617 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1622 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1625 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1626 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1627 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1628 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1630 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1631 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1632 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1640 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1641 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1647 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1648 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1649 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1650 // outside of those situations will fail.
1651 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1655 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1660 1 + // script length (0)
1664 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1665 2 + // witness marker and flag
1666 1 + // witness element count
1667 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1668 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1669 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1670 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1671 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1672 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1674 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1675 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1676 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1682 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1683 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1684 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1685 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1687 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1688 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1689 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1691 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1692 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1693 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1694 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1695 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1696 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1699 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1700 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1703 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1704 value_to_holder = 0;
1707 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1708 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1709 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1710 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1712 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1713 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1716 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1717 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1721 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1722 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1723 /// our counterparty!)
1724 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1725 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1726 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1727 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1728 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1729 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1730 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1732 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1736 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1737 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1738 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1739 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1740 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1741 //may see payments to it!
1742 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1743 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1744 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1746 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1749 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1750 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1751 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1752 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1753 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1756 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1759 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1760 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1762 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1764 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1765 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1766 where L::Target: Logger {
1767 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1768 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1769 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0);
1770 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1771 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1772 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1773 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1774 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1778 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1779 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1780 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1781 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1783 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1784 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1786 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1788 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1790 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1791 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1792 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1794 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1795 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1796 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1797 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1798 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1800 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1801 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1802 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1804 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1805 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1807 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1810 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1811 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1815 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1819 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1820 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1821 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1822 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1823 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1824 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1827 // Now update local state:
1829 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1830 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1831 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1832 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1833 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1834 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1835 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1839 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1840 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1841 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1842 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1843 // do not not get into this branch.
1844 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1845 match pending_update {
1846 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1847 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1848 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1849 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1850 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1851 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1852 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1855 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1856 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1857 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1858 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1859 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1860 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1861 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1867 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1868 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1869 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1872 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1873 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1875 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1876 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1879 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1880 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1882 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1883 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1885 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1886 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1889 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1892 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1893 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1894 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1895 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1900 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1901 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1902 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1903 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1904 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1907 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1908 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1909 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1910 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1911 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1913 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1914 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1915 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1919 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1920 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1921 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1922 /// before we fail backwards.
1923 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1924 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1925 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1926 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1927 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1929 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1931 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1932 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1933 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1935 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1936 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1937 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1939 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1940 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1941 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1943 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1948 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1949 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1955 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1956 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1957 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1958 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1959 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1963 // Now update local state:
1964 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1965 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1966 match pending_update {
1967 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1968 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1969 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1970 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1974 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1975 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1976 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1977 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1983 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1984 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1985 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1991 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1993 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1994 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1997 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1998 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1999 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2004 // Message handlers:
2006 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2007 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2009 // Check sanity of message fields:
2010 if !self.is_outbound() {
2011 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2013 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2014 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2016 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2019 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2022 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2025 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2027 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2029 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2030 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2033 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2034 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2037 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2040 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2044 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2045 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2046 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2048 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2049 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2051 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2052 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2054 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2055 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2057 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2058 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2060 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2061 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2063 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2064 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2067 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2068 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2071 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2072 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2074 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2077 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2078 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2079 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2080 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2081 if script.len() == 0 {
2084 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2087 Some(script.clone())
2090 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2091 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2097 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2098 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2099 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2100 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2101 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2103 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2104 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2106 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2109 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2110 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2111 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2112 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2113 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2114 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2117 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2118 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2119 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2122 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2123 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2125 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2126 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2131 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2132 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2134 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2135 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2137 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2138 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2139 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2140 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2141 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2142 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2143 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2144 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2145 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2148 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2149 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2151 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2152 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2153 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2154 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2156 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2157 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2159 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2160 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2163 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2164 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2167 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2168 if self.is_outbound() {
2169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2171 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2172 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2173 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2177 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2180 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2181 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2182 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2183 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2186 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2187 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2188 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2189 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2190 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2192 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2194 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2195 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2199 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2200 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2201 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2205 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2206 initial_commitment_tx,
2209 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2210 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2213 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2214 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2216 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2218 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2219 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2220 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2221 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2222 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2223 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2224 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2225 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2226 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2228 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2230 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2232 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2233 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2234 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2235 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2237 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2239 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2240 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2242 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2245 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2246 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2247 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2248 if !self.is_outbound() {
2249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2251 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2254 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2255 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2256 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2257 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2260 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2262 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2263 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2264 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2265 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2267 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2268 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2270 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2271 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2273 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2274 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2275 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2276 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2277 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2282 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2283 initial_commitment_tx,
2286 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2287 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2290 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2291 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2294 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2295 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2296 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2297 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2298 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2299 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2300 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2301 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2302 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2303 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2305 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2307 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2309 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2310 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2311 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2312 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2314 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2316 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2319 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2320 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2322 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2323 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2324 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2325 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2328 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2329 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2330 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2331 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2332 // when routing outbound payments.
2333 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2337 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2339 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2340 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2341 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2342 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2343 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2344 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 ||
2345 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2346 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2347 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2349 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2350 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2351 let expected_point =
2352 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2353 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2355 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2357 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2358 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2359 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2360 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2361 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2363 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2364 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2371 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2372 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2374 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2376 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2379 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2380 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2381 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2382 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2388 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2389 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2390 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2391 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2392 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2393 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2394 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2395 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2396 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2399 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2400 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2401 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2402 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2403 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2404 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2406 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2407 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2413 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2414 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2415 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2416 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2417 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2418 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2419 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2420 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2421 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2424 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2425 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2426 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2427 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2428 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2429 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2431 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2432 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2436 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2437 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2438 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2439 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2440 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2441 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2442 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2444 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2445 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2447 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2454 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2455 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2456 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2457 /// corner case properly.
2458 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2459 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2460 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2462 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2463 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2464 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2465 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2468 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2470 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2471 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2472 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2475 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2476 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2477 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2478 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2480 outbound_capacity_msat,
2481 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2482 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2483 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2489 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2490 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2493 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2494 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2495 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2496 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2497 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2498 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2501 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2502 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2504 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2505 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2508 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2509 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2510 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2512 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2513 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2515 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2516 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2518 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2519 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2521 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2522 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2526 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2527 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2533 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2534 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2535 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2538 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2539 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2540 included_htlcs += 1;
2543 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2544 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2548 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2549 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2550 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2551 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2552 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2553 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2558 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2560 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2561 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2566 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2567 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2571 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2572 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2573 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2576 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2577 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2579 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2580 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2581 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2583 total_pending_htlcs,
2584 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2585 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2586 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2588 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2589 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2590 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2592 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2594 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2599 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2600 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2601 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2603 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2604 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2606 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2607 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2609 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2610 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2612 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2613 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2617 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2618 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2624 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2625 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2626 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2627 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2628 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2629 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2632 included_htlcs += 1;
2635 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2636 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2639 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2640 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2642 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2643 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2644 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2649 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2650 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2651 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2654 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2655 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2657 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2658 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2660 total_pending_htlcs,
2661 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2662 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2663 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2665 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2666 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2667 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2669 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2671 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2676 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2677 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2678 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2679 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2680 if local_sent_shutdown {
2681 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2683 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2684 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2685 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2686 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2688 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2691 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2692 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2694 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2695 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2697 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2698 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2701 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2702 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2703 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2704 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2706 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2707 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2709 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2710 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2711 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2712 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2713 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2714 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2715 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2716 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2717 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2718 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2719 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2721 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2722 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2723 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2724 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2725 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2726 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2730 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2731 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2732 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2733 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2734 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2735 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2736 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2740 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2741 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2742 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2743 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2744 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2745 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2746 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2750 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2751 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2752 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2753 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2754 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2758 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2759 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2760 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2761 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2762 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2764 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2768 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2772 if !self.is_outbound() {
2773 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2774 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2775 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2776 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2777 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2778 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2779 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2780 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2781 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2782 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2783 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2784 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2785 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2786 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2787 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2790 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2791 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2792 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2793 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2797 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2798 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2800 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2801 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2804 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2805 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2806 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2810 // Now update local state:
2811 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2812 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2813 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2814 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2815 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2816 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2817 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2822 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2824 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2825 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2826 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2827 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2828 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2829 None => fail_reason.into(),
2830 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2831 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2832 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2835 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2839 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2840 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2841 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2842 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2844 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2845 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2850 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2853 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2854 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2857 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2861 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2864 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2865 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2868 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2872 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2876 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2877 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2880 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2881 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2884 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2888 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2889 where L::Target: Logger
2891 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2892 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2894 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2895 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2897 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2898 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2901 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2903 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2905 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2906 let commitment_txid = {
2907 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2908 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2909 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2911 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2912 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2913 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2914 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2915 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2916 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2920 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2922 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2923 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2924 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2925 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2928 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2929 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2930 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2931 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2934 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2936 if self.is_outbound() {
2937 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2938 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2939 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2940 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2941 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2942 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2943 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2944 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2945 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2946 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2952 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2953 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
2956 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2957 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2958 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2959 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2960 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2961 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
2962 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2964 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2965 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2966 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2967 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2968 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2969 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2970 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2971 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2973 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2975 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2979 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2980 commitment_stats.tx,
2982 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2983 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2984 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2987 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2988 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2989 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
2990 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2992 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2993 let mut need_commitment = false;
2994 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2995 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2996 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2997 need_commitment = true;
3001 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3002 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3003 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3004 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3005 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3006 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3010 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3011 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3012 Some(forward_info.clone())
3014 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3015 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3016 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3017 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3018 need_commitment = true;
3021 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3022 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3023 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3024 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3025 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3026 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3027 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3028 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3029 need_commitment = true;
3033 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3034 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3035 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3036 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3038 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3039 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3040 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3041 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3042 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3043 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3044 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3045 // includes the right HTLCs.
3046 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3047 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3048 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3049 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3050 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3051 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3053 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3054 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3055 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3058 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3059 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3060 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3061 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3062 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3063 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3064 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3065 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3066 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3070 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3071 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3073 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3074 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3075 per_commitment_secret,
3076 next_per_commitment_point,
3077 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3080 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3081 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3082 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3083 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3084 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
3085 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3086 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3087 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3090 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3091 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3092 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3093 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3094 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3095 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3096 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3098 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3099 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3100 updates: Vec::new(),
3103 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3104 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3105 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3106 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3107 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3108 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3109 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3110 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3111 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3112 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3113 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3114 // to rebalance channels.
3115 match &htlc_update {
3116 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3117 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3118 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3121 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3122 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3123 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3124 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3125 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3126 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3127 // into the holding cell without ever being
3128 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3129 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3130 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3133 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3139 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3140 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3141 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3142 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3143 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3144 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3145 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3146 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3147 (msg, monitor_update)
3148 } else { unreachable!() };
3149 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3150 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3152 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3153 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3154 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3155 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3156 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3157 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3158 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3159 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3160 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3163 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3165 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3172 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3173 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3175 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3176 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3181 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3182 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3183 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3184 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3185 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3187 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3188 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3189 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3191 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3193 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3195 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3198 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3200 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3204 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3205 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3206 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3207 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3208 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3209 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3210 where L::Target: Logger,
3212 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3213 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3215 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3216 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3218 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3222 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3224 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3225 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3226 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3230 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3231 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3232 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3233 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3234 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3235 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3236 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3237 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3243 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3244 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3247 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3248 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3250 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3252 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3253 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3254 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3255 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3256 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3257 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3258 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3259 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3263 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3264 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3265 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3266 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3267 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3268 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3269 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3270 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3272 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3273 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3276 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3277 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3278 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3279 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3280 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3281 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3282 let mut require_commitment = false;
3283 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3286 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3287 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3288 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3290 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3291 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3292 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3293 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3294 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3295 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3300 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3301 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3302 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3303 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3304 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3306 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3307 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3308 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3313 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3314 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3316 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3320 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3321 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3323 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3324 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3325 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3326 require_commitment = true;
3327 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3328 match forward_info {
3329 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3330 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3331 require_commitment = true;
3333 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3334 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3335 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3337 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3338 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3339 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3343 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3344 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3345 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3346 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3352 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3353 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3354 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3355 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3357 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3358 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3359 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3360 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3361 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3362 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3363 require_commitment = true;
3367 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3369 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3370 match update_state {
3371 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3372 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3373 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3374 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3375 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3377 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3378 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3379 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3380 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3381 require_commitment = true;
3382 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3383 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3388 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
3389 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3390 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3391 if require_commitment {
3392 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3393 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3394 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3395 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3396 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3397 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3398 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3399 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3400 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3402 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3403 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3404 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3405 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3406 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3407 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3408 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3410 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3414 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3415 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3416 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3417 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3418 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3420 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3421 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3422 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3425 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3426 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3427 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3428 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3431 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3432 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3433 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3434 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3436 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3439 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3440 if require_commitment {
3441 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3443 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3444 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3445 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3446 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3448 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3449 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3451 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3452 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3453 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3455 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3459 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3460 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3461 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3464 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3466 commitment_update: None,
3467 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3468 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3469 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3476 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3477 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3478 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3479 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3480 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3481 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3482 if !self.is_outbound() {
3483 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3485 if !self.is_usable() {
3486 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3488 if !self.is_live() {
3489 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3492 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3493 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3494 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3495 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3496 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3497 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3498 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3499 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3500 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3501 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3505 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3506 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3507 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3508 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3509 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3512 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3513 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3517 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3518 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3522 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3523 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3525 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3526 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3531 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3532 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3533 Some(update_fee) => {
3534 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3535 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3541 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3542 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3544 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3546 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3547 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3548 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3549 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3553 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3554 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3555 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3559 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3560 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3563 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3564 // will be retransmitted.
3565 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3566 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3567 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3569 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3570 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3572 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3573 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3574 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3575 // this HTLC accordingly
3576 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3579 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3580 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3581 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3582 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3585 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3586 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3587 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3588 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3589 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3590 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3595 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3597 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3598 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3599 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3600 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3604 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3605 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3606 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3607 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3608 // the update upon reconnection.
3609 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3613 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3614 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3617 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3618 /// updates are partially paused.
3619 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3620 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3621 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3622 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3623 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3624 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3625 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3626 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3628 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3629 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3630 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3631 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3632 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3633 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3634 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3637 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3638 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3639 /// to the remote side.
3640 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3641 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3642 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3644 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3645 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3646 // first received the funding_signed.
3647 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3648 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3649 self.funding_transaction.take()
3651 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3652 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3653 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3654 funding_broadcastable = None;
3657 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3658 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3659 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3660 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3661 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3662 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3663 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3664 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3665 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3666 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3667 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3668 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3669 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3670 next_per_commitment_point,
3671 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3675 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3677 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3678 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3679 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3680 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3681 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3682 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3684 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3685 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3686 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3687 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3688 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3689 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3693 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3694 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3696 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3697 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3700 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3701 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3702 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3703 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3704 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3705 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3706 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3707 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3708 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3712 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3713 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3715 if self.is_outbound() {
3716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3718 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3719 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3721 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3722 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3724 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3725 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3726 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3727 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3728 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3729 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3730 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3731 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3732 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3733 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3734 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3735 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3736 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3738 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3739 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3740 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3746 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3747 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3748 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3749 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3750 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3751 per_commitment_secret,
3752 next_per_commitment_point,
3756 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3757 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3758 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3759 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3760 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3762 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3763 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3764 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3765 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3766 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3767 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3768 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3769 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3770 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3775 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3776 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3778 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3779 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3780 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3781 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3782 reason: err_packet.clone()
3785 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3786 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3787 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3788 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3789 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3790 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3793 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3794 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3795 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3796 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3797 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3804 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3805 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3806 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3807 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3811 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3812 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3813 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3814 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3815 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3816 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3820 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3821 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3823 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3824 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3825 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3826 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3827 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3828 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3829 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3830 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3831 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3832 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3833 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3837 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3838 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3842 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3843 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3844 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3845 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3846 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3847 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3848 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3851 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3852 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3853 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3854 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3855 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3858 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3859 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3860 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3861 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3862 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3863 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3864 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3865 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3868 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3872 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3873 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3874 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3875 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3877 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3881 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3882 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3883 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3885 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3886 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3887 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3888 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3889 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3893 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3895 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3896 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3897 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3898 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3899 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3902 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3903 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3904 channel_ready: None,
3905 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3906 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3907 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3908 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3912 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3913 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3914 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3915 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3916 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3917 next_per_commitment_point,
3918 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3920 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3921 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3922 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3923 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3927 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3928 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3929 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3931 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3932 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3933 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3936 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3942 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3943 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3944 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3945 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3946 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3948 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3949 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending ChannelReady
3950 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3951 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3952 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3953 next_per_commitment_point,
3954 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3958 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3959 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3960 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3962 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3965 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3966 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3967 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3968 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3970 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3971 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3972 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) =>
3973 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3974 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3975 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3976 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3977 raa: required_revoke,
3978 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3979 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3980 mon_update: Some(monitor_update),
3981 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
3984 Ok((None, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3985 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3986 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3987 raa: required_revoke,
3988 commitment_update: None,
3989 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3991 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
3996 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3997 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3998 raa: required_revoke,
3999 commitment_update: None,
4000 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4002 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4005 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4006 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4007 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4009 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4012 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4013 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4014 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4015 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4016 commitment_update: None, raa: None, mon_update: None,
4017 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4018 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4021 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4022 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4023 raa: required_revoke,
4024 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4025 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4027 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4031 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4035 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4036 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4037 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4038 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4040 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4042 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4044 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4045 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4046 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4047 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4048 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4049 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4051 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4052 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4053 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4054 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4055 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4057 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4058 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4059 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4060 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4063 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4064 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4065 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4066 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4067 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4068 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4069 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4070 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4071 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4072 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4073 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4074 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4075 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4076 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4077 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4079 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4082 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4083 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4086 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4087 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4088 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4089 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4090 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4091 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4092 self.channel_state &
4093 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4094 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
4095 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4096 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4099 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4100 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4101 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4102 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4103 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4104 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4105 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4107 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4113 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4114 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4115 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4116 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4118 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4119 return Ok((None, None));
4122 if !self.is_outbound() {
4123 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4124 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4126 return Ok((None, None));
4129 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4131 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4132 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4133 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4134 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4136 let sig = self.holder_signer
4137 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4138 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4140 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4141 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4142 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4143 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4145 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4146 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4147 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4152 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4153 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4154 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4155 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
4157 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4160 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4161 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4162 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4163 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4166 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4167 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4171 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4173 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4174 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4177 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4178 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4179 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4182 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4185 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4186 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4187 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4188 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4190 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4193 assert!(send_shutdown);
4194 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4195 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4198 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4203 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4205 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4206 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4208 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4209 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4210 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4211 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4212 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4213 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4217 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4218 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4219 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4220 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4224 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4225 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4226 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4227 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4228 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4229 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4231 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4232 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4239 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4240 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4242 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4245 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4246 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4248 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4250 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4251 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4252 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4253 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4254 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4255 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4256 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4257 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4258 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4260 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4261 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4264 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4268 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4269 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4270 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4271 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4273 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4276 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4279 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4280 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4282 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4286 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4290 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
4291 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4292 return Ok((None, None));
4295 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4296 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4297 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4300 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4302 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4305 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4306 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4307 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4308 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4309 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4313 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4314 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4319 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4320 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4321 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4322 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4323 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4324 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4325 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4329 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4331 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4332 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4333 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4334 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4336 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4339 let sig = self.holder_signer
4340 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4341 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4343 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4344 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4345 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4346 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4350 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4351 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4352 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4353 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4355 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4356 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4357 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4363 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4364 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4365 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4367 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4368 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4370 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4371 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4374 if !self.is_outbound() {
4375 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4376 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4377 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4378 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4380 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4381 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4382 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4384 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4385 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4388 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4389 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4390 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4391 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4392 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4393 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4394 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4395 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4397 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4400 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4401 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4402 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4403 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4409 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4410 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4411 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4412 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4414 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4420 // Public utilities:
4422 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4426 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4430 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4431 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4432 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
4436 /// Gets the channel's type
4437 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4441 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4442 /// is_usable() returns true).
4443 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4444 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4445 self.short_channel_id
4448 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4449 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4450 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4453 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4454 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4455 self.outbound_scid_alias
4457 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4458 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4459 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4460 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4461 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4464 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4465 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4466 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4467 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4470 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4471 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4474 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4475 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4478 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4479 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4480 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4483 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4484 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4487 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4488 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4489 self.counterparty_node_id
4492 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4493 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4494 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4497 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4498 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4499 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4502 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4503 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4505 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4506 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4507 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4508 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4510 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4514 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4515 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4516 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4519 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4520 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4521 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4524 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4525 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4526 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4528 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4529 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4534 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4535 self.channel_value_satoshis
4538 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4539 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4542 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4543 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4546 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4547 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4550 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4551 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4552 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4555 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4556 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4557 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4558 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4559 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4562 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4564 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4565 self.prev_config = None;
4569 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4570 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4574 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4575 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4576 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4577 let did_channel_update =
4578 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4579 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4580 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4581 if did_channel_update {
4582 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4583 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4584 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4585 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4587 self.config.options = *config;
4591 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4592 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4593 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4594 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4595 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4596 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4597 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4599 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4600 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4603 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4605 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4606 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4612 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4613 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4614 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4615 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4616 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4617 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4618 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4620 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4621 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4628 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4632 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4633 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4634 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4635 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4636 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4637 // which are near the dust limit.
4638 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4639 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4640 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4641 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4642 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4644 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4645 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4647 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4650 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4651 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4654 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4655 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4658 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4659 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4663 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4668 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4670 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4671 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4672 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4673 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4674 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4675 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4677 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4679 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4687 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4688 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4692 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4693 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4694 self.update_time_counter
4697 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4698 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4701 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4702 self.config.announced_channel
4705 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4706 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4709 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4710 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4711 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4712 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4715 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4716 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4717 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4720 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4721 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4722 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4723 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4724 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4727 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4728 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4729 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4730 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4731 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4734 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4735 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4736 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4737 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
4740 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4741 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4742 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4745 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4746 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4747 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32
4750 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4751 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4752 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4755 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4756 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4757 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4760 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4761 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4762 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4763 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4764 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4765 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4770 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4771 self.channel_update_status
4774 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4775 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4776 self.channel_update_status = status;
4779 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4781 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4782 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4783 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4787 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4788 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4789 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4792 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4796 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4797 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4798 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4800 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4801 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4802 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4804 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4805 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4808 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4809 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4810 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4811 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4812 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4813 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4814 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4815 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4816 self.channel_state);
4818 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4822 if need_commitment_update {
4823 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
4824 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4825 let next_per_commitment_point =
4826 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4827 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4828 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4829 next_per_commitment_point,
4830 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4834 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4840 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4841 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4842 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4843 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4844 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4845 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4846 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4847 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4848 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4849 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4850 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4851 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4852 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4853 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4854 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4855 if self.is_outbound() {
4856 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4857 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4858 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4859 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4860 // channel and move on.
4861 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4862 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4864 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4865 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4866 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4868 if self.is_outbound() {
4869 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4870 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4871 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4872 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4873 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4874 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4878 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4879 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4880 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4881 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4882 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4886 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4887 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4888 // may have already happened for this block).
4889 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4890 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4891 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4892 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4895 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4896 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4897 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4898 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4906 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4907 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4908 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4909 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4911 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4912 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4915 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4917 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4918 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4919 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
4922 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
4923 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4924 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4925 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4926 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4928 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4929 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4931 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4932 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4933 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4941 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4943 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4944 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
4945 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
4947 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4948 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4951 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4952 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
4953 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4954 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4955 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4956 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4957 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4958 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4959 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4962 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4963 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4964 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4965 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4967 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4968 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4969 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4971 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4972 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4973 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4974 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4976 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4977 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4978 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4979 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4980 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
4981 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4982 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4985 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
4986 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
4988 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4991 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4992 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4993 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4994 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4995 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4996 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4997 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4998 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4999 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5000 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5001 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5002 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5003 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5004 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5005 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5006 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5007 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5013 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5018 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5019 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5021 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5022 if !self.is_outbound() {
5023 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5025 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5026 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5029 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5030 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5033 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5034 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5038 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5039 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5040 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5041 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5042 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5043 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5044 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5045 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5046 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5047 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5048 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5049 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5050 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5051 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5052 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5053 first_per_commitment_point,
5054 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5055 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5056 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5057 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5059 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5063 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5064 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5067 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5068 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5069 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5070 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5073 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5074 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5076 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5077 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u64) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5078 if self.is_outbound() {
5079 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5081 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5082 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5084 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5085 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5087 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5088 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5091 self.user_id = user_id;
5092 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5094 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5097 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5098 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5099 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5101 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5102 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5103 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5104 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5106 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5107 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5108 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5109 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5110 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5111 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5112 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5113 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5114 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5115 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5116 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5117 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5118 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5119 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5120 first_per_commitment_point,
5121 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5122 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5123 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5125 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5129 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5130 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5132 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5134 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5135 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5138 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5139 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5140 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5141 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5142 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5143 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5146 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5147 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5148 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5149 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5150 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5151 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5152 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5153 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5154 if !self.is_outbound() {
5155 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5157 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5158 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5160 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5161 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5162 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5163 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5166 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5167 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5169 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5172 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5173 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5178 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5180 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5182 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5183 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5184 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5186 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5187 temporary_channel_id,
5188 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5189 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5194 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5195 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5196 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5197 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5199 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5202 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5203 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5204 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5205 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5207 if !self.is_usable() {
5208 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5211 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5213 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5214 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
5216 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5217 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5218 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5219 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5220 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5221 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5227 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5228 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5229 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5233 if !self.is_usable() {
5237 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5238 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5242 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5246 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5247 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5250 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5254 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5256 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5261 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5263 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5264 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5265 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5266 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5267 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5271 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5273 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5274 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5275 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5277 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5278 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5279 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5280 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5281 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5282 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5283 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5284 contents: announcement,
5287 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5291 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5292 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5293 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5294 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5295 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5297 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5299 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5301 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5302 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5304 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5306 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5307 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5310 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5311 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5312 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5313 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5316 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5319 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5320 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5321 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5322 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5325 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5327 Err(_) => return None,
5329 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5330 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5335 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5336 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5337 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5338 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5339 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5340 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5341 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5342 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5343 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5344 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5345 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5346 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5347 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5348 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5349 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5350 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5351 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5352 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5353 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5356 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5357 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5358 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5359 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5362 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5363 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5364 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5365 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5366 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5367 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5368 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5369 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5371 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5372 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5373 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5374 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5375 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5376 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5377 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5378 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5379 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5381 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5387 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5389 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5390 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5392 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5394 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5395 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5397 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
5398 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
5401 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5403 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5404 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5405 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5406 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5408 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5409 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5410 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5413 if amount_msat == 0 {
5414 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5417 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5418 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5421 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5422 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5423 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5424 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5425 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5426 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5427 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5428 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5431 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5432 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5433 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5434 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5436 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5437 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5438 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5441 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5442 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5443 if !self.is_outbound() {
5444 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5445 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5446 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5447 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5448 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5449 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5453 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5454 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5455 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5456 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5457 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5458 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5462 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5463 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5464 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5465 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5466 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5467 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5471 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5472 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5473 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5476 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5477 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5478 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5479 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5481 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5482 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5485 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5486 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5487 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5488 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5489 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5492 // Now update local state:
5493 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
5494 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5499 onion_routing_packet,
5504 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5505 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5507 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5509 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5513 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5514 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5515 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5519 onion_routing_packet,
5521 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5526 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5527 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5528 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5529 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5530 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5531 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5532 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5534 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5535 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5537 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5538 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5540 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
5541 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5543 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5544 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5545 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5546 have_updates = true;
5548 if have_updates { break; }
5550 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5551 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5552 have_updates = true;
5554 if have_updates { break; }
5557 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5559 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5561 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5562 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5563 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5564 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5565 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5567 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5568 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5569 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5571 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5572 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5576 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5577 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5578 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5579 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5580 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5581 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5582 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5585 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5586 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5587 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5588 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5589 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5590 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5593 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5595 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5596 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5597 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5598 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5599 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5600 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5602 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5605 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5606 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5609 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5610 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5611 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5612 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5613 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5614 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5615 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5616 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5619 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5620 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5623 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5624 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5625 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5626 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5627 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5628 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5629 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5631 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5633 if !self.is_outbound() {
5634 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5635 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5636 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5637 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5638 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5639 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5640 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5641 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5642 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5643 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5650 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5651 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5655 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5656 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5658 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5660 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5661 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5662 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5663 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5665 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5666 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5667 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5668 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5669 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5670 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5674 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5675 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5678 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5681 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5682 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5683 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5685 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5686 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5687 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5688 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5689 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5695 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5696 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5697 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5700 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5701 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5702 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5704 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5705 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5706 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5707 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5713 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5714 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5715 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5716 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5717 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5718 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5719 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5720 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5723 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5724 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5725 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5727 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5728 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5731 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5732 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
5733 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5736 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5739 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5740 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5741 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5743 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5748 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5749 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5750 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5751 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5753 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5755 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5757 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5758 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5759 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5760 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5761 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5762 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5766 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5767 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5768 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5771 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5772 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5773 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5774 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5775 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5777 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5778 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5785 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5788 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5789 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5790 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5791 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5792 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5793 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5794 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5795 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5796 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5797 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5798 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5800 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5801 // return them to fail the payment.
5802 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5803 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5804 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5806 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5807 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5812 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5813 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5814 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5815 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5816 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5817 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5818 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5819 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5820 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5821 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5822 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5823 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5824 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5829 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5830 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5831 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5835 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5836 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5838 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5844 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5845 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5846 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5847 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5848 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5850 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5851 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5852 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5853 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5859 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5860 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5861 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5862 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5863 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5864 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5869 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5870 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5871 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5872 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5874 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5875 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5876 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5877 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5882 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5883 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5884 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5885 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5886 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5887 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5892 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5893 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5894 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
5897 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5899 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
5901 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
5902 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
5903 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
5904 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
5906 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
5907 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
5908 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5910 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
5912 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
5913 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
5914 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
5915 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
5916 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
5917 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
5919 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
5920 // deserialized from that format.
5921 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
5922 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
5923 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
5925 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
5927 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5928 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5929 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
5931 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
5932 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5933 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5934 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
5937 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5938 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5939 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
5942 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5943 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5944 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5945 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5947 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
5948 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
5950 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5952 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
5954 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5956 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5959 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
5961 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
5966 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
5968 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5969 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5970 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5971 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5972 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5973 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5974 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
5976 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
5978 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
5980 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5983 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
5984 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
5985 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
5988 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
5990 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
5991 preimages.push(preimage);
5993 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
5994 reason.write(writer)?;
5996 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
5998 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
5999 preimages.push(preimage);
6001 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6002 reason.write(writer)?;
6007 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6008 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6010 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6012 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6013 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6014 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6015 source.write(writer)?;
6016 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6018 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6020 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6021 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6023 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6025 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6026 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6031 match self.resend_order {
6032 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6033 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6036 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6037 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6038 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6040 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6041 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6042 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6043 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6046 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6047 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6048 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6049 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6050 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6053 if self.is_outbound() {
6054 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6055 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6056 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6058 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6059 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6060 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6062 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6064 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6065 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6066 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6067 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6069 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6070 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6071 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6072 // consider the stale state on reload.
6075 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6076 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6077 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6079 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6080 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6081 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6083 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6084 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6086 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6087 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6088 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6090 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6091 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6093 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6096 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6097 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6098 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6100 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6103 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6104 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6106 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6107 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6108 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6110 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6112 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6114 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6116 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6117 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6118 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6119 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6120 htlc.write(writer)?;
6123 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6124 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6125 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6127 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6128 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6130 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6131 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6132 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6133 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6134 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6135 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6136 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6138 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6139 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6140 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6141 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6142 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6144 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6145 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6146 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6147 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6148 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6149 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6150 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6152 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6153 (2, chan_type, option),
6154 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6155 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6156 (5, self.config, required),
6157 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6158 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6159 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6160 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6161 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6162 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6163 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6164 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6165 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6172 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6173 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<Signer>
6174 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
6175 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6176 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6177 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6179 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6181 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6183 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6184 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6185 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6186 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6187 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6189 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6190 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6193 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6194 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6195 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6197 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6199 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6200 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6201 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6202 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6203 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6204 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6205 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6206 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6208 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6210 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6211 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6212 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6215 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6217 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6218 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6219 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6221 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6222 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6223 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6224 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6225 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6226 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6227 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6228 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6229 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6230 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6231 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6232 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6233 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6234 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6239 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6240 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6241 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6242 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6243 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6244 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6245 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6246 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6247 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6248 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6249 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6250 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6252 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6253 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6256 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6257 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6260 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6261 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6263 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6268 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6269 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6270 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6271 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6272 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6273 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6274 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6275 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6276 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6277 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6279 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6280 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6281 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6283 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6284 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6285 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6287 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6291 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6292 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6293 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6294 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6297 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6298 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6299 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6301 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6302 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6303 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6304 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6307 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6308 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6309 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6310 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6313 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6315 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6317 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6318 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6319 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6320 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6322 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6323 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6324 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6325 // consider the stale state on reload.
6326 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6329 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6330 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6331 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6333 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6336 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6337 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6338 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6340 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6341 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6342 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6343 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6345 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6346 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6348 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6349 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6351 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6352 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6353 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6355 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6357 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6358 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6360 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6361 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6364 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6366 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6367 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6368 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6369 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6371 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6374 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6375 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6377 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6379 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6380 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6382 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6383 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6385 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6387 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6388 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6389 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6391 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6392 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6393 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6397 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6398 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6399 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6401 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6407 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6408 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6409 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6410 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6411 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6412 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6413 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6414 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6415 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6416 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6418 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6419 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6420 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6421 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6422 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6424 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6425 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6426 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6427 (2, channel_type, option),
6428 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6429 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6430 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6431 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6432 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6433 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6434 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6435 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6436 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6437 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6438 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6439 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6442 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6443 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6444 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6446 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6447 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6449 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6450 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6455 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6456 if iter.next().is_some() {
6457 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6461 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6462 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6463 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6464 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6465 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6468 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6469 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6470 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6473 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6474 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6479 config: config.unwrap(),
6483 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6484 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6485 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6489 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6491 channel_value_satoshis,
6493 latest_monitor_update_id,
6496 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6499 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6500 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6503 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6504 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6505 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6509 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6510 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6511 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6512 monitor_pending_forwards,
6513 monitor_pending_failures,
6514 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6517 holding_cell_update_fee,
6518 next_holder_htlc_id,
6519 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6520 update_time_counter,
6523 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6524 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6525 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6526 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6528 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6529 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6530 closing_fee_limits: None,
6531 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6533 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6535 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6536 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6538 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6540 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6541 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6542 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6543 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6544 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6545 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6546 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6547 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6548 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6551 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6553 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6554 funding_transaction,
6556 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6557 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6558 counterparty_node_id,
6560 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6564 channel_update_status,
6565 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6569 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6570 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6571 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6572 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6574 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6576 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6577 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6578 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6580 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6581 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6583 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6591 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6592 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6593 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6594 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6595 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6597 use ln::PaymentHash;
6598 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6599 use ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6600 use ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6601 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures};
6602 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6603 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6605 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6606 use chain::BestBlock;
6607 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6608 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6609 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6610 use util::config::UserConfig;
6611 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6612 use util::errors::APIError;
6613 use util::test_utils;
6614 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6615 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6616 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6617 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6618 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6619 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6620 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6621 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6622 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6623 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6624 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6625 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6628 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6631 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6632 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6638 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6639 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6640 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6641 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6645 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6646 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6647 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6648 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6649 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6650 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator, u32::max_value()).is_err());
6654 signer: InMemorySigner,
6656 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6657 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6659 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6660 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6661 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6662 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6663 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6664 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6665 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6666 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6669 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6670 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6671 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6672 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6675 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6678 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6679 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6680 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6683 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6684 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6685 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6689 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6690 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6691 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6692 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6694 let seed = [42; 32];
6695 let network = Network::Testnet;
6696 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6697 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6698 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6701 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6702 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6703 let config = UserConfig::default();
6704 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6705 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6706 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6708 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6709 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6713 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6714 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6716 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6717 let original_fee = 253;
6718 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6719 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6720 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6721 let seed = [42; 32];
6722 let network = Network::Testnet;
6723 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6725 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6726 let config = UserConfig::default();
6727 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6729 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6730 // same as the old fee.
6731 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6732 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6733 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6737 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6738 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6739 // dust limits are used.
6740 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6741 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6742 let seed = [42; 32];
6743 let network = Network::Testnet;
6744 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6745 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6747 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6748 // they have different dust limits.
6750 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6751 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6752 let config = UserConfig::default();
6753 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6755 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6756 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6757 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6758 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6759 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6761 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6762 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6763 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6764 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6765 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6767 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6768 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6769 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6771 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6772 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6773 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6774 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6777 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6779 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6780 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6781 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6782 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6783 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6785 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6786 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6787 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6788 payment_secret: None,
6789 payment_params: None,
6793 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6794 // the dust limit check.
6795 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6796 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6797 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6798 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6800 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6801 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6802 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6803 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6804 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6805 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6806 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6810 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6811 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6812 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6813 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6814 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6815 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6816 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6817 let seed = [42; 32];
6818 let network = Network::Testnet;
6819 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6821 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6822 let config = UserConfig::default();
6823 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6825 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6826 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6828 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6829 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6830 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6831 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6832 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6833 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6835 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6836 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6837 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6838 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6839 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6841 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6843 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6844 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6845 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6846 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6847 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6849 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6850 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6851 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6852 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6853 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6857 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6858 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6859 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6860 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6861 let seed = [42; 32];
6862 let network = Network::Testnet;
6863 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6864 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6865 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6867 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6869 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6870 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6871 let config = UserConfig::default();
6872 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6874 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6875 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6876 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6877 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6879 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
6880 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6881 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6883 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
6884 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6885 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6886 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
6888 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
6889 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
6890 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
6892 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
6893 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
6895 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
6896 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
6897 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6898 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6899 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6900 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6901 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6902 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6903 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6908 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
6910 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6911 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6912 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6913 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6914 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6915 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6916 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6923 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6924 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6925 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6926 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6927 let seed = [42; 32];
6928 let network = Network::Testnet;
6929 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6930 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6931 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6933 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
6934 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
6935 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
6936 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
6937 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
6938 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
6939 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
6940 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
6942 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
6943 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
6944 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
6945 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6946 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6947 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
6949 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
6950 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6951 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6952 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
6954 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6956 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
6957 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
6958 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
6959 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6960 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6961 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
6963 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
6964 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6965 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6966 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
6968 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
6969 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
6970 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6971 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6972 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
6974 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
6975 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
6977 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6978 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6979 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
6981 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
6982 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
6983 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6984 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6985 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
6987 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
6988 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
6990 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6991 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6992 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
6996 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
6998 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
6999 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7000 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7002 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7003 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7004 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7005 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7007 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7008 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7009 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7011 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7013 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7014 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7017 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7018 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7019 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7020 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7021 let seed = [42; 32];
7022 let network = Network::Testnet;
7023 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7024 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7025 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7028 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7029 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7030 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7032 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7033 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7035 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7036 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7037 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7039 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7040 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7042 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7044 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7045 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7047 // Channel Negotiations failed
7048 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7049 assert!(result.is_err());
7054 fn channel_update() {
7055 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7056 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7057 let seed = [42; 32];
7058 let network = Network::Testnet;
7059 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7060 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7062 // Create a channel.
7063 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7064 let config = UserConfig::default();
7065 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7066 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7067 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7068 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7070 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7071 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7072 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7074 short_channel_id: 0,
7077 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7078 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7079 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7081 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7082 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7084 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7086 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7088 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7089 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7090 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7091 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7093 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7094 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7095 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7097 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7101 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7103 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7104 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7105 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7106 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7107 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7108 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7109 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7110 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7111 use ln::PaymentPreimage;
7112 use ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7113 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7114 use util::logger::Logger;
7117 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7118 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7119 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7120 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7122 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7124 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7125 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7126 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7127 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7128 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7129 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7131 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7132 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7137 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7138 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7139 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7141 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7142 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7143 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7144 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7145 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7146 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7148 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7150 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7151 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7152 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7153 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7154 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7155 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7157 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7158 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7159 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7160 selected_contest_delay: 144
7162 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7163 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7165 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7166 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7168 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7169 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7171 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7172 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7174 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7175 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7176 // build_commitment_transaction.
7177 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7178 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7179 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7180 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7181 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7183 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7184 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7185 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7186 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7190 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7191 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7192 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7193 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7197 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7198 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7199 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7201 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7202 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7204 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7205 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7207 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7209 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7210 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7211 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7212 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7213 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7214 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7215 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7217 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7218 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7219 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7220 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7222 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7223 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7224 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7226 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7228 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7229 commitment_tx.clone(),
7230 counterparty_signature,
7231 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7232 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7233 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7235 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7236 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7238 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7239 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7240 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7242 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7243 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7246 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7247 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7249 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7250 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7251 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7252 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7253 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7254 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7255 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7256 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7258 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7261 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7262 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7263 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7267 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7270 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7271 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7272 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7274 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7275 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7276 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7277 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7278 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7279 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7280 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7281 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7283 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7287 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7288 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7290 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7291 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7292 "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", {});
7294 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7295 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7296 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7297 "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", {});
7299 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7300 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7302 amount_msat: 1000000,
7304 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7305 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7307 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7310 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7311 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7313 amount_msat: 2000000,
7315 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7316 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7318 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7321 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7322 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7324 amount_msat: 2000000,
7326 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7327 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7328 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7330 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7333 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7334 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7336 amount_msat: 3000000,
7338 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7339 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7340 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7342 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7345 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7346 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7348 amount_msat: 4000000,
7350 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7351 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7353 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7357 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7358 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7359 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7361 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7362 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7363 "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", {
7366 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7367 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7368 "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" },
7371 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7372 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7373 "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" },
7376 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7377 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7378 "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" },
7381 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7382 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7383 "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" },
7386 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7387 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7388 "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" }
7391 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7392 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7393 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7395 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7396 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7397 "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", {
7400 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7401 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7402 "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" },
7405 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7406 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7407 "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" },
7410 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7411 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7412 "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" },
7415 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7416 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7417 "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" },
7420 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7421 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7422 "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" }
7425 // anchors: commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7426 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7427 chan.feerate_per_kw = 644;
7429 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e0106830467a558c07544a3de7715610c1147062e7d091deeebe8b5c661cda9402202ad049c1a6d04834317a78483f723c205c9f638d17222aafc620800cc1b6ae35",
7430 "3045022100ef82a405364bfc4007e63a7cc82925a513d79065bdbc216d60b6a4223a323f8a02200716730b8561f3c6d362eaf47f202e99fb30d0557b61b92b5f9134f8e2de3681",
7431 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80094a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994e80300000000000022002010f88bf09e56f14fb4543fd26e47b0db50ea5de9cf3fc46434792471082621aed0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a4f996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ef82a405364bfc4007e63a7cc82925a513d79065bdbc216d60b6a4223a323f8a02200716730b8561f3c6d362eaf47f202e99fb30d0557b61b92b5f9134f8e2de368101483045022100e0106830467a558c07544a3de7715610c1147062e7d091deeebe8b5c661cda9402202ad049c1a6d04834317a78483f723c205c9f638d17222aafc620800cc1b6ae3501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7434 "304402205912d91c58016f593d9e46fefcdb6f4125055c41a17b03101eaaa034b9028ab60220520d4d239c85c66e4c75c5b413620b62736e227659d7821b308e2b8ced3e728e",
7435 "30440220473166a5adcca68550bab80403f410a726b5bd855030527e3fefa8c1e4b4fd7b02203b1dc91d8d69039473036cb5c34398b99e8eb90ae500c22130a557b62294b188",
7436 "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" },
7439 "3045022100c6b4113678039ee1e43a6cba5e3224ed2355ffc05e365a393afe8843dc9a76860220566d01fd52d65a89ba8595023884f9e8f2e9a310a6b9b85281c0bce06863430c",
7440 "3045022100d0d86307ea55d5daa80f453ad6d64b78fe8a6504aac25407c73e8502c0702c1602206a0809a02aa00c8dc4a53d976bb05d4605d8bb0b7b26b973a5c4e2734d8afbb4",
7441 "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" },
7444 "304402203c3a699fb80a38112aafd73d6e3a9b7d40bc2c3ed8b7fbc182a20f43b215172202204e71821b984d1af52c4b8e2cd4c572578c12a965866130c2345f61e4c2d3fef4",
7445 "304402205bcfa92f83c69289a412b0b6dd4f2a0fe0b0fc2d45bd74706e963257a09ea24902203783e47883e60b86240e877fcbf33d50b1742f65bc93b3162d1be26583b367ee",
7446 "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" },
7449 "304402200f089bcd20f25475216307d32aa5b6c857419624bfba1da07335f51f6ba4645b02206ce0f7153edfba23b0d4b2afc26bb3157d404368cb8ea0ca7cf78590dcdd28cf",
7450 "3045022100e4516da08f72c7a4f7b2f37aa84a0feb54ae2cc5b73f0da378e81ae0ca8119bf02207751b2628d8e2f62b4b9abccda4866246c1bfcc82e3d416ad562fd212102c28f",
7451 "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" },
7454 "3045022100aa72cfaf0965020c73a12c77276c6411ca68c4de36ac1998adf86c917a899a43022060da0a159fecfe0bed37c3962d767f12f90e30fed8a8f34b1301775c21a2bd3a",
7455 "304402203cd12065c2a42963c762e6b1a981e17695616ecb6f9fb33d8b0717cdd7ca0ee4022065500005c491c1dcf2fe9c4024f74b1c90785d572527055a491278f901143904",
7456 "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" }
7459 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7460 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7461 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7463 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7464 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7465 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7468 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7469 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7470 "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" },
7473 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7474 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7475 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7478 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7479 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7480 "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" },
7483 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7484 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7485 "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" }
7488 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7489 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7490 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7492 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7493 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7494 "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", {
7497 "30440220446f9e5c375db6a61d6eeee8b59219a30a4a37372afc2670a1a2889c78e9b943022061895f6088fb48b490ab2140a4842c277b64bf25ff591625dd0356e0c96ab7a8",
7498 "3045022100c1621ba26a99c263fd885feff5fda5ca2cc73df080b3a49ecf15164ee244d2a5022037f4cc7fd4441af39a83a0e44c3b1db7d64a4c8080e8697f9e952f85421a34d8",
7499 "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" },
7502 "3044022027a3ffcb8a007e3349d75382efbd4b3fb99fcbd479a18555e58697bd1278d5c402205c8303d46211c3ae8975fe84a0df08b4623119fecd03bc93b49d7f7a0c64c710",
7503 "3045022100b697aca55c6fb15e5348bb7387b584815fd15e8dd306afe0c477cb550d0c2d40022050b0f7e370f7604d2fec781fefe86715dbe95dff4dab88d628f509d62f854de1",
7504 "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" },
7507 "30440220013975ae356e6daf22a86a29f21c4f35aca82ed8f731a1103c60c74f5ed1c5aa02200350d4e5455cdbcacb7ccf174db5bed8286019e509a113f6b4c5e606ee12c9d7",
7508 "3045022100e69a29f78779577830e73f327073c93168896f1b89432124b7846f5def9cd9cb02204433db3697e6ed7ac89574ca066a749640e0c9e114ac2e0ee4545741fcf7b7e9",
7509 "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" },
7512 "304402205257017423644c7e831f30bc0c334eecfe66e9a6d2e92d157c5bece576b2be4f022047b21cf8e955e22b7471940563922d1a5852fb95459ca32905c7d46a19141664",
7513 "304402204f5de65a624e3f757adffb678bd887eb4e656538c5ea7044922f6ee3eed8a06202206ff6f7bfe73b565343cae76131ac658f1a9c60d3ca2343358cda60b9e35f94c8",
7514 "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" }
7517 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7518 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7519 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7521 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7522 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7523 "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", {
7526 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7527 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7528 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7531 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7532 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7533 "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" },
7536 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7537 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7538 "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" },
7541 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7542 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7543 "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" }
7546 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7547 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7548 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2060;
7550 test_commitment_with_anchors!("304402206208aeb34e404bd052ce3f298dfa832891c9d42caec99fe2a0d2832e9690b94302201b034bfcc6fa9faec667a9b7cbfe0b8d85e954aa239b66277887b5088aff08c3",
7551 "304402201ce37a44b95213358c20f44404d6db7a6083bea6f58de6c46547ae41a47c9f8202206db1d45be41373e92f90d346381febbea8c78671b28c153e30ad1db3441a9497",
7552 "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", {
7555 "30440220011f999016570bbab9f3125377d0f35096b4dbe155f97c20f71829ead2817d1602201f23f7e17f6928734601c5d8613431eed5c90aa41c3106e8c1cb02ce32aacb5d",
7556 "3044022017da96dfb0eb4061fa0162dc6fa6b2e07ecc5040ab5e6cb07be59838460b3e58022079371ffc95002cc1dc2891ec38198c9c25aca8164304fe114f1b55e2ffd1ddd5",
7557 "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" },
7560 "304402202d2d9681409b0a0987bd4a268ffeb112df85c4c988ac2a3a2475cb00a61912c302206aa4f4d1388b7d3282bc847871af3cca30766cc8f1064e3a41ec7e82221e10f7",
7561 "304402206426d67911aa6ff9b1cb147b093f3f65a37831a86d7c741d999afc0666e1773d022000bb71821650c70ea58d9bcdd03af736c41a5a8159d436c3ee0408a07394dcce",
7562 "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" },
7565 "3045022100f51cdaa525b7d4304548c642bb7945215eb5ae7d32874517cde67ca23ab0a12202206286d59e4b19926c6ac844be6f3ab8149a1ddb9c70f5026b7e83e40a6c08e6e1",
7566 "304502210091b16b1ac63b867e7a5ca0344f7b2aa1cdd49d4b72eac86a31e7ec6f069e20640220402bfb571ba3a9c49e3b0061c89303453803d0241059d899222aaac4799b5076",
7567 "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" },
7570 "304402202f058d99cb5a54f90773d43ba4e7a0089efd9f8269ef2da1b85d48a3e230555402205acc4bd6561830867d45cd7b84bba9fa35ad2b345016471c1737142bc99782c4",
7571 "304402202913f9cacea54efd2316cffa91219def9e0e111977216c1e76e9da80befab14f022000a9a69e8f37ebe4a39107ab50fab0dde537334588f8f412bbaca57b179b87a6",
7572 "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" }
7575 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7576 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7577 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7579 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7580 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7581 "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", {
7584 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7585 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7586 "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" },
7589 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7590 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7591 "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" },
7594 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7595 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7596 "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" }
7599 // anchors: commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7600 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7601 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2061;
7603 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100a2faf2ad7e323b2a82e07dc40b6847207ca6ad7b089f2c21dea9a4d37e52d59d02204c9480ce0358eb51d92a4342355a97e272e3cc45f86c612a76a3fe32fc3c4cb4",
7604 "304402204ab07c659412dd2cd6043b1ad811ab215e901b6b5653e08cb3d2fe63d3e3dc57022031c7b3d130f9380ef09581f4f5a15cb6f359a2e0a597146b96c3533a26d6f4cd",
7605 "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", {
7608 "3045022100e10744f572a2cd1d787c969e894b792afaed21217ee0480df0112d2fa3ef96ea02202af4f66eb6beebc36d8e98719ed6b4be1b181659fcb561fc491d8cfebff3aa85",
7609 "3045022100c3dc3ea50a0ca20e350f97b50c52c5514717cfa36cb9600918caac5cb556842b022049af018d676dde0c8e28ecf325f3ff5c1594261c4f7511d501f9d62d0594d2a2",
7610 "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" },
7613 "3045022100e1f51fb72fec604b029b348a3bb6363454e1869f5b1e24fd736f860c8039f8070220030a2c90186437d8c9b47d4897798c024521b1274991c4cdc125970b346094b1",
7614 "3045022100ec7ade6037e531629f24390ca9713782a04d648065d17fbe6b015981cdb296c202202d61049a6ecba2fb5314f3edcda2361cad187a89bea6e5d15185354d80c0c085",
7615 "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" },
7618 "304402203479f81a1d83c516957679dc98bf91d35deada967739a8e3869e3e8db08246130220053c8e154b97e3019048dcec3d51bfaf396f36861fbda6d33f0e2a57155c8b9f",
7619 "3045022100a558eb5caa04e35a4417c1f0123ac12eec5f6badee28f5764dc6b69486e594f802201589b12784e242f205832d2d032149bd4e79433ec304c05394241fc7dcba5a71",
7620 "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" }
7623 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7624 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7625 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7627 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7628 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7629 "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", {
7632 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7633 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7634 "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" },
7637 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7638 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7639 "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" },
7642 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7643 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7644 "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" }
7647 // anchors: commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7648 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7649 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2184;
7651 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022013d326f80ff7607cf366c823fcbbcb7a2b10322484825f151e6c4c756af24b8f02201ba05b9d8beb7cea2947f9f4d9e03f90435e93db2dd48b32eb9ca3f3dd042c79",
7652 "30440220555c05261f72c5b4702d5c83a608630822b473048724b08640d6e75e345094250220448950b74a96a56963928ba5db8b457661a742c855e69d239b3b6ab73de307a3",
7653 "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", {
7656 "304402202e03ba1390998b3487e9a7fefcb66814c09abea0ef1bcc915dbaefbcf310569a02206bd10493a105ac69048e9bcedcb8e3301ef81b55018d911a4afd297297f98d30",
7657 "304402200c3952ca04be0c60dcc0b7873a0829f560607524943554ae4a27d8d967166199022021a68657b88e22f9bf9ac6065be412685aff643d17049f04f2e99e86197dabb1",
7658 "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" },
7661 "304402201f8a6adda2403bc400c919ea69d72d315337291e00d02cde085ea32953dbc50002202d65230da98df7af8ebefd2b60b457d0945232988ee2d7460a94a77d414a9acc",
7662 "3045022100ea69c9273b8914ac62b5b7082d6ac1da2b7b065ebf2ef3cd6403f5305ce3f26802203d98736ea97638895a898dfcc5ee0d0c55eb496b3964df0bb25d223688ea8b87",
7663 "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" },
7666 "3045022100ea6e4c9b8f56dd9cf5799492a201cdd65b8bc9bc089c3cff34107896ae313f90022034760f7760975cc68e8917a7f62894e25583da7be11af557c4fc402661d0cbf8",
7667 "30440220717012f2f7ef6cac590aaf66c2109132c93ffba245959ac62d82e394ba80191302203f00fd9cb37c92c6b0ad4b33e62c3e55b04e5c2cfa0adcca5a9bc49774eeca8a",
7668 "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" }
7671 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7672 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7673 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7675 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7676 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7677 "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", {
7680 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7681 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7682 "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" },
7685 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7686 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7687 "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" }
7690 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7691 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7692 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7694 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7695 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7696 "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", {
7699 "304502210094480e38afb41d10fae299224872f19c53abe23c7033a1c0642c48713e7863a10220726dd9456407682667dc4bd9c66975acb3744961770b5002f7eb9c0df9ef2f3e",
7700 "304402203148dac61513dc0361738cba30cb341a1e580f8acd5ab0149bf65bd670688cf002207e5d9a0fcbbea2c263bc714fa9e9c44d7f582ea447f366119fc614a23de32f1f",
7701 "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" },
7704 "304402200dbde868dbc20c6a2433fe8979ba5e3f966b1c2d1aeb615f1c42e9c938b3495402202eec5f663c8b601c2061c1453d35de22597c137d1907a2feaf714d551035cb6e",
7705 "3045022100b896bded41d7feac7af25c19e35c53037c53b50e73cfd01eb4ba139c7fdf231602203a3be049d3d89396c4dc766d82ce31e237da8bc3a93e2c7d35992d1932d9cfeb",
7706 "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" }
7709 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7710 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7711 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7713 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7714 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7715 "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", {
7718 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7719 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7720 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7723 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7724 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7725 "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" }
7728 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7729 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7730 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3686;
7732 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220784485cf7a0ad7979daf2c858ffdaf5298d0020cea7aea466843e7948223bd9902206031b81d25e02a178c64e62f843577fdcdfc7a1decbbfb54cd895de692df85ca",
7733 "3045022100c268496aad5c3f97f25cf41c1ba5483a12982de29b222051b6de3daa2229413b02207f3c82d77a2c14f0096ed9bb4c34649483bb20fa71f819f71af44de6593e8bb2",
7734 "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", {
7737 "304402202cfe6618926ca9f1574f8c4659b425e9790b4677ba2248d77901290806130ffe02204ab37bb0287abcdb8b750b018d41a09effe37cb65ff801fa70d3f1a416599841",
7738 "3044022030b318139715e3b34f19be852cc01c1c0e1599e8b926a73df2bfb70dd186ddee022062a2b7398aed9f563b4014da04a1a99debd0ff663ceece68a547df5982dc2d72",
7739 "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" },
7742 "30440220687af8544d335376620a6f4b5412bfd0da48de047c1785674f26e669d4a3ff82022058591c1e3a6c50017427d38a8f756eb685bdab88ec73838eed3530048861f9d5",
7743 "30440220109f1a62b5a13d28d5b7634dd7693b1d5994eb404c4bb4a9a80aa540d3984d170220307251107ff8499a23e99abce7dda4f1c707c98abddb9405a83de0081cde8ace",
7744 "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" }
7747 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7748 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7749 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7751 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7752 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7753 "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", {
7756 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7757 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7758 "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" }
7761 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7762 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7763 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7765 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7766 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7767 "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", {
7770 "3045022100b287bb8e079a62dcb3aaa8b6c67c0f434a87ebf64ab0bcfb2fc14b55576b859f02206d37c2eb5fd04cfc9eb0534c76a28a98da251b84a931377cce307af39dfaed74",
7771 "3045022100a497c64faea286ec4221f48628086dc6403fd7b60a23c4176e8ebbca15ae70dc0220754e20e968e96cf6421fd2a672c8c26d3bc6e19218cfc8fc2aa51fce026c14b1",
7772 "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" }
7775 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7776 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7777 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7779 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7780 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7781 "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", {
7784 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7785 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7786 "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" }
7789 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7790 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7791 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4893;
7793 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100a8771147109e4d3f44a5976c3c3de98732bbb77308d21444dbe0d76faf06480e02200b4e916e850c3d1f918de87bbbbb07843ffea1d4658dfe060b6f9ccd96d34be8",
7794 "30440220086288faceab47461eb2d808e9e9b0cb3ffc24a03c2f18db7198247d38f10e58022031d1c2782a58c8c6ce187d0019eb47a83babdf3040e2caff299ab48f7e12b1fa",
7795 "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", {
7798 "30450221008db80f8531104820b3e894492b4463f074f965b542e1b5c153ddfb108a5ea642022030b203d857a2b3581c2087a7bf17c95d04fadc1c6cdae88c620477f2dccb1ee4",
7799 "3045022100e5fbae857c47dbfc050a05924bd449fc9804798bd6442002c578437dc34450810220296589bc387645512345299e307116aaac4ce9fc752abcd1936b802d03526312",
7800 "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" }
7803 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7804 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7805 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7807 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7808 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7809 "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", {});
7811 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7812 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7813 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7815 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7816 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7817 "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", {});
7819 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7820 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7821 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7823 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7824 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7825 "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", {});
7827 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7828 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7829 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7831 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7832 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7833 "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", {});
7835 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7836 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7837 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7839 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7840 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7841 "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", {});
7843 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7844 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7845 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7847 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7848 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7849 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7851 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7852 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7853 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7854 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7855 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7856 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7858 amount_msat: 2000000,
7860 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7861 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7863 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7866 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7867 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7868 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7870 amount_msat: 5000000,
7872 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7873 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7874 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7876 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7879 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7880 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7882 amount_msat: 5000000,
7884 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7885 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7886 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7888 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7892 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7893 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7894 "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", {
7897 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7898 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7899 "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" },
7901 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7902 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7903 "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" },
7905 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7906 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7907 "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" }
7910 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7911 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7912 "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", {
7915 "304402202060a5acb12105e92f27d7b86e6caf1e003d9d82068338e5a8a9a0d14cba11260220030ca4dba8fad24a2e395906220c991eccd5369bc4b0f216d217b5f86d1fc61d",
7916 "3044022044f5425fe630fa614f349f55642e4a0b76e2583054b21543821660d9e8f3735702207f70424835b541874ca8bf0443cca4028afa2f6c03a17b0688df85d5c44eeefc",
7917 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe29020000000001000000011e070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202060a5acb12105e92f27d7b86e6caf1e003d9d82068338e5a8a9a0d14cba11260220030ca4dba8fad24a2e395906220c991eccd5369bc4b0f216d217b5f86d1fc61d83473044022044f5425fe630fa614f349f55642e4a0b76e2583054b21543821660d9e8f3735702207f70424835b541874ca8bf0443cca4028afa2f6c03a17b0688df85d5c44eeefc012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
7919 "304402206fde7eb6d7a47fdc63705d3db2169054e229f10342dea66f150b163381f48a0802201be28509c2de9be4b7ab72c569c6fd51c0ce0904fea459142f31d442cd043eb8",
7920 "3045022100ad0236a78dbd029d3a8f583f7f82ee62892273d45303d00ef5a03fecf8903a36022004b2db33f8ff2f4a08ca6127c9cbfd9144c691a2feb9287e36ae6bc7c83c5a5f",
7921 "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" },
7923 "304402205eebc78d8ae6a36c27ef80172359eb757fb18e99fa75b28c37ffe3444b967bc7022060a01c33398d4d8244c42c762fb699e9f61c1f034ff976df2c94350c5a6032a7",
7924 "3045022100ad3fd523594e1b876316401774a30ee6c48bb7fa0efd768bf9a2d022201311ff02207bed627ed8e01041137f03dbaf03c836970be27a4d50f69d90cf1282ff2815e3",
7925 "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" }
7930 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7931 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7933 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7934 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7935 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7936 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7938 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7939 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7940 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7942 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7943 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7945 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7946 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7948 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7949 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7950 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7954 fn test_key_derivation() {
7955 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7956 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7958 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7959 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7961 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7962 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7964 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7965 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7967 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7968 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7970 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7971 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7973 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7974 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7976 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7977 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7981 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7982 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7983 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7984 let seed = [42; 32];
7985 let network = Network::Testnet;
7986 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7987 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7989 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7990 let config = UserConfig::default();
7991 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7992 node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7994 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7995 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7997 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7998 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7999 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8000 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8001 node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8002 assert!(res.is_ok());