1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
109 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
110 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
111 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
113 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
114 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
116 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
118 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
119 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
120 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
122 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
126 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
128 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
131 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
135 enum InboundHTLCState {
136 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
137 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
138 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
139 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
140 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
141 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
142 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
143 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
144 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
145 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
146 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
147 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
148 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
149 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
150 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
152 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
153 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
154 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
155 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
156 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
157 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
158 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
159 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
160 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
161 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
162 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
163 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
164 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
165 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
167 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
168 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
169 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
170 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
171 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
172 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
173 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
174 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
176 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
177 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
179 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
180 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
181 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
182 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
183 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
184 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
185 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
186 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
189 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
191 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
192 /// through the following states in the state machine:
193 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
194 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
195 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
196 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
197 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
198 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
199 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
201 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
202 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
203 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
204 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
205 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
206 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
207 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
208 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
209 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
211 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
212 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
213 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
214 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
216 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
217 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
218 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
219 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
220 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
221 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
222 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
223 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
225 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
228 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
229 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
231 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
232 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
233 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
234 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
235 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
236 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
237 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
238 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
239 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
240 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
241 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
242 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
243 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
248 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
249 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
250 (2, Committed) => {},
251 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
252 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
255 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
259 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
260 state: InboundHTLCState,
263 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
264 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
265 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
267 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
268 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
269 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
271 /// The amount in msat.
272 pub amount_msat: u64,
273 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
274 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
275 /// The payment hash.
276 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
277 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
279 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
280 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
282 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
284 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
285 /// states may result in `None` here.
286 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
287 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
288 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
289 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
290 /// transactions as well.
292 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
293 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
296 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
297 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
301 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
302 (0, htlc_id, required),
303 (2, amount_msat, required),
304 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
305 (6, payment_hash, required),
306 (7, state, upgradable_option),
307 (8, is_dust, required),
310 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
311 enum OutboundHTLCState {
312 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
313 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
314 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
315 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
316 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
317 /// money back (though we won't), and,
318 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
319 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
320 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
321 /// we'll never get out of sync).
322 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
323 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
324 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
326 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
327 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
328 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
329 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
330 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
331 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
332 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
333 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
334 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
335 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
336 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
337 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
338 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
339 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
340 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
343 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
345 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
346 /// through the following states in the state machine:
347 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
348 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
349 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
350 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
351 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
352 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
353 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
355 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
356 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
357 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
358 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
359 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
360 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
361 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
362 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
364 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
365 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
367 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
368 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
369 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
370 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
371 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
372 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
373 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
374 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
375 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
376 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
379 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
380 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
382 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
383 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
384 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
385 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
386 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
388 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
389 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
390 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
391 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
392 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
393 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
394 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
395 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
396 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
397 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
402 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
403 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
404 (2, Committed) => {},
405 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
406 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
410 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
411 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
412 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
413 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
414 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
417 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
418 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
420 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
421 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
426 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
427 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
429 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
430 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
435 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
436 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
440 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
441 state: OutboundHTLCState,
443 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
444 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
447 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
448 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
449 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
451 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
452 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
453 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
455 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
456 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
457 /// The amount in msat.
458 pub amount_msat: u64,
459 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
460 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
461 /// The payment hash.
462 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
463 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
465 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
466 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
468 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
470 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
471 /// states may result in `None` here.
472 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
473 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
474 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
475 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
476 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
477 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
478 /// transactions as well.
480 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
481 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
484 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
485 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
489 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
490 (0, htlc_id, required),
491 (2, amount_msat, required),
492 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
493 (6, payment_hash, required),
494 (7, state, upgradable_option),
495 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
496 (10, is_dust, required),
499 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
500 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
501 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
502 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
506 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
508 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
509 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
510 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
511 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
514 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
519 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
524 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
528 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
529 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
530 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
531 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
532 struct $flag_type(u32);
537 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
540 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
542 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
545 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
548 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
549 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
552 Ok($flag_type(flags))
557 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
559 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
561 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
563 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
567 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
570 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
572 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
574 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
575 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
577 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
579 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
581 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
582 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
585 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
586 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
588 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
591 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
593 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
595 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
598 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
599 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
601 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
602 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
603 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
604 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
605 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
606 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
607 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
608 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
610 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
612 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
614 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
615 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
617 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
619 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
621 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
622 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
624 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
625 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
627 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
628 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
633 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
636 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
637 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
638 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
639 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
640 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
641 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
642 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
643 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
644 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
645 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
646 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
647 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
648 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
649 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
653 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
655 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
656 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
657 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
658 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
659 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
660 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
661 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
662 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
663 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
664 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
665 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
666 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
667 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
668 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
673 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
674 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
675 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
676 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
677 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
678 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
683 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
684 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
685 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
686 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
687 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
688 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
689 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
690 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
691 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
692 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
693 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
694 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
695 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
696 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
701 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
702 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
703 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
704 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
705 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
706 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
707 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
708 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
712 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
713 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
714 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
716 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
717 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
718 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
719 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
720 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
722 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
723 /// funding transaction to confirm.
724 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
725 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
727 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
728 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
729 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
733 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
734 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
736 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
739 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
748 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
750 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
754 fn $clear(&mut self) {
757 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
759 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
763 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
764 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
766 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
767 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
772 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
774 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
775 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
777 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
778 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
779 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
780 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
781 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
782 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
783 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
784 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
792 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
794 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
795 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
796 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
797 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
798 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
802 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
803 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
806 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
807 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
810 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
812 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
813 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
814 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
818 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
820 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
821 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
822 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
823 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
825 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
831 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
832 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
833 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
834 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
835 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
836 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
837 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
838 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
841 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
843 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
845 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
846 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
847 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
848 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
852 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
854 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
856 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
858 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
859 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
860 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
861 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
862 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
864 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
865 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
867 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
869 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
870 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
872 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
873 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
874 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
875 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
876 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
877 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
879 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
880 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
882 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
883 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
884 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
885 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
886 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
888 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
889 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
891 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
892 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
894 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
895 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
896 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
897 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
903 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
904 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
906 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
907 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
908 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
913 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
914 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
916 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
917 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
918 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
923 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
925 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
926 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
929 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
930 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
931 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
932 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
933 self.logger.log(record)
937 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
938 where L::Target: Logger {
939 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
940 where S::Target: SignerProvider
944 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
945 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
950 macro_rules! secp_check {
951 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
954 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
959 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
960 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
961 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
962 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
963 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
964 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
965 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
966 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
968 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
970 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
972 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
976 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
978 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
979 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
980 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
982 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
983 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
985 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
986 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
987 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
988 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
989 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
991 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
992 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
996 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
1002 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
1005 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1006 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1007 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1008 holding_cell_msat: u64,
1009 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
1012 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
1013 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
1014 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
1015 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
1016 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
1017 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
1018 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
1019 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1020 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1021 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
1022 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
1025 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
1026 struct HTLCCandidate {
1028 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1031 impl HTLCCandidate {
1032 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1040 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1042 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1044 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1045 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1046 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1051 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1052 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1053 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1054 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1055 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1057 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1058 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1059 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1060 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1062 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1063 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1067 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1068 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1069 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1070 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1071 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1072 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1073 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1074 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1075 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1076 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1077 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1080 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1082 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1083 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1084 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1085 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1088 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1089 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1090 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1091 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1092 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1093 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1094 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1095 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1098 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1100 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1101 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1102 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1103 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1104 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1105 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1106 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1107 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1108 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1109 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1110 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1111 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1112 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1113 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1114 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1117 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1118 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1119 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1120 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1121 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1122 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1123 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1124 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1125 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1126 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1127 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1128 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1129 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1130 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1131 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1133 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1134 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1135 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1136 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1138 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1139 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1140 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1141 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1143 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1144 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1145 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1146 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1147 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1149 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1150 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1151 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1152 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1154 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1155 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1156 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1158 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1159 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1160 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1161 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1162 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1164 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1165 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1168 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1169 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1171 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1172 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1173 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1174 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1176 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1177 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1179 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1180 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1183 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1184 (0, update, required),
1187 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1188 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1189 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1190 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1191 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1192 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
1193 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1194 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
1195 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1196 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1199 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1200 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1201 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1203 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1205 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1206 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1207 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1208 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
1209 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1210 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
1211 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1215 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1217 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1218 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1219 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1220 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
1221 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1222 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
1223 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1228 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1229 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1230 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1231 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1232 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1234 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1235 /// in a timely manner.
1236 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1239 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1240 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1241 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1243 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1244 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1245 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1246 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1250 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1251 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1252 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1254 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1255 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1256 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1257 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1259 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1263 /// The current channel ID.
1264 channel_id: ChannelId,
1265 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1266 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1267 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1268 channel_state: ChannelState,
1270 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1271 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1273 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1274 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1275 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1277 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1278 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1279 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1280 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1282 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1283 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1285 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1287 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1288 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1289 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1291 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1292 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1293 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1295 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1296 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1297 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1298 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1299 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1300 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1302 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1303 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1304 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1305 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1306 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1307 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1309 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1311 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1312 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1313 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1315 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1316 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1317 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1318 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1319 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1320 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1321 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1322 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1324 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1325 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1326 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1328 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1329 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1330 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1331 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1332 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1333 /// outbound or inbound.
1334 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1336 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1338 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1339 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1340 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1341 // HTLCs with similar state.
1342 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1343 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1344 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1345 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1346 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1347 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1348 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1349 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1350 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1351 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1353 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1354 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1355 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1357 update_time_counter: u32,
1359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1360 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1361 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1362 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1363 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1364 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1366 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1367 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1369 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1370 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1371 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1372 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1374 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1375 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1377 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1379 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1381 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1382 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1383 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1384 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1385 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1387 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1388 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1390 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1391 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1392 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1394 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1395 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1396 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1397 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1398 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1399 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1400 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1401 channel_creation_height: u32,
1403 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1406 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1408 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1411 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1413 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1416 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1418 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1420 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1421 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1424 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1426 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1428 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1429 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1431 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1433 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1434 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1435 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1437 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1439 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1440 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1441 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1443 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1444 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1445 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1447 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1449 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1451 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1452 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1453 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1454 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1456 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1457 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1458 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1460 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1461 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1462 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1464 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1465 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1466 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1467 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1468 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1469 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1470 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1471 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1473 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1474 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1475 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1476 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1477 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1479 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1480 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1482 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1483 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1484 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1485 /// unblock the state machine.
1487 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1488 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1489 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1491 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1492 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1493 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1495 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1496 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1497 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1498 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1499 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1500 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1501 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1502 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1504 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1505 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1507 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1508 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1509 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1511 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1512 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1513 // associated channel mapping.
1515 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1516 // to store all of them.
1517 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1519 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1520 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1521 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1522 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1523 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1525 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1526 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1528 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1529 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1531 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1532 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1534 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1535 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1537 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1539 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1541 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1542 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1543 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1546 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1547 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1548 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1549 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1550 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1551 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1552 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1554 config: &'a UserConfig,
1555 current_chain_height: u32,
1558 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1559 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1560 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1561 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1562 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1564 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1565 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1567 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1568 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1570 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1572 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id));
1573 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1575 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1577 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1578 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1579 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1581 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1582 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1585 // Check sanity of message fields:
1586 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1587 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1588 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1589 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1590 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1592 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1593 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1595 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1596 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1598 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1599 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1600 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1602 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1603 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1605 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1606 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1608 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1610 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1611 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1612 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1614 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1617 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1618 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1621 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1622 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1623 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1625 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1626 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1628 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1629 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1631 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1632 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1634 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1635 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1637 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1638 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1640 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1641 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1644 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1646 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1647 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1652 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1653 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1654 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1657 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1658 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1660 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1661 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1662 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1664 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1665 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1668 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1669 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1670 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1671 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1675 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1676 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1677 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1681 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1682 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1683 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1684 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1688 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1689 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1690 &Some(ref script) => {
1691 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1692 if script.len() == 0 {
1695 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1696 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1698 Some(script.clone())
1701 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1703 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1708 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1709 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1710 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1711 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1715 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1716 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1717 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1721 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1722 Ok(script) => script,
1723 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1726 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1727 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1729 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1732 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1735 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1737 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1739 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1742 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1743 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1745 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1750 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1752 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1753 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1754 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1755 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1757 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1760 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1762 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1763 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1766 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1767 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1770 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1771 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1772 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1773 pending_update_fee: None,
1774 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1775 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1776 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1777 update_time_counter: 1,
1779 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1781 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1782 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1783 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1784 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1785 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1786 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1787 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1789 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1790 signer_pending_funding: false,
1793 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1794 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1795 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1796 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1798 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1799 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1800 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1801 closing_fee_limits: None,
1802 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1804 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1805 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1806 short_channel_id: None,
1807 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1809 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1810 channel_value_satoshis,
1811 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1812 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1813 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1814 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1815 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1816 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1817 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1818 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1819 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1820 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1823 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1825 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1826 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1827 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1828 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1829 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1830 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1831 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1833 funding_outpoint: None,
1834 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1836 funding_transaction: None,
1837 is_batch_funding: None,
1839 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1840 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1841 counterparty_node_id,
1843 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1845 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1847 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1848 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1850 announcement_sigs: None,
1852 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1853 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1855 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1857 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1858 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1860 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1861 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1863 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1864 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1866 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1867 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1872 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1874 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1880 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1881 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1882 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1883 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1884 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1885 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1886 funding_satoshis: u64,
1889 config: &'a UserConfig,
1890 current_chain_height: u32,
1891 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1892 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1893 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1894 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1895 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1896 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1897 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1899 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1900 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1901 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1903 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1904 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1906 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1908 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1909 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1911 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1914 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1915 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1916 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1918 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1922 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1923 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1925 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1926 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1928 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1930 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1932 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1933 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1934 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1935 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1938 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1939 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1941 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1942 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1943 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1944 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1948 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1949 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1950 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1954 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1955 Ok(script) => script,
1956 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1959 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1964 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1965 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1966 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1967 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1972 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1974 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1975 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1976 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1977 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1979 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1980 channel_value_satoshis,
1982 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1984 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1985 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1988 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1989 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1992 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1993 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1994 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1995 pending_update_fee: None,
1996 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1997 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1998 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1999 update_time_counter: 1,
2001 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2003 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2004 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2005 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2006 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2007 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2008 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2009 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
2011 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
2012 signer_pending_funding: false,
2014 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
2015 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2016 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2017 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2018 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2019 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2021 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2022 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2023 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
2024 closing_fee_limits: None,
2025 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2027 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2028 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2029 short_channel_id: None,
2030 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2032 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
2033 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
2034 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2035 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
2036 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
2037 // receive `accept_channel2`.
2038 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2039 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2040 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2041 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
2042 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2043 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
2044 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2045 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2047 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2049 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2050 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2051 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2052 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2053 counterparty_parameters: None,
2054 funding_outpoint: None,
2055 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
2057 funding_transaction: None,
2058 is_batch_funding: None,
2060 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
2061 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2062 counterparty_node_id,
2064 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2066 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2068 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2069 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2071 announcement_sigs: None,
2073 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2074 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2076 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2078 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2079 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2081 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2082 outbound_scid_alias,
2084 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2085 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2087 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2088 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
2093 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2094 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
2098 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2099 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2100 self.update_time_counter
2103 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2104 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2107 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2108 self.config.announced_channel
2111 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2112 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2115 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2117 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2118 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2121 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2122 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2123 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2126 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2127 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2128 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2129 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2130 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2131 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2132 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2135 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2136 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2137 match self.channel_state {
2138 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2139 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2140 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2141 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2142 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2143 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2144 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2146 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2148 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2149 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2153 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2154 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2155 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2156 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2157 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2158 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2161 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2162 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2163 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2167 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2168 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2169 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2170 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2171 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2174 // Public utilities:
2176 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2180 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2182 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2183 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2184 self.temporary_channel_id
2187 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2191 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2192 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2193 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2197 /// Gets the channel's type
2198 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2202 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2204 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2205 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2206 self.short_channel_id
2209 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2210 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2211 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2214 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2215 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2216 self.outbound_scid_alias
2219 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2221 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2222 return &self.holder_signer
2225 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2226 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2227 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2228 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2229 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2230 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2233 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2234 /// get_funding_created.
2235 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2236 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2239 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2240 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2241 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2242 if conf_height > 0 {
2249 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2250 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2251 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2254 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2255 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2256 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2257 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2261 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2264 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2265 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2268 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2269 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2272 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2273 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2274 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2277 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2278 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2281 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2282 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2283 self.counterparty_node_id
2286 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2287 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2288 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2291 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2292 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2293 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2296 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2297 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2299 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2300 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2301 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2302 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2304 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2308 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2309 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2310 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2313 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2314 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2315 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2318 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2319 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2320 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2322 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2323 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2328 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2329 self.channel_value_satoshis
2332 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2333 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2336 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2337 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2340 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
2341 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
2342 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2344 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2345 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2346 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
2347 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
2348 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
2350 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2354 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2355 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2356 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2359 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2360 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2361 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2364 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2365 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2366 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2369 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2370 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2371 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2374 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2375 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2376 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2379 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2380 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2381 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2384 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2385 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2386 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2387 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2388 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2391 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2393 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2394 self.prev_config = None;
2398 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2399 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2403 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2404 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2405 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2406 let did_channel_update =
2407 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2408 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2409 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2410 if did_channel_update {
2411 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2412 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2413 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2414 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2416 self.config.options = *config;
2420 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2421 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2422 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2423 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2424 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2427 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2428 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2429 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2430 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2431 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2433 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2434 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2435 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2436 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2437 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2438 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2439 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2441 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2442 where L::Target: Logger
2444 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2445 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2446 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2448 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2449 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2450 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2451 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2453 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2454 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2455 if match update_state {
2456 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2457 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2458 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2459 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2460 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2462 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2466 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2467 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2468 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2470 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2472 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2473 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2474 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2476 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2477 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2478 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2479 transaction_output_index: None
2484 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2485 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2486 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2487 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2488 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2491 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2493 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2494 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2495 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2497 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2498 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2501 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2502 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2505 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2507 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2508 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2509 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2511 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2512 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2518 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2520 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2521 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2522 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2523 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2524 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2525 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2526 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2530 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2531 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2533 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2535 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2536 if generated_by_local {
2537 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2538 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2539 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2549 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2551 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2552 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2553 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2554 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2555 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2556 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2557 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2560 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2561 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2562 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2563 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2567 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2568 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2572 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2573 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2575 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2577 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2578 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2580 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2581 if !generated_by_local {
2582 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2590 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2591 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2592 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2593 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2594 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2595 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2596 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2597 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2599 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2601 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2602 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2603 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2604 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2606 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2608 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2609 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2610 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2611 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2614 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2615 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2616 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2617 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2619 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2622 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2623 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2624 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2625 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2627 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2630 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2631 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2636 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2637 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2642 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2644 let channel_parameters =
2645 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2646 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2647 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2654 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2657 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2658 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2659 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2660 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2668 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2669 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2670 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2671 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2676 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2677 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2678 /// our counterparty!)
2679 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2680 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2681 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2682 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2683 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2684 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2685 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2687 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2691 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2692 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2693 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2694 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2695 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2696 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2697 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2699 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2702 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2703 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2704 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2705 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2706 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2709 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2710 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2713 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2717 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2718 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2719 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2720 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2721 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2722 // which are near the dust limit.
2723 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2724 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2725 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2726 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2727 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2729 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2730 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2732 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2733 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2736 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2737 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2738 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2741 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2742 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2744 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2745 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2746 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2747 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2748 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2749 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2750 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2753 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2756 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2757 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2758 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2760 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2761 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2762 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2763 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2764 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2765 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2767 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2768 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2774 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2775 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2777 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2778 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2779 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2780 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2781 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2782 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2783 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2786 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2789 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2790 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2791 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2793 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2794 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2795 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2796 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2797 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2798 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2800 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2801 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2805 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2806 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2807 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2808 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2809 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2810 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2811 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2813 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2814 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2816 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2823 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2824 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2825 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2826 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2827 match holding_cell_update {
2828 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2829 holding_cell_states.insert(
2831 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2834 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2835 holding_cell_states.insert(
2837 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2840 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2841 holding_cell_states.insert(
2843 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2847 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2850 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2851 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2854 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2855 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2857 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2858 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2859 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2860 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2861 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2862 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2863 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2864 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2865 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2866 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2873 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2874 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2875 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2876 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2879 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2880 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2882 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2883 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2884 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2885 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2886 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2887 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2888 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2889 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2890 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2891 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2894 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2895 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2901 } = *holding_cell_update {
2902 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2904 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2905 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2906 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2907 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2908 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2909 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2916 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2917 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2918 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2919 /// corner case properly.
2920 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2921 -> AvailableBalances
2922 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2924 let context = &self;
2925 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2926 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2927 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2929 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2930 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2931 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2932 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2935 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2937 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2938 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2940 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2942 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2944 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2945 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2949 if context.is_outbound() {
2950 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2951 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2953 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2954 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2956 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2957 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2958 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2959 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2962 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2963 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2964 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2965 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2966 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2967 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2968 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2971 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2972 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2973 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2974 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2975 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2976 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2977 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2978 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2979 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2980 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2981 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2983 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2986 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2987 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2988 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2989 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2990 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2993 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2994 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2996 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2997 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2998 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
3000 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3001 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
3002 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
3003 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
3007 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
3009 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
3010 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
3011 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
3012 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
3013 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
3014 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
3015 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3017 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3018 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
3020 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3021 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3022 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3024 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3025 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3026 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
3027 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
3028 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3031 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3032 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3033 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
3034 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
3035 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
3036 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
3039 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
3040 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
3041 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
3043 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3047 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3048 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
3050 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3051 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3055 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3056 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3057 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3058 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3060 outbound_capacity_msat,
3061 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3062 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3067 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3068 let context = &self;
3069 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3072 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3073 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3075 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3076 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3078 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3079 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3081 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3082 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3083 let context = &self;
3084 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3086 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3089 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3090 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3092 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3093 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3095 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3096 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3098 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3099 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3103 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3104 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3110 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3111 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3112 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3115 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3116 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3117 included_htlcs += 1;
3120 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3121 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3125 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3126 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3127 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3128 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3129 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3130 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3135 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3137 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3138 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3143 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3144 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3148 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3149 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3150 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3153 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3154 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3156 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3157 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3158 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3160 total_pending_htlcs,
3161 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3162 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3163 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3165 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3166 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3167 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3169 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3171 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3176 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3177 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3179 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3180 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3182 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3183 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3185 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3186 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3187 let context = &self;
3188 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3190 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3193 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3194 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3196 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3197 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3199 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3200 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3202 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3203 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3207 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3208 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3214 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3215 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3216 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3217 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3218 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3219 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3222 included_htlcs += 1;
3225 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3226 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3229 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3230 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3232 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3233 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3234 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3239 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3240 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3244 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3245 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3247 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3248 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3250 total_pending_htlcs,
3251 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3252 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3253 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3255 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3256 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3257 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3259 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3261 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3266 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3267 match self.channel_state {
3268 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3269 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3270 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3271 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3281 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3283 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3284 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3287 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3289 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3290 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3291 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3295 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3296 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3297 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3300 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3302 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3303 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3306 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3307 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3308 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3309 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3310 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3311 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3312 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3313 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3314 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3315 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3316 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3318 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3319 // return them to fail the payment.
3320 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3321 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3322 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3324 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3325 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3330 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3331 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3332 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3333 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3334 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3335 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3336 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3337 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3338 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3339 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3340 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3341 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3342 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3343 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3344 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3348 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3349 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3351 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3352 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3356 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3357 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3358 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3359 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3360 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3361 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3362 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3363 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3367 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3368 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3369 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3370 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3372 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3373 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3374 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3375 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3377 match &self.holder_signer {
3378 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3379 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3380 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3381 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3382 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3385 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3389 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3390 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3391 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3393 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3394 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3395 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3397 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3398 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3399 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3402 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3403 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3405 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3411 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3412 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3413 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3414 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3415 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3418 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3420 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3422 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3423 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3428 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3429 // We've exhausted our options
3432 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3433 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3436 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3437 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3438 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3439 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3441 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3442 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3443 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3444 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3445 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3446 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3448 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3450 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3455 // Internal utility functions for channels
3457 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3458 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3459 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3461 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3463 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3464 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3465 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3467 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3470 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3472 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3475 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3476 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3477 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3479 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3481 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3482 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3483 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3484 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3485 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3488 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3489 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3490 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3491 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3492 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3493 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3494 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3497 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3498 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3500 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3502 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3503 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3504 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3505 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3506 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3507 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3508 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3511 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3512 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3514 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3515 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3518 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3519 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3520 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3521 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3522 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3523 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3526 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3527 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3528 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3529 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3530 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3531 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3532 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3533 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3534 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3535 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3536 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3537 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3540 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3541 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3542 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3543 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3544 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3545 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3548 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3549 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3551 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3552 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3553 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3557 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3558 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3559 trait FailHTLCContents {
3560 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3561 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3562 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3563 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3565 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3566 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3567 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3568 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3570 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3571 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3573 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3574 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3577 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3578 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3579 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3580 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3583 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3584 failure_code: self.1
3587 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3588 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3590 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3591 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3593 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3594 failure_code: self.1
3599 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3600 fn name() -> &'static str;
3602 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3603 fn name() -> &'static str {
3607 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3608 fn name() -> &'static str {
3609 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3613 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3614 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3615 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
3617 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3618 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3619 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3620 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3622 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3623 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3625 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3627 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3628 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3629 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3630 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3632 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3633 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3643 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3644 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3645 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3646 // outside of those situations will fail.
3647 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3651 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3656 1 + // script length (0)
3660 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3661 2 + // witness marker and flag
3662 1 + // witness element count
3663 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3664 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3665 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3666 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3667 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3668 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3670 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3671 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3672 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3678 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3679 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3680 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3681 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3683 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3684 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3685 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3687 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3688 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3689 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3690 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3691 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3692 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3695 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3696 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3699 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3700 value_to_holder = 0;
3703 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3704 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3705 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3706 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3708 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3709 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3712 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3713 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3716 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3719 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3720 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3722 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3724 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3725 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3726 where L::Target: Logger {
3727 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3728 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3729 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3730 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3731 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3732 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3733 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3734 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3738 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3739 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3740 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3741 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3743 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3744 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3747 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3748 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3749 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3751 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3752 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3753 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3754 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3755 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3756 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3757 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3759 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3760 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3761 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3763 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3764 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3766 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3769 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3770 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3774 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3778 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3779 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3780 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3781 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3782 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3783 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3786 // Now update local state:
3788 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3789 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3790 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3791 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3792 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3793 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3794 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3795 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3797 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3800 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3801 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3802 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3803 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3804 // do not not get into this branch.
3805 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3806 match pending_update {
3807 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3808 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3809 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3810 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3811 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3812 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3813 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3816 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3817 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3819 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3820 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3821 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3822 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3823 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3824 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3830 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3831 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3832 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3835 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3836 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3838 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3839 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3842 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3843 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3845 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3846 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3848 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3849 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3852 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3855 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3856 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3857 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3858 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3863 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3864 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3865 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3866 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3867 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3868 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3869 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3870 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3871 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3872 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3873 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3874 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3875 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3876 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3877 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3879 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3880 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3881 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3882 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3883 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3886 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3887 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3888 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3894 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3895 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3897 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3901 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3902 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3903 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3904 /// before we fail backwards.
3906 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3907 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3908 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3909 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3910 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3911 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3912 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3915 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3916 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3918 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3919 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3920 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3921 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3922 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3923 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3926 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3927 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3928 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3929 /// before we fail backwards.
3931 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3932 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3933 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3934 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3935 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3937 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3938 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3939 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3942 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3943 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3944 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3946 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3947 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3948 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3950 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3951 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3952 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3954 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3959 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3960 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3966 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3968 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3969 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3970 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3974 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3975 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3976 force_holding_cell = true;
3979 // Now update local state:
3980 if force_holding_cell {
3981 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3982 match pending_update {
3983 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3984 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3985 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3986 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3990 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3991 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3993 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3994 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3995 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
4001 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
4002 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
4006 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
4007 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
4009 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
4010 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
4013 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
4016 // Message handlers:
4017 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
4018 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
4019 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
4020 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
4021 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
4022 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
4023 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
4026 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
4028 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
4030 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
4031 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
4032 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
4033 debug_assert!(matches!(
4034 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
4036 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4037 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
4040 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
4041 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4043 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4044 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4045 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4046 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4048 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4051 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4052 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4053 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4056 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4057 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4058 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4059 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4060 // when routing outbound payments.
4061 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4065 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4066 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4067 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4068 match &self.context.channel_state {
4069 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4070 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4071 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4072 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4073 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4074 check_reconnection = true;
4075 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4076 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4077 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4078 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4079 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4081 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4082 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4085 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4086 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4087 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4089 if check_reconnection {
4090 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4091 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4092 let expected_point =
4093 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4094 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4096 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4097 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4098 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4099 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4100 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4101 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4103 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4104 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4105 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4106 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4107 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4109 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4115 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4116 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4118 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4120 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4123 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
4124 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4125 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
4126 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4127 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
4128 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4130 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4133 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
4134 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4135 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
4137 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4138 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4139 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4141 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4144 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4147 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4148 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4150 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4154 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4155 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4156 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4157 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4159 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4163 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4164 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4165 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4166 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4167 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4168 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4169 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4170 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4171 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4172 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4173 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4175 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4176 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4177 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4178 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4179 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4180 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4184 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4185 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4188 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
4189 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
4190 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
4192 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4193 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4194 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
4195 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4196 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4197 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
4198 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
4202 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4203 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4204 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
4205 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4206 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4207 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
4208 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
4212 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4213 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4214 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4215 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4216 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4220 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4221 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4223 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4224 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4225 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4227 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4228 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4232 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4235 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4240 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4241 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4245 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4246 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
4247 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
4248 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
4249 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
4250 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4251 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
4252 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4253 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
4255 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
4256 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
4257 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
4258 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
4259 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
4262 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4263 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4264 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4265 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4266 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4269 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4270 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4272 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4276 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4277 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4278 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4282 // Now update local state:
4283 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4284 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4285 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4286 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4287 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4288 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4289 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4290 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4296 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4298 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4299 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4300 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4301 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4302 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4303 None => fail_reason.into(),
4304 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4305 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4306 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4309 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4313 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4315 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4316 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4318 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4324 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4327 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4328 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4331 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4335 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4338 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4339 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4342 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4346 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4350 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4351 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4354 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4358 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4362 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4363 where L::Target: Logger
4365 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4366 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4368 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4371 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4375 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4377 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4379 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4380 let commitment_txid = {
4381 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4382 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4383 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4385 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4386 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4387 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4388 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4389 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4394 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4396 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4397 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4398 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4399 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4402 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4403 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4404 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4408 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4410 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4411 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4412 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4413 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4414 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4415 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4416 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4417 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4418 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4419 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4420 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4426 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4427 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4430 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4431 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4432 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4433 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4434 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4435 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4436 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4437 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4438 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4439 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4440 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4441 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4442 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4445 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4446 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4447 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4448 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4449 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4450 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4451 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4453 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4454 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4455 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4456 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4457 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4458 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4459 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4460 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4462 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4463 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4466 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4468 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4469 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4470 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4473 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4476 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4477 commitment_stats.tx,
4479 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4480 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4481 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4484 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4485 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4487 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4488 let mut need_commitment = false;
4489 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4490 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4491 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4492 need_commitment = true;
4496 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4497 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4498 Some(resolution.clone())
4500 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4501 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4502 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4503 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4504 need_commitment = true;
4507 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4508 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4509 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4510 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4511 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4512 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4513 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4514 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4515 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4516 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4517 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4518 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4519 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4520 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4522 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4524 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4525 need_commitment = true;
4529 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4530 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4531 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4532 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4533 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4534 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4535 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4537 nondust_htlc_sources,
4539 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4542 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4543 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4544 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4545 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4546 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4548 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4549 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4550 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4551 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4552 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4553 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4554 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4555 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4556 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4557 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4558 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4559 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4560 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4561 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4563 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4564 &self.context.channel_id);
4565 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4568 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4569 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4570 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4571 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4572 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4573 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4574 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4575 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4576 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4580 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4581 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4582 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4583 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4586 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4587 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4588 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4589 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4590 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4591 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4592 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4594 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4595 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4596 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4599 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4600 /// for our counterparty.
4601 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4602 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4603 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4604 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4606 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4607 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4608 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4609 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4611 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4612 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4613 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4614 updates: Vec::new(),
4615 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4618 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4619 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4620 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4621 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4622 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4623 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4624 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4625 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4626 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4627 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4628 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4629 // to rebalance channels.
4630 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4631 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4632 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4633 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4635 match self.send_htlc(
4636 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4637 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4639 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4642 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4643 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4644 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4645 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4646 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4647 // into the holding cell without ever being
4648 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4649 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4650 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4653 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4660 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4661 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4662 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4663 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4664 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4665 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4666 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4667 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4668 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4669 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4670 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4671 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4674 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4675 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4676 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4678 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4679 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4680 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4683 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4685 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4686 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4687 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4688 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4689 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4690 // for a full revocation before failing.
4691 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4692 update_fail_count += 1;
4694 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4696 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4701 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4702 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4704 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4705 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4710 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4711 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4712 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4713 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4714 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4716 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4717 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4718 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4720 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4721 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4727 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4728 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4729 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4730 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4731 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4732 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4733 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4734 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4735 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4737 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4740 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4743 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4747 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4749 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4750 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4755 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4756 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4757 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4758 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4759 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4760 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4761 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4762 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4766 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4768 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4769 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4772 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4773 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4774 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4775 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4777 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4779 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4784 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4785 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4786 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4787 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4788 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4789 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4790 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4791 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4792 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4794 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4797 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4798 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4799 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4800 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4801 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4802 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4803 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4804 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4805 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4807 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4808 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4811 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4812 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4813 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4814 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4815 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4816 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4817 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4818 let mut require_commitment = false;
4819 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4822 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4823 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4824 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4825 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4827 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4828 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4829 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4830 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4831 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4832 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4834 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4838 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4839 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4840 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4841 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4842 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4844 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4845 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4846 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4851 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4852 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4854 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4858 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4859 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4861 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4862 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4863 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4864 require_commitment = true;
4865 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4867 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4868 match pending_htlc_status {
4869 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4870 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4871 require_commitment = true;
4873 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4874 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4875 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4877 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4878 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4879 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4883 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4884 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4885 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4886 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4889 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4890 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4891 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4892 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4898 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4899 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4900 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4901 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4902 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4904 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4905 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4906 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4907 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4908 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4909 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4910 require_commitment = true;
4914 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4916 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4917 match update_state {
4918 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4919 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4920 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4921 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4922 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4923 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4925 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4926 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4927 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4928 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4929 require_commitment = true;
4930 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4931 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4936 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4937 let release_state_str =
4938 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4939 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4940 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4941 if !release_monitor {
4942 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4943 update: monitor_update,
4945 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4947 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4952 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4954 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4955 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4956 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4957 if require_commitment {
4958 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4959 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4960 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4961 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4963 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4964 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4965 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4966 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4967 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4969 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4970 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4971 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4972 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4973 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4976 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4977 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4978 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4979 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4980 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4981 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4983 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4984 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4986 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4987 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4989 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4990 if require_commitment {
4991 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4993 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4994 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4995 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4996 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4998 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4999 &self.context.channel_id(),
5000 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
5003 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5004 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5006 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
5007 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5009 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5010 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5016 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5017 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5018 /// commitment update.
5019 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
5020 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5021 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5023 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
5024 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
5027 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
5028 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
5029 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
5030 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
5032 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
5033 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5034 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5035 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5036 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5037 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
5038 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5040 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5041 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
5043 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5044 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
5046 if !self.context.is_live() {
5047 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
5050 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
5051 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
5052 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
5053 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5054 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5055 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
5056 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5057 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
5058 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
5059 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
5063 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
5064 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5065 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5066 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
5067 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5068 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5071 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5072 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5076 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5077 force_holding_cell = true;
5080 if force_holding_cell {
5081 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
5085 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
5086 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
5088 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5089 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5094 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5095 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5097 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5099 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5100 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5101 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5102 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5106 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5107 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5108 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5112 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5113 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5116 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5117 // will be retransmitted.
5118 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5119 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5120 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5122 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5123 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5125 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5126 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5127 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5128 // this HTLC accordingly
5129 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5132 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5133 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5134 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5135 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5138 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5139 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5140 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5141 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5142 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5143 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5148 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5150 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5151 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5152 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5153 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5157 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5158 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5159 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5160 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5161 // the update upon reconnection.
5162 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5166 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5168 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5169 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5173 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5174 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5175 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5176 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5177 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5178 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5179 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5181 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5182 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5183 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5184 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5185 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5186 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5187 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5189 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5190 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5191 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5192 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5193 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5194 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5195 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5198 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5199 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5200 /// to the remote side.
5201 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5202 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5203 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5204 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5207 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5209 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5210 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5212 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5213 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5214 // first received the funding_signed.
5215 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5216 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5217 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5218 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5220 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5222 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5223 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5224 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5225 funding_broadcastable = None;
5228 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5229 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5230 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5231 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5232 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5233 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5234 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5235 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5236 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5237 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5238 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5239 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5240 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5241 next_per_commitment_point,
5242 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5246 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5248 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5249 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5250 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5251 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5252 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5253 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5255 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5256 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5257 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5258 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5259 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5260 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5264 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5265 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5267 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5268 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5270 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5271 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5274 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5275 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5276 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5277 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5278 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5279 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5280 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5281 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5282 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5286 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5287 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5289 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5292 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5295 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5297 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5298 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5299 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5300 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5301 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5302 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5303 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5304 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5305 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
5306 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5308 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
5310 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5311 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5312 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
5318 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5320 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5321 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5322 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5323 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5325 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5326 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5328 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5329 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5332 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5333 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5334 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5335 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5337 SignerResumeUpdates {
5344 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5345 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5346 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5347 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5348 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5349 per_commitment_secret,
5350 next_per_commitment_point,
5352 next_local_nonce: None,
5356 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5357 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5358 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5359 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5360 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5361 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5363 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5364 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5365 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5366 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5367 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5368 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5369 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5370 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5371 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5372 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5373 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5378 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5379 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5381 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5382 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5383 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5384 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5385 reason: err_packet.clone()
5388 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5389 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5390 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5391 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5392 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5393 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5396 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5397 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5398 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5399 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5400 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5407 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5408 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5409 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5410 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5414 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5415 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5416 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5417 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5418 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5419 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5420 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5424 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5425 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5427 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5428 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5429 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5430 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5435 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5436 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5441 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5442 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5443 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5444 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5445 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5446 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5447 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5452 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5453 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5455 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5456 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5457 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5458 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5459 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5460 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5461 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5462 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5465 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5467 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5468 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5469 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5470 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5474 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5475 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5476 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5479 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5480 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5481 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5482 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5483 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5484 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5485 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5487 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5488 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5489 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5490 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5491 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5494 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5495 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5496 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5497 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5498 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5499 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5500 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5501 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5505 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5506 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5507 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5508 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5509 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5510 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5511 our_commitment_transaction
5515 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5516 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5517 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5518 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5520 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5522 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5524 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5525 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5526 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5527 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5528 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5529 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5531 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5532 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5533 channel_ready: None,
5534 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5535 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5536 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5540 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5541 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5542 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5543 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5544 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5545 next_per_commitment_point,
5546 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5548 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5549 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5550 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5554 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5555 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5556 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5558 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5559 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5560 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5563 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5566 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5567 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5568 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5569 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5570 our_commitment_transaction
5574 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5575 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5576 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5577 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5578 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5579 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5580 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5582 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5584 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5585 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5586 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5587 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5588 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5589 next_per_commitment_point,
5590 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5594 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5595 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5596 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5598 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5601 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5602 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5603 raa: required_revoke,
5604 commitment_update: None,
5605 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5607 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5608 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5609 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5611 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5614 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5615 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5616 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5617 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5618 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5619 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5622 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5623 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5624 raa: required_revoke,
5625 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5626 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5629 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5630 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5631 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5632 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5633 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5636 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5637 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5638 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5639 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5644 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5645 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5646 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5647 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5649 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5651 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5653 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5654 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5655 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5656 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5657 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5658 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5659 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5660 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5662 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5663 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5664 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5665 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5666 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5668 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5669 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5670 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5671 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5674 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5675 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5676 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5677 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5678 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5679 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5680 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5681 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5682 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5683 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5684 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5685 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5686 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5687 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5688 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5690 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5693 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5694 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5697 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5698 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5699 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5700 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5701 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5702 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5705 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5706 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5707 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5708 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5709 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5710 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5711 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5713 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5719 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5720 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5721 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5722 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5724 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5725 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5726 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5727 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5728 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5729 return Ok((None, None, None));
5732 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5733 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5734 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5736 return Ok((None, None, None));
5739 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5740 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5741 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5742 return Ok((None, None, None));
5745 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5747 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5748 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5749 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5750 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5752 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5753 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5755 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5756 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5758 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5759 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5760 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5761 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5763 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5764 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5765 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5769 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5775 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5776 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5778 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5779 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5782 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5783 /// within our expected timeframe.
5785 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5786 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5787 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5790 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5793 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5794 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5798 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5799 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5801 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5802 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5804 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5805 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5806 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5807 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5810 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5811 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5815 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5817 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5818 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5821 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5822 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5823 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5826 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5829 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5830 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5831 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5832 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5834 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5837 assert!(send_shutdown);
5838 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5839 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5840 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5842 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5843 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5845 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5850 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5852 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5853 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5855 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5856 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5857 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5858 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5859 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5860 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5861 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5863 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5865 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5866 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5868 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5869 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5870 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5871 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5875 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5876 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5877 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5878 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5879 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5880 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5882 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5883 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5890 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5891 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5893 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5896 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5897 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5899 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5901 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5902 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5903 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5904 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5905 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5906 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5907 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5908 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5909 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5911 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5912 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5915 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5919 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5920 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5921 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5922 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5924 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5927 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5930 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5933 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5934 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5937 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5938 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5941 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5942 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5943 return Ok((None, None, None));
5946 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5947 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5948 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5949 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5951 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5953 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5956 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5957 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5958 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5959 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5960 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5964 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5965 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5970 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5971 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5973 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5976 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5977 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5978 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5979 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5981 monitor_update: None,
5982 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5983 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5984 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5985 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5986 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5987 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5988 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5989 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5991 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5992 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5993 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5994 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5998 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
6000 macro_rules! propose_fee {
6001 ($new_fee: expr) => {
6002 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6003 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
6005 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
6008 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
6009 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6011 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6012 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
6013 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6014 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6016 monitor_update: None,
6017 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6018 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6019 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6020 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6021 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6022 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6023 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6024 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6026 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6027 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6028 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6029 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
6034 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
6035 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
6036 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6037 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
6039 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
6040 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
6041 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
6043 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
6045 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6052 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
6053 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
6054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
6056 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6057 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6059 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6060 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6063 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6064 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
6065 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
6066 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
6067 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
6069 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6070 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
6071 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
6073 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
6074 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6077 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
6078 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
6079 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6080 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6081 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6082 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6083 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6084 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6089 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6090 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6091 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6092 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6098 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6099 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6100 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6101 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6103 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6109 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6110 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6111 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6112 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6113 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6114 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6115 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6117 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6118 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6121 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6123 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6124 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6130 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6131 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6132 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6133 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6134 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6135 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6136 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6138 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6139 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6146 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6147 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6150 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6151 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6154 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6155 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6159 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6160 &self.context.holder_signer
6164 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6166 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6167 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6168 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6169 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6170 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6171 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6173 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6175 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6183 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6184 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6188 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6189 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6190 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6191 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6194 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6195 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6196 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6197 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6200 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6201 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6202 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6203 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6204 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6205 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6208 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6209 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6210 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6211 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6212 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6213 if !release_monitor {
6214 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6223 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6224 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6227 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6228 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6229 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6231 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6232 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6234 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6235 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6237 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6238 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6239 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6242 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6243 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6244 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6245 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6246 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6247 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6249 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6250 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6251 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6253 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6254 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6255 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6256 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6257 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6258 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6264 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6265 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6266 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6267 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6270 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6271 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6272 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6275 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6276 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6277 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6280 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6281 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6282 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6285 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6286 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6287 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6288 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6289 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6292 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6293 self.context.channel_update_status
6296 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6297 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6298 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6301 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6303 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6304 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6305 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6309 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6310 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6311 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6314 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6318 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6319 // channel_ready yet.
6320 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6324 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6325 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6326 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6327 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6329 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6330 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6331 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6333 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6334 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6337 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6338 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6340 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6341 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6342 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6343 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6344 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6345 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6346 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6347 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6349 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6353 if need_commitment_update {
6354 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6355 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6356 let next_per_commitment_point =
6357 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6358 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6359 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6360 next_per_commitment_point,
6361 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6365 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6371 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6372 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6373 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6374 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6375 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6376 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6377 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6379 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6382 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6383 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6384 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6385 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6386 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6387 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6388 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6389 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6390 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6391 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6392 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6393 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6394 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6395 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6396 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6397 // channel and move on.
6398 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6399 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6401 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6402 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6403 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6405 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6406 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6407 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6408 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6409 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6410 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6411 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6412 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6417 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6418 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6419 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6420 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6421 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6424 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6425 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6426 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6427 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6428 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6429 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6432 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6433 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6434 // may have already happened for this block).
6435 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6436 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6437 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6438 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6441 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6442 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6443 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6444 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6452 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6453 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6454 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6455 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6457 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6458 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6461 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6463 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6464 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6465 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6466 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6468 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6471 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6474 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6475 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6476 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6477 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6479 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6482 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6483 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6484 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6486 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6487 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6489 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6490 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6491 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6499 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6501 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6502 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6503 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6505 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6506 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6509 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6510 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6511 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6512 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6513 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6514 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6515 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6516 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6519 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6520 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6521 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6522 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6524 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6525 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6526 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6528 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6529 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6530 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6531 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6533 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6534 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6535 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6536 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6537 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6538 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6539 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6542 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6543 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6545 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6548 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6549 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6550 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6551 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6552 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6553 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6554 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6555 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6556 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6557 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6558 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6559 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6560 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6561 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6562 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6563 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6564 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6570 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6575 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6576 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6578 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6579 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6580 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6581 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6583 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6586 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6588 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6589 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6590 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6591 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6592 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6593 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6595 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6596 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6599 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6600 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6601 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6602 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6603 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6604 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6606 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6607 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6610 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6611 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6612 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6613 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6614 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6620 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6621 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6622 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6623 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6625 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6628 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6632 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6636 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6637 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6641 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6645 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6646 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6649 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6653 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6655 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6660 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6661 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6662 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6664 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6669 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6671 None => return None,
6674 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6676 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6677 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6679 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6680 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6683 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6689 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6691 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6692 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6693 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6694 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6695 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6696 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6697 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6699 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6700 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6701 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6702 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6703 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6704 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6705 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6706 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6707 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6708 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6709 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6710 contents: announcement,
6713 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6718 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6722 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6723 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6724 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6725 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6726 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6727 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6728 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6729 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6731 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6733 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6734 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6735 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6736 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6738 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6739 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6740 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6741 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6744 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6745 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6746 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6747 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6750 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6753 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6754 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6755 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6756 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6757 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6758 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6761 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6763 Err(_) => return None,
6765 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6766 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6771 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6772 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6773 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6774 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6775 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6776 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6777 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6778 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6779 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6780 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6781 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6782 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6783 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6784 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6785 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6786 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6789 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6792 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6793 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6794 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6795 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6796 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6797 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6798 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6799 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6800 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6802 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6803 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6804 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6805 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6806 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6807 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6808 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6809 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6810 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6812 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6813 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6814 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6815 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6816 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6817 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6818 next_funding_txid: None,
6823 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6825 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6826 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6827 /// commitment update.
6829 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6830 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6831 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6832 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6833 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6834 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6835 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6838 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6839 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6840 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6842 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6843 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6848 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6849 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6851 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6853 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6854 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6856 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6857 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6858 /// regenerate them.
6860 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6861 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6863 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6864 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6865 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6866 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6867 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6868 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6869 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6870 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6872 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6873 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6874 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6876 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6878 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6879 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6880 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6883 if amount_msat == 0 {
6884 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6887 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6888 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6889 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6890 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6893 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6894 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6895 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6898 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6899 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6900 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6901 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6902 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6903 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6904 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6905 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6908 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6909 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6910 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6911 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6912 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6913 else { "to peer" });
6915 if need_holding_cell {
6916 force_holding_cell = true;
6919 // Now update local state:
6920 if force_holding_cell {
6921 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6926 onion_routing_packet,
6933 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6934 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6936 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6938 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6944 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6945 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6946 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6950 onion_routing_packet,
6954 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6959 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6960 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6961 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6962 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6964 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6965 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6966 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6968 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6969 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6973 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6974 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6975 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6976 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6977 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6978 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6979 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6982 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6983 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6984 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6985 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6986 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6987 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6990 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6992 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6993 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6994 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6995 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6996 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6998 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6999 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7002 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7003 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7004 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7005 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7006 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7007 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7008 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7009 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7010 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7011 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7012 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7013 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7015 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7017 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7021 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7022 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7023 where L::Target: Logger
7025 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7026 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7027 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7029 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7031 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7032 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7033 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7034 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7035 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7036 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7037 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7038 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7039 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7040 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7041 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7047 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7050 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7051 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7052 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7053 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7054 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7055 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7057 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7058 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7059 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7061 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7062 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7063 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7066 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7067 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7071 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7072 &commitment_stats.tx,
7073 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7074 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7075 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7076 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7078 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7080 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7081 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7082 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7083 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7085 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7086 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7087 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7088 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7089 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7090 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7094 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7095 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7099 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7100 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7102 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7108 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7109 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7111 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7112 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7113 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7114 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7115 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7116 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7117 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7118 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7120 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7121 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7122 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7125 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7126 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7127 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7133 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7135 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7136 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7137 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7138 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7139 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7141 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7143 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7149 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7150 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7151 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7152 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7153 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7155 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7156 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7157 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7160 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7161 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7163 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7164 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7166 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7167 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7169 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7170 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7171 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7174 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7177 // use override shutdown script if provided
7178 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7179 Some(script) => script,
7181 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7182 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7183 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7184 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7188 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7189 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7191 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7196 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7197 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7198 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7199 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7200 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7202 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7203 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7204 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7205 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7206 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7207 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7208 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7210 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7212 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7213 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7215 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7216 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7217 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7220 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7221 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7222 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7223 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7224 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7226 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7227 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7234 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7235 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7237 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7240 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7241 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7242 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7244 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7245 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7249 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7253 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7254 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7255 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7256 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7259 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7260 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7261 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7262 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7263 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7264 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7265 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7266 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7268 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7269 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7270 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7271 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7272 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7273 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7276 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7277 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7278 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7281 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7285 counterparty_node_id,
7287 channel_value_satoshis,
7291 current_chain_height,
7292 outbound_scid_alias,
7293 temporary_channel_id,
7294 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7299 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7304 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7305 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7306 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7307 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7308 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7309 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7310 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7311 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7312 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7314 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7319 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7320 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7321 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7324 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7325 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7326 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7327 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7330 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7332 next_local_nonce: None,
7336 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7337 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7338 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7339 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7340 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7341 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7342 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7343 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7344 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7345 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7346 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7349 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7350 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7352 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7354 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7355 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7356 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7357 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7360 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7361 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7363 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7365 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7366 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7368 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7369 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7370 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7371 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7372 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7373 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7376 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7377 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7379 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7380 if funding_created.is_none() {
7381 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7382 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7384 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7385 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7386 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7387 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7395 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7396 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7397 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7398 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7399 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7400 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7402 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7404 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7405 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7408 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7409 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7410 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7412 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7413 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7416 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7417 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7420 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7421 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7424 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7426 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7427 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7428 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7429 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7430 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7431 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7432 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7433 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7434 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7435 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7436 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7437 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7438 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7439 first_per_commitment_point,
7440 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7441 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7442 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7443 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7445 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7447 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7448 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7453 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7454 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7456 // Check sanity of message fields:
7457 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7458 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7460 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7463 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7464 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7466 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7467 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7469 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7472 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7473 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7474 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7476 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7477 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7478 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7480 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7481 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7482 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7484 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7485 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7487 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7488 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7491 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7492 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7493 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7495 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7496 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7498 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7499 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7501 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7502 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7504 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7505 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7507 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7508 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7510 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7511 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7514 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7515 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7516 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7518 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7519 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7521 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7522 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7523 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7525 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7526 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7529 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7530 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7531 &Some(ref script) => {
7532 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7533 if script.len() == 0 {
7536 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7537 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7539 Some(script.clone())
7542 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7549 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7550 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7551 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7552 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7553 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7555 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7556 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7558 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7561 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7562 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7563 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7564 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7565 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7566 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7569 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7570 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7571 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7574 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7575 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7577 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7578 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7580 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7585 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7586 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7587 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7588 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7589 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7593 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7594 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7596 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7597 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7599 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7600 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7601 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7602 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7605 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7607 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7608 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7609 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7610 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7612 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7613 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7615 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7616 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7618 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7619 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7620 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7621 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7622 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7623 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7627 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7628 initial_commitment_tx,
7631 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7632 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7636 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7637 if validated.is_err() {
7638 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7641 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7642 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7643 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7644 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7645 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7646 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7647 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7648 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7649 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7650 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7651 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7652 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7654 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7655 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7656 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7657 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7658 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7659 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7660 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7661 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7663 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7664 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7665 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7667 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7669 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7670 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7672 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7674 let mut channel = Channel {
7675 context: self.context,
7676 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7677 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7680 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7681 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7682 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7685 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7687 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7688 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7689 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7690 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7691 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7696 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7697 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7698 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7699 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7702 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7703 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7704 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7705 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7706 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7707 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7708 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7709 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7710 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7713 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7714 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7715 // `static_remote_key`.
7716 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7717 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7719 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7720 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7721 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7723 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7724 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7727 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7729 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7730 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7737 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7738 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7739 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7740 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7741 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7742 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7743 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7744 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7745 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7746 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7747 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7750 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7752 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7753 // support this channel type.
7754 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7756 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7757 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7758 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7759 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7760 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7761 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7762 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7766 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7770 counterparty_node_id,
7774 current_chain_height,
7779 counterparty_pubkeys,
7781 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7782 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7784 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7786 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7791 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7792 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7794 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7795 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7796 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7797 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7800 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7801 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7803 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7805 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7806 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7809 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7812 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7813 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7814 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7816 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7817 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7818 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7819 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7821 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7822 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7823 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7824 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7825 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7826 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7827 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7828 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7829 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7830 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7831 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7832 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7833 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7834 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7835 first_per_commitment_point,
7836 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7837 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7838 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7840 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7842 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7844 next_local_nonce: None,
7848 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7849 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7851 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7853 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7854 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7857 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7858 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7860 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7861 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7862 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7863 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7864 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7865 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7866 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7867 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7868 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7869 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7870 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7872 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7875 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7876 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7877 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7881 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7882 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7885 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7886 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7888 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7889 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7891 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7893 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7894 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7895 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7896 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7899 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7900 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7901 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7902 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7903 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7905 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7907 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7908 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7909 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7912 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7913 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7914 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7918 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7919 initial_commitment_tx,
7922 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7923 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7926 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7927 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7930 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7932 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7933 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7934 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7935 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7937 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7939 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7940 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7941 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7942 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7943 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7944 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7945 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7946 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7947 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7948 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7949 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7951 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7952 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7953 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7954 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7955 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7956 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7957 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7959 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7960 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7962 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7963 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7964 let mut channel = Channel {
7965 context: self.context,
7966 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7967 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7969 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7970 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7972 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7976 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
7977 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7978 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7979 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7980 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7981 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7982 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
7985 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7986 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7987 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7988 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7989 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
7990 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
7991 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
7992 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
7993 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7994 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7996 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
7997 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7998 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8000 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8002 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8003 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8005 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8006 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8009 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8013 counterparty_node_id,
8019 current_chain_height,
8020 outbound_scid_alias,
8021 temporary_channel_id,
8022 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8027 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8028 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8029 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8030 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8031 funding_tx_locktime,
8032 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8038 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8039 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8040 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8041 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8042 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8043 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8045 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8047 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8048 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8051 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8052 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8053 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8056 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8057 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8060 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8061 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8062 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8063 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8064 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8065 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8066 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8068 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8069 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8071 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8072 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8073 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8074 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8075 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8076 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8077 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8078 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8079 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8080 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8081 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8082 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8083 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8084 first_per_commitment_point,
8085 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8086 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8087 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8088 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8090 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8092 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8093 second_per_commitment_point,
8094 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8095 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8100 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8101 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8102 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8103 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8104 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8105 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8108 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8109 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8110 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8111 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8112 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8113 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8114 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8115 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8116 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8117 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8118 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8119 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8122 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8123 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8124 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8125 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8126 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8128 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8129 // support this channel type.
8130 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8131 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8132 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8134 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8136 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8137 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8138 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8139 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8140 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8141 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8144 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8148 counterparty_node_id,
8152 current_chain_height,
8158 counterparty_pubkeys,
8160 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8161 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8162 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8163 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8165 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8166 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8167 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8168 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8172 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8173 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8174 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8175 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8176 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8177 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8184 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8185 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8187 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8188 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8189 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8190 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8193 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8194 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8196 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8198 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8199 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8202 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8205 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8206 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8207 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8209 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8210 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8211 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8212 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8213 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8214 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8215 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8217 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8218 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8219 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8220 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8221 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8222 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8223 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8224 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8225 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8226 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8227 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8228 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8229 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8230 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8231 first_per_commitment_point,
8232 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8233 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8234 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8236 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8238 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8239 second_per_commitment_point,
8240 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8244 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8245 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8247 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8249 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8250 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8254 // Unfunded channel utilities
8256 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8257 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8258 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8259 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8260 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8261 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8262 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8263 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8264 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8265 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8268 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8269 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8270 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8271 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8272 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8273 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8279 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8280 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8282 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8288 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8289 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8290 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8291 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8292 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8294 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8295 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8296 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8297 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8303 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8304 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8305 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8306 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8307 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8308 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8313 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8314 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8315 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8316 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8318 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8319 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8320 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8321 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8326 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8327 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8328 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8329 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8330 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8331 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8336 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8337 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8338 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8341 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8342 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8343 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8344 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8348 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8350 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8352 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8354 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8355 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8356 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8357 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8358 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8360 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8361 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8362 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8363 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8365 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8367 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8368 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8369 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8371 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8373 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8375 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8377 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8379 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8380 // deserialized from that format.
8381 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8382 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8383 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8385 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8387 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8388 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8389 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8391 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8392 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8393 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8394 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8397 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8398 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8399 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8402 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8403 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8404 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8405 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8407 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8408 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8410 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8411 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8412 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8417 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8420 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8422 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8423 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8424 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8429 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8432 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8435 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8437 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8442 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8443 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8444 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8446 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8447 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8448 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8449 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8450 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8451 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8452 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8454 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8456 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8458 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8461 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8462 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8463 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8466 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8468 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8469 preimages.push(preimage);
8471 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8472 reason.write(writer)?;
8474 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8476 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8477 preimages.push(preimage);
8479 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8480 reason.write(writer)?;
8483 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8484 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8487 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8488 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8489 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8490 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8491 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8492 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8494 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8495 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8496 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8499 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8500 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8501 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8502 source.write(writer)?;
8503 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8505 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8506 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8508 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8510 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8511 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8513 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8515 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8516 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8518 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8519 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8521 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8522 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8523 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8525 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8527 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8528 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8533 match self.context.resend_order {
8534 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8535 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8538 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8539 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8540 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8542 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8543 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8544 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8545 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8548 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8549 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8550 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8551 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8552 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8555 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8556 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8557 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8558 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8560 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8561 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8562 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8564 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8566 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8567 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8568 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8569 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8571 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8572 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8573 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8574 // consider the stale state on reload.
8577 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8578 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8579 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8581 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8582 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8583 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8585 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8586 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8588 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8589 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8590 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8592 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8593 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8595 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8598 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8599 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8600 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8602 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8605 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8606 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8608 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8609 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8610 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8612 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8614 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8616 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8618 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8619 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8620 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8621 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8622 htlc.write(writer)?;
8625 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8626 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8627 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8629 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8630 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8632 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8633 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8634 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8635 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8636 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8637 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8638 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8640 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8641 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8642 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8643 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8644 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8646 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8647 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8649 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8650 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8651 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8652 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8654 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8656 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8657 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8658 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8661 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8662 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8663 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8664 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8665 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8666 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8667 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8669 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8670 (2, chan_type, option),
8671 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8672 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8673 (5, self.context.config, required),
8674 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8675 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8676 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8677 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8678 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8679 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8680 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8681 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8682 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8683 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8684 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8685 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8686 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8687 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8688 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8689 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8690 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8691 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8692 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8693 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8694 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8695 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8696 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8697 (45, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8704 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8705 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8707 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8708 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8710 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8711 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8712 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8714 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8715 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8716 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8717 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8719 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8721 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8722 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8723 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8724 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8725 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8727 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8728 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8731 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8732 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8733 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8735 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8737 let mut keys_data = None;
8739 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8740 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8741 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8742 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8743 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8744 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8745 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8746 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8747 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8748 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8752 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8753 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8754 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8757 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8759 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8760 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8761 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8763 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8765 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8766 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8767 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8768 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8769 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8770 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8771 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8772 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8774 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8775 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8777 Readable::read(reader)?
8779 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8782 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8783 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8785 Readable::read(reader)?
8787 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8789 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8790 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8791 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8796 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8797 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8798 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8799 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8800 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8801 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8802 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8803 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8804 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8805 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8806 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8807 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8809 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8810 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8813 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8814 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8817 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8818 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8820 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8822 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8823 blinding_point: None,
8827 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8828 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8829 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8830 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8831 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8832 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8833 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8834 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8835 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8836 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8837 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8838 blinding_point: None,
8840 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8841 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8842 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8844 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8845 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8846 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8848 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8852 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8853 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8854 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8855 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8858 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8859 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8860 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8862 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8863 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8864 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8865 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8868 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8869 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8870 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8871 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8874 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8876 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8878 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8879 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8880 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8881 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8883 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8884 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8885 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8886 // consider the stale state on reload.
8887 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8890 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8891 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8892 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8894 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8897 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8898 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8899 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8901 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8902 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8903 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8904 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8906 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8907 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8909 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8910 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8912 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8913 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8914 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8916 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8918 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8919 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8921 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8922 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8925 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8927 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8928 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8929 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8930 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8932 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8935 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8936 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8938 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8940 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8941 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8943 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8944 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8946 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8948 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8949 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8950 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8952 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8953 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8954 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8958 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8959 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8960 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8962 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8968 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8969 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8970 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8971 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8972 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8973 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8974 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8975 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8976 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8977 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8979 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8980 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8981 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8982 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8983 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8984 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8985 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8987 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8988 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8989 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8990 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8992 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8994 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8995 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8997 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8999 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9001 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9002 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9004 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9005 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9007 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9008 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9009 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9010 (2, channel_type, option),
9011 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9012 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9013 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9014 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9015 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9016 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9017 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9018 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9019 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9020 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9021 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9022 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9023 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9024 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9025 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9026 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9027 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9028 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9029 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9030 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9031 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9032 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9033 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9034 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9035 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9036 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9037 (45, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9040 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9041 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9042 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9043 // required channel parameters.
9044 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9045 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9047 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9049 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9050 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9051 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9052 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9055 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9056 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9057 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9059 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9060 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9062 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9063 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9068 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9069 if iter.next().is_some() {
9070 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9074 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9075 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9076 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9077 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9078 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9081 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9082 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9083 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9085 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9086 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9088 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9089 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9090 // separate u64 values.
9091 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9093 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9095 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9096 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9097 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9098 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9100 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9101 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9103 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9104 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9105 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9106 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9107 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9110 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9111 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9113 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9114 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9115 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9116 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9118 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9119 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9121 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9122 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9123 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9124 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9125 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9128 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9129 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9132 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9133 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9134 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9135 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9136 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9137 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9140 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9141 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9142 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9144 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9149 context: ChannelContext {
9152 config: config.unwrap(),
9156 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9157 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9158 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9161 temporary_channel_id,
9163 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9165 channel_value_satoshis,
9167 latest_monitor_update_id,
9169 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9170 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9173 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9174 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9177 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9178 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9179 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9180 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9184 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9185 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9186 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9187 monitor_pending_forwards,
9188 monitor_pending_failures,
9189 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9190 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9192 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9193 signer_pending_funding: false,
9196 holding_cell_update_fee,
9197 next_holder_htlc_id,
9198 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9199 update_time_counter,
9202 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9203 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9204 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9205 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9207 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9208 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9209 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9210 closing_fee_limits: None,
9211 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9213 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9214 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9216 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9218 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9219 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9220 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9221 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9222 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9223 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9224 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9225 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9226 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9229 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9231 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9232 funding_transaction,
9235 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9236 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9237 counterparty_node_id,
9239 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9243 channel_update_status,
9244 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9248 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9249 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9250 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9251 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9253 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9254 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9256 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9257 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9258 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9260 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9261 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9263 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9264 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9266 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9269 local_initiated_shutdown,
9271 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9273 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9274 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9282 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9283 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9284 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
9285 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9286 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
9287 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9288 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9289 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9290 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9291 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9292 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9293 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9294 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9295 use crate::ln::msgs;
9296 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9297 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9298 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9299 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9300 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9301 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9302 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9303 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9304 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9305 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9306 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9307 use crate::util::test_utils;
9308 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9309 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9310 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9311 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9312 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9313 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9314 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9315 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
9316 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9317 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
9318 use crate::prelude::*;
9321 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9322 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9323 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9324 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9326 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9327 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9328 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9329 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9332 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9335 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9336 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9342 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9343 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9344 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9345 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9349 signer: InMemorySigner,
9352 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9353 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9356 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9357 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9359 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9361 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9362 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9365 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9369 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9371 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9372 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9373 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9374 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9375 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9378 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9379 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9380 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9381 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9385 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9386 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9387 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9391 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9392 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9393 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9394 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9397 let seed = [42; 32];
9398 let network = Network::Testnet;
9399 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9400 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9401 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9404 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9405 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9406 let config = UserConfig::default();
9407 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9408 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9409 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9411 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9412 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9416 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9417 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9419 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9420 let original_fee = 253;
9421 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9422 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9423 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9424 let seed = [42; 32];
9425 let network = Network::Testnet;
9426 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9428 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9429 let config = UserConfig::default();
9430 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9432 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9433 // same as the old fee.
9434 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9435 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9436 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9440 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9441 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9442 // dust limits are used.
9443 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9444 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9445 let seed = [42; 32];
9446 let network = Network::Testnet;
9447 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9448 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9449 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9451 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9452 // they have different dust limits.
9454 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9455 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9456 let config = UserConfig::default();
9457 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9459 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9460 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9461 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9462 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9463 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9465 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9466 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9467 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9468 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9469 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9471 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9472 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9473 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9474 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9476 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9477 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9478 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9480 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9481 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9482 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9484 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9485 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9486 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9488 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9489 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9490 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9491 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9494 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9496 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9497 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9498 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9499 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9500 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9501 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9502 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9503 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9504 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9506 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9507 blinding_point: None,
9510 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9511 // the dust limit check.
9512 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9513 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9514 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9515 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9517 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9518 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9519 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9520 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9521 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9522 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9523 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9527 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9528 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9529 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9530 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9531 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9532 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9533 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9534 let seed = [42; 32];
9535 let network = Network::Testnet;
9536 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9538 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9539 let config = UserConfig::default();
9540 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9542 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9543 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9545 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9546 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9547 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9548 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9549 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9550 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9552 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9553 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9554 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9555 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9556 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9558 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9560 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9561 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9562 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9563 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9564 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9566 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9567 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9568 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9569 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9570 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9574 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9575 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9576 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9577 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9578 let seed = [42; 32];
9579 let network = Network::Testnet;
9580 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9581 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9582 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9584 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9586 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9587 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9588 let config = UserConfig::default();
9589 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9591 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9592 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9593 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9594 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9596 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9597 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9598 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9600 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9601 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9602 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9603 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9605 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9606 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9607 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9609 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9610 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9611 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9613 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9614 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9615 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9616 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9617 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9618 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9619 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9621 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9623 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9624 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9625 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9626 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9627 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9631 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9632 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9633 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9634 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9635 let seed = [42; 32];
9636 let network = Network::Testnet;
9637 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9638 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9639 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9641 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9642 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9643 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9644 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9645 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9646 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9647 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9648 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9650 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9651 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9652 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9653 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9654 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9655 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9657 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9658 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9659 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9660 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9662 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9664 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9665 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9666 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9667 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9668 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9669 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9671 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9672 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9673 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9674 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9676 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9677 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9678 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9679 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9680 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9682 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9683 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9685 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9686 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9687 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9689 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9690 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9691 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9692 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9693 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9695 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9696 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9698 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9699 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9700 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9704 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9706 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9707 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9708 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9710 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9711 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9712 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9713 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9715 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9716 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9717 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9719 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9721 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9722 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9725 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9726 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9727 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9728 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9729 let seed = [42; 32];
9730 let network = Network::Testnet;
9731 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9732 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9733 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9736 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9737 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9738 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9740 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9741 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9743 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9744 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9745 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9747 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9748 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9750 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9752 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9753 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9755 // Channel Negotiations failed
9756 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9757 assert!(result.is_err());
9762 fn channel_update() {
9763 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9764 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9765 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9766 let seed = [42; 32];
9767 let network = Network::Testnet;
9768 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9769 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9770 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9772 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9773 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9774 let config = UserConfig::default();
9775 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9777 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9778 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9779 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9780 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9781 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9783 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9784 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9785 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9786 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9787 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9789 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9790 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9791 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9792 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9794 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9795 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9796 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9798 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9799 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9800 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9802 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9803 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9804 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9806 short_channel_id: 0,
9809 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9810 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9811 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9813 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9814 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9816 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9818 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9820 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9821 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9822 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9823 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9825 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9826 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9827 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9829 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9832 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9836 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9837 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9839 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9840 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9841 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9842 let seed = [42; 32];
9843 let network = Network::Testnet;
9844 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9845 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9847 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9848 let config = UserConfig::default();
9849 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9850 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9851 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9853 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9854 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9855 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9857 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9858 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9859 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9861 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9862 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9863 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9864 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9865 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9868 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9870 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9871 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9872 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9873 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9877 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9878 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9879 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9881 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9884 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9886 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9887 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9888 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9889 blinding_point: None,
9891 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9892 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9894 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9897 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9900 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9902 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9905 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9906 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9907 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9909 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9910 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9913 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9914 blinding_point: None,
9916 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9917 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9920 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9921 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9923 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9924 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9926 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9929 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9930 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9931 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9932 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9933 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9934 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9935 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9936 } = &mut dummy_add {
9937 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9938 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9940 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9941 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9942 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9944 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9947 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9949 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9950 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9951 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9952 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9953 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9954 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9955 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9956 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9959 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9961 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9962 use bitcoin::sighash;
9963 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9964 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9965 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9966 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9967 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9968 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9969 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9970 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9971 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9972 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9973 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9974 use crate::sync::Arc;
9975 use core::str::FromStr;
9976 use hex::DisplayHex;
9978 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9979 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9980 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9981 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9983 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9985 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9986 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9987 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9988 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9989 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9991 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9992 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9998 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9999 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10000 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10002 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10003 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10004 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10005 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10006 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10007 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10009 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10011 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10012 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10013 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10014 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10015 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10016 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10018 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10019 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10020 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10021 selected_contest_delay: 144
10023 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10024 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10026 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10027 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10029 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10030 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10032 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10033 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10035 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10036 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10037 // build_commitment_transaction.
10038 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10039 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10040 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10041 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10042 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10044 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10045 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10046 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10047 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10051 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10052 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10053 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10054 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10058 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10059 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10060 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10062 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10063 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10065 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10066 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10068 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10070 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10071 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10072 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10073 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10074 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10075 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10076 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10078 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10079 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10080 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10081 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10083 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10084 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10085 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10087 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10089 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10090 commitment_tx.clone(),
10091 counterparty_signature,
10092 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10093 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10094 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10096 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10097 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10099 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10100 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10101 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10103 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10104 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10107 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10108 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10110 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10111 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10112 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10113 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10114 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10115 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10116 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10117 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10119 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10122 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10123 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10124 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10128 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10131 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10132 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10133 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10134 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10135 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10136 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10138 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10139 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10140 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10141 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10142 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10143 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10144 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10145 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10146 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10147 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10149 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10150 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10151 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10152 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10153 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10154 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10156 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10160 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10161 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10162 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10163 "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", {});
10165 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10166 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10168 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10169 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10170 "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", {});
10172 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10173 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10174 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10175 "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", {});
10177 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10178 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10180 amount_msat: 1000000,
10182 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10183 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10185 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10188 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10189 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10191 amount_msat: 2000000,
10193 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10194 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10196 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10199 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10200 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10202 amount_msat: 2000000,
10204 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10205 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10206 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10207 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10208 blinding_point: None,
10210 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10213 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10214 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10216 amount_msat: 3000000,
10218 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10219 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10220 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10221 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10222 blinding_point: None,
10224 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10227 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10228 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10230 amount_msat: 4000000,
10232 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10233 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10235 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10239 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10240 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10241 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10243 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10244 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10245 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10248 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10249 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10250 "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" },
10253 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10254 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10255 "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" },
10258 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10259 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10260 "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" },
10263 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10264 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10265 "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" },
10268 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10269 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10270 "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" }
10273 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10274 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10275 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10277 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10278 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10279 "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", {
10282 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10283 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10284 "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" },
10287 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10288 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10289 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10292 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10293 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10294 "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" },
10297 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10298 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10299 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10302 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10303 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10304 "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" }
10307 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10308 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10309 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10311 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10312 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10313 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10316 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10317 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10318 "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" },
10321 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10322 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10323 "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" },
10326 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10327 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10328 "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" },
10331 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10332 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10333 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10336 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10337 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10338 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10339 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10341 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10342 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10343 "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", {
10346 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10347 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10348 "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" },
10351 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10352 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10353 "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" },
10356 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10357 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10358 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
10361 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10362 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10363 "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" }
10366 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10367 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10368 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10369 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10371 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10372 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10373 "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", {
10376 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10377 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10378 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10381 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10382 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10383 "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" },
10386 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10387 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10388 "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" },
10391 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10392 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10393 "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" }
10396 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10397 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10398 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10400 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10401 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10402 "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", {
10405 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10406 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10407 "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" },
10410 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10411 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10412 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10415 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10416 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10417 "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" }
10420 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10421 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10422 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10424 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10425 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10426 "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", {
10429 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10430 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10431 "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" },
10434 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10435 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10436 "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" },
10439 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10440 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10441 "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" }
10444 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10445 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10446 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10448 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10449 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10450 "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", {
10453 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10454 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10455 "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" },
10458 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10459 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10460 "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" }
10463 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10464 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10465 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10466 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10467 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10468 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10470 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10471 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10472 "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", {
10475 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10476 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10477 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
10480 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10481 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10482 "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" }
10485 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10486 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10487 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10488 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10489 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10491 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10492 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10493 "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", {
10496 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10497 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10498 "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" },
10501 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10502 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10503 "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" }
10506 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10507 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10508 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10510 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10511 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10512 "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", {
10515 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10516 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10517 "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" }
10520 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10521 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10522 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10523 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10524 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10526 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10527 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10528 "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", {
10531 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10532 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10533 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
10536 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10537 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10538 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10539 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10540 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10542 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10543 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10544 "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", {
10547 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10548 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10549 "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" }
10552 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10553 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10554 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10555 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10557 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10558 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10559 "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", {});
10561 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10562 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10563 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10564 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10565 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10567 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10568 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10569 "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", {});
10571 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10572 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10573 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10574 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10575 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10577 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10578 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10579 "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", {});
10581 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10582 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10583 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10585 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10586 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10587 "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", {});
10589 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10590 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10591 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10592 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10593 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10595 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10596 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10597 "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", {});
10599 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10600 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10601 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10602 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10603 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10605 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10606 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10607 "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", {});
10609 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10610 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10611 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10612 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10613 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10614 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10616 amount_msat: 2000000,
10618 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10619 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10621 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10624 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10625 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10626 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10628 amount_msat: 5000001,
10630 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10631 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10632 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10633 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10634 blinding_point: None,
10636 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10639 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10640 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10642 amount_msat: 5000000,
10644 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10645 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10646 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10647 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10648 blinding_point: None,
10650 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10654 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10655 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10656 "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", {
10659 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10660 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10661 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce501473044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
10663 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10664 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10665 "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" },
10667 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10668 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10669 "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" }
10672 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10673 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10674 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10675 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10678 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10679 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10680 "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" },
10682 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10683 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10684 "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" },
10686 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10687 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10688 "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" }
10693 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10694 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10696 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10697 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10698 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10699 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10701 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10702 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10703 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10705 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10706 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10708 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10709 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10711 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10712 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10713 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10717 fn test_key_derivation() {
10718 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10719 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10721 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10722 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10724 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10725 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10727 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10728 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10730 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10731 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10733 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10734 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10736 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10737 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10741 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10742 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10743 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10744 let seed = [42; 32];
10745 let network = Network::Testnet;
10746 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10747 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10749 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10750 let config = UserConfig::default();
10751 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10752 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10754 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10755 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10757 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10758 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10759 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10760 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10761 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10762 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10763 assert!(res.is_ok());
10767 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10768 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10769 // resulting `channel_type`.
10770 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10771 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10772 let network = Network::Testnet;
10773 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10774 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10776 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10777 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10779 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10780 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10782 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10783 // need to signal it.
10784 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10785 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10786 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10787 &config, 0, 42, None
10789 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10791 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10792 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10793 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10795 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10796 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10797 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10801 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10802 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10803 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10804 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10805 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10808 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10809 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10813 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10814 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10815 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10816 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10817 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10818 let network = Network::Testnet;
10819 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10820 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10822 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10823 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10825 let config = UserConfig::default();
10827 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10828 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10829 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10830 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10831 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10833 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10834 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10835 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10839 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10840 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10841 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10843 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10844 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10845 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10846 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10847 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10848 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10850 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10854 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10855 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10857 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10858 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10859 let network = Network::Testnet;
10860 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10861 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10863 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10864 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10866 let config = UserConfig::default();
10868 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10869 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10870 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10871 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10872 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10873 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10874 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10875 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10877 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10878 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10879 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10880 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10881 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10882 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10886 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10887 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10889 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10890 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10891 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10892 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10894 assert!(res.is_err());
10896 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10897 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10898 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10900 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10901 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10902 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10905 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10907 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10908 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10909 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10910 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10913 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10914 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10916 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10917 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10919 assert!(res.is_err());
10923 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10924 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10925 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10926 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10927 let seed = [42; 32];
10928 let network = Network::Testnet;
10929 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10930 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10931 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10933 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10934 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10935 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10936 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10938 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10939 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10940 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10945 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10955 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10956 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10957 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10962 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10963 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10969 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10972 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10973 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10974 &accept_channel_msg,
10975 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10976 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10979 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10980 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10981 let tx = Transaction {
10983 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10987 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10990 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10993 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10994 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10995 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10996 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10997 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10998 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11002 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11003 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11011 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11012 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11013 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11014 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11016 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11017 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11024 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11025 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11026 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11027 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11028 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11030 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11031 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11032 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11040 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11041 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11044 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11045 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11046 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11047 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());