1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, WithChannelMonitor, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
264 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
265 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
266 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
267 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
268 struct $flag_type(u32);
273 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
276 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
278 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
281 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
284 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
285 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
288 Ok($flag_type(flags))
293 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
296 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
299 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
301 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
303 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
305 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
307 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
308 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
310 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
312 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
314 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
315 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
318 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
319 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
321 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
322 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
323 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
325 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
327 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
328 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
330 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
332 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
334 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
335 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
337 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
338 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
340 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
341 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
346 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
349 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
350 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
351 pub const FUNDING_CREATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
352 pub const FUNDING_SENT: u32 = 1 << 3;
353 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
354 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
355 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
356 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
357 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
358 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
359 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
360 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
361 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
362 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
366 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
368 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
369 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
370 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
371 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
372 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
373 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
374 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
375 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
376 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
377 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
382 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
383 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
384 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
385 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
386 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
387 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
392 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::FundingSent`].",
393 FUNDED_STATE, FundingSentFlags, [
394 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
395 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
396 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
397 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
398 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
399 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
400 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
401 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
402 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
407 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
408 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
409 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
410 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
411 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
412 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
413 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
417 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
419 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
420 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
421 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
422 /// `FundingSent`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
423 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
425 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
426 /// funding transaction to confirm.
427 FundingSent(FundingSentFlags),
428 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
430 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
431 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
432 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
436 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
437 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
439 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
442 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
451 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
453 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
457 fn $clear(&mut self) {
460 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
462 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
466 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
467 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [FundingSent, ChannelReady]);
469 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
470 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
475 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
477 state_flags::FUNDING_CREATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingCreated),
478 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
480 if val & state_flags::FUNDING_SENT == state_flags::FUNDING_SENT {
481 FundingSentFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::FUNDING_SENT)
482 .map(|flags| ChannelState::FundingSent(flags))
483 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
484 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
485 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
486 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
487 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
495 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
497 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
498 ChannelState::FundingCreated => state_flags::FUNDING_CREATED,
499 ChannelState::FundingSent(flags) => state_flags::FUNDING_SENT | flags.0,
500 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
501 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
505 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
506 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingCreated)
509 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
510 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
513 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
515 ChannelState::FundingSent(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
516 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
517 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
521 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
523 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
524 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
525 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
526 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
528 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
534 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
535 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
536 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
537 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
538 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
539 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
540 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
541 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
542 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
543 FundingSentFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, FundingSent);
544 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
545 FundingSentFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, FundingSent);
546 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
547 FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, FundingSent);
548 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
549 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
552 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
554 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
556 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
557 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
558 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
559 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
565 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
567 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
569 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
570 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
571 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
572 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
573 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
575 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
576 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
578 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
580 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
581 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
583 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
584 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
585 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
586 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
587 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
588 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
590 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
591 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
593 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
594 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
595 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
596 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
597 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
599 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
600 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
602 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
603 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
605 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
606 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
607 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
608 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
614 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
615 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
617 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
618 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
619 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
624 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
625 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
627 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
628 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
629 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
636 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
637 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
640 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
641 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
642 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
643 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
644 self.logger.log(record)
648 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
649 where L::Target: Logger {
650 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
651 where S::Target: SignerProvider
655 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
656 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
661 macro_rules! secp_check {
662 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
665 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
670 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
671 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
672 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
673 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
674 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
675 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
676 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
677 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
679 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
681 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
683 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
687 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
689 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
690 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
691 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
693 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
694 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
696 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
697 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
698 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
699 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
700 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
702 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
703 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
707 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
713 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
716 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
717 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
718 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
719 holding_cell_msat: u64,
720 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
723 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
724 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
725 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
726 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
727 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
728 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
729 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
730 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
731 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
732 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
733 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
736 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
737 struct HTLCCandidate {
739 origin: HTLCInitiator,
743 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
751 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
753 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
755 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
756 htlc_value_msat: u64,
757 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
762 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
763 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
764 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
765 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
766 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
768 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
769 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
770 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
771 htlc_value_msat: u64,
773 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
774 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
778 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
779 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
780 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
781 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
782 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
783 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
784 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
785 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
786 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
787 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
788 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
791 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
793 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
794 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
795 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
796 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
797 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
800 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
801 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
802 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
803 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
804 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
805 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
806 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
807 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
810 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
812 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
813 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
814 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
815 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
816 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
817 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
818 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
819 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
820 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
821 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
824 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
825 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
826 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
827 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
828 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
829 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
830 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
831 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
832 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
833 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
834 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
835 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
836 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
837 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
838 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
840 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
841 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
842 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
843 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
845 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
846 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
847 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
848 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
850 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
851 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
852 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
853 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
854 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
856 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
857 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
858 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
859 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
861 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
862 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
863 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
865 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
866 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
867 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
868 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
869 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
871 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
872 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
875 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
876 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
878 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
879 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
880 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
881 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
883 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
884 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
886 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
887 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
890 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
891 (0, update, required),
894 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
895 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
896 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
897 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
898 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
902 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
903 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
904 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
906 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
908 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
909 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
910 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
914 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
916 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
917 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
923 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
924 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
925 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
926 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
927 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
929 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
930 /// in a timely manner.
931 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
934 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
935 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
936 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
938 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
939 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
940 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
941 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
945 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
946 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
947 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
949 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
950 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
951 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
952 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
954 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
958 /// The current channel ID.
959 channel_id: ChannelId,
960 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
961 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
962 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
963 channel_state: ChannelState,
965 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
966 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
968 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
969 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
970 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
972 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
973 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
974 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
975 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
977 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
978 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
980 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
982 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
983 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
984 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
986 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
987 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
988 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
990 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
991 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
992 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
993 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
994 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
995 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
997 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
998 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
999 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1000 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1001 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1002 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1004 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1006 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1007 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1008 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1010 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1011 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1012 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1013 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1014 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1015 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1016 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1018 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1019 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1020 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1022 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1023 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1024 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1025 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1026 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1027 /// outbound or inbound.
1028 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1030 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1032 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1033 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1034 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1035 // HTLCs with similar state.
1036 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1037 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1038 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1039 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1040 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1041 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1042 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1043 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1044 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1045 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1047 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1048 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1049 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1051 update_time_counter: u32,
1053 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1054 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1055 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1056 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1057 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1058 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1060 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1061 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1063 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1064 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1065 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1066 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1068 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1069 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1071 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1073 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1075 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1076 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1077 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1078 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1079 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1081 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1082 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1084 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1085 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1086 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1088 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1089 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1090 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1091 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1092 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1093 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1094 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1095 channel_creation_height: u32,
1097 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1100 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1102 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1105 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1107 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1110 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1112 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1114 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1115 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1118 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1120 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1122 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1123 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1125 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1127 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1128 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1129 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1131 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1133 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1134 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1135 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1137 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1138 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1139 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1141 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1143 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1145 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1146 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1147 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1148 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1150 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1151 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1152 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1154 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1155 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1156 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1158 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1159 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1160 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1161 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1162 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1163 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1164 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1165 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1167 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1168 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1169 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1170 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1171 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1173 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1174 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1176 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1177 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1178 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1179 /// unblock the state machine.
1181 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1182 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1183 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1185 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1186 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1187 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1189 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1190 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1191 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1192 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1193 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1194 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1195 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1196 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1198 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1199 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1201 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1202 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1203 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1205 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1206 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1207 // associated channel mapping.
1209 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1210 // to store all of them.
1211 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1213 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1214 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1215 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1216 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1217 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1219 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1220 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1222 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1223 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1225 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1226 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1227 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1229 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1230 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1231 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1234 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1235 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1236 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1237 self.update_time_counter
1240 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1241 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1244 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1245 self.config.announced_channel
1248 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1249 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1252 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1253 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1254 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1255 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1258 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1259 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1260 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1263 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1264 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1265 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1266 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1267 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1268 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1269 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1272 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1273 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1274 match self.channel_state {
1275 ChannelState::FundingSent(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1276 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1277 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1278 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1279 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1280 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1281 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1283 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1285 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1286 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1290 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1291 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1292 ChannelState::FundingSent(flags) =>
1293 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1294 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1295 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1298 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1299 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1300 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1304 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1305 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1306 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1307 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1308 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1311 // Public utilities:
1313 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1317 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1319 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1320 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1321 self.temporary_channel_id
1324 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1328 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1329 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1330 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1334 /// Gets the channel's type
1335 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1339 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1341 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1342 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1343 self.short_channel_id
1346 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1347 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1348 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1351 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1352 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1353 self.outbound_scid_alias
1356 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1358 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1359 return &self.holder_signer
1362 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1363 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1364 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1365 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1366 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1367 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1370 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1371 /// get_funding_created.
1372 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1373 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1376 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1377 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1378 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1379 if conf_height > 0 {
1386 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1387 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1388 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1391 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1392 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1393 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1394 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1398 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1401 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1402 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1405 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1406 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1409 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1410 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1411 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1414 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1415 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1418 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1419 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1420 self.counterparty_node_id
1423 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1424 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1425 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1428 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1429 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1430 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1433 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1434 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1436 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1437 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1438 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1439 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1441 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1445 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1446 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1447 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1450 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1451 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1452 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1455 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1456 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1457 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1459 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1460 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1465 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1466 self.channel_value_satoshis
1469 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1470 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1473 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1474 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1477 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1478 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1479 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1481 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1482 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1483 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1484 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1485 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1487 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1491 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1492 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1493 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1496 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1497 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1498 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1501 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1502 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1503 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1506 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1507 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1508 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1511 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1512 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1513 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1516 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1517 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1518 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1521 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1522 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1523 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1524 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1525 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1528 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1530 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1531 self.prev_config = None;
1535 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1536 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1540 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1541 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1542 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1543 let did_channel_update =
1544 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1545 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1546 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1547 if did_channel_update {
1548 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1549 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1550 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1551 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1553 self.config.options = *config;
1557 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1558 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1559 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1560 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1561 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(flags) if flags.is_set(FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1564 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1565 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1566 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1567 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1568 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1570 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1571 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1572 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1573 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1574 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1575 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1576 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1578 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1579 where L::Target: Logger
1581 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1582 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1583 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1585 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1586 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1587 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1588 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1590 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1591 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1592 if match update_state {
1593 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1594 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1595 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1596 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1597 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1599 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1603 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1604 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1605 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1607 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1609 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1610 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1611 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1613 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1614 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1615 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1616 transaction_output_index: None
1621 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1622 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1623 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1624 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1625 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1628 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1630 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1631 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1632 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1634 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1635 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1638 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1639 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1642 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1644 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1645 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1646 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1648 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1649 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1655 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1657 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1658 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1659 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1660 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1661 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1662 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1663 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1667 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1668 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1670 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1672 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1673 if generated_by_local {
1674 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1675 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1676 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1686 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1688 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1689 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1690 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1691 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1692 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1693 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1694 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1697 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1698 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1699 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1700 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1704 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1705 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1709 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1710 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1712 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1714 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1715 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1717 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1718 if !generated_by_local {
1719 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1727 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1728 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1729 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1730 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1731 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1732 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1733 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1734 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1736 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1738 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1739 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1740 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1741 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1743 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1745 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1746 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1747 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1748 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1751 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1752 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1753 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1754 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1756 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1759 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1760 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1761 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1762 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1764 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1767 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1768 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1773 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1774 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1779 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1781 let channel_parameters =
1782 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1783 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1784 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1791 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1794 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1795 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1796 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1797 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1799 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1800 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1801 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1809 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1810 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1811 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1812 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1817 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1818 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1819 /// our counterparty!)
1820 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1821 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1822 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1823 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1824 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1825 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1826 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1828 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1832 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1833 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1834 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1835 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1836 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1837 //may see payments to it!
1838 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1839 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1840 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1842 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1845 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1846 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1847 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1848 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1849 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1852 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1853 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1856 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1860 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1861 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1862 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1863 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1864 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1865 // which are near the dust limit.
1866 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1867 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1868 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1869 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1870 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1872 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1873 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1875 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1878 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1879 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1880 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1883 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1884 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1886 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1887 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1888 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1889 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1890 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1891 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1892 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1895 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1898 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1899 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1900 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1902 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1903 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1904 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1905 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1906 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1907 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1909 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1910 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1916 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1917 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1919 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1920 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1921 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1922 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1923 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1924 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1925 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1928 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1931 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1932 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1933 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1935 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1936 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1937 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1938 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1939 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1940 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1942 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1943 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1947 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1948 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1949 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1950 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1951 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1952 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1953 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1955 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1956 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1958 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1965 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1966 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1967 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1968 /// corner case properly.
1969 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1970 -> AvailableBalances
1971 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1973 let context = &self;
1974 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1975 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1976 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1978 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1979 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1980 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1981 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1984 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1986 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1987 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1989 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1991 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1993 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1994 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1998 if context.is_outbound() {
1999 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2000 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2002 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2003 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2005 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2006 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2007 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2008 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2011 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2012 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2013 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2014 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2015 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2016 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2017 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2020 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2021 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2022 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2023 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2024 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2025 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2026 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2027 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2028 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2029 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2030 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2032 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2035 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2036 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2037 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2038 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2039 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2042 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2043 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2045 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2046 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2047 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2049 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2050 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2051 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2052 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2056 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2058 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2059 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2060 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2061 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2062 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2063 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2064 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2066 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2067 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2069 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2070 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2071 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2073 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2074 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2075 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2076 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2077 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2080 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2081 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2082 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2083 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2084 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2085 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2088 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2089 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2090 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2092 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2096 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2097 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2099 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2100 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2104 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2105 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2106 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2107 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2109 outbound_capacity_msat,
2110 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2111 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2116 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2117 let context = &self;
2118 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2121 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2122 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2124 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2125 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2127 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2128 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2130 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2131 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2132 let context = &self;
2133 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2135 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2138 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2139 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2141 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2142 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2144 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2145 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2147 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2148 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2152 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2153 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2159 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2160 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2161 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2164 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2165 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2166 included_htlcs += 1;
2169 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2170 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2174 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2175 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2176 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2177 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2178 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2179 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2184 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2186 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2187 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2192 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2193 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2197 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2198 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2199 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2202 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2203 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2205 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2206 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2207 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2209 total_pending_htlcs,
2210 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2211 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2212 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2214 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2215 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2216 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2218 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2220 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2225 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2226 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2228 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2229 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2231 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2232 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2234 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2235 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2236 let context = &self;
2237 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2239 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2242 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2243 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2245 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2246 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2248 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2249 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2251 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2252 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2256 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2257 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2263 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2264 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2265 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2266 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2267 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2268 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2271 included_htlcs += 1;
2274 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2275 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2278 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2279 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2281 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2282 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2283 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2288 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2289 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2290 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2293 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2294 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2296 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2297 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2299 total_pending_htlcs,
2300 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2301 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2302 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2304 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2305 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2306 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2308 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2310 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2315 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2316 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2317 match self.channel_state {
2318 ChannelState::FundingCreated => f(),
2319 ChannelState::FundingSent(flags) => if flags.is_set(FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) {
2328 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2330 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2331 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2334 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2336 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2337 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2338 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2342 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2343 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2344 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2347 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2349 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2350 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2353 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2354 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2355 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2356 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2357 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2358 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2359 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2360 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2361 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2362 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2363 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2365 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2366 // return them to fail the payment.
2367 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2368 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2369 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2371 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2372 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2377 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2378 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2379 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2380 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2381 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2382 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2383 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2384 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2385 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2386 ChannelState::FundingSent(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2389 if generate_monitor_update {
2390 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2391 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2392 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2393 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2397 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2399 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2400 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2403 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2404 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2405 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2406 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2410 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2411 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2412 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2413 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2414 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2415 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2416 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2417 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2418 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2420 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2425 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2426 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2427 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2430 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2431 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2432 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2433 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2436 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2438 next_local_nonce: None,
2442 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2443 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2444 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2445 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2447 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2448 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2449 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2450 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2452 match &self.holder_signer {
2453 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2454 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2455 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2456 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2457 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2460 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2464 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2465 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2466 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2467 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2468 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2469 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2472 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2473 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2475 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2482 // Internal utility functions for channels
2484 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2485 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2486 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2488 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2490 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2491 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2492 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2494 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2497 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2499 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2502 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2503 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2504 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2506 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2508 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2509 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2510 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2511 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2512 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2515 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2516 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2517 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2518 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2519 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2520 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2521 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2524 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2525 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2527 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2528 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2531 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2532 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2533 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2534 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2535 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2536 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2539 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2540 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2541 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2542 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2545 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2546 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2548 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2549 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2550 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2554 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2555 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2556 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2558 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2559 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2560 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2561 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2563 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2564 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2566 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2568 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2569 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2570 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2571 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2573 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2574 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2578 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2584 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2585 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2586 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2587 // outside of those situations will fail.
2588 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2592 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2597 1 + // script length (0)
2601 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2602 2 + // witness marker and flag
2603 1 + // witness element count
2604 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2605 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2606 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2607 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2608 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2609 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2611 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2612 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2613 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2619 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2620 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2621 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2622 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2624 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2625 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2626 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2628 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2629 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2630 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2631 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2632 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2633 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2636 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2637 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2640 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2641 value_to_holder = 0;
2644 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2645 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2646 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2647 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2649 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2650 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2653 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2654 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2657 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2660 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2661 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2663 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2665 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2666 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2667 where L::Target: Logger {
2668 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2669 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2670 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2671 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2672 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2673 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2674 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2675 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2679 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2680 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2681 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2682 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2684 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2685 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2688 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2689 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2690 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2692 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2693 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2694 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2695 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2696 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2697 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2698 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2700 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2701 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2702 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2704 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2705 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2707 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2710 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2711 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2715 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2719 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2720 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2721 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2722 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2723 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2724 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2727 // Now update local state:
2729 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2730 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2731 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2732 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2733 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2734 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2735 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2739 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2740 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2741 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2742 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2743 // do not not get into this branch.
2744 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2745 match pending_update {
2746 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2747 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2748 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2749 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2751 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2752 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2755 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2756 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2757 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2758 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2759 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2760 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2761 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2767 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2768 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2769 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2771 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2772 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2773 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2775 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2776 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2779 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2780 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2782 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2783 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2785 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2786 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2789 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2792 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2793 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2794 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2795 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2800 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2801 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2802 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2803 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2804 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2805 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2806 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2807 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2808 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2809 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2810 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2811 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2812 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2813 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2814 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2816 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2817 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2818 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2819 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2820 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2823 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2824 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2825 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2831 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2832 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2834 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2838 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2839 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2840 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2841 /// before we fail backwards.
2843 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2844 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2845 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2846 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2847 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2848 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2849 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2852 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2853 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2854 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2855 /// before we fail backwards.
2857 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2858 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2859 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2860 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2861 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2862 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2863 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2866 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2867 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2868 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2870 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2871 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2872 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2874 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2875 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2876 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2878 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2883 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2890 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2891 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2892 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2893 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2894 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2898 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2899 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2900 force_holding_cell = true;
2903 // Now update local state:
2904 if force_holding_cell {
2905 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2906 match pending_update {
2907 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2908 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2909 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2910 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2914 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2915 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2916 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2917 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2923 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2924 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2925 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2931 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2933 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2934 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2937 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2938 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2939 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2944 // Message handlers:
2946 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2947 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2948 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2949 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2950 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>, ChannelError>
2954 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2957 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingCreated) {
2958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2960 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2961 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2962 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2963 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2966 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2968 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2969 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2970 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2971 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2973 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2974 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2976 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2977 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2979 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2980 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2981 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2982 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2983 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2988 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2989 initial_commitment_tx,
2992 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2993 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2996 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2997 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3000 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3001 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3002 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3003 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
3004 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
3005 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
3006 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
3007 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
3008 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3009 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
3010 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
3011 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
3013 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
3014 let logger_with_chan_monitor = WithChannelMonitor::from(logger, &channel_monitor);
3015 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
3016 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
3017 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
3018 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
3019 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
3020 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
3021 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), &&logger_with_chan_monitor);
3023 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
3024 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
3025 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent(FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
3027 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent(FundingSentFlags::new());
3029 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3030 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3032 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3034 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
3035 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3039 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3040 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3041 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3042 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3043 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3044 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3045 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3048 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3049 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3051 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3052 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3053 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3054 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3056 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3059 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3060 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3061 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3064 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3065 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3066 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3067 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3068 // when routing outbound payments.
3069 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3073 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3074 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3075 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3076 match &self.context.channel_state {
3077 ChannelState::FundingSent(flags) => {
3078 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
3079 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(FundingSentFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3080 if flags & !FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == FundingSentFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3081 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3082 check_reconnection = true;
3083 } else if (flags & !FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3084 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3085 } else if flags == FundingSentFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3086 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3087 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3089 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3090 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3093 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3094 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3095 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3097 if check_reconnection {
3098 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3099 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3100 let expected_point =
3101 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3102 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3104 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3105 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3106 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3107 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3108 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3109 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3111 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3112 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3113 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3114 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3115 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3117 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3123 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3124 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3126 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3128 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3131 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3132 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3133 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3134 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3135 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3136 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3138 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3141 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3142 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3143 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3145 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3146 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3149 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3150 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3152 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3155 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3158 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3162 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3163 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3164 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3167 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3171 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3172 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3173 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3174 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3175 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3176 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3177 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3178 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3179 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3180 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3181 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3183 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3184 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3185 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3186 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3187 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3188 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3192 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3193 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3196 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3197 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3198 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3200 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3201 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3202 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3203 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3204 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3205 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3206 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3210 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3211 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3212 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3213 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3214 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3215 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3216 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3220 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3221 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3222 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3223 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3224 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3228 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3229 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3231 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3232 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3233 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3235 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3236 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3240 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3243 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3248 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3249 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3253 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3254 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3255 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3256 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3257 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3258 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3259 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3260 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3261 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3263 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3264 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3265 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3266 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3267 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3270 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3271 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3272 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3273 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3277 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3280 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3284 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3285 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3286 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3290 // Now update local state:
3291 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3292 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3293 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3294 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3295 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3296 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3297 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3302 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3304 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3305 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3306 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3307 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3308 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3309 None => fail_reason.into(),
3310 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3311 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3312 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3315 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3319 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3321 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3322 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3330 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3333 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3334 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3337 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3341 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3344 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3345 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3348 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3352 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3356 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3357 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3360 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3361 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3364 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3368 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3369 where L::Target: Logger
3371 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3374 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3377 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3381 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3383 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3385 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3386 let commitment_txid = {
3387 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3388 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3389 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3391 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3392 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3393 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3394 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3395 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3400 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3402 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3403 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3404 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3405 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3408 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3409 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3410 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3416 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3417 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3418 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3419 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3420 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3421 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3422 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3423 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3424 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3425 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3426 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3432 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3433 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3436 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3437 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3438 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3439 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3440 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3441 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3442 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3443 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3444 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3445 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3446 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3447 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3448 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3451 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3452 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3453 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3454 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3455 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3456 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3457 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3459 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3460 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3461 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3462 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3463 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3464 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3465 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3468 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3469 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3472 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3474 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3475 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3476 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3479 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3482 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3483 commitment_stats.tx,
3485 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3486 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3487 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3490 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3491 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3493 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3494 let mut need_commitment = false;
3495 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3496 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3497 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3498 need_commitment = true;
3502 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3503 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3504 Some(forward_info.clone())
3506 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3507 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3508 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3509 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3510 need_commitment = true;
3513 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3514 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3515 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3516 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3517 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3518 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3519 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3520 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3521 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3522 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3523 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3524 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3525 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3526 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3528 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3530 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3531 need_commitment = true;
3535 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3536 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3537 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3538 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3539 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3540 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3542 nondust_htlc_sources,
3546 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3547 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3548 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3549 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3550 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3552 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3553 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3554 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3555 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3556 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3557 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3558 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3559 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3560 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3561 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3562 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3563 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3564 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3565 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3567 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3568 &self.context.channel_id);
3569 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3572 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3573 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3574 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3575 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3576 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3577 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3578 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3579 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3580 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3584 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3585 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3586 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3587 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3590 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3591 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3592 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3593 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3594 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3595 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3596 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3598 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3599 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3600 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3603 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3604 /// for our counterparty.
3605 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3606 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3607 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3608 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3610 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3611 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3612 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3613 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3615 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3616 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3617 updates: Vec::new(),
3620 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3621 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3622 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3623 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3624 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3625 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3626 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3627 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3628 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3629 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3630 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3631 // to rebalance channels.
3632 match &htlc_update {
3633 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3634 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3635 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3637 match self.send_htlc(
3638 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3639 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3641 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3644 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3645 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3646 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3647 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3648 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3649 // into the holding cell without ever being
3650 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3651 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3652 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3655 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3661 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3662 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3663 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3664 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3665 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3666 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3667 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3668 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3669 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3670 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3671 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3672 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3674 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3675 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3676 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3677 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3678 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3679 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3680 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3681 // for a full revocation before failing.
3682 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3683 update_fail_count += 1;
3686 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3688 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3695 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3696 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3698 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3699 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3704 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3705 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3706 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3707 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3708 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3710 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3711 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3712 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3714 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3715 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3721 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3722 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3723 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3724 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3725 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3726 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3727 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3728 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3729 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3731 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3732 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3734 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3737 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3741 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3743 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3744 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3749 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3750 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3751 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3752 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3753 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3754 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3755 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3756 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3760 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3762 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3763 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3766 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3767 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3768 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3769 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3771 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3773 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3778 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3779 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3780 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3781 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3782 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3783 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3784 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3785 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3789 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3790 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3791 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3792 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3793 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3794 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3795 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3796 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3797 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3799 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3800 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3803 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3804 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3805 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3806 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3807 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3808 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3809 let mut require_commitment = false;
3810 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3813 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3814 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3815 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3816 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3818 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3819 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3820 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3821 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3822 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3823 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3825 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3829 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3830 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3831 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3832 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3833 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3835 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3836 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3837 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3842 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3843 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3845 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3849 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3850 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3852 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3853 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3854 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3855 require_commitment = true;
3856 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3857 match forward_info {
3858 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3859 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3860 require_commitment = true;
3862 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3863 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3864 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3866 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3867 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3868 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3872 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3873 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3874 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3875 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3881 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3882 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3883 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3884 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3885 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3887 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3888 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3889 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3890 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3891 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3892 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3893 require_commitment = true;
3897 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3899 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3900 match update_state {
3901 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3902 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3903 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3904 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3905 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3906 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3908 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3909 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3910 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3911 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3912 require_commitment = true;
3913 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3914 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3919 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3920 let release_state_str =
3921 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3922 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3923 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3924 if !release_monitor {
3925 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3926 update: monitor_update,
3928 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3930 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3935 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3936 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3937 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3938 if require_commitment {
3939 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3940 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3941 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3942 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3944 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3945 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3946 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3947 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3948 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3950 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3951 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3952 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3953 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3954 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3957 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3958 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3959 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3960 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3961 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3962 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3964 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3965 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3967 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3968 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3970 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3971 if require_commitment {
3972 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3974 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3975 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3976 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3977 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3979 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3980 &self.context.channel_id(),
3981 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3984 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3985 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3987 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3988 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3990 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3991 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3997 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3998 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3999 /// commitment update.
4000 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4001 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4002 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4004 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4005 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4008 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4009 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4010 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4011 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4013 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4014 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4015 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4016 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4017 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4018 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4019 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4021 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4022 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4024 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4025 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4027 if !self.context.is_live() {
4028 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4031 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4032 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4033 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4034 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4035 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4036 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4037 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4038 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4039 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4040 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4044 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4045 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4046 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4047 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4048 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4049 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4052 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4053 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4057 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4058 force_holding_cell = true;
4061 if force_holding_cell {
4062 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4066 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4067 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4069 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4070 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4075 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4076 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4078 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4080 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4081 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4082 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4083 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4087 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4088 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4089 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4093 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4094 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4097 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4098 // will be retransmitted.
4099 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4100 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4101 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4103 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4104 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4106 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4107 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4108 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4109 // this HTLC accordingly
4110 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4113 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4114 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4115 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4116 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4119 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4120 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4121 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4122 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4123 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4124 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4129 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4131 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4132 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4133 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4134 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4138 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4139 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4140 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4141 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4142 // the update upon reconnection.
4143 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4147 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4149 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4150 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4154 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4155 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4156 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4157 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4158 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4159 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4160 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4162 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4163 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4164 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4165 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4166 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4167 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4168 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4170 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4171 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4172 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4173 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4174 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4175 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4176 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4179 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4180 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4181 /// to the remote side.
4182 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4183 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4184 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4185 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4188 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4190 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4191 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4193 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
4194 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4195 // first received the funding_signed.
4196 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4197 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4198 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(flags) if !flags.is_set(FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4199 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4201 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4203 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4204 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4205 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4206 funding_broadcastable = None;
4209 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4210 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4211 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4212 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4213 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4214 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4215 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4216 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4217 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4218 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4219 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4220 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4221 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4222 next_per_commitment_point,
4223 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4227 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4229 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4230 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4231 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4232 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4233 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4234 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4236 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4237 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4238 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4239 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4240 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4241 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4245 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4246 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4248 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4249 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4251 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4252 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4255 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4256 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4257 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4258 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4259 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4260 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4261 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4262 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4263 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4267 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4268 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4270 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4273 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4276 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4278 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4279 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4280 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4281 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4282 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4283 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4284 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4285 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4286 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4287 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4289 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4291 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4293 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4299 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4302 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4303 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4304 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4306 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4307 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4309 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4310 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4312 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4313 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4316 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4317 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4318 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4319 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4320 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4322 SignerResumeUpdates {
4330 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4331 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4332 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4333 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4334 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4335 per_commitment_secret,
4336 next_per_commitment_point,
4338 next_local_nonce: None,
4342 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4343 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4344 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4345 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4346 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4347 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4349 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4350 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4351 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4352 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4353 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4354 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4355 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4356 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4357 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4358 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4359 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4364 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4365 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4367 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4368 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4369 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4370 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4371 reason: err_packet.clone()
4374 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4375 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4376 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4377 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4378 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4379 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4382 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4383 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4384 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4385 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4386 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4393 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4394 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4395 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4396 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4400 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4401 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4402 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4403 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4404 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4405 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4406 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4410 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4411 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4412 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4416 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4417 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4422 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4423 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4424 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4425 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4426 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4427 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4428 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4433 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4434 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4436 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4437 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4438 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4439 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4440 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4441 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4442 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4443 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4446 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4448 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4449 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4450 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4451 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4455 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4456 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4457 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4460 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4461 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4462 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4463 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4464 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4465 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4468 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4469 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4470 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4471 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4472 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4475 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4476 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4477 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4478 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4479 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4480 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4481 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4482 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4486 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4487 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4488 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4489 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4490 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4491 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4492 our_commitment_transaction
4496 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4497 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4498 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4499 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4501 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4503 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4505 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(_)) {
4506 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4507 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4508 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4509 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4510 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4512 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4513 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4514 channel_ready: None,
4515 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4516 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4517 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4521 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4522 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4523 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4524 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4525 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4526 next_per_commitment_point,
4527 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4529 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4530 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4531 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4535 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4536 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4537 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4539 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4540 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4541 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4544 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4547 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4548 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4549 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4550 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4551 our_commitment_transaction
4555 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4556 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4557 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4558 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4559 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4560 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4561 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4563 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4565 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4566 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4567 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4568 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4569 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4570 next_per_commitment_point,
4571 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4575 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4576 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4577 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4579 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4582 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4583 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4584 raa: required_revoke,
4585 commitment_update: None,
4586 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4588 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4589 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4590 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4592 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4595 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4596 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4597 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4598 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4599 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4600 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4603 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4604 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4605 raa: required_revoke,
4606 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4607 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4610 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4611 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4612 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4613 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4614 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4617 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4618 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4619 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4620 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4625 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4626 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4627 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4628 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4630 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4632 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4634 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4635 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4636 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4637 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4638 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4639 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4640 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4641 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4643 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4644 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4645 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4646 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4647 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4649 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4650 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4651 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4652 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4655 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4656 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4657 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4658 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4659 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4660 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4661 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4662 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4663 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4664 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4665 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4666 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4667 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4668 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4669 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4671 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4674 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4675 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4678 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4679 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4680 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4681 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4682 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4683 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4686 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4687 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4688 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4689 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4690 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4691 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4692 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4694 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4700 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4701 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4702 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4703 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4705 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4706 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4707 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4708 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4709 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4710 return Ok((None, None, None));
4713 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4714 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4715 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4717 return Ok((None, None, None));
4720 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4721 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4722 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4723 return Ok((None, None, None));
4726 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4728 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4729 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4730 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4731 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4733 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4734 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4736 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4737 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4739 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4740 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4741 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4742 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4744 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4745 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4746 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4750 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4756 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4757 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4759 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4760 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4763 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4764 /// within our expected timeframe.
4766 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4767 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4768 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4771 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4774 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4775 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4779 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4780 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4782 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4785 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4786 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4787 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4788 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4789 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4791 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4792 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4793 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4796 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4798 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4799 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4802 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4803 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4804 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4807 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4810 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4811 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4812 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4813 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4815 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4818 assert!(send_shutdown);
4819 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4820 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4821 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4823 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4826 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4831 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4833 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4834 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4836 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4837 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4838 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4839 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4840 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4841 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4844 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4845 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4847 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4848 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4849 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4850 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4854 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4855 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4856 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4857 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4858 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4859 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4861 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4862 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4869 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4870 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4872 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4875 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4876 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4878 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4880 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4881 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4882 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4883 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4884 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4885 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4886 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4887 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4888 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4890 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4891 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4894 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4898 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4899 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4900 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4901 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4903 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4906 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4907 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4909 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4910 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4912 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4916 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4920 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4921 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4922 return Ok((None, None, None));
4925 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4926 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4927 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4928 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4930 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4932 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4935 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4936 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4937 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4938 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4939 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4943 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4944 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4949 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4950 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4951 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4952 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4953 monitor_update: None,
4954 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4955 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4956 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4957 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4959 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4960 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4961 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4962 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4966 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4968 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4969 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4970 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4971 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4973 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4976 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4977 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4979 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4980 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4981 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4982 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4983 monitor_update: None,
4984 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4985 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4986 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4987 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4989 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4990 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4991 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4992 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4997 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4998 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4999 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5000 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5002 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5003 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5004 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5006 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5008 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5015 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5016 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5019 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5020 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5022 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5023 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5026 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5027 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5028 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5029 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5030 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5032 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5034 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5036 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5037 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5040 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5041 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5042 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5043 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5044 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5045 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5046 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5047 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5049 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5052 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5053 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5054 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5055 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5061 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5062 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5063 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5064 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5066 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5072 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5073 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5074 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5075 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5076 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5077 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5078 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5080 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5081 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5084 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5086 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5087 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5093 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5094 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5095 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5096 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5097 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5098 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5099 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5101 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5102 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5109 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5110 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5113 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5114 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5117 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5118 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5122 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5123 &self.context.holder_signer
5127 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5129 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5130 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5131 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5132 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5133 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5134 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5136 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5138 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5146 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5147 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5151 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5152 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5153 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5154 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5157 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5158 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5159 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5160 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5163 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5164 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5165 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5166 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5167 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5168 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5171 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5172 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5173 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5174 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5175 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5176 if !release_monitor {
5177 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5186 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5187 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5190 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5191 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5192 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5194 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5195 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5197 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(flags)
5198 if (flags & !(FundingSentFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5200 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5201 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5202 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5205 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5206 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5207 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5208 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5209 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5210 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5212 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5213 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5214 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5216 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5217 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5218 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5219 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5220 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5221 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5227 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5228 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5229 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(flags) if flags.is_set(FundingSentFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5230 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5233 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5234 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5235 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5238 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5239 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5240 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5243 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5244 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5245 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5246 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5247 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5250 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5251 self.context.channel_update_status
5254 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5255 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5256 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5259 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5261 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5262 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5263 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5267 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5268 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5269 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5272 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5276 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5277 // channel_ready yet.
5278 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5282 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5283 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5284 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5285 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5287 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundingSentFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5288 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5289 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5291 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundingSentFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5292 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5295 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5296 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5298 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5299 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5300 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5301 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5302 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5303 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5304 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5305 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5307 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5311 if need_commitment_update {
5312 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5313 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5314 let next_per_commitment_point =
5315 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5316 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5317 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5318 next_per_commitment_point,
5319 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5323 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5329 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5330 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5331 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5332 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5333 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5334 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5335 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5337 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5340 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5341 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5342 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5343 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5344 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5345 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5346 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5347 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5348 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5349 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5350 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5351 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5352 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5353 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5354 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5355 // channel and move on.
5356 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5357 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5359 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5360 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5361 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5363 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5364 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5365 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5366 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5367 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5368 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5369 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5370 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5375 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5376 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5377 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5378 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5379 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5382 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5383 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5384 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5385 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5386 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5387 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5390 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5391 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5392 // may have already happened for this block).
5393 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5394 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5395 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5396 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5399 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5400 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5401 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5402 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5410 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5411 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5412 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5413 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5415 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5416 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5419 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5421 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5422 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5423 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5424 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5426 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5429 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5432 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5433 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5434 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5435 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5437 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5440 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5441 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5442 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5444 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5445 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5447 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5448 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5449 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5457 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5459 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5460 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5461 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5463 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5464 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5467 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5468 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5469 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5470 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5471 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5472 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5473 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5474 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5477 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5478 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5479 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5480 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5482 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5483 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5484 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5486 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5487 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5488 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5489 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5491 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5492 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5493 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5494 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5495 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5496 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5497 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5500 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5501 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5503 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5506 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5507 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5508 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5509 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5510 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5511 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5512 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5513 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5514 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5515 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5516 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5517 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5518 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5519 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5520 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5521 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5522 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5528 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5533 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5534 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5536 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5537 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5538 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5539 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5541 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5544 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5546 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5547 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5548 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5549 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5550 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5551 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5553 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5554 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5557 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5558 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5559 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5560 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5561 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5562 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5564 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5565 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5568 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5569 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5570 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5571 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5572 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5578 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5579 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5580 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5581 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5583 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5586 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5590 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5594 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5595 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5599 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5603 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5604 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5607 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5611 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5613 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5618 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5619 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5620 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5622 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5627 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5629 None => return None,
5632 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5634 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5635 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5637 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5638 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5641 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5647 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5649 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5650 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5651 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5652 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5653 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5654 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5655 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5657 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5658 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5659 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5660 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5661 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5662 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5663 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5664 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5665 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5666 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5667 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5668 contents: announcement,
5671 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5676 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5680 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5681 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5682 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5683 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5684 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5685 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5686 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5687 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5689 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5691 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5693 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5694 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5696 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5698 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5699 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5702 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5703 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5704 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5705 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5708 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5711 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5712 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5713 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5714 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5715 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5716 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5719 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5721 Err(_) => return None,
5723 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5724 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5729 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5730 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5731 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5732 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5733 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5734 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5735 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5736 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5737 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5738 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5739 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5740 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5741 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5742 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5743 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5744 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5747 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5750 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5751 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5752 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5753 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5754 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5755 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5756 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5757 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5758 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5760 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5761 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5762 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5763 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5764 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5765 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5766 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5767 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5768 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5770 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5771 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5772 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5773 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5774 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5775 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5776 next_funding_txid: None,
5781 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5783 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5784 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5785 /// commitment update.
5787 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5788 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5789 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5790 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5791 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5792 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5793 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5796 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5797 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5798 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5800 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5801 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5806 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5807 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5809 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5811 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5812 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5814 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5815 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5816 /// regenerate them.
5818 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5819 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5821 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5822 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5823 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5824 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5825 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5826 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5827 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5828 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5830 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5831 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5832 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5834 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5836 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5837 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5838 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5841 if amount_msat == 0 {
5842 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5845 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5846 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5847 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5848 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5851 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5852 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5853 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5856 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5857 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5858 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5859 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5860 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5861 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5862 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5863 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5866 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5867 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5868 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5869 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5870 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5871 else { "to peer" });
5873 if need_holding_cell {
5874 force_holding_cell = true;
5877 // Now update local state:
5878 if force_holding_cell {
5879 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5884 onion_routing_packet,
5891 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5892 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5894 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5896 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5902 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5903 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5904 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5908 onion_routing_packet,
5912 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5917 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5918 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5919 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5920 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5922 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5923 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5924 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5926 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5927 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5931 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5932 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5933 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5934 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5935 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5936 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5937 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5940 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5941 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5942 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5943 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5944 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5945 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5948 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5950 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5951 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5952 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5953 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5954 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5956 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5957 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5960 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5961 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5962 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5963 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5964 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5965 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5966 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5967 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5968 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5969 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5970 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5973 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5977 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5978 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5979 where L::Target: Logger
5981 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5982 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5983 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5985 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5987 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5988 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5989 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5990 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5991 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5992 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5993 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5994 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5995 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5996 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5997 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6003 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6006 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6007 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6008 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6009 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6010 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6011 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6013 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6014 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6015 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6017 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6018 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6019 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6022 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6023 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6027 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6028 &commitment_stats.tx,
6029 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6030 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6031 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6032 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6034 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6036 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6037 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6038 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6039 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6041 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6042 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6043 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6044 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6045 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6046 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6050 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6051 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6055 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6056 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6058 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6064 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6065 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6067 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6068 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6069 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6070 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6071 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6072 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6073 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6074 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6076 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6077 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6078 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6081 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6082 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6083 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6089 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6091 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6092 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6093 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6094 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6095 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6097 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6099 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6105 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6106 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6108 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6109 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6110 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6111 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6112 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
6114 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6115 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6116 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6119 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6120 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6122 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6123 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6125 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6126 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6128 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6129 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6130 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6133 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6134 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6135 let mut chan_closed = false;
6136 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
6140 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6142 None if !chan_closed => {
6143 // use override shutdown script if provided
6144 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6145 Some(script) => script,
6147 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6148 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6149 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6150 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6154 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6155 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6157 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6163 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6164 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6165 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
6166 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6167 monitor_update: None,
6168 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6169 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6170 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6171 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6173 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6174 Some(shutdown_result)
6176 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6179 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6181 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6182 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6183 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6184 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6185 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6186 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6189 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6190 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6192 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6193 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6194 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6197 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6198 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6199 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6200 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6201 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6203 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6204 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6211 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6212 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6214 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
6217 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6218 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6219 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6221 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6222 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6226 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6230 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6231 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6232 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6233 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6236 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6237 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6238 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6239 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6240 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6241 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6242 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6243 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6245 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6246 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6247 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6248 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6250 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6251 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6253 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6254 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6256 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6257 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6258 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6260 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6261 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6263 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6264 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6265 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6266 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6267 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6270 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6271 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6273 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6274 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6276 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6278 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6280 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6281 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6282 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6283 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6286 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6287 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6289 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6290 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6291 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6292 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6296 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6297 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6298 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6302 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6303 Ok(script) => script,
6304 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6307 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6310 context: ChannelContext {
6313 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6314 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6315 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6316 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6321 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6323 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6324 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6325 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6326 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6328 channel_value_satoshis,
6330 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6332 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6333 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6336 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6337 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6340 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6341 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6342 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6343 pending_update_fee: None,
6344 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6345 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6346 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6347 update_time_counter: 1,
6349 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6351 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6352 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6353 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6354 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6355 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6356 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6358 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6359 signer_pending_funding: false,
6361 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6362 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6363 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6364 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6366 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6367 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6368 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6369 closing_fee_limits: None,
6370 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6372 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6373 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6374 short_channel_id: None,
6375 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6377 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6378 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6379 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6380 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6381 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6382 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6383 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6384 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6385 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6386 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6387 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6388 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6390 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6392 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6393 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6394 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6395 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6396 counterparty_parameters: None,
6397 funding_outpoint: None,
6398 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6400 funding_transaction: None,
6401 is_batch_funding: None,
6403 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6404 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6405 counterparty_node_id,
6407 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6409 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6411 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6412 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6414 announcement_sigs: None,
6416 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6417 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6418 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6419 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6421 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6422 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6424 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6425 outbound_scid_alias,
6427 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6428 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6430 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6431 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6436 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6438 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6442 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6443 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6444 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6445 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6446 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6447 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6448 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6449 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6450 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6451 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6452 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6455 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6456 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6458 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6460 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6461 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6462 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6463 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6466 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6467 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6469 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6471 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated;
6472 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6474 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6475 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6476 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6477 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6478 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6479 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6482 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6483 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6485 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6486 if funding_created.is_none() {
6487 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6488 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6489 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6493 let channel = Channel {
6494 context: self.context,
6497 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6500 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6501 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6502 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6503 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6504 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6505 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6506 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6507 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6508 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6509 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6512 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6513 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6514 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6515 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6516 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6517 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6523 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6524 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6525 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6526 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6527 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6528 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6530 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6532 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6534 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6535 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6540 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6541 // We've exhausted our options
6544 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6545 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6548 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6549 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6550 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6551 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6553 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6554 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6555 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6556 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6557 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6558 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6560 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6562 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6563 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6566 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6567 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6568 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6570 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6571 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6574 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6575 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6578 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6579 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6583 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6584 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6585 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6586 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6587 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6588 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6589 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6590 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6591 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6592 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6593 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6594 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6595 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6596 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6597 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6598 first_per_commitment_point,
6599 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6600 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6601 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6602 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6604 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6609 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6610 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6612 // Check sanity of message fields:
6613 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6616 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6617 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6619 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6622 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6623 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6625 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6626 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6628 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6629 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6630 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6632 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6633 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6634 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6636 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6637 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6638 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6640 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6643 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6644 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6647 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6648 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6649 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6651 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6652 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6654 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6657 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6658 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6660 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6661 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6663 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6666 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6667 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6670 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6671 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6672 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6674 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6675 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6677 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6678 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6681 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6682 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6685 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6686 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6687 &Some(ref script) => {
6688 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6689 if script.len() == 0 {
6692 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6693 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6695 Some(script.clone())
6698 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6700 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6705 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6706 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6707 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6708 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6709 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6711 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6712 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6714 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6717 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6718 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6719 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6720 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6721 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6722 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6725 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6726 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6727 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6730 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6731 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6733 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6734 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6736 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6742 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6743 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6744 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6745 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6748 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6749 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6750 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6751 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6752 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6753 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6754 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6755 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6756 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6757 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6758 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6761 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6762 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6764 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6765 // support this channel type.
6766 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6767 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6771 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6772 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6773 // `static_remote_key`.
6774 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6777 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6778 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6781 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6784 channel_type.clone()
6786 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6787 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6788 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6793 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6794 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6795 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6796 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6797 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6798 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6799 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6800 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6801 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6804 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6805 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6808 // Check sanity of message fields:
6809 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6810 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6812 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6815 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6816 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6818 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6819 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6820 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6822 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6823 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6825 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6826 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6828 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6830 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6831 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6834 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6837 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6838 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6841 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6842 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6843 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6845 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6846 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6848 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6849 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6851 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6852 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6854 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6855 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6857 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6858 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6860 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6861 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6864 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6866 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6867 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6872 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6873 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6874 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6875 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6878 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6879 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6881 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6882 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6883 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6885 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6886 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6889 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6890 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6891 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6892 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6896 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6897 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6898 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6899 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6902 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6903 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6904 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6905 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6906 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6909 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6910 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6911 &Some(ref script) => {
6912 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6913 if script.len() == 0 {
6916 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6917 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6919 Some(script.clone())
6922 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6929 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6930 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6931 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6932 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6936 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6937 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6938 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6942 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6943 Ok(script) => script,
6944 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6947 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6948 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6950 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6953 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6957 context: ChannelContext {
6960 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6961 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6963 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6968 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6970 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6971 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6972 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6973 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6975 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6978 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6980 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6981 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6984 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6985 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6986 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6988 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6989 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6990 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6991 pending_update_fee: None,
6992 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6993 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6994 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6995 update_time_counter: 1,
6997 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6999 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7000 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7001 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7002 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7003 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7004 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7006 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7007 signer_pending_funding: false,
7009 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7010 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7011 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7012 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7014 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7015 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7016 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7017 closing_fee_limits: None,
7018 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7020 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7021 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7022 short_channel_id: None,
7023 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7025 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7026 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7027 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7028 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7029 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7030 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7031 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7032 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7033 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7034 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7035 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7036 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7039 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7041 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7042 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7043 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7044 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7045 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7046 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7047 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7049 funding_outpoint: None,
7050 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7052 funding_transaction: None,
7053 is_batch_funding: None,
7055 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7056 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7057 counterparty_node_id,
7059 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7061 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7063 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7064 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7066 announcement_sigs: None,
7068 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7069 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7070 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7071 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7073 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7074 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7076 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7077 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7079 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7080 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7082 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7083 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7088 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7090 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7096 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7097 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7099 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7100 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7101 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7102 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7105 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7106 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7108 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7110 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7111 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7114 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7117 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7118 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7119 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7121 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7122 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7123 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7124 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7126 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7127 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7128 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7129 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7130 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7131 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7132 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7133 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7134 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7135 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7136 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7137 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7138 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7139 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7140 first_per_commitment_point,
7141 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7142 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7143 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7145 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7147 next_local_nonce: None,
7151 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7152 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7154 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7156 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7157 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7160 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7161 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7163 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7164 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7165 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7166 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7167 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7168 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7169 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7170 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7171 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7172 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7173 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7175 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7178 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7179 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7180 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7184 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7185 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7188 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7189 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7191 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7192 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7194 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7196 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7197 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7198 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7199 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7202 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7203 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7204 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7205 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7206 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7208 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7210 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7211 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7212 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7215 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7216 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7217 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7221 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7222 initial_commitment_tx,
7225 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7226 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7229 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7230 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7233 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7235 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent(FundingSentFlags::new());
7236 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7237 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7238 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7240 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7242 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7243 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7244 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7245 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7246 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7247 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7248 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7249 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7250 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7251 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7252 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7254 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7255 let logger_with_chan_monitor = WithChannelMonitor::from(logger, &channel_monitor);
7256 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7257 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7258 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7259 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7260 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7261 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), &&logger_with_chan_monitor);
7263 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7264 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7266 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7267 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7268 let mut channel = Channel {
7269 context: self.context,
7271 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7272 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7274 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7278 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7279 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7281 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7287 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7288 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7289 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7290 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7291 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7293 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7294 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7295 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7296 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7302 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7303 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7304 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7305 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7306 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7307 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7312 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7313 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7314 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7315 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7317 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7318 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7319 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7320 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7325 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7326 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7327 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7328 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7329 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7330 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7335 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7336 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7337 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7340 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7342 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7343 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7344 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7345 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7346 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7348 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7349 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7350 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7351 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7353 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7355 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7356 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7357 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7359 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7361 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7363 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7365 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7366 // deserialized from that format.
7367 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7368 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7369 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7371 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7373 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7374 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7375 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7377 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7378 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7379 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7380 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7383 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7384 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7385 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7388 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7389 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7390 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7391 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7393 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7394 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7396 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7398 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7400 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7402 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7405 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7407 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7412 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7413 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7414 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7416 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7417 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7418 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7419 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7420 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7421 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7422 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7424 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7426 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7428 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7431 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7432 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7433 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7436 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7438 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7439 preimages.push(preimage);
7441 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7442 reason.write(writer)?;
7444 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7446 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7447 preimages.push(preimage);
7449 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7450 reason.write(writer)?;
7453 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7454 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7455 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7457 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7458 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7459 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7461 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7464 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7465 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7466 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7467 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7469 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7470 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7471 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7474 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7475 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7476 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7477 source.write(writer)?;
7478 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7480 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7481 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7482 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7484 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7485 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7487 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7489 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7491 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7492 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7494 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7496 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7497 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7502 match self.context.resend_order {
7503 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7504 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7507 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7508 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7509 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7511 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7512 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7513 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7514 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7517 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7518 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7519 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7520 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7521 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7524 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7525 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7526 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7527 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7529 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7530 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7531 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7533 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7535 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7536 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7537 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7538 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7540 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7541 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7542 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7543 // consider the stale state on reload.
7546 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7547 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7548 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7550 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7551 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7552 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7554 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7555 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7557 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7558 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7559 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7561 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7562 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7564 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7567 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7568 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7569 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7571 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7574 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7575 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7577 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7578 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7579 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7581 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7583 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7585 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7587 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7588 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7589 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7590 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7591 htlc.write(writer)?;
7594 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7595 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7596 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7598 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7599 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7601 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7602 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7603 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7604 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7605 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7606 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7607 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7609 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7610 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7611 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7612 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7613 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7615 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7616 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7618 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7619 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7620 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7621 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7623 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7625 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7626 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7627 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7628 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7629 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7630 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7631 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7633 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7634 (2, chan_type, option),
7635 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7636 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7637 (5, self.context.config, required),
7638 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7639 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7640 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7641 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7642 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7643 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7644 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7645 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7646 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7647 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7648 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7649 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7650 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7651 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7652 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7653 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7654 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7655 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7656 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7657 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7658 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7665 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7666 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7668 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7669 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7671 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7672 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7673 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7675 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7676 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7677 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7678 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7680 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7682 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7683 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7684 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7685 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7686 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7688 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7689 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7692 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7693 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7694 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7696 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7698 let mut keys_data = None;
7700 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7701 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7702 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7703 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7704 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7705 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7706 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7707 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7708 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7709 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7713 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7714 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7715 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7718 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7720 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7721 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7722 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7724 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7726 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7727 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7728 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7729 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7730 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7731 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7732 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7733 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7734 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7735 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7736 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7737 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7738 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7743 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7744 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7745 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7746 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7747 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7748 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7749 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7750 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7751 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7752 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7753 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7754 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7756 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7757 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7760 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7761 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7764 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7765 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7767 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7769 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7770 blinding_point: None,
7774 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7775 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7776 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7777 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7778 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7779 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7780 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7781 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7782 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7783 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7784 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7785 blinding_point: None,
7787 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7788 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7789 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7791 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7792 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7793 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7795 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7799 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7800 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7801 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7802 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7805 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7806 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7807 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7809 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7810 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7811 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7812 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7815 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7816 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7817 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7818 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7821 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7823 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7825 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7826 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7827 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7828 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7830 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7831 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7832 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7833 // consider the stale state on reload.
7834 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7837 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7838 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7839 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7841 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7844 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7845 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7846 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7848 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7849 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7850 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7851 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7853 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7854 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7856 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7857 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7859 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7860 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7861 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7863 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7865 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7866 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7868 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7869 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7872 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7874 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7875 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7876 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7877 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7879 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7882 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7883 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7885 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7887 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7888 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7890 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7891 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7893 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7895 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7896 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7897 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7899 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7900 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7901 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7905 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7906 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7907 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7909 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7915 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7916 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7917 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7918 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7919 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7920 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7921 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7922 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7923 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7924 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7926 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7927 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7928 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7929 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7930 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7931 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7932 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7934 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7935 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7936 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7937 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7939 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7941 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7942 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7944 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7946 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7947 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7949 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7950 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7951 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7952 (2, channel_type, option),
7953 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7954 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7955 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7956 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7957 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7958 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7959 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7960 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7961 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7962 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7963 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7964 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7965 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7966 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7967 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7968 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7969 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7970 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7971 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7972 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7973 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7974 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7975 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7976 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7979 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7980 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7981 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7982 // required channel parameters.
7983 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated {
7984 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7986 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7988 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7989 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7990 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7991 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7994 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7995 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7996 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7998 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7999 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8001 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8002 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8007 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8008 if iter.next().is_some() {
8009 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8013 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8014 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8015 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8016 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8017 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8020 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8021 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8022 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8024 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8025 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8027 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8028 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8029 // separate u64 values.
8030 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8032 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8034 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8035 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8036 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8037 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8039 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8040 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8042 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8043 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8044 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8045 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8046 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8049 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8050 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8052 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8053 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8054 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8055 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8057 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8058 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8060 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8061 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8062 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8063 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8064 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8067 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8068 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8072 context: ChannelContext {
8075 config: config.unwrap(),
8079 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8080 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8081 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8084 temporary_channel_id,
8086 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8088 channel_value_satoshis,
8090 latest_monitor_update_id,
8092 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8093 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8096 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8097 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8100 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8101 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8102 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8103 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8107 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8108 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8109 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8110 monitor_pending_forwards,
8111 monitor_pending_failures,
8112 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8114 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8115 signer_pending_funding: false,
8118 holding_cell_update_fee,
8119 next_holder_htlc_id,
8120 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8121 update_time_counter,
8124 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8125 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8126 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8127 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8129 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8130 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8131 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8132 closing_fee_limits: None,
8133 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8135 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8136 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8138 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8140 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8141 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8142 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8143 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8144 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8145 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8146 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8147 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8148 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8151 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8153 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8154 funding_transaction,
8157 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8158 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8159 counterparty_node_id,
8161 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8165 channel_update_status,
8166 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8170 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8171 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8172 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8173 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8175 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8176 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8178 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8179 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8180 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8182 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8183 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8185 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8186 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8188 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8191 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8200 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8201 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8202 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8203 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8204 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8205 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8206 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8207 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8208 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8209 use crate::ln::channel::{FundingSentFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8210 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8211 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8212 use crate::ln::msgs;
8213 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8214 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8215 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8216 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8217 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8218 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8219 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8220 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8221 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8222 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8223 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8224 use crate::util::test_utils;
8225 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8226 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8227 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8228 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8229 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8230 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8231 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8232 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8233 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8234 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8235 use crate::prelude::*;
8237 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8240 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8241 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8247 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8248 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8249 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8250 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8254 signer: InMemorySigner,
8257 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8258 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8261 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8262 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8264 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8266 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8267 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8270 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8274 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8276 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8277 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8278 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8279 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8280 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8283 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8284 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8285 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8286 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8290 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8291 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8292 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8296 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8297 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8298 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8299 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8302 let seed = [42; 32];
8303 let network = Network::Testnet;
8304 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8305 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8306 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8309 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8310 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8311 let config = UserConfig::default();
8312 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8313 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8314 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8316 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8317 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8321 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8322 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8324 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8325 let original_fee = 253;
8326 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8327 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8328 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8329 let seed = [42; 32];
8330 let network = Network::Testnet;
8331 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8333 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8334 let config = UserConfig::default();
8335 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8337 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8338 // same as the old fee.
8339 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8340 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8341 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8345 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8346 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8347 // dust limits are used.
8348 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8349 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8350 let seed = [42; 32];
8351 let network = Network::Testnet;
8352 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8353 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8354 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8356 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8357 // they have different dust limits.
8359 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8360 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8361 let config = UserConfig::default();
8362 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8364 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8365 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8366 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8367 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8368 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8370 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8371 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8372 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8373 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8374 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8376 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8377 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8378 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8379 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8381 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8382 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8383 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8385 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8386 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8388 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8389 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8390 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8392 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8393 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8394 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8395 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8398 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8400 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8401 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8402 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8403 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8404 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8405 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8406 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8407 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8408 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8410 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8411 blinding_point: None,
8414 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8415 // the dust limit check.
8416 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8417 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8418 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8419 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8421 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8422 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8423 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8424 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8425 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8426 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8427 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8431 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8432 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8433 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8434 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8435 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8436 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8437 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8438 let seed = [42; 32];
8439 let network = Network::Testnet;
8440 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8442 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8443 let config = UserConfig::default();
8444 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8446 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8447 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8449 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8450 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8451 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8452 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8453 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8454 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8456 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8457 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8458 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8459 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8460 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8462 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8464 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8465 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8466 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8467 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8468 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8470 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8471 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8472 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8473 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8474 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8478 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8479 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8480 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8481 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8482 let seed = [42; 32];
8483 let network = Network::Testnet;
8484 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8485 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8486 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8488 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8490 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8491 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8492 let config = UserConfig::default();
8493 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8495 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8496 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8497 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8498 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8500 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8501 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8502 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8504 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8505 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8506 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8507 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8509 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8510 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8511 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8513 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8514 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8516 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8517 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8518 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8519 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8520 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8521 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8522 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8524 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8526 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8527 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8528 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8529 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8530 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8534 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8535 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8536 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8537 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8538 let seed = [42; 32];
8539 let network = Network::Testnet;
8540 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8541 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8542 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8544 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8545 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8546 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8547 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8548 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8549 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8550 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8551 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8553 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8554 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8555 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8556 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8557 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8558 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8560 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8561 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8562 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8563 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8565 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8567 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8568 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8569 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8570 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8571 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8572 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8574 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8575 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8576 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8577 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8579 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8580 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8581 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8582 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8583 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8585 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8586 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8588 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8589 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8590 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8592 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8593 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8594 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8595 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8596 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8598 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8599 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8601 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8602 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8603 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8607 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8609 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8610 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8611 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8613 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8614 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8615 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8616 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8618 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8619 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8620 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8622 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8624 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8625 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8628 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8629 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8630 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8631 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8632 let seed = [42; 32];
8633 let network = Network::Testnet;
8634 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8635 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8636 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8639 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8640 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8641 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8643 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8644 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8646 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8647 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8648 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8650 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8651 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8653 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8655 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8656 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8658 // Channel Negotiations failed
8659 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8660 assert!(result.is_err());
8665 fn channel_update() {
8666 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8667 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8668 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8669 let seed = [42; 32];
8670 let network = Network::Testnet;
8671 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8672 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8673 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8675 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8676 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8677 let config = UserConfig::default();
8678 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8680 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8681 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8682 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8683 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8684 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8686 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8687 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8688 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8689 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8690 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8692 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8693 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8694 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8695 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8697 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8698 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8699 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8701 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8702 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8704 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8705 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8706 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8708 short_channel_id: 0,
8711 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8712 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8713 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8715 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8716 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8718 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8720 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8722 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8723 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8724 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8725 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8727 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8728 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8729 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8731 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8734 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8738 fn blinding_point_ser() {
8739 // Ensure that channel blinding points are (de)serialized properly.
8740 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8741 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8742 let seed = [42; 32];
8743 let network = Network::Testnet;
8744 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8746 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8747 let config = UserConfig::default();
8748 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8749 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8750 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8752 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8754 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8755 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8756 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8757 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8761 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8762 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8763 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8765 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8768 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8770 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8771 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8772 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8773 blinding_point: None,
8775 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8776 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8778 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8781 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8783 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8786 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8787 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8788 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8790 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8791 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8794 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8795 blinding_point: None,
8797 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8798 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8801 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(10);
8804 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8805 } else if i % 3 == 1 {
8806 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8808 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8809 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = &mut dummy_add {
8810 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8812 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8815 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8817 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8818 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8819 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8820 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8821 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8822 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8823 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8824 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8827 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8829 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8830 use bitcoin::sighash;
8831 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8832 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8833 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8834 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8835 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8836 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8837 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8838 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8839 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8840 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8841 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8842 use crate::sync::Arc;
8843 use core::str::FromStr;
8844 use hex::DisplayHex;
8846 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8847 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8848 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8849 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8851 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8853 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8854 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8855 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8856 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8857 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8859 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8860 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8866 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8867 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8868 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8870 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8871 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8872 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8873 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8874 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8875 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8877 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8879 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8880 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8881 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8882 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8883 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8884 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8886 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8887 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8888 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8889 selected_contest_delay: 144
8891 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8892 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8894 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8895 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8897 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8898 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8900 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8901 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8903 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8904 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8905 // build_commitment_transaction.
8906 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8907 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8908 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8909 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8910 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8912 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8913 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8914 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8915 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8919 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8920 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8921 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8922 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8926 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8927 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8928 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8930 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8931 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8933 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8934 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8936 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8938 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8939 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8940 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8941 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8942 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8943 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8944 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8946 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8947 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8948 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8949 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8951 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8952 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8953 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8955 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8957 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8958 commitment_tx.clone(),
8959 counterparty_signature,
8960 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8961 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8962 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8964 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8965 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8967 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8968 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8969 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8971 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8972 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8975 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8976 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8978 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8979 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8980 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8981 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8982 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8983 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8984 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8985 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8987 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8990 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
8991 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8992 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8996 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8999 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9000 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9001 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9002 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9003 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9004 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9006 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9007 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9008 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9009 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9011 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9012 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9013 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9014 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9015 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9017 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9018 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9019 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9020 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9021 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9022 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9024 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9028 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9029 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9030 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9031 "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", {});
9033 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9034 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9036 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9037 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9038 "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", {});
9040 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9041 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9042 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9043 "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", {});
9045 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9046 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9048 amount_msat: 1000000,
9050 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9051 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9053 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9056 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9057 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9059 amount_msat: 2000000,
9061 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9062 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9064 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9067 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9068 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9070 amount_msat: 2000000,
9072 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9073 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9074 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9075 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9076 blinding_point: None,
9078 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9081 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9082 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9084 amount_msat: 3000000,
9086 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9087 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9088 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9089 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9090 blinding_point: None,
9092 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9095 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9096 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9098 amount_msat: 4000000,
9100 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9101 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9103 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9107 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9108 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9109 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9111 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9112 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9113 "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", {
9116 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9117 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9118 "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" },
9121 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9122 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9123 "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" },
9126 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9127 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9128 "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" },
9131 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9132 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9133 "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" },
9136 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9137 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9138 "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" }
9141 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9142 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9143 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9145 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9146 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9147 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9150 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9151 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9152 "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" },
9155 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9156 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9157 "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" },
9160 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9161 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9162 "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" },
9165 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9166 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9167 "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" },
9170 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9171 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9172 "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" }
9175 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9176 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9177 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9179 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9180 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9181 "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", {
9184 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9185 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9186 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9189 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9190 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9191 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
9194 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9195 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9196 "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" },
9199 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9200 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9201 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9204 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9205 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9206 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9207 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9209 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9210 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9211 "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", {
9214 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9215 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9216 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
9219 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9220 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9221 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
9224 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9225 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9226 "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" },
9229 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9230 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9231 "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" }
9234 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9235 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9236 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9237 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9239 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9240 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9241 "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", {
9244 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9245 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9246 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9249 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9250 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9251 "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" },
9254 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9255 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9256 "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" },
9259 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9260 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9261 "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" }
9264 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9265 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9266 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9268 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9269 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9270 "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", {
9273 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9274 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9275 "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" },
9278 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9279 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9280 "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" },
9283 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9284 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9285 "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" }
9288 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9289 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9290 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9292 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9293 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9294 "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", {
9297 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9298 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9299 "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" },
9302 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9303 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9304 "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" },
9307 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9308 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9309 "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" }
9312 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9313 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9314 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9316 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9317 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9318 "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", {
9321 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9322 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9323 "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" },
9326 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9327 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9328 "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" }
9331 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9332 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9333 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9334 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9335 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9336 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9338 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9339 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9340 "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", {
9343 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9344 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9345 "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" },
9348 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9349 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9350 "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" }
9353 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9354 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9355 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9356 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9357 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9359 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9360 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9361 "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", {
9364 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9365 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9366 "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" },
9369 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9370 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9371 "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" }
9374 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9375 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9376 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9378 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9379 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9380 "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", {
9383 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9384 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9385 "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" }
9388 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9389 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9390 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9391 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9392 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9394 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9395 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9396 "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", {
9399 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9400 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9401 "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" }
9404 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9405 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9406 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9407 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9408 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9410 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9411 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9412 "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", {
9415 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9416 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9417 "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" }
9420 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9421 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9422 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9423 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9425 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9426 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9427 "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", {});
9429 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9430 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9431 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9432 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9433 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9435 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9436 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9437 "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", {});
9439 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9440 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9441 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9442 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9443 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9445 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9446 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9447 "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", {});
9449 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9450 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9451 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9453 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9454 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9455 "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", {});
9457 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9458 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9459 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9460 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9461 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9463 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9464 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9465 "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", {});
9467 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9468 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9469 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9470 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9471 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9473 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9474 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9475 "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", {});
9477 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9478 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9479 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9480 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9481 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9482 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9484 amount_msat: 2000000,
9486 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9487 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9489 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9492 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9493 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9494 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9496 amount_msat: 5000001,
9498 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9499 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9500 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9501 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9502 blinding_point: None,
9504 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9507 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9508 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9510 amount_msat: 5000000,
9512 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9513 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9514 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9515 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9516 blinding_point: None,
9518 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9522 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9523 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9524 "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", {
9527 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9528 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9529 "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" },
9531 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9532 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9533 "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" },
9535 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9536 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9537 "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" }
9540 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9541 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9542 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9543 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9546 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9547 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9548 "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" },
9550 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9551 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9552 "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" },
9554 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9555 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9556 "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" }
9561 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9562 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9564 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9565 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9566 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9567 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9569 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9570 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9571 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9573 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9574 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9576 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9577 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9579 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9580 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9581 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9585 fn test_key_derivation() {
9586 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9587 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9589 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9590 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9592 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9593 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9595 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9596 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9598 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9599 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9601 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9602 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9604 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9605 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9609 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9610 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9611 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9612 let seed = [42; 32];
9613 let network = Network::Testnet;
9614 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9615 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9617 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9618 let config = UserConfig::default();
9619 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9620 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9622 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9623 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9625 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9626 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9627 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9628 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9629 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9630 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9631 assert!(res.is_ok());
9635 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9636 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9637 // resulting `channel_type`.
9638 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9639 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9640 let network = Network::Testnet;
9641 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9642 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9644 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9645 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9647 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9648 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9650 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9651 // need to signal it.
9652 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9653 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9654 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9655 &config, 0, 42, None
9657 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9659 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9660 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9661 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9663 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9664 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9665 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9669 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9670 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9671 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9672 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9673 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9676 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9677 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9681 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9682 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9683 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9684 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9685 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9686 let network = Network::Testnet;
9687 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9688 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9690 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9691 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9693 let config = UserConfig::default();
9695 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9696 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9697 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9698 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9699 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9701 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9702 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9703 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9707 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9708 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9709 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9711 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9712 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9713 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9714 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9715 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9716 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9718 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9722 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9723 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9725 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9726 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9727 let network = Network::Testnet;
9728 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9729 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9731 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9732 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9734 let config = UserConfig::default();
9736 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9737 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9738 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9739 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9740 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9741 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9742 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9743 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9745 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9746 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9747 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9748 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9749 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9750 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9754 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9755 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9757 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9758 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9759 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9760 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9762 assert!(res.is_err());
9764 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9765 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9766 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9768 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9769 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9770 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9773 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9775 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9776 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9777 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9778 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9781 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9782 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9784 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9785 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9787 assert!(res.is_err());
9791 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9792 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9793 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9794 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9795 let seed = [42; 32];
9796 let network = Network::Testnet;
9797 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9798 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9799 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9801 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9802 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9803 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9804 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9806 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9807 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9808 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9813 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9823 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9824 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9825 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9830 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9831 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9837 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9840 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9841 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9842 &accept_channel_msg,
9843 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9844 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9847 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9848 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9849 let tx = Transaction {
9851 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9855 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9858 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9861 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9862 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9867 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9868 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9869 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9873 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9874 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9882 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9883 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9884 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9885 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9890 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9897 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9898 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9899 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9900 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9901 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
9903 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9904 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9905 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9913 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9914 ChannelState::FundingSent(FundingSentFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | FundingSentFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
9917 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9918 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9919 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingSent(FundingSentFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
9920 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());