1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
301 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
304 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
306 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
308 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
310 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
312 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
315 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
317 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
319 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
323 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
324 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
328 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
330 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
332 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
333 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
335 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
337 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
339 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
340 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
342 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
343 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
345 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
346 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
351 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
354 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
355 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
356 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
357 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
358 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
359 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
360 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
361 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
362 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
363 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
364 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
365 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
366 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
367 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
371 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
373 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
374 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
375 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
376 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
377 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
378 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
379 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
380 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
381 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
382 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
387 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
388 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
389 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
390 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
391 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
392 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
397 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
398 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
399 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
400 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
401 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
402 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
403 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
404 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
405 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
406 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
407 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
412 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
413 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
414 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
415 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
416 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
417 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
418 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
424 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
425 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
426 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
427 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
428 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
430 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
431 /// funding transaction to confirm.
432 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
433 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
435 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
436 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
437 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
441 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
442 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
444 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
447 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
456 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
458 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
462 fn $clear(&mut self) {
465 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
467 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
471 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
472 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
474 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
475 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
480 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
482 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
483 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
485 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
486 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
487 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
488 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
489 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
490 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
491 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
492 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
500 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
502 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
503 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
504 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
505 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
506 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
510 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
511 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
514 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
515 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
518 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
520 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
521 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
522 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
526 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
528 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
529 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
530 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
531 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
533 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
539 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
540 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
541 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
542 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
543 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
544 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
545 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
546 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
547 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
548 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
549 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
550 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
551 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
552 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
553 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
554 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
557 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
559 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
561 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
564 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
575 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
576 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
577 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
578 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
580 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
581 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
583 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
585 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
586 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
588 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
589 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
590 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
591 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
592 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
593 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
595 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
596 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
598 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
599 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
600 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
601 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
602 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
604 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
605 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
607 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
608 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
610 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
611 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
612 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
613 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
619 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
622 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
623 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
624 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
629 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
630 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
632 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
633 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
639 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
641 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
642 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
645 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
646 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
647 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
648 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
649 self.logger.log(record)
653 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
654 where L::Target: Logger {
655 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
656 where S::Target: SignerProvider
660 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
661 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
666 macro_rules! secp_check {
667 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
675 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
676 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
677 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
678 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
679 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
680 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
681 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
682 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
684 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
686 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
688 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
692 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
694 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
695 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
696 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
698 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
699 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
701 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
702 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
703 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
704 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
705 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
707 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
708 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
712 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
718 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
721 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
723 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
724 holding_cell_msat: u64,
725 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
728 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
729 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
730 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
731 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
732 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
733 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
734 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
735 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
736 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
737 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
738 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
741 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
742 struct HTLCCandidate {
744 origin: HTLCInitiator,
748 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
756 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
758 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
760 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
761 htlc_value_msat: u64,
762 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
767 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
768 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
769 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
770 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
771 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
773 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
774 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
775 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
776 htlc_value_msat: u64,
778 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
779 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
783 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
784 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
785 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
786 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
787 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
788 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
789 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
790 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
791 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
792 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
793 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
796 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
798 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
799 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
800 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
804 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
805 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
806 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
807 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
808 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
809 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
810 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
811 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
814 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
816 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
817 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
818 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
819 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
820 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
821 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
822 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
823 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
824 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
825 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
826 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
827 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
828 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
829 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
832 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
833 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
834 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
835 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
836 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
837 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
838 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
839 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
840 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
841 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
842 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
843 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
844 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
845 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
846 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
848 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
849 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
850 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
851 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
853 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
854 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
855 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
856 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
858 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
859 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
860 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
861 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
862 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
864 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
865 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
866 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
867 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
869 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
870 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
871 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
873 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
874 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
875 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
876 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
877 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
879 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
880 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
883 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
884 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
886 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
887 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
888 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
889 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
891 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
892 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
894 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
895 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
898 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
899 (0, update, required),
902 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
903 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
904 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
905 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
906 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
910 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
911 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
912 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
914 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
916 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
917 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
922 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
924 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
925 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
926 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
931 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
932 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
933 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
934 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
935 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
937 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
938 /// in a timely manner.
939 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
942 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
943 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
944 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
946 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
947 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
948 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
949 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
953 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
954 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
955 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
957 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
958 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
959 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
960 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
962 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
966 /// The current channel ID.
967 channel_id: ChannelId,
968 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
969 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
970 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
971 channel_state: ChannelState,
973 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
974 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
976 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
977 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
978 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
980 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
981 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
982 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
983 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
985 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
986 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
988 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
990 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
991 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
992 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
994 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
995 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
996 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
998 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
999 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1000 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1001 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1002 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1003 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1005 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1006 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1007 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1008 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1009 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1010 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1012 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1014 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1015 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1016 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1018 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1019 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1020 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1021 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1022 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1023 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1024 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1026 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1027 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1028 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1030 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1031 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1032 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1033 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1034 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1035 /// outbound or inbound.
1036 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1038 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1040 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1041 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1042 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1043 // HTLCs with similar state.
1044 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1045 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1046 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1047 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1048 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1049 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1050 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1051 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1052 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1053 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1055 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1056 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1057 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1059 update_time_counter: u32,
1061 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1062 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1063 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1064 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1065 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1066 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1068 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1069 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1071 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1072 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1073 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1074 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1076 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1077 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1079 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1081 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1083 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1084 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1085 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1086 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1087 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1089 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1090 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1092 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1093 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1094 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1096 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1097 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1098 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1099 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1100 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1101 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1102 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1103 channel_creation_height: u32,
1105 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1108 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1110 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1113 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1115 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1118 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1120 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1122 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1123 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1126 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1128 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1130 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1131 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1133 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1135 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1136 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1137 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1139 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1141 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1142 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1143 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1145 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1146 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1147 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1149 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1151 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1153 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1154 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1155 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1156 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1158 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1159 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1160 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1162 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1163 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1164 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1166 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1167 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1168 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1169 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1170 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1171 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1172 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1173 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1175 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1176 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1177 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1178 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1179 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1181 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1182 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1184 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1185 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1186 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1187 /// unblock the state machine.
1189 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1190 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1191 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1193 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1194 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1195 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1197 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1198 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1199 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1200 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1201 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1202 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1203 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1204 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1206 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1207 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1209 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1210 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1211 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1213 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1214 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1215 // associated channel mapping.
1217 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1218 // to store all of them.
1219 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1221 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1222 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1223 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1224 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1225 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1227 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1228 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1230 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1231 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1233 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1234 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1235 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1237 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1238 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1239 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1242 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1243 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1244 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1245 self.update_time_counter
1248 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1249 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1252 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1253 self.config.announced_channel
1256 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1257 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1260 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1261 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1262 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1263 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1266 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1267 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1268 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1271 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1272 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1273 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1274 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1275 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1276 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1277 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1280 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1281 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1282 match self.channel_state {
1283 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1284 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1285 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1286 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1287 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1288 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1289 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1291 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1293 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1294 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1298 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1299 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1300 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1301 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1302 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1303 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1306 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1307 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1308 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1312 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1313 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1314 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1315 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1316 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1319 // Public utilities:
1321 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1325 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1327 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1328 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1329 self.temporary_channel_id
1332 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1336 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1337 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1338 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1342 /// Gets the channel's type
1343 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1347 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1349 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1350 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1351 self.short_channel_id
1354 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1355 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1356 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1359 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1360 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1361 self.outbound_scid_alias
1364 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1366 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1367 return &self.holder_signer
1370 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1371 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1372 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1373 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1374 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1375 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1378 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1379 /// get_funding_created.
1380 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1381 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1384 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1385 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1386 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1387 if conf_height > 0 {
1394 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1395 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1396 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1399 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1400 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1401 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1402 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1406 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1409 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1410 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1413 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1414 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1417 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1418 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1419 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1422 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1423 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1426 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1427 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1428 self.counterparty_node_id
1431 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1432 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1433 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1436 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1437 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1438 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1441 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1442 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1444 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1445 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1446 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1447 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1449 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1453 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1454 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1455 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1458 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1459 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1460 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1463 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1464 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1465 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1467 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1468 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1473 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1474 self.channel_value_satoshis
1477 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1478 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1481 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1482 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1485 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1486 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1487 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1489 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1490 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1491 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1492 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1493 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1495 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1499 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1500 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1501 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1504 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1505 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1506 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1509 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1510 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1511 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1514 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1515 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1516 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1519 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1520 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1521 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1524 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1525 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1526 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1529 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1530 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1531 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1532 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1533 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1536 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1538 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1539 self.prev_config = None;
1543 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1544 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1548 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1549 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1550 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1551 let did_channel_update =
1552 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1553 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1554 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1555 if did_channel_update {
1556 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1557 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1558 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1559 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1561 self.config.options = *config;
1565 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1566 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1567 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1568 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1569 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1572 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1573 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1574 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1575 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1576 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1578 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1579 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1580 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1581 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1582 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1583 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1584 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1586 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1587 where L::Target: Logger
1589 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1590 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1591 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1593 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1594 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1595 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1596 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1598 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1599 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1600 if match update_state {
1601 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1602 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1603 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1604 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1605 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1607 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1611 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1612 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1613 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1615 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1617 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1618 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1619 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1621 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1622 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1623 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1624 transaction_output_index: None
1629 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1630 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1631 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1632 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1633 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1636 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1638 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1639 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1640 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1642 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1643 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1646 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1647 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1650 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1652 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1653 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1654 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1656 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1657 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1663 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1665 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1666 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1667 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1668 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1669 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1670 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1671 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1675 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1676 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1678 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1680 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1681 if generated_by_local {
1682 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1683 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1684 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1694 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1696 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1697 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1698 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1699 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1700 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1701 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1702 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1705 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1706 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1707 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1708 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1712 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1713 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1717 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1718 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1720 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1722 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1723 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1725 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1726 if !generated_by_local {
1727 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1735 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1736 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1737 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1738 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1739 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1740 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1741 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1742 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1744 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1746 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1747 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1748 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1749 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1751 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1753 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1754 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1755 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1756 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1759 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1760 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1761 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1762 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1764 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1767 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1768 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1769 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1770 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1772 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1775 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1776 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1781 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1782 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1787 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1789 let channel_parameters =
1790 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1791 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1792 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1799 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1802 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1803 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1804 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1805 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1813 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1814 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1815 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1816 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1821 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1822 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1823 /// our counterparty!)
1824 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1825 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1826 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1827 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1828 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1829 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1830 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1832 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1836 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1837 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1838 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1839 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1840 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1841 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1842 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1844 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1847 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1848 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1849 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1850 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1851 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1854 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1855 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1858 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1862 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1863 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1864 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1865 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1866 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1867 // which are near the dust limit.
1868 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1869 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1870 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1871 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1872 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1874 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1875 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1877 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
1878 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
1881 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1882 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1883 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1886 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1887 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1889 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1890 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1891 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1892 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1893 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1894 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1895 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1898 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1901 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1902 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1903 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1905 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1906 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1908 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1909 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1910 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1912 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1913 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1919 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1920 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1922 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1923 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1924 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1925 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1926 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1927 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1928 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1931 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1934 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1935 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1936 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1938 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1939 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1940 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1941 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1942 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1943 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1945 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1946 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1950 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1951 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1952 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1953 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1954 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1955 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1956 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1958 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1959 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1961 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1968 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1969 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1970 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1971 /// corner case properly.
1972 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1973 -> AvailableBalances
1974 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1976 let context = &self;
1977 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1978 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1979 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1981 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1982 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1983 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1984 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1987 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1989 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1990 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1992 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1994 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1996 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1997 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2001 if context.is_outbound() {
2002 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2003 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2005 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2006 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2008 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2009 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2010 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2011 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2014 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2015 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2016 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2017 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2018 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2019 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2020 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2023 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2024 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2025 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2026 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2027 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2028 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2029 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2030 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2031 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2032 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2033 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2035 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2038 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2039 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2040 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2041 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2042 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2045 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2046 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2048 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2049 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2050 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2052 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2053 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2054 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2055 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2059 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2061 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2062 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2063 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2064 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2065 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2066 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2067 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2069 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2070 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2072 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2073 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2074 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2076 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2077 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2078 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2079 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2080 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2083 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2084 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2085 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2086 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2087 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2088 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2091 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2092 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2093 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2095 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2099 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2100 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2102 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2103 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2107 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2108 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2109 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2110 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2112 outbound_capacity_msat,
2113 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2114 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2119 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2120 let context = &self;
2121 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2124 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2125 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2127 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2128 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2130 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2131 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2133 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2134 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2135 let context = &self;
2136 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2138 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2141 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2142 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2144 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2145 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2147 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2148 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2150 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2151 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2155 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2156 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2162 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2163 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2164 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2167 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2168 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2169 included_htlcs += 1;
2172 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2173 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2177 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2178 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2179 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2180 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2181 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2182 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2187 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2189 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2190 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2195 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2196 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2200 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2201 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2202 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2205 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2206 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2208 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2209 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2210 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2212 total_pending_htlcs,
2213 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2214 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2215 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2217 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2218 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2219 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2221 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2223 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2228 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2229 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2231 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2232 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2234 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2235 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2237 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2238 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2239 let context = &self;
2240 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2242 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2245 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2246 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2248 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2249 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2251 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2252 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2254 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2255 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2259 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2260 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2266 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2267 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2268 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2269 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2270 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2271 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2274 included_htlcs += 1;
2277 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2278 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2281 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2282 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2284 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2285 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2286 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2291 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2292 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2293 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2296 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2297 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2299 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2300 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2302 total_pending_htlcs,
2303 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2304 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2305 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2307 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2308 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2309 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2311 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2313 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2318 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2319 match self.channel_state {
2320 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2321 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2322 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2323 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2333 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2335 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2336 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2339 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2341 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2342 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2343 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2347 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2348 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2349 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2352 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2354 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2355 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2358 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2359 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2360 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2361 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2362 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2363 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
2364 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2365 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2366 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2367 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2368 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2370 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2371 // return them to fail the payment.
2372 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2373 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2374 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2376 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2377 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2382 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2383 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2384 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2385 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2386 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2387 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2388 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2389 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2390 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2391 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2394 if generate_monitor_update {
2395 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2396 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2397 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2398 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2399 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2403 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2404 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
2406 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2407 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2411 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2412 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2413 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2414 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
2415 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2416 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2417 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
2421 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2422 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2423 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2424 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2426 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2427 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2428 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2429 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2431 match &self.holder_signer {
2432 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2433 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2434 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2435 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2436 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2439 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2443 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2444 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2445 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2447 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2448 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2449 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2451 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2452 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2453 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2456 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2457 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2459 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2466 // Internal utility functions for channels
2468 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2469 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2470 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2472 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2474 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2475 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2476 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2478 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2481 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2483 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2486 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2487 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2488 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2490 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2492 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2493 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2494 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2495 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2496 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2499 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2500 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2501 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2502 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2503 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2504 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2505 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2508 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2509 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2511 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2512 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2515 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2516 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2517 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2518 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2519 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2520 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2523 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2524 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2525 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2526 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2529 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2530 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2532 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2533 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2534 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2538 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2539 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2540 trait FailHTLCContents {
2541 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2542 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2543 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2544 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2546 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2547 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2548 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2549 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2551 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2552 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2554 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2555 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2558 impl FailHTLCContents for (u16, [u8; 32]) {
2559 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC; // (failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
2560 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2561 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2564 failure_code: self.0,
2565 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2568 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2569 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(
2570 InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((self.1, self.0))
2573 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2574 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2576 failure_code: self.0,
2577 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2582 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2583 fn name() -> &'static str;
2585 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2586 fn name() -> &'static str {
2590 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2591 fn name() -> &'static str {
2592 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2596 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2597 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2598 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2600 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2601 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2602 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2603 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2605 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2606 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2608 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2610 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2611 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2612 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2613 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2615 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2616 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2626 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2627 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2628 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2629 // outside of those situations will fail.
2630 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2634 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2639 1 + // script length (0)
2643 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2644 2 + // witness marker and flag
2645 1 + // witness element count
2646 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2647 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2648 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2649 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2650 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2651 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2653 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2654 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2655 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2661 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2662 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2663 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2664 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2666 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2667 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2668 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2670 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2671 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2672 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2673 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2674 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2675 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2678 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2679 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2682 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2683 value_to_holder = 0;
2686 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2687 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2688 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2689 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2691 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2692 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2695 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2696 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2699 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2702 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2703 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2705 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2707 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2708 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2709 where L::Target: Logger {
2710 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2711 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2712 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2713 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2714 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2715 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2716 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2717 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2721 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2722 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2723 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2724 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2726 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2727 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2730 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2731 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2732 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2734 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2735 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2736 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2737 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2738 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2739 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2740 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2742 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2743 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2744 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2746 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2747 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2749 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2752 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2753 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2757 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2761 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2762 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2763 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2764 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2765 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2766 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2769 // Now update local state:
2771 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2772 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2773 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2774 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2775 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2776 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
2777 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2778 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2782 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2783 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2784 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2785 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2786 // do not not get into this branch.
2787 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2788 match pending_update {
2789 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2790 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2791 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2792 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2793 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2794 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2795 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2798 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2799 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2801 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2802 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2803 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2804 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2805 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2806 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2812 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2813 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2814 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2817 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2818 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2820 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2821 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2824 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2825 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2827 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2828 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2830 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2831 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2834 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2837 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2838 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2839 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2840 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2845 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2846 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2847 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2848 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2849 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2850 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2851 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2852 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2853 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2854 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2855 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2856 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2857 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2858 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2859 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2861 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2862 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2863 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2864 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2865 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2868 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2869 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2870 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2876 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2877 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2879 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2883 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2884 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2885 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2886 /// before we fail backwards.
2888 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2889 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2890 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2891 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2892 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2893 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2894 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2897 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
2898 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
2900 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
2901 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
2902 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
2903 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2904 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), true, logger)
2905 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2908 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2909 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2910 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2911 /// before we fail backwards.
2913 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2914 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2915 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2916 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2917 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2919 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2920 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2921 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2924 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2925 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2926 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2928 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2929 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2930 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2932 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2933 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2934 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2936 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2941 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2948 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2949 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2950 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2951 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2952 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2956 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2957 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2958 force_holding_cell = true;
2961 // Now update local state:
2962 if force_holding_cell {
2963 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2964 match pending_update {
2965 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2966 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2968 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2972 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2973 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2975 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2976 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2983 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2984 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_packet.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
2988 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
2989 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
2991 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2992 htlc.state = err_packet.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
2995 Ok(Some(err_packet.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
2998 // Message handlers:
2999 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3000 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3001 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3002 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3003 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3004 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3005 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3008 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3010 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3012 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3013 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3014 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3015 debug_assert!(matches!(
3016 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3018 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3019 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3022 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3023 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3025 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3026 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3027 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3028 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3030 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3033 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3034 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3035 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3038 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3039 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3040 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3041 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3042 // when routing outbound payments.
3043 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3047 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3048 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3049 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3050 match &self.context.channel_state {
3051 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3052 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
3053 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3054 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3055 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3056 check_reconnection = true;
3057 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3058 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3059 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3060 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3061 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3063 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3064 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3067 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3068 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3069 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3071 if check_reconnection {
3072 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3073 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3074 let expected_point =
3075 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3076 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3078 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3079 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3080 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3081 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3082 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3083 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3085 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3086 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3087 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3088 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3089 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3091 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3097 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3098 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3100 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3102 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3105 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3106 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3107 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3108 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3109 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3110 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3112 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3115 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3116 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3117 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3119 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3120 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3123 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3124 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3126 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3129 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3132 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3136 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3137 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3138 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3141 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3145 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3146 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3147 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3148 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3149 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3150 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3151 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3152 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3153 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3154 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3155 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3157 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3158 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3159 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3160 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3161 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3162 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3166 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3167 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3170 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3171 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3172 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3174 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3175 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3176 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3177 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3178 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3179 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3180 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3184 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3185 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3186 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3187 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3188 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3189 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3190 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3194 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3195 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3196 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3197 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3198 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3202 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3203 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3205 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3206 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3207 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3209 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3210 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3214 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3217 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3222 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3223 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3227 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3228 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3229 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3230 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3231 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3232 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3233 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3234 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3235 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3237 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3238 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3239 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3240 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3241 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3244 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3245 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3246 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3247 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3251 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3254 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3258 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3259 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3260 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3264 // Now update local state:
3265 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3266 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3267 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3268 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3269 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3270 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3271 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3276 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3278 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3279 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3280 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3281 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3282 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3283 None => fail_reason.into(),
3284 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3285 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3286 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3289 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3293 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3295 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3296 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3298 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3304 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3307 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3308 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3311 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3315 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3318 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3319 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3322 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3326 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3330 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3331 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3334 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3338 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3342 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3343 where L::Target: Logger
3345 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3348 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3351 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3355 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3357 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3359 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3360 let commitment_txid = {
3361 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3362 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3363 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3365 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3366 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3367 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3368 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3369 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3374 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3376 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3377 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3378 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3379 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3382 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3383 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3384 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3388 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3390 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3391 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3392 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3393 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3394 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3395 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3396 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3397 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3398 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3399 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3400 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3406 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3407 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3410 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3411 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3412 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3413 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3414 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3415 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3416 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3417 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3418 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3419 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3420 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3421 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3422 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3425 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3426 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3427 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3428 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3429 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3430 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3431 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3433 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3434 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3435 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3436 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3437 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3438 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3439 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3442 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3443 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3446 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3448 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3449 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3450 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3453 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3456 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3457 commitment_stats.tx,
3459 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3460 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3461 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3464 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3465 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3467 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3468 let mut need_commitment = false;
3469 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3470 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3471 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3472 need_commitment = true;
3476 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3477 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3478 Some(forward_info.clone())
3480 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3481 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3482 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3483 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3484 need_commitment = true;
3487 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3488 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3489 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3490 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3491 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3492 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3493 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3494 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3495 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3496 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3497 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3498 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3499 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3500 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3502 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3504 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3505 need_commitment = true;
3509 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3510 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3511 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3512 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3513 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3514 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3515 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3517 nondust_htlc_sources,
3521 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3522 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3523 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3524 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3525 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3527 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3528 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3529 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3530 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3531 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3532 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3533 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3534 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3535 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3536 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3537 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3538 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3539 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3540 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3542 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3543 &self.context.channel_id);
3544 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3547 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3548 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3549 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3550 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3551 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3552 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3553 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3554 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3555 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3559 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3560 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3561 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3562 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3565 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3566 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3567 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3568 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3569 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3570 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3571 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3573 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3574 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3575 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3578 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3579 /// for our counterparty.
3580 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3581 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3582 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3583 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3585 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3586 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3587 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3588 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3590 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3591 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3592 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3593 updates: Vec::new(),
3596 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3597 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3598 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3599 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3600 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3601 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3602 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3603 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3604 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3605 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3606 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3607 // to rebalance channels.
3608 match &htlc_update {
3609 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3610 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3611 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3613 match self.send_htlc(
3614 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3615 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3617 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3620 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3621 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3622 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3623 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3624 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3625 // into the holding cell without ever being
3626 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3627 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3628 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3631 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3637 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3638 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3639 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3640 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3641 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3642 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3643 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3644 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3645 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3646 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3647 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3648 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3650 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3651 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3652 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3653 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3654 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3655 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3656 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3657 // for a full revocation before failing.
3658 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3659 update_fail_count += 1;
3662 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3664 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3669 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3670 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), false, logger) {
3671 Ok(update_fail_malformed_opt) => {
3672 debug_assert!(update_fail_malformed_opt.is_some()); // See above comment
3673 update_fail_count += 1;
3676 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3678 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3685 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3686 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3688 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3689 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3694 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3695 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3696 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3697 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3698 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3700 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3701 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3702 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3704 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3705 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3711 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3712 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3713 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3714 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3715 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3716 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3717 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3718 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3719 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3721 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3724 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3727 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3731 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3733 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3734 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3739 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3740 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3741 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3742 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3743 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3744 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3745 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3746 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3752 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3753 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3756 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3757 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3758 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3759 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3761 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3763 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3768 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3769 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3770 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3771 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3772 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3773 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3774 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3775 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3776 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3780 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3781 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3782 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3783 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3784 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3785 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3786 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3787 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3788 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3790 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3791 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3794 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3795 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3796 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3797 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3798 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3799 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3800 let mut require_commitment = false;
3801 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3804 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3805 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3806 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3807 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3809 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3810 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3811 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3812 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3813 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3814 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3816 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3820 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3821 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3822 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3823 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3824 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3826 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3827 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3828 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3833 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3834 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3836 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3840 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3841 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3843 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3844 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3845 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3846 require_commitment = true;
3847 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3848 match forward_info {
3849 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3850 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3851 require_commitment = true;
3853 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3854 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3855 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3857 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3858 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3859 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3863 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3864 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3865 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3866 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3872 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3873 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3874 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3875 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3876 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3878 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3879 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3880 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3881 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3882 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3883 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3884 require_commitment = true;
3888 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3890 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3891 match update_state {
3892 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3893 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3894 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3895 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3896 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3897 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3899 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3900 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3901 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3902 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3903 require_commitment = true;
3904 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3905 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3910 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3911 let release_state_str =
3912 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3913 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3914 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3915 if !release_monitor {
3916 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3917 update: monitor_update,
3919 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3921 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3926 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3927 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3928 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3929 if require_commitment {
3930 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3931 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3932 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3933 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3935 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3936 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3937 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3938 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3939 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3941 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3942 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3943 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3944 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3945 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3948 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3949 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3950 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3951 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3952 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3953 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3955 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3956 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3958 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3959 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3961 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3962 if require_commitment {
3963 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3965 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3966 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3967 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3968 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3970 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3971 &self.context.channel_id(),
3972 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3975 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3976 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3978 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3979 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3981 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3982 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3988 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3989 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3990 /// commitment update.
3991 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3992 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3993 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3995 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3996 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3999 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4000 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4001 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4002 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4004 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4005 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4006 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4007 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4008 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4009 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4010 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4012 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4013 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4015 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4016 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4018 if !self.context.is_live() {
4019 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4022 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4023 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4024 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4025 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4026 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4027 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4028 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4029 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4030 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4031 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4035 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4036 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4037 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4038 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4039 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4040 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4043 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4044 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4048 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4049 force_holding_cell = true;
4052 if force_holding_cell {
4053 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4057 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4058 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4060 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4061 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4066 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4067 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4069 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4071 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4072 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4073 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4074 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4078 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4079 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4080 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4084 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4085 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4088 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4089 // will be retransmitted.
4090 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4091 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4092 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4094 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4095 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4097 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4098 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4099 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4100 // this HTLC accordingly
4101 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4104 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4105 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4106 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4107 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4110 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4111 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4112 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4113 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4114 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4115 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4120 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4122 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4123 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4124 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4125 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4129 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4130 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4131 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4132 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4133 // the update upon reconnection.
4134 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4138 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4140 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4141 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4145 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4146 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4147 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4148 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4149 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4150 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4151 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4153 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4154 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4155 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4156 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4157 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4158 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4159 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4161 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4162 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4163 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4164 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4165 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4166 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4167 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4170 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4171 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4172 /// to the remote side.
4173 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4174 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4175 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4176 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4179 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4181 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4182 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4184 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4185 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4186 // first received the funding_signed.
4187 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4188 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4189 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4190 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4192 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4194 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4195 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4196 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4197 funding_broadcastable = None;
4200 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4201 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4202 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4203 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4204 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4205 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4206 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4207 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4208 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4209 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4210 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4211 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4212 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4213 next_per_commitment_point,
4214 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4218 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4220 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4221 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4222 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4223 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4224 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4225 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4227 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4228 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4229 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4230 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4231 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4232 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4236 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4237 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4239 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4240 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4242 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4243 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4246 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4247 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4248 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4249 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4250 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4251 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4252 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4253 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4254 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4258 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4259 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4261 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4264 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4267 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4269 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4270 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4271 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4272 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4273 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4274 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4275 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4276 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4277 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4278 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4280 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4282 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4284 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4290 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4292 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4293 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4294 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4295 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4297 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4298 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4300 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4301 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4304 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4305 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4306 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4307 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4309 SignerResumeUpdates {
4316 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4317 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4318 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4319 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4320 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4321 per_commitment_secret,
4322 next_per_commitment_point,
4324 next_local_nonce: None,
4328 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4329 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4330 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4331 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4332 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4333 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4335 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4336 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4337 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4338 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4339 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4340 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4341 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4342 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4343 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4344 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4345 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4350 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4351 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4353 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4354 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4355 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4356 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4357 reason: err_packet.clone()
4360 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4361 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4362 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4363 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4364 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4365 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4368 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4369 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4370 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4371 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4372 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4379 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4380 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4381 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4382 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4386 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4387 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4388 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4389 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4390 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4391 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4392 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4396 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4397 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4399 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4400 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4401 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4402 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4407 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4408 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4413 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4414 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4415 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4416 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4417 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4418 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4419 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4424 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4425 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4427 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4428 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4429 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4430 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4431 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4432 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4433 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4434 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4437 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4439 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4440 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4441 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4442 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4446 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4447 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4451 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4452 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4453 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4454 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4455 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4456 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4457 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4459 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4460 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4461 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4462 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4463 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4466 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4467 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4468 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4469 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4470 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4471 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4472 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4473 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4477 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4478 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4479 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4480 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4481 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4482 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4483 our_commitment_transaction
4487 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4488 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4489 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4490 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4492 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4494 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4496 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4497 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4498 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4499 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4500 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4501 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4503 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4504 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4505 channel_ready: None,
4506 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4507 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4508 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4512 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4513 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4514 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4515 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4516 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4517 next_per_commitment_point,
4518 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4520 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4521 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4522 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4526 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4527 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4528 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4530 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4531 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4532 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4535 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4538 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4539 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4540 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4541 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4542 our_commitment_transaction
4546 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4547 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4548 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4549 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4550 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4551 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4552 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4554 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4556 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4557 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4558 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4559 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4560 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4561 next_per_commitment_point,
4562 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4566 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4567 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4568 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4570 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4573 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4574 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4575 raa: required_revoke,
4576 commitment_update: None,
4577 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4579 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4580 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4581 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4583 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4586 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4587 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4588 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4589 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4590 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4591 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4594 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4595 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4596 raa: required_revoke,
4597 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4598 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4601 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4602 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4603 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4604 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4605 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4608 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4609 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4610 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4611 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4616 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4617 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4618 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4619 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4621 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4623 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4625 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4626 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4627 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4628 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4629 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4630 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4631 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4632 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4634 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4635 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4636 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4637 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4638 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4640 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4641 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4642 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4643 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4646 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4647 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4648 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4649 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4650 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4651 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4652 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4653 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4654 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4655 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4656 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4657 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4658 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4659 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4660 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4662 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4665 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4666 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4669 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4670 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4671 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4672 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4673 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4674 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4677 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4678 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4679 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4680 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4681 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4682 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4683 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4685 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4691 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4692 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4693 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4694 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4696 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4697 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4698 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4699 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4700 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4701 return Ok((None, None, None));
4704 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4705 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4706 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4708 return Ok((None, None, None));
4711 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4712 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4713 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4714 return Ok((None, None, None));
4717 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4719 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4720 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4721 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4722 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4724 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4725 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4727 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4728 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4730 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4731 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4732 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4733 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4735 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4736 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4737 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4741 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4747 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4748 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4750 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4751 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4754 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4755 /// within our expected timeframe.
4757 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4758 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4759 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4762 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4765 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4766 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4770 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4771 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4773 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4774 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4776 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4777 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4778 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4779 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4782 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4783 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4784 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4787 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4789 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4790 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4793 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4794 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4795 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4798 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4801 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4802 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4803 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4804 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4806 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4809 assert!(send_shutdown);
4810 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4811 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4812 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4814 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4815 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4817 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4822 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4824 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4825 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4827 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4828 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4829 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4830 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4831 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4832 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4833 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4836 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4837 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4839 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4840 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4841 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4842 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4846 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4847 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4848 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4849 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4850 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4851 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4853 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4854 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4861 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4862 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4864 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4867 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4868 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4870 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4872 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4873 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4874 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4875 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4876 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4877 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4878 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4879 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4880 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4882 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4883 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4886 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4890 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4891 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4892 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4893 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4895 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4898 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4901 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4902 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4904 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4908 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4912 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4913 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4914 return Ok((None, None, None));
4917 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4918 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4919 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4920 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4922 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4924 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4927 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4928 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4929 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4930 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4931 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4935 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4936 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4941 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4942 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4943 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4944 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4945 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4946 monitor_update: None,
4947 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4948 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4949 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4950 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4951 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4952 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4953 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4955 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4956 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4957 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4958 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4962 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4964 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4965 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4966 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4967 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4969 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4972 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4973 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4975 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4976 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4977 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4978 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4979 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4980 monitor_update: None,
4981 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4982 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4983 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4984 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4985 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4986 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4987 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4989 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4990 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4991 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4992 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4997 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4998 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4999 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5000 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5002 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5003 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5004 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5006 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5008 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5015 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5016 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5019 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5020 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5022 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5023 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5026 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5027 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5028 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5029 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5030 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5032 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5034 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5036 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5037 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5040 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5041 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5042 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5043 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5044 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5045 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5046 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5047 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5049 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5052 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5053 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5054 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5055 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5061 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5062 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5063 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5064 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5066 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5072 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5073 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5074 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5075 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5076 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5077 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5078 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5080 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5081 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5084 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5086 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5087 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5093 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5094 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5095 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5096 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5097 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5098 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5099 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5101 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5102 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5109 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5110 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5113 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5114 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5117 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5118 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5122 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5123 &self.context.holder_signer
5127 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5129 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5130 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5131 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5132 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5133 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5134 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5136 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5138 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5146 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5147 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5151 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5152 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5153 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5154 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5157 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5158 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5159 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5160 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5163 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5164 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5165 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5166 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5167 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5168 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5171 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5172 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5173 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5174 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5175 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5176 if !release_monitor {
5177 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5186 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5187 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5190 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5191 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5192 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5194 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5195 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5197 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5198 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5200 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5201 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5202 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5205 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5206 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5207 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5208 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5209 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5210 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5212 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5213 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5214 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5216 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5217 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5218 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5219 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5220 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5221 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5227 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5228 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5229 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5230 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5233 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5234 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5235 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5238 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5239 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5240 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5243 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5244 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5245 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5246 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5247 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5250 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5251 self.context.channel_update_status
5254 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5255 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5256 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5259 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5261 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5262 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5263 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5267 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5268 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5269 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5272 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5276 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5277 // channel_ready yet.
5278 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5282 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5283 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5284 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5285 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5287 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5288 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5289 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5291 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5292 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5295 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5296 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5298 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5299 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5300 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5301 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5302 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5303 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5304 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5305 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5307 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5311 if need_commitment_update {
5312 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5313 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5314 let next_per_commitment_point =
5315 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5316 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5317 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5318 next_per_commitment_point,
5319 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5323 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5329 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5330 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5331 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5332 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5333 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5334 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5335 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5337 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5340 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5341 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5342 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5343 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5344 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5345 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5346 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5347 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5348 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5349 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5350 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5351 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5352 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5353 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5354 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5355 // channel and move on.
5356 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5357 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5359 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5360 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5361 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5363 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5364 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5365 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5366 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5367 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5368 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5369 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5370 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5375 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5376 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5377 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5378 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5379 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5382 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5383 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5384 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5385 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5386 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5387 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5390 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5391 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5392 // may have already happened for this block).
5393 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5394 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5395 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5396 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5399 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5400 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5401 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5402 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5410 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5411 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5412 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5413 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5415 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5416 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5419 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5421 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5422 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5423 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5424 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5426 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5429 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5432 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5433 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5434 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5435 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5437 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5440 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5441 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5442 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5444 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5445 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5447 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5448 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5449 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5457 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5459 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5460 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5461 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5463 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5464 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5467 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5468 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5469 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5470 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5471 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5472 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5473 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5474 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5477 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5478 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5479 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5480 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5482 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5483 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5484 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5486 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5487 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5488 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5489 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5491 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5492 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5493 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5494 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5495 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5496 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5497 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5500 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5501 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5503 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5506 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5507 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5508 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5509 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5510 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5511 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5512 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5513 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5514 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5515 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5516 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5517 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5518 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5519 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5520 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5521 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5522 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5528 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5533 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5534 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5536 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5537 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5538 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5539 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5541 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5544 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5546 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5547 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5548 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5549 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5550 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5551 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5553 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5554 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5557 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5558 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5559 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5560 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5561 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5562 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5564 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5565 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5568 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5569 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5570 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5571 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5572 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5578 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5579 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5580 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5581 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5583 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5586 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5590 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5594 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5595 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5599 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5603 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5604 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5607 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5611 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5613 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5618 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5619 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5620 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5622 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5627 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5629 None => return None,
5632 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5634 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5635 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5637 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5638 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5641 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5647 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5649 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5650 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5651 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5652 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5653 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5654 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5655 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5657 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5658 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5659 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5660 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5661 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5662 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5663 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5664 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5665 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5666 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5667 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5668 contents: announcement,
5671 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5676 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5680 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5681 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5682 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5683 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5684 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5685 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5686 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5687 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5689 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5691 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5693 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5694 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5696 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5698 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5699 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5702 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5703 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5704 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5705 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5708 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5711 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5712 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5713 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5714 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5715 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5716 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5719 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5721 Err(_) => return None,
5723 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5724 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5729 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5730 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5731 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5732 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5733 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5734 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5735 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5736 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5737 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5738 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5739 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5740 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5741 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5742 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5743 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5744 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5747 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5750 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5751 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5752 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5753 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5754 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5755 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5756 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5757 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5758 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5760 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5761 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5762 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5763 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5764 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5765 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5766 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5767 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5768 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5770 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5771 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5772 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5773 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5774 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5775 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5776 next_funding_txid: None,
5781 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5783 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5784 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5785 /// commitment update.
5787 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5788 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5789 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5790 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5791 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5792 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5793 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5796 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5797 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5798 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5800 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5801 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5806 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5807 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5809 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5811 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5812 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5814 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5815 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5816 /// regenerate them.
5818 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5819 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5821 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5822 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5823 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5824 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5825 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5826 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5827 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5828 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5830 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5831 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5832 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5834 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5836 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5837 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5838 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5841 if amount_msat == 0 {
5842 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5845 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5846 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5847 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5848 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5851 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5852 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5853 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5856 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5857 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5858 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5859 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5860 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5861 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5862 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5863 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5866 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5867 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5868 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5869 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5870 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5871 else { "to peer" });
5873 if need_holding_cell {
5874 force_holding_cell = true;
5877 // Now update local state:
5878 if force_holding_cell {
5879 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5884 onion_routing_packet,
5891 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5892 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5894 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5896 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5902 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5903 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5904 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5908 onion_routing_packet,
5912 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5917 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5918 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5919 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5920 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5922 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5923 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5924 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5926 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5927 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5931 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5932 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5933 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5934 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5935 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5936 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5937 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5940 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5941 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5942 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5943 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5944 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5945 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5948 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5950 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5951 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5952 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5953 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5954 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5956 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5957 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5960 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5961 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5962 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5963 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5964 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5965 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5966 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5967 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5968 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5969 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5970 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5971 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5974 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5978 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5979 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5980 where L::Target: Logger
5982 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5983 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5984 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5986 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5988 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5989 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5990 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5991 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5992 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5993 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5994 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5995 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5996 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5997 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5998 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6004 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6007 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6008 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6009 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6010 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6011 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6012 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6014 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6015 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6016 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6018 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6019 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6020 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6023 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6024 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6028 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6029 &commitment_stats.tx,
6030 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6031 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6032 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6033 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6035 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6037 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6038 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6039 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6040 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6042 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6043 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6044 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6045 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6046 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6047 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6051 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6052 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6056 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6057 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6059 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6065 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6066 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6068 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6069 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6070 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6071 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6072 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6073 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6074 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6075 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6077 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6078 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6079 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6082 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6083 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6084 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6090 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6092 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6093 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6094 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6095 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6096 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6098 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6100 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6106 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6107 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6108 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6109 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6110 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6112 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6113 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6114 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6117 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6118 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6120 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6121 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6123 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6124 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6126 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6127 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6128 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6131 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6134 // use override shutdown script if provided
6135 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6136 Some(script) => script,
6138 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6139 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6140 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6141 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6145 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6146 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6148 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6153 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6154 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6155 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6156 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6158 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6159 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6160 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6161 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6162 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6163 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6164 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6167 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6168 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6170 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6171 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6172 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6175 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6176 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6177 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6178 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6179 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6181 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6182 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6189 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6190 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6192 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6195 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6196 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6197 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6199 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6200 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6204 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6208 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6209 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6210 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6211 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6214 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6215 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6216 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6217 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6218 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6219 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6220 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6221 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6223 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6224 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6225 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6226 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6228 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6229 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6231 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6232 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6234 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6235 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6236 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6238 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6239 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6241 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6242 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6243 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6244 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6245 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6248 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6249 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6251 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6252 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6254 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6256 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6258 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6259 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6260 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6261 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6264 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6265 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6267 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6268 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6269 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6270 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6274 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6275 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6276 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6280 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6281 Ok(script) => script,
6282 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6285 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6288 context: ChannelContext {
6291 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6292 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6293 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6294 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6299 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6301 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6302 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6303 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6304 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6306 channel_value_satoshis,
6308 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6310 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6311 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6314 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6315 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6318 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6319 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6320 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6321 pending_update_fee: None,
6322 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6323 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6324 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6325 update_time_counter: 1,
6327 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6329 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6330 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6331 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6332 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6333 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6334 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6336 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6337 signer_pending_funding: false,
6339 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6340 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6341 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6342 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6344 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6345 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6346 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6347 closing_fee_limits: None,
6348 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6350 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6351 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6352 short_channel_id: None,
6353 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6355 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6356 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6357 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6358 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6359 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6360 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6361 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6362 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6363 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6364 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6365 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6366 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6368 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6370 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6371 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6372 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6373 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6374 counterparty_parameters: None,
6375 funding_outpoint: None,
6376 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6378 funding_transaction: None,
6379 is_batch_funding: None,
6381 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6382 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6383 counterparty_node_id,
6385 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6387 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6389 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6390 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6392 announcement_sigs: None,
6394 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6395 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6396 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6397 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6399 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6400 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6402 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6403 outbound_scid_alias,
6405 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6406 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6408 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6409 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6414 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6416 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6420 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6421 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6422 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6423 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6424 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6425 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6426 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6427 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6428 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6430 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6435 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6436 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6437 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6440 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6441 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6442 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6443 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6446 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6448 next_local_nonce: None,
6452 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6453 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6454 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6455 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6456 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6457 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6458 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6459 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6460 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6461 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6462 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6465 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6466 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6468 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6470 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6471 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6472 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6473 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6476 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6477 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6479 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6481 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6482 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6484 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6485 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6486 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6487 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6488 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6489 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6492 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6493 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6495 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6496 if funding_created.is_none() {
6497 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6498 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6500 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6501 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6502 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6503 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6511 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6512 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6513 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6514 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6515 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6516 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6517 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6518 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6519 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6520 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6523 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6524 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6525 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6526 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6527 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6528 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6534 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6535 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6536 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6537 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6538 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6539 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6541 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6543 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6545 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6546 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6551 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6552 // We've exhausted our options
6555 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6556 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6559 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6560 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6561 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6562 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6564 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6565 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6566 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6567 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6568 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6569 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6571 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6573 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6574 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6577 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6578 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6579 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6581 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6582 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6585 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6586 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6589 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6590 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6594 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6595 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6596 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6597 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6598 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6599 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6600 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6601 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6602 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6603 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6604 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6605 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6606 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6607 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6608 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6609 first_per_commitment_point,
6610 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6611 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6612 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6613 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6615 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6620 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6621 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6623 // Check sanity of message fields:
6624 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6625 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6627 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6628 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6630 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6631 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6633 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6634 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6636 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6639 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6640 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6641 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6643 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6644 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6645 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6647 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6648 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6649 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6651 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6654 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6658 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6659 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6660 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6662 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6665 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6666 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6668 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6669 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6671 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6672 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6674 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6677 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6681 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6682 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6683 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6685 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6686 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6688 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6689 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6692 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6693 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6696 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6697 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6698 &Some(ref script) => {
6699 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6700 if script.len() == 0 {
6703 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6704 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6706 Some(script.clone())
6709 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6711 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6716 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6717 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6718 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6719 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6720 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6722 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6723 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6725 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6728 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6729 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6730 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6731 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6732 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6733 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6736 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6737 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6738 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6741 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6742 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6744 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6745 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6747 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6752 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6753 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6754 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6755 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6756 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6760 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6761 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6763 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6764 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6766 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6767 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6768 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6769 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6772 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6774 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6775 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6776 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6777 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6779 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6780 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6782 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6783 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6785 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6786 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6787 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6788 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6789 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6790 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6794 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6795 initial_commitment_tx,
6798 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6799 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6803 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6804 if validated.is_err() {
6805 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6808 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6809 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6810 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6811 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6812 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6813 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6814 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6815 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6816 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6817 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6818 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6819 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6821 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6822 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6823 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6824 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6825 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6826 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6827 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6828 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6830 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6831 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6832 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6834 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6836 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6837 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6839 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6841 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6843 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6844 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6845 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6848 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6850 #[cfg(async_signing)]
6851 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6852 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6853 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6854 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6859 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6860 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6861 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6862 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6865 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
6866 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
6867 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
6868 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6869 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
6870 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
6871 if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6872 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6876 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6877 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6878 // `static_remote_key`.
6879 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6882 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6883 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6886 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6887 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6890 Ok(channel_type.clone())
6892 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6893 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6894 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6900 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6901 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6902 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6903 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6904 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6905 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6906 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6907 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6908 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6909 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6910 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6913 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6914 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6916 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6917 // support this channel type.
6918 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
6920 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6921 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6922 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6923 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6924 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6925 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6926 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6927 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6928 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6931 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6932 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6935 // Check sanity of message fields:
6936 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6937 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6939 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6940 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6942 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6943 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6945 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6946 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6947 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6949 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6950 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6952 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6953 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6955 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6957 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6958 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6961 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6964 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6965 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6968 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6969 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6970 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6972 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6973 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6975 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6976 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6978 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6979 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6981 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6984 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6985 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6987 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6991 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6993 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6994 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6999 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
7000 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7001 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7002 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7005 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
7006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
7008 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7009 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
7010 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7012 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
7013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7016 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
7017 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
7018 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7019 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7023 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7024 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7025 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7029 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7030 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7031 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7032 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7033 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7036 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7037 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7038 &Some(ref script) => {
7039 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7040 if script.len() == 0 {
7043 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7046 Some(script.clone())
7049 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7056 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7057 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7058 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7059 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7063 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7064 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7069 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7070 Ok(script) => script,
7071 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7074 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7075 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7077 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7080 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7084 context: ChannelContext {
7087 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7088 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7090 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7095 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7097 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7098 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7099 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7100 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7102 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7105 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7107 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7108 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7111 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7112 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7113 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7115 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7116 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7117 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7118 pending_update_fee: None,
7119 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7120 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7121 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7122 update_time_counter: 1,
7124 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7126 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7127 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7128 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7129 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7130 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7131 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7133 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7134 signer_pending_funding: false,
7136 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7137 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7138 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7139 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7141 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7142 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7143 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7144 closing_fee_limits: None,
7145 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7147 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7148 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7149 short_channel_id: None,
7150 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7152 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7153 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7154 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7155 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7156 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7157 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7158 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7159 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7160 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7161 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7162 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7163 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7166 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7168 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7169 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7170 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7171 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7172 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7173 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7174 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7176 funding_outpoint: None,
7177 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7179 funding_transaction: None,
7180 is_batch_funding: None,
7182 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7183 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7184 counterparty_node_id,
7186 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7188 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7190 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7191 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7193 announcement_sigs: None,
7195 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7196 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7197 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7198 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7200 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7201 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7203 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7204 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7206 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7207 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7209 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7210 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7215 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7217 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7223 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7224 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7226 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7227 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7228 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7229 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7232 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7233 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7235 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7237 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7238 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7241 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7244 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7245 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7246 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7248 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7249 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7250 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7251 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7253 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7254 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7255 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7256 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7257 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7258 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7259 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7260 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7261 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7262 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7263 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7264 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7265 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7266 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7267 first_per_commitment_point,
7268 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7269 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7270 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7272 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7274 next_local_nonce: None,
7278 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7279 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7281 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7283 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7284 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7287 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7288 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7290 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7291 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7292 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7293 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7294 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7295 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7296 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7297 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7298 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7299 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7300 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7302 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7305 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7306 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7307 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7311 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7312 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7315 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7316 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7318 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7319 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7321 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7323 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7324 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7325 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7326 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7329 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7330 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7331 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7332 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7333 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7335 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7337 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7338 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7339 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7342 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7343 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7344 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7348 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7349 initial_commitment_tx,
7352 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7353 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7356 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7357 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7360 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7362 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7363 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7364 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7365 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7367 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7369 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7370 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7371 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7372 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7373 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7374 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7375 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7376 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7377 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7378 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7379 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7381 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7382 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7383 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7384 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7385 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7386 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7387 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7389 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7390 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7392 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7393 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7394 let mut channel = Channel {
7395 context: self.context,
7397 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7398 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7400 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7404 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7405 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7407 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7413 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7414 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7415 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7416 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7417 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7419 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7420 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7421 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7422 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7428 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7429 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7430 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7431 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7432 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7433 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7438 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7439 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7440 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7441 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7443 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7444 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7445 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7446 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7451 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7452 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7453 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7454 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7455 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7456 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7461 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7462 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7463 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7466 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7468 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7469 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7470 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7471 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7472 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7474 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7475 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7476 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7477 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7479 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7481 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7482 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7483 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7485 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7487 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7489 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7491 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7492 // deserialized from that format.
7493 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7494 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7495 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7497 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7499 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7500 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7501 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7503 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7504 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7505 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7506 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7509 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7510 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7511 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7514 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7515 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7516 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7517 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7519 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7520 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7522 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7524 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7526 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7528 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7531 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7533 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7538 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7539 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7540 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7542 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7543 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7544 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7545 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7546 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7547 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7548 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7550 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7552 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7554 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7557 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7558 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7559 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7562 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7564 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7565 preimages.push(preimage);
7567 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7568 reason.write(writer)?;
7570 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7572 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7573 preimages.push(preimage);
7575 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7576 reason.write(writer)?;
7579 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7580 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7583 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7584 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7585 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7586 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7587 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7588 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7590 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7591 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7592 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7595 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7596 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7597 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7598 source.write(writer)?;
7599 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7601 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7602 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7604 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7606 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7607 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7609 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7611 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7612 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7614 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7615 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7617 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7618 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7619 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7621 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7623 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7624 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7629 match self.context.resend_order {
7630 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7631 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7634 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7635 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7636 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7638 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7639 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7640 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7641 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7644 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7645 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7646 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7647 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7648 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7651 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7652 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7653 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7654 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7656 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7657 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7658 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7660 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7662 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7663 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7664 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7665 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7667 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7668 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7669 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7670 // consider the stale state on reload.
7673 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7674 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7675 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7677 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7678 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7679 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7681 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7682 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7684 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7685 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7686 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7688 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7689 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7691 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7694 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7695 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7696 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7698 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7701 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7702 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7704 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7705 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7706 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7708 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7710 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7712 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7714 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7715 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7716 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7717 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7718 htlc.write(writer)?;
7721 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7722 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7723 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7725 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7726 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7728 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7729 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7730 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7731 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7732 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7733 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7734 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7736 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7737 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7738 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7739 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7740 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7742 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7743 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7745 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7746 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7747 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7748 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7750 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7752 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7753 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7754 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7755 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7756 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7757 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7758 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7760 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7761 (2, chan_type, option),
7762 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7763 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7764 (5, self.context.config, required),
7765 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7766 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7767 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7768 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7769 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7770 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7771 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7772 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7773 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7774 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7775 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7776 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7777 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7778 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7779 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7780 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7781 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7782 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7783 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7784 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7785 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7786 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7793 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7794 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7796 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7797 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7799 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7800 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7801 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7803 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7804 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7805 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7806 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7808 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7810 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7811 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7812 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7813 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7814 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7816 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7817 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7820 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7821 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7822 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7824 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7826 let mut keys_data = None;
7828 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7829 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7830 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7831 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7832 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7833 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7834 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7835 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7836 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7837 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7841 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7842 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7843 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7846 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7848 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7849 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7850 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7852 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7854 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7855 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7856 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7857 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7858 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7859 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7860 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7861 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7862 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7863 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7864 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7865 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7866 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7871 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7872 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7873 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7874 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7875 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7876 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7877 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7878 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7879 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7880 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7881 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7882 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7884 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7885 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7888 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7889 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7892 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7893 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7895 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7897 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7898 blinding_point: None,
7902 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7903 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7904 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7905 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7906 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7907 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7908 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7909 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7910 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7911 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7912 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7913 blinding_point: None,
7915 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7916 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7917 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7919 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7920 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7921 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7923 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7927 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7928 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7929 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7930 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7933 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7934 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7935 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7937 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7938 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7939 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7940 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7943 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7944 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7945 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7946 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7949 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7951 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7953 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7954 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7955 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7956 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7958 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7959 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7960 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7961 // consider the stale state on reload.
7962 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7965 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7966 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7967 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7969 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7972 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7973 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7974 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7976 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7977 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7978 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7979 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7981 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7982 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7984 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7985 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7987 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7988 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7989 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7991 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7993 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7994 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7996 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7997 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8000 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8002 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8003 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8004 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8005 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8007 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8010 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8011 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8013 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8015 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8016 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8018 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8019 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8021 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8023 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8024 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
8025 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8027 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8028 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8029 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8033 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8034 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8035 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8037 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8043 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8044 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8045 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8046 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8047 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8048 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8049 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8050 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8051 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8052 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8054 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8055 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8056 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8057 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8058 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8059 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8060 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8062 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8063 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8064 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8065 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8067 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8069 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8070 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8072 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8074 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8075 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8077 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8079 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8080 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8081 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8082 (2, channel_type, option),
8083 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8084 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8085 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8086 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8087 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8088 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8089 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8090 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8091 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8092 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8093 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8094 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8095 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8096 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8097 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8098 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8099 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8100 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8101 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8102 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8103 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8104 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8105 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8106 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8107 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8110 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8111 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8112 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8113 // required channel parameters.
8114 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8115 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8117 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8119 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8120 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8121 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8122 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8125 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8126 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8127 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8129 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8130 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8132 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8133 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8138 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8139 if iter.next().is_some() {
8140 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8144 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8145 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8146 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8147 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8148 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8151 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8152 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8153 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8155 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8156 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8158 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8159 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8160 // separate u64 values.
8161 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8163 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8165 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8166 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8167 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8168 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8170 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8171 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8173 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8174 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8175 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8176 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8177 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8180 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8181 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8183 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8184 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8185 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8186 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8188 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8189 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8191 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8192 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8193 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8194 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8195 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8198 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8199 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8202 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8203 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8204 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8205 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8206 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8207 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8210 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8211 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8212 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8214 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8219 context: ChannelContext {
8222 config: config.unwrap(),
8226 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8227 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8228 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8231 temporary_channel_id,
8233 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8235 channel_value_satoshis,
8237 latest_monitor_update_id,
8239 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8240 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8243 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8244 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8247 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8248 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8249 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8250 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8254 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8255 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8256 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8257 monitor_pending_forwards,
8258 monitor_pending_failures,
8259 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8261 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8262 signer_pending_funding: false,
8265 holding_cell_update_fee,
8266 next_holder_htlc_id,
8267 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8268 update_time_counter,
8271 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8272 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8273 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8274 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8276 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8277 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8278 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8279 closing_fee_limits: None,
8280 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8282 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8283 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8285 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8287 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8288 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8289 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8290 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8291 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8292 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8293 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8294 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8295 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8298 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8300 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8301 funding_transaction,
8304 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8305 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8306 counterparty_node_id,
8308 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8312 channel_update_status,
8313 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8317 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8318 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8319 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8320 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8322 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8323 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8325 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8326 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8327 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8329 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8330 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8332 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8333 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8335 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8338 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8347 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8348 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8349 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8350 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8351 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8352 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8353 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8354 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8355 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8356 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8357 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8358 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8359 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8360 use crate::ln::msgs;
8361 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8362 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8363 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8364 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8365 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8366 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8367 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8368 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8369 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8370 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8371 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8372 use crate::util::test_utils;
8373 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8374 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8375 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8376 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8377 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8378 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8379 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8380 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8381 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8382 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8383 use crate::prelude::*;
8385 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8388 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8389 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8395 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8396 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8397 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8398 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8402 signer: InMemorySigner,
8405 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8406 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8409 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8410 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8412 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8414 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8415 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8418 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8422 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8424 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8425 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8426 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8427 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8428 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8431 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8432 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8433 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8434 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8438 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8439 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8440 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8444 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8445 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8446 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8447 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8450 let seed = [42; 32];
8451 let network = Network::Testnet;
8452 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8453 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8454 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8457 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8458 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8459 let config = UserConfig::default();
8460 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8461 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8462 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8464 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8465 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8469 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8470 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8472 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8473 let original_fee = 253;
8474 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8475 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8476 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8477 let seed = [42; 32];
8478 let network = Network::Testnet;
8479 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8481 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8482 let config = UserConfig::default();
8483 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8485 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8486 // same as the old fee.
8487 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8488 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8489 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8493 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8494 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8495 // dust limits are used.
8496 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8497 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8498 let seed = [42; 32];
8499 let network = Network::Testnet;
8500 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8501 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8502 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8504 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8505 // they have different dust limits.
8507 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8508 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8509 let config = UserConfig::default();
8510 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8512 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8513 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8514 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8515 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8516 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8518 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8519 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8520 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8521 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8522 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8524 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8525 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8526 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8527 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8529 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8530 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8531 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8533 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8534 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8535 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8537 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8538 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8539 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8541 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8542 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8543 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8544 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8547 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8549 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8550 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8551 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8552 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8553 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8554 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8555 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8556 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8557 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8559 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8560 blinding_point: None,
8563 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8564 // the dust limit check.
8565 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8566 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8567 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8568 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8570 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8571 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8572 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8573 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8574 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8575 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8576 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8580 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8581 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8582 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8583 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8584 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8585 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8586 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8587 let seed = [42; 32];
8588 let network = Network::Testnet;
8589 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8591 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8592 let config = UserConfig::default();
8593 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8595 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8596 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8598 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8599 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8600 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8601 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8602 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8603 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8605 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8606 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8607 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8608 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8609 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8611 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8613 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8614 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8615 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8616 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8617 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8619 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8620 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8621 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8622 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8623 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8627 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8628 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8629 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8630 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8631 let seed = [42; 32];
8632 let network = Network::Testnet;
8633 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8634 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8635 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8637 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8639 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8640 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8641 let config = UserConfig::default();
8642 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8644 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8645 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8646 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8647 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8649 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8650 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8651 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8653 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8654 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8655 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8656 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8658 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8659 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8660 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8662 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8663 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8664 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8666 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8667 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8668 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8669 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8670 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8671 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8672 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8674 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8676 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8677 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8678 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8679 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8680 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8684 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8685 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8686 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8687 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8688 let seed = [42; 32];
8689 let network = Network::Testnet;
8690 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8691 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8692 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8694 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8695 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8696 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8697 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8698 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8699 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8700 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8701 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8703 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8704 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8705 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8706 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8707 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8708 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8710 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8711 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8712 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8713 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8715 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8717 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8718 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8719 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8720 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8721 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8722 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8724 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8725 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8726 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8727 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8729 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8730 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8731 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8732 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8733 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8735 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8736 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8738 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8739 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8740 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8742 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8743 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8744 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8745 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8746 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8748 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8749 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8751 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8752 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8753 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8757 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8759 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8760 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8761 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8763 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8764 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8765 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8766 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8768 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8769 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8770 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8772 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8774 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8775 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8778 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8779 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8780 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8781 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8782 let seed = [42; 32];
8783 let network = Network::Testnet;
8784 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8785 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8786 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8789 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8790 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8791 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8793 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8794 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8796 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8797 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8798 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8800 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8801 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8803 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8805 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8806 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8808 // Channel Negotiations failed
8809 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8810 assert!(result.is_err());
8815 fn channel_update() {
8816 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8817 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8818 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8819 let seed = [42; 32];
8820 let network = Network::Testnet;
8821 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8822 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8823 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8825 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8826 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8827 let config = UserConfig::default();
8828 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8830 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8831 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8832 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8833 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8834 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8836 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8837 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8838 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8839 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8840 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8842 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8843 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8844 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8845 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8847 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8848 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8849 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8851 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8852 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8853 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8855 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8856 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8857 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8859 short_channel_id: 0,
8862 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8863 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8864 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8866 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8867 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8869 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8871 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8873 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8874 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8875 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8876 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8878 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8879 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8880 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8882 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8885 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8889 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
8890 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
8892 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8893 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8894 let seed = [42; 32];
8895 let network = Network::Testnet;
8896 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8898 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8899 let config = UserConfig::default();
8900 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8901 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8902 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8904 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8906 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8907 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8908 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8909 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8913 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8914 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8915 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8917 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8920 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8922 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8923 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8924 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8925 blinding_point: None,
8927 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8928 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8930 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8933 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8936 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8938 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8941 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8942 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8943 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8945 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8946 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8949 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8950 blinding_point: None,
8952 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8953 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8956 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8957 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
8959 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8960 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
8962 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
8965 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8966 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
8967 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8968 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
8969 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8970 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8971 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8972 } = &mut dummy_add {
8973 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8974 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8976 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8977 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
8978 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
8980 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
8983 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8985 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8986 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8987 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8988 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8989 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8990 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8991 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8992 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8995 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8997 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8998 use bitcoin::sighash;
8999 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9000 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9001 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9002 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9003 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9004 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9005 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9006 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9007 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9008 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9009 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9010 use crate::sync::Arc;
9011 use core::str::FromStr;
9012 use hex::DisplayHex;
9014 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9015 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9016 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9017 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9019 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9021 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9022 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9023 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9024 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9025 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9027 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9028 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9034 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9035 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9036 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9038 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9039 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9040 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9041 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9042 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9043 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9045 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9047 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9048 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9049 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9050 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9051 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9052 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9054 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9055 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9056 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9057 selected_contest_delay: 144
9059 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9060 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9062 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9063 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9065 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9066 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9068 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9069 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9071 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9072 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9073 // build_commitment_transaction.
9074 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9075 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9076 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9077 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9078 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9080 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9081 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9082 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9083 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9087 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9088 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9089 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9090 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9094 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9095 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9096 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9098 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9099 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9101 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9102 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9104 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9106 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9107 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9108 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9109 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9110 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9111 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9112 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9114 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9115 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9116 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9117 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9119 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9120 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9121 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9123 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9125 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9126 commitment_tx.clone(),
9127 counterparty_signature,
9128 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9129 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9130 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9132 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9133 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9135 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9136 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9137 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9139 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9140 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9143 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9144 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9146 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9147 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9148 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9149 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9150 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9151 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9152 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9153 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9155 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9158 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9159 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9160 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9164 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9167 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9168 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9169 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9170 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9171 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9172 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9174 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9175 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9176 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9177 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9179 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9180 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9181 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9182 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9183 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9185 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9186 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9187 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9188 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9189 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9190 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9192 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9196 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9197 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9198 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9199 "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", {});
9201 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9202 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9204 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9205 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9206 "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", {});
9208 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9209 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9210 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9211 "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", {});
9213 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9214 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9216 amount_msat: 1000000,
9218 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9219 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9221 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9224 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9225 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9227 amount_msat: 2000000,
9229 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9230 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9232 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9235 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9236 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9238 amount_msat: 2000000,
9240 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9241 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9242 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9243 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9244 blinding_point: None,
9246 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9249 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9250 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9252 amount_msat: 3000000,
9254 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9255 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9256 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9257 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9258 blinding_point: None,
9260 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9263 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9264 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9266 amount_msat: 4000000,
9268 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9269 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9271 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9275 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9276 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9277 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9279 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9280 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9281 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9284 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9285 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9286 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
9289 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9290 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9291 "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" },
9294 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9295 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9296 "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" },
9299 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9300 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9301 "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" },
9304 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9305 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9306 "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" }
9309 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9310 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9311 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9313 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9314 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9315 "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", {
9318 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9319 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9320 "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" },
9323 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9324 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9325 "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" },
9328 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9329 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9330 "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" },
9333 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9334 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9335 "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" },
9338 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9339 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9340 "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" }
9343 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9344 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9345 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9347 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9348 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9349 "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", {
9352 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9353 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9354 "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" },
9357 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9358 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9359 "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" },
9362 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9363 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9364 "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" },
9367 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9368 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9369 "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" }
9372 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9373 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9374 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9375 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9377 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9378 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9379 "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", {
9382 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9383 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9384 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
9387 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9388 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9389 "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" },
9392 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9393 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9394 "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" },
9397 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9398 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9399 "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" }
9402 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9403 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9404 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9405 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9407 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9408 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9409 "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", {
9412 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9413 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9414 "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" },
9417 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9418 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9419 "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" },
9422 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9423 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9424 "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" },
9427 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9428 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9429 "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" }
9432 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9433 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9434 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9436 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9437 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9438 "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", {
9441 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9442 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9443 "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" },
9446 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9447 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9448 "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" },
9451 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9452 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9453 "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" }
9456 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9457 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9458 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9460 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9461 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9462 "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", {
9465 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9466 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9467 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9470 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9471 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9472 "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" },
9475 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9476 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9477 "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" }
9480 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9481 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9482 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9484 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9485 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9486 "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", {
9489 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9490 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9491 "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" },
9494 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9495 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9496 "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" }
9499 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9500 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9501 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9502 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9503 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9504 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9506 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9507 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9508 "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", {
9511 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9512 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9513 "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" },
9516 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9517 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9518 "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" }
9521 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9522 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9523 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9524 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9525 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9527 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9528 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9529 "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", {
9532 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9533 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9534 "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" },
9537 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9538 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9539 "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" }
9542 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9543 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9544 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9546 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9547 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9548 "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", {
9551 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9552 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9553 "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" }
9556 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9557 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9558 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9559 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9560 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9562 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9563 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9564 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9567 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9568 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9569 "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" }
9572 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9573 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9574 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9575 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9576 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9578 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9579 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9580 "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", {
9583 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9584 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9585 "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" }
9588 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9589 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9590 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9591 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9593 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9594 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9595 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
9597 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9598 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9599 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9600 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9601 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9603 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9604 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9605 "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", {});
9607 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9608 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9609 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9610 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9611 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9613 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9614 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9615 "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", {});
9617 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9618 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9619 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9621 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9622 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9623 "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", {});
9625 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9626 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9627 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9628 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9629 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9631 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9632 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9633 "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", {});
9635 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9636 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9637 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9638 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9639 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9641 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9642 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9643 "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", {});
9645 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9646 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9647 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9648 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9649 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9650 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9652 amount_msat: 2000000,
9654 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9655 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9657 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9660 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9661 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9662 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9664 amount_msat: 5000001,
9666 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9667 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9668 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9669 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9670 blinding_point: None,
9672 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9675 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9676 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9678 amount_msat: 5000000,
9680 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9681 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9682 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9683 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9684 blinding_point: None,
9686 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9690 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9691 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9692 "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", {
9695 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9696 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9697 "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" },
9699 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9700 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9701 "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" },
9703 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9704 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9705 "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" }
9708 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9709 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9710 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9711 "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", {
9714 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9715 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9716 "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" },
9718 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9719 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9720 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
9722 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9723 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9724 "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" }
9729 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9730 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9732 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9733 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9734 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9735 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9737 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9738 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9739 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9741 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9742 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9744 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9745 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9747 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9748 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9749 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9753 fn test_key_derivation() {
9754 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9755 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9757 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9758 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9760 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9761 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9763 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9764 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9766 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9767 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9769 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9770 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9772 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9773 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9777 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9778 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9779 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9780 let seed = [42; 32];
9781 let network = Network::Testnet;
9782 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9783 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9785 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9786 let config = UserConfig::default();
9787 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9788 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9790 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9791 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9793 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9794 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9795 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9796 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9797 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9798 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9799 assert!(res.is_ok());
9803 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9804 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9805 // resulting `channel_type`.
9806 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9807 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9808 let network = Network::Testnet;
9809 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9810 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9812 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9813 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9815 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9816 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9818 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9819 // need to signal it.
9820 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9821 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9822 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9823 &config, 0, 42, None
9825 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9827 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9828 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9829 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9831 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9832 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9833 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9837 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9838 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9839 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9840 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9841 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9844 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9845 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9849 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9850 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9851 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9852 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9853 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9854 let network = Network::Testnet;
9855 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9856 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9858 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9859 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9861 let config = UserConfig::default();
9863 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9864 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9865 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9866 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9867 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9869 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9870 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9871 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9875 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9876 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9877 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9879 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9880 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9881 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9882 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9883 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9884 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9886 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9890 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9891 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9893 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9894 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9895 let network = Network::Testnet;
9896 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9897 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9899 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9900 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9902 let config = UserConfig::default();
9904 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9905 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9906 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9907 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9908 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9909 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9910 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9911 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9913 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9914 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9915 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9916 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9917 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9918 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9922 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9923 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9925 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9926 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9927 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9928 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9930 assert!(res.is_err());
9932 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9933 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9934 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9936 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9937 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9938 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9941 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9943 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9944 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9945 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9946 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9949 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9950 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9952 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9953 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9955 assert!(res.is_err());
9959 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9960 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9961 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9962 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9963 let seed = [42; 32];
9964 let network = Network::Testnet;
9965 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9966 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9967 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9969 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9970 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9971 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9972 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9974 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9975 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9976 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9981 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9991 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9992 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9993 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9998 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9999 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10005 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10008 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10009 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10010 &accept_channel_msg,
10011 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10012 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10015 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10016 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10017 let tx = Transaction {
10019 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10023 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10026 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10029 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10030 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10031 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10032 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10033 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10034 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10038 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10039 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10047 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10048 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10049 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10050 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10052 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10053 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10060 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10061 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10062 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10063 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10064 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10066 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10067 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10068 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10076 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10077 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10080 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10081 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10082 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10083 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());