1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
483 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
484 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
489 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
490 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
492 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
493 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
494 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
495 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
497 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
501 channel_id: [u8; 32],
502 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
505 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
506 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
508 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
509 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
510 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
512 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
513 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
514 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
515 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
517 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
518 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
520 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
522 holder_signer: Signer,
523 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
524 destination_script: Script,
526 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
527 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
528 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
530 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
531 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
532 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
533 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
534 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
535 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
537 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
538 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
539 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
540 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
541 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
542 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
544 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
546 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
547 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
548 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
550 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
551 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
552 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
553 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
554 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
555 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
556 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
558 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
560 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
561 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
562 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
563 // HTLCs with similar state.
564 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
565 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
566 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
567 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
568 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
569 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
570 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
571 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
572 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
575 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
576 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
577 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
579 update_time_counter: u32,
581 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
582 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
583 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
584 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
585 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
586 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
588 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
589 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
591 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
592 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
593 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
594 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
596 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
597 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
599 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
601 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
603 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
604 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
605 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
606 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
607 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
608 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
610 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
611 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
612 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
613 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
614 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
616 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
617 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
618 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
619 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
620 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
621 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
622 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
623 channel_creation_height: u32,
625 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
628 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
630 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
633 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
635 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
638 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
643 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
646 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
648 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
650 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
651 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
653 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
656 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
657 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
659 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
661 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
662 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
664 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
665 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
666 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
668 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
670 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
672 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
673 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
674 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
675 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
677 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
678 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
679 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
681 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
682 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
683 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
685 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
686 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
687 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
688 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
690 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
691 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
692 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
694 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
695 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
696 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
697 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
698 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
700 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
701 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
703 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
704 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
705 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
706 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
707 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
708 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
709 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
710 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
712 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
713 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
715 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
716 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
717 // the channel's funding UTXO.
719 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
720 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
721 // associated channel mapping.
723 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
724 // to store all of them.
725 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
727 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
728 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
729 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
730 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
731 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
733 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
734 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
736 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
737 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
739 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
740 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
741 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
743 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
744 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
745 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
746 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
747 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
751 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
753 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
754 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
755 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
759 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
761 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
762 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
763 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
764 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
768 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
770 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
772 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
774 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
775 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
776 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
777 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
778 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
780 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
781 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
783 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
785 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
786 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
788 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
789 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
790 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
791 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
792 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
793 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
795 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
796 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
798 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
799 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
800 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
801 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
802 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
804 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
805 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
807 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
808 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
810 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
811 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
812 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
813 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
819 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
820 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
822 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
823 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
824 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
829 macro_rules! secp_check {
830 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
833 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
838 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
839 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
840 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
843 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
845 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
846 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
847 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
849 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
852 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
854 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
857 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
858 /// required by us according to the configured or default
859 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
861 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
863 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
864 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
865 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
866 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
867 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
870 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
871 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
872 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
873 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
874 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
875 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
876 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
879 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
880 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
883 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
884 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
885 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
886 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
887 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
888 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
889 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
890 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
891 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
892 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
895 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
896 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
897 // `only_static_remotekey`.
899 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
900 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
901 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
902 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
909 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
910 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
911 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
912 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
913 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
914 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
915 // We've exhausted our options
918 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
919 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
922 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
923 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
924 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
925 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
927 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
928 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
929 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
930 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
931 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
932 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
934 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
936 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
940 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
941 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
942 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
943 outbound_scid_alias: u64
944 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
945 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
946 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
947 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
949 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
950 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
951 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
952 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
954 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
955 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
957 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
960 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
961 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
964 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
965 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
967 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
968 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
969 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
970 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
971 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
974 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
975 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
977 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
979 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
980 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
981 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
985 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
986 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
988 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
989 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
992 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
993 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
994 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
998 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1003 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1004 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1005 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1006 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1011 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1013 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1014 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1015 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1016 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1018 channel_value_satoshis,
1020 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1023 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1024 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1026 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1027 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1030 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1031 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1032 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1033 pending_update_fee: None,
1034 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1035 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1036 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1037 update_time_counter: 1,
1039 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1041 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1042 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1043 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1044 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1045 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1046 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1048 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1049 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1050 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1051 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1053 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1054 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1055 closing_fee_limits: None,
1056 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1058 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1060 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1061 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1062 short_channel_id: None,
1063 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1065 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1066 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1067 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1068 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1069 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1070 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1071 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1072 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1073 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1074 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1075 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1077 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1079 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1080 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1081 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1082 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1083 counterparty_parameters: None,
1084 funding_outpoint: None,
1085 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1086 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1088 funding_transaction: None,
1090 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1091 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1092 counterparty_node_id,
1094 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1096 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1098 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1099 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1101 announcement_sigs: None,
1103 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1104 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1105 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1106 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1108 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1110 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1111 outbound_scid_alias,
1113 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1114 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1116 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1117 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1122 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1126 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1127 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1128 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1130 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1131 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1132 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1133 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1134 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1135 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1136 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1139 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1140 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1141 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1142 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1143 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1144 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1145 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1146 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1148 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1149 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1158 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1159 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1160 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1161 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1162 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1163 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1164 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1165 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1166 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1167 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1171 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1173 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1174 // support this channel type.
1175 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1176 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1180 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1181 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1182 // `static_remote_key`.
1183 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1186 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1187 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1190 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1193 channel_type.clone()
1195 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1196 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1201 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1203 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1204 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1205 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1206 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1207 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1208 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1209 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1210 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1211 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1214 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1218 // Check sanity of message fields:
1219 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1222 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1225 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1228 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1229 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1232 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1235 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1238 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1240 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1241 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1244 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1247 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1251 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1252 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1258 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1261 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1264 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1265 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1267 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1270 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1274 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1276 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1277 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1282 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1283 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1284 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1285 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1288 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1291 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1292 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1293 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1295 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1299 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1300 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1301 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1302 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1303 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1307 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1308 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1309 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1310 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1314 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1315 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1316 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1317 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1318 if script.len() == 0 {
1321 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1324 Some(script.clone())
1327 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1328 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1334 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1335 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1338 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1339 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1340 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1344 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1345 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1347 let chan = Channel {
1350 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1351 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1353 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1358 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1360 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1361 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1362 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1363 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1366 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1369 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1370 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1372 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1373 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1374 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1376 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1377 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1378 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1379 pending_update_fee: None,
1380 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1381 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1382 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1383 update_time_counter: 1,
1385 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1387 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1388 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1389 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1390 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1391 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1392 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1394 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1395 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1396 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1397 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1399 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1400 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1401 closing_fee_limits: None,
1402 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1404 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1406 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1407 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1408 short_channel_id: None,
1409 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1411 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1412 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1413 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1414 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1415 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1416 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1417 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1418 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1419 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1420 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1421 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1422 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1424 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1426 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1427 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1428 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1429 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1430 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1431 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1432 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1434 funding_outpoint: None,
1435 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1436 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1438 funding_transaction: None,
1440 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1441 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1442 counterparty_node_id,
1444 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1446 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1448 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1449 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1451 announcement_sigs: None,
1453 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1454 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1456 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1458 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1460 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1461 outbound_scid_alias,
1463 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1464 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1466 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1467 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1472 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1478 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1479 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1480 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1481 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1482 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1484 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1485 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1486 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1487 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1488 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1489 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1490 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1492 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1493 where L::Target: Logger
1495 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1496 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1497 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1499 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1500 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1501 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1502 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1504 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1505 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1506 if match update_state {
1507 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1508 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1509 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1510 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1511 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1513 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1517 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1518 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1519 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1520 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1522 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1523 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1524 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1526 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1527 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1528 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1529 transaction_output_index: None
1534 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1535 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1536 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1537 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1538 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1541 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1543 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1544 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1545 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1547 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1548 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1551 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1552 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1555 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1557 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1558 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1559 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1561 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1562 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1568 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1569 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1570 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1571 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1572 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1573 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1574 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1578 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1579 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1581 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1583 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1584 if generated_by_local {
1585 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1586 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1595 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1597 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1598 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1599 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1600 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1601 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1602 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1603 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1606 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1607 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1608 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1609 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1613 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1614 preimages.push(preimage);
1618 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1619 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1621 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1623 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1624 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1626 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1627 if !generated_by_local {
1628 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1636 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1637 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1638 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1639 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1640 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1641 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1642 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1643 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1645 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1647 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1648 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1649 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1650 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1652 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1654 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1655 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1656 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1657 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1660 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1661 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1662 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1663 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1665 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1668 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1669 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1670 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1671 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1673 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1676 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1677 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1682 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1683 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1688 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1690 let channel_parameters =
1691 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1692 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1693 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1696 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1701 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1704 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1705 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1706 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1707 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1709 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1710 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1711 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1719 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1720 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1726 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1727 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1728 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1729 // outside of those situations will fail.
1730 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1734 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1739 1 + // script length (0)
1743 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1744 2 + // witness marker and flag
1745 1 + // witness element count
1746 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1747 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1748 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1749 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1750 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1751 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1753 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1754 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1755 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1761 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1762 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1763 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1764 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1766 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1767 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1768 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1770 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1771 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1772 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1773 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1774 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1775 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1778 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1779 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1782 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1783 value_to_holder = 0;
1786 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1787 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1788 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1789 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1791 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1792 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1795 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1796 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1800 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1801 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1802 /// our counterparty!)
1803 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1804 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1805 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1806 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1807 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1808 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1809 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1811 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1815 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1816 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1817 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1818 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1819 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1820 //may see payments to it!
1821 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1822 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1823 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1825 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1828 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1829 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1830 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1831 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1832 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1835 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1838 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1839 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1841 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1843 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1844 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1845 where L::Target: Logger {
1846 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1847 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1848 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1849 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1850 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1851 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1852 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1853 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1857 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1858 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1859 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1860 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1862 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1863 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1865 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1867 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1869 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1870 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1871 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1873 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1874 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1875 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1876 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1877 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1879 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1880 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1881 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1883 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1884 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1886 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1889 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1890 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1894 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1898 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1900 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1901 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1902 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1903 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1906 // Now update local state:
1908 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1909 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1910 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1911 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1912 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1913 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1914 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1918 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1919 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1920 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1921 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1922 // do not not get into this branch.
1923 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1924 match pending_update {
1925 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1926 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1927 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1928 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1929 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1930 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1931 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1934 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1935 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1936 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1937 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1938 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1939 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1940 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1946 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1947 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1948 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1950 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1951 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1952 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1954 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1955 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1958 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1959 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1961 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1962 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1964 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1965 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1968 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1971 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1972 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1973 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1974 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1979 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1980 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1981 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1982 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1983 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1984 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1985 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1986 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1987 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1988 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1989 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1990 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1994 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1995 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1996 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1997 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1998 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
2002 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2006 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2007 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2008 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2009 /// before we fail backwards.
2011 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2012 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2013 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2014 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2015 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2016 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2017 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2020 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2021 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2022 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2023 /// before we fail backwards.
2025 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2026 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2027 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2028 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2029 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2030 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2031 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2033 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2035 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2036 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2037 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2039 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2040 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2041 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2043 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2044 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2045 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2047 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2052 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2053 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2059 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2060 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2061 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2062 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2063 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2067 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2068 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2069 force_holding_cell = true;
2072 // Now update local state:
2073 if force_holding_cell {
2074 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2075 match pending_update {
2076 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2077 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2078 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2079 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2083 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2084 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2085 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2092 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2093 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2094 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2100 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2102 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2103 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2106 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2107 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2108 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2113 // Message handlers:
2115 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2116 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2118 // Check sanity of message fields:
2119 if !self.is_outbound() {
2120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2122 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2125 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2126 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2128 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2131 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2134 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2136 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2138 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2139 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2142 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2143 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2146 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2149 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2153 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2154 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2157 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2160 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2163 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2164 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2166 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2169 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2170 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2172 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2176 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2177 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2180 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2181 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2183 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2184 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2187 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2190 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2191 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2192 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2193 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2194 if script.len() == 0 {
2197 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2200 Some(script.clone())
2203 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2204 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2210 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2211 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2212 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2213 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2214 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2216 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2217 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2219 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2222 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2223 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2224 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2225 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2226 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2227 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2230 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2231 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2232 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2235 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2236 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2238 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2239 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2244 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2245 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2247 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2248 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2250 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2251 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2252 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2253 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2254 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2255 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2256 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2257 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2258 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2261 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2262 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2264 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2265 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2266 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2267 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2269 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2270 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2272 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2273 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2276 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2277 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2280 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2281 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2282 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2284 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2287 if self.is_outbound() {
2288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2290 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2291 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2292 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2296 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2299 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2300 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2301 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2302 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2305 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2306 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2307 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2308 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2309 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2311 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2313 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2314 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2318 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2319 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2320 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2324 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2325 initial_commitment_tx,
2328 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2329 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2332 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2333 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2335 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2337 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2338 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2339 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2340 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2341 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2342 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2343 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2344 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2345 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2346 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2347 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2349 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2351 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2353 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2354 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2355 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2356 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2358 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2360 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2361 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2363 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2364 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2367 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2368 }, channel_monitor))
2371 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2372 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2373 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2374 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2375 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2377 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2380 if !self.is_outbound() {
2381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2383 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2386 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2387 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2388 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2389 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2392 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2394 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2395 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2396 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2397 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2399 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2400 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2402 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2403 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2405 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2406 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2407 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2408 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2409 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2414 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2415 initial_commitment_tx,
2418 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2419 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2422 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2423 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2426 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2427 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2428 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2429 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2430 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2431 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2432 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2433 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2434 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2435 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2436 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2437 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2439 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2441 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2443 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2444 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2445 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2446 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2448 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2450 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2451 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2455 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2456 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2458 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2459 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2460 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2461 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2463 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2466 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2467 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2468 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2471 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2472 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2473 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2474 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2475 // when routing outbound payments.
2476 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2480 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2482 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2483 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2484 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2485 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2486 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2487 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2488 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2489 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2490 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2492 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2493 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2494 let expected_point =
2495 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2496 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2498 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2499 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2500 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2501 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2502 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2503 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2505 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2506 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2507 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2508 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2509 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2511 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2512 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2516 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2519 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2520 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2522 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2524 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2527 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2528 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2529 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2530 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2536 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2537 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2538 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2539 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2540 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2541 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2542 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2543 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2544 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2547 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2550 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2551 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2552 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2554 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2555 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2556 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2557 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2558 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2559 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2561 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2562 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2568 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2569 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2570 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2571 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2572 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2573 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2574 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2575 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2576 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2579 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2582 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2583 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2584 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2586 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2587 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2588 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2589 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2590 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2591 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2593 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2594 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2598 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2599 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2600 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2601 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2602 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2603 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2604 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2606 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2607 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2609 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2616 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2617 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2618 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2619 /// corner case properly.
2620 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2621 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2622 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2624 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2625 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2626 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2627 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2630 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2632 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2633 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2634 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2637 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2638 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2639 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2640 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2642 outbound_capacity_msat,
2643 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2644 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2645 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2651 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2652 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2655 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2656 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2657 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2658 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2659 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2660 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2663 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2664 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2666 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2667 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2670 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2671 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2672 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2674 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2675 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2677 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2680 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2681 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2683 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2684 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2686 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2687 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2689 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2690 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2694 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2695 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2701 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2702 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2703 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2706 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2707 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2708 included_htlcs += 1;
2711 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2712 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2716 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2717 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2718 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2719 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2720 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2721 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2726 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2728 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2729 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2734 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2735 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2739 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2740 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2744 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2745 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2747 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2748 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2749 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2751 total_pending_htlcs,
2752 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2753 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2754 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2756 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2757 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2758 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2760 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2762 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2767 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2768 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2769 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2771 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2772 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2774 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2777 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2778 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2780 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2781 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2783 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2784 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2786 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2787 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2791 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2792 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2798 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2799 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2800 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2801 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2802 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2803 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2806 included_htlcs += 1;
2809 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2810 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2813 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2814 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2816 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2817 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2818 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2823 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2824 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2825 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2828 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2829 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2831 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2832 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2834 total_pending_htlcs,
2835 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2836 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2837 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2839 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2840 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2841 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2843 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2845 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2850 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2851 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2852 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2853 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2854 if local_sent_shutdown {
2855 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2857 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2858 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2859 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2862 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2865 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2868 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2871 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2872 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2875 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2876 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2877 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2878 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2880 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2881 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2883 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2884 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2885 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2886 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2887 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2888 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2889 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2890 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2891 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2892 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2893 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2895 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2896 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2897 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2898 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2899 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2900 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2904 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2907 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2908 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2909 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2911 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2912 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2913 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2914 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2915 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2916 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2917 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2921 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2922 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2923 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2924 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2925 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2926 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2927 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2931 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2932 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2933 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2934 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2935 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2939 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2940 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2941 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2942 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2943 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2945 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2949 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2950 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2953 if !self.is_outbound() {
2954 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2955 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2956 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2957 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2958 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2959 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2960 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2961 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2962 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2963 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2964 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2965 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2966 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2967 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2968 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2971 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2972 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2973 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2974 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2975 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2978 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2979 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2981 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2985 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2986 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2987 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2991 // Now update local state:
2992 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2993 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2994 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2995 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2996 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2997 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2998 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3003 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3005 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3006 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3007 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3008 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3009 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3010 None => fail_reason.into(),
3011 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3012 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3013 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3016 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3020 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3021 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3022 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3023 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3025 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3031 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3034 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3035 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3036 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3038 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3042 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3045 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3046 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3047 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3049 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3053 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3057 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3058 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3059 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3061 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3065 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3069 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3070 where L::Target: Logger
3072 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3073 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3075 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3078 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3082 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3084 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3086 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3087 let commitment_txid = {
3088 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3089 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3090 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3092 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3093 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3094 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3095 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3096 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3101 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3103 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3104 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3105 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3106 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3109 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3110 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3111 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3112 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3115 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3117 if self.is_outbound() {
3118 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3119 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3120 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3121 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3122 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3123 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3124 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3125 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3126 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3127 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3133 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3137 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3138 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3139 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3140 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3141 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3142 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3143 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3145 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3146 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3147 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3148 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3149 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3150 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3151 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3154 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3156 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3160 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3161 commitment_stats.tx,
3163 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3164 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3165 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3168 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3169 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3171 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3172 let mut need_commitment = false;
3173 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3174 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3175 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3176 need_commitment = true;
3180 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3181 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3182 Some(forward_info.clone())
3184 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3185 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3186 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3187 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3188 need_commitment = true;
3191 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3192 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3193 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3194 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3195 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3196 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3197 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3198 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3199 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3200 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3201 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3202 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3203 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3204 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3206 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3208 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3209 need_commitment = true;
3213 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3214 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3215 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3216 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3217 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3218 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3223 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3224 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3225 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3226 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3228 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3229 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3230 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3231 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3232 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3233 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3234 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3235 // includes the right HTLCs.
3236 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3237 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3238 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3239 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3240 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3241 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3243 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3244 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3245 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3246 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3249 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3250 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3251 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3252 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3253 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3254 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3255 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3256 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3257 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3261 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3262 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3263 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3264 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3265 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3268 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3269 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3270 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3271 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3272 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3273 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3274 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3275 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3278 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3279 /// for our counterparty.
3280 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3281 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3282 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3283 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3284 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3286 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3287 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3288 updates: Vec::new(),
3291 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3292 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3293 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3294 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3295 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3296 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3297 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3298 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3299 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3300 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3301 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3302 // to rebalance channels.
3303 match &htlc_update {
3304 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3305 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3306 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3309 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3310 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3311 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3312 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3313 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3314 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3315 // into the holding cell without ever being
3316 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3317 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3318 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3321 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3327 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3328 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3329 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3330 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3331 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3332 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3333 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3334 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3335 (msg, monitor_update)
3336 } else { unreachable!() };
3337 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3338 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3340 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3341 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3342 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3343 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3344 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3345 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3346 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3347 // for a full revocation before failing.
3348 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3351 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3353 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3360 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3361 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3363 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3364 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3369 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3370 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3371 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3372 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3373 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3375 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3376 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3377 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3379 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3380 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3381 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3387 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3388 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3389 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3390 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3391 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3392 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3393 where L::Target: Logger,
3395 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3398 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3401 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3405 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3407 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3408 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3409 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3413 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3414 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3415 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3416 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3417 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3418 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3419 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3420 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3421 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3424 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3426 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3427 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3430 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3431 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3433 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3435 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3436 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3437 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3438 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3439 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3440 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3441 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3442 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3446 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3447 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3448 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3449 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3450 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3451 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3452 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3453 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3455 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3456 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3459 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3460 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3461 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3462 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3463 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3464 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3465 let mut require_commitment = false;
3466 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3469 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3470 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3471 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3473 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3474 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3475 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3476 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3477 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3478 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3483 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3484 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3485 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3486 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3487 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3489 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3490 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3491 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3496 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3497 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3499 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3503 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3504 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3506 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3507 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3508 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3509 require_commitment = true;
3510 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3511 match forward_info {
3512 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3513 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3514 require_commitment = true;
3516 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3517 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3518 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3520 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3521 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3522 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3526 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3527 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3528 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3529 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3535 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3536 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3537 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3538 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3540 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3541 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3542 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3543 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3544 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3545 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3546 require_commitment = true;
3550 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3552 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3553 match update_state {
3554 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3555 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3556 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3557 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3558 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3560 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3561 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3562 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3563 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3564 require_commitment = true;
3565 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3566 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3571 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3572 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3573 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3574 if require_commitment {
3575 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3576 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3577 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3578 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3579 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3580 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3581 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3582 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3583 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3585 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3586 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3587 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3588 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3589 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3590 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3593 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3594 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3595 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3596 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3597 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3598 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3599 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3601 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3602 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3603 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3605 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3606 if require_commitment {
3607 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3609 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3610 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3611 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3612 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3614 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3615 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3616 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3617 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3618 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3620 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3621 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3622 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3623 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3629 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3630 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3631 /// commitment update.
3632 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3633 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3634 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3637 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3638 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3639 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3640 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3642 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3643 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3644 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3645 if !self.is_outbound() {
3646 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3648 if !self.is_usable() {
3649 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3651 if !self.is_live() {
3652 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3655 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3656 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3657 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3658 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3659 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3660 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3661 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3662 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3663 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3664 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3668 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3669 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3670 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3671 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3672 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3675 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3676 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3680 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3681 force_holding_cell = true;
3684 if force_holding_cell {
3685 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3689 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3690 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3692 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3693 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3698 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3699 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3701 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3703 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3704 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3705 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3706 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3710 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3711 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3712 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3716 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3717 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3720 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3721 // will be retransmitted.
3722 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3723 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3724 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3726 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3727 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3729 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3730 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3731 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3732 // this HTLC accordingly
3733 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3736 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3737 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3738 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3739 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3742 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3743 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3744 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3745 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3746 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3747 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3752 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3754 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3755 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3756 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3757 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3761 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3762 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3763 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3764 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3765 // the update upon reconnection.
3766 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3770 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3771 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3774 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3775 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3776 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3777 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3778 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3779 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3780 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3782 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3783 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3784 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3785 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3786 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3787 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3788 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3790 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3791 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3792 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3793 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3794 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3795 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3796 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3799 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3800 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3801 /// to the remote side.
3802 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3803 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3804 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3805 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3808 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3810 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3811 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3812 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3814 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3815 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3816 // first received the funding_signed.
3817 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3818 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3819 self.funding_transaction.take()
3821 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3822 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3823 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3824 funding_broadcastable = None;
3827 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3828 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3829 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3830 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3831 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3832 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3833 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3834 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3835 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3836 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3837 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3838 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3839 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3840 next_per_commitment_point,
3841 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3845 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3847 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3848 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3849 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3850 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3851 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3852 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3854 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3855 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3856 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3857 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3858 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3859 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3863 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3864 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3866 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3867 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3870 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3871 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3872 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3873 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3874 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3875 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3876 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3877 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3878 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3882 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3883 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3885 if self.is_outbound() {
3886 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3888 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3889 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3891 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3892 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3894 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3895 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3896 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3897 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3898 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3899 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3900 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3901 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3902 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3903 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3904 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3905 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3906 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3908 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3909 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3910 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3916 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3917 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3918 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3919 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3920 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3921 per_commitment_secret,
3922 next_per_commitment_point,
3924 next_local_nonce: None,
3928 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3929 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3930 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3931 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3932 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3934 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3935 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3936 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3937 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3938 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3939 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3940 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3941 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3942 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3947 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3948 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3950 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3951 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3952 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3953 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3954 reason: err_packet.clone()
3957 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3958 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3959 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3960 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3961 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3962 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3965 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3966 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3967 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3968 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3969 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3976 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3977 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3978 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3979 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3983 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3984 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3985 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3986 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3987 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3988 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3992 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3993 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3995 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3996 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3997 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3998 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3999 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4000 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4001 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4002 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4005 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4007 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4008 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4009 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4010 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4011 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4014 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4015 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4016 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4019 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4020 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4021 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4022 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4023 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4024 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4025 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4028 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4029 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4030 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4031 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4032 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4035 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4036 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4037 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4038 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4039 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4040 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4041 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4042 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4045 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4049 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4050 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4051 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4052 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4054 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4058 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4059 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4060 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4062 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4063 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4064 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4065 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4066 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4070 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4072 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4073 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4074 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4075 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4076 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4079 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4080 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4081 channel_ready: None,
4082 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4083 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4084 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4088 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4089 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4090 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4091 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4092 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4093 next_per_commitment_point,
4094 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4096 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4097 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4098 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4102 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4103 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4104 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4106 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4107 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4108 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4111 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4117 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4118 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4119 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4120 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4121 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4123 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4124 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4125 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4126 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4127 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4128 next_per_commitment_point,
4129 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4133 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4134 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4135 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4137 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4140 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4141 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4142 raa: required_revoke,
4143 commitment_update: None,
4144 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4146 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4147 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4148 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4150 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4153 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4154 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4155 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4156 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4157 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4158 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4161 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4162 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4163 raa: required_revoke,
4164 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4165 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4169 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4173 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4174 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4175 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4176 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4178 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4180 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4182 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4183 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4184 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4185 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4186 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4187 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4189 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4190 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4191 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4192 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4193 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4195 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4196 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4197 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4198 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4201 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4202 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4203 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4204 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4205 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4206 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4207 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4208 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4209 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4210 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4211 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4212 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4213 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4214 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4215 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4217 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4220 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4221 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4224 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4225 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4226 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4227 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4228 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4229 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4230 self.channel_state &
4231 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4232 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4233 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4234 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4237 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4238 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4239 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4240 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4241 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4242 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4245 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4251 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4252 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4253 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4254 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4256 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4257 return Ok((None, None));
4260 if !self.is_outbound() {
4261 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4262 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4264 return Ok((None, None));
4267 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4269 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4270 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4271 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4272 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4274 let sig = self.holder_signer
4275 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4276 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4278 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4279 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4280 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4281 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4283 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4284 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4285 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4290 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4291 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4292 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4293 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4295 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4298 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4299 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4300 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4301 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4304 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4305 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4309 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4311 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4312 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4315 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4316 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4317 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4320 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4323 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4324 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4325 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4326 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4328 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4331 assert!(send_shutdown);
4332 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4333 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4336 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4341 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4343 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4344 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4346 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4347 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4348 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4349 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4350 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4351 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4354 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4355 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4356 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4358 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4359 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4360 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4361 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4365 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4366 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4367 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4368 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4369 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4370 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4372 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4373 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4380 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4381 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4383 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4386 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4387 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4389 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4391 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4392 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4393 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4394 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4395 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4396 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4397 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4398 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4399 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4401 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4402 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4405 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4409 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4410 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4411 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4412 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4414 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4415 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4417 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4420 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4421 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4423 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4427 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4428 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4431 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4432 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4433 return Ok((None, None));
4436 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4437 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4438 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4439 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4441 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4443 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4446 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4447 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4448 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4449 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4450 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4454 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4455 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4456 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4460 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4461 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4462 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4463 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4464 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4465 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4466 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4470 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4472 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4473 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4474 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4475 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4477 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4480 let sig = self.holder_signer
4481 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4482 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4484 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4485 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4486 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4487 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4491 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4492 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4493 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4494 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4496 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4497 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4498 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4504 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4505 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4508 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4509 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4511 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4512 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4515 if !self.is_outbound() {
4516 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4517 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4518 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4519 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4521 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4522 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4523 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4525 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4526 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4529 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4530 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4531 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4532 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4533 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4534 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4535 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4536 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4538 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4541 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4542 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4543 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4544 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4550 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4551 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4552 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4553 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4555 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4561 // Public utilities:
4563 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4567 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4569 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4570 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4571 self.temporary_channel_id
4574 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4578 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4579 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4580 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4584 /// Gets the channel's type
4585 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4589 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4590 /// is_usable() returns true).
4591 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4592 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4593 self.short_channel_id
4596 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4597 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4598 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4601 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4602 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4603 self.outbound_scid_alias
4605 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4606 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4607 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4608 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4609 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4612 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4613 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4614 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4615 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4618 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4619 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4620 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4623 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4624 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4625 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4626 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4630 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4633 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4634 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4637 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4638 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4641 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4642 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4643 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4646 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4647 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4650 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4651 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4652 self.counterparty_node_id
4655 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4656 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4657 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4660 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4661 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4662 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4665 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4666 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4668 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4669 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4670 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4671 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4673 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4677 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4678 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4679 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4682 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4683 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4684 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4687 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4688 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4689 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4691 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4692 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4697 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4698 self.channel_value_satoshis
4701 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4702 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4705 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4706 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4709 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4710 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4713 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4714 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4715 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4718 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4719 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4720 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4723 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4724 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4725 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4728 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4729 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4730 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4733 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4734 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4735 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4738 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4739 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4740 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4743 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4744 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4745 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4746 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4747 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4750 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4752 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4753 self.prev_config = None;
4757 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4758 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4762 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4763 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4764 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4765 let did_channel_update =
4766 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4767 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4768 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4769 if did_channel_update {
4770 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4771 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4772 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4773 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4775 self.config.options = *config;
4779 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4780 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4781 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4782 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4783 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4784 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4785 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4787 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4788 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4791 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4793 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4794 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4800 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4801 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4802 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4803 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4804 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4805 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4806 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4808 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4809 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4816 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4820 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4821 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4822 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4823 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4824 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4825 // which are near the dust limit.
4826 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4827 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4828 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4829 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4830 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4832 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4833 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4835 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4838 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4839 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4842 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4843 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4846 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4847 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4851 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4856 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4858 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4859 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4860 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4861 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4862 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4863 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4865 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4867 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4875 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4876 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4880 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4881 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4882 self.update_time_counter
4885 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4886 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4889 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4890 self.config.announced_channel
4893 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4894 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4897 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4898 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4899 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4900 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4903 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4904 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4905 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4908 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4909 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4910 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4911 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4912 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4915 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4916 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4917 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4918 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4919 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4922 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4923 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4924 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4925 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4928 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4929 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4932 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4933 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4934 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4937 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4938 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4939 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4941 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4942 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4943 if self.channel_state &
4944 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4945 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4946 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4947 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4948 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4951 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4952 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4953 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4954 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4955 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4956 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4958 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4959 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4960 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4962 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4963 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4964 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4965 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4966 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4967 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4973 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4974 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4975 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4978 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4979 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4980 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4983 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4984 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4985 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4988 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4989 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4990 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4991 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4992 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4993 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4998 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4999 self.channel_update_status
5002 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5003 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5004 self.channel_update_status = status;
5007 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5009 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5010 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5011 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5015 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5016 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5017 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5020 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5024 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5025 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5026 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5028 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5029 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5030 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5032 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5033 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5036 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5037 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5038 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5039 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5040 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5041 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5042 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5043 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5044 self.channel_state);
5046 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5050 if need_commitment_update {
5051 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5052 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5053 let next_per_commitment_point =
5054 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5055 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5056 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5057 next_per_commitment_point,
5058 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5062 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5068 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5069 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5070 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5071 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5072 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5073 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5074 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5076 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5079 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5080 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5081 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5082 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5083 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5084 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5085 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5086 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5087 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5088 if self.is_outbound() {
5089 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5090 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5091 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5092 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5093 // channel and move on.
5094 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5095 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5097 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5098 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5099 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5101 if self.is_outbound() {
5102 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5103 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5104 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5105 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5106 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5107 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5111 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5112 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5113 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5114 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5115 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5119 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5120 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5121 // may have already happened for this block).
5122 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5123 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5124 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5125 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5128 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5129 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5130 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5131 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5139 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5140 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5141 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5142 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5144 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5145 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5148 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5150 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5151 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5152 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5153 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5155 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5158 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5161 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5162 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5163 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5164 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5166 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5169 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5170 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5171 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5173 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5174 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5176 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5177 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5178 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5186 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5188 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5189 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5190 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5192 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5193 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5196 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5197 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5198 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5199 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5200 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5201 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5202 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5203 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5204 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5207 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5208 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5209 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5210 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5212 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5213 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5214 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5216 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5217 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5218 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5219 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5221 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5222 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5223 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5224 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5225 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5226 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5227 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5230 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5231 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5233 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5236 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5237 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5238 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5239 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5240 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5241 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5242 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5243 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5244 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5245 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5246 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5247 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5248 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5249 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5250 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5251 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5252 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5258 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5263 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5264 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5266 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5267 if !self.is_outbound() {
5268 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5270 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5271 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5274 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5275 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5278 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5279 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5283 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5284 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5285 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5286 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5287 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5288 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5289 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5290 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5291 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5292 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5293 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5294 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5295 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5296 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5297 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5298 first_per_commitment_point,
5299 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5300 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5301 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5302 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5304 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5308 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5309 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5312 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5313 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5314 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5315 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5318 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5319 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5321 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5322 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5323 if self.is_outbound() {
5324 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5326 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5327 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5329 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5330 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5332 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5333 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5336 self.user_id = user_id;
5337 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5339 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5342 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5343 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5344 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5346 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5347 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5348 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5349 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5351 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5352 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5353 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5354 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5355 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5356 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5357 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5358 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5359 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5360 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5361 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5362 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5363 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5364 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5365 first_per_commitment_point,
5366 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5367 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5368 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5370 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5372 next_local_nonce: None,
5376 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5377 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5379 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5381 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5382 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5385 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5386 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5387 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5388 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5389 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5390 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5393 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5394 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5395 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5396 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5397 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5398 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5399 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5400 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5401 if !self.is_outbound() {
5402 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5404 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5405 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5407 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5408 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5409 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5410 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5413 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5414 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5416 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5419 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5420 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5425 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5427 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5429 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5430 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5431 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5433 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5434 temporary_channel_id,
5435 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5436 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5439 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5441 next_local_nonce: None,
5445 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5446 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5447 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5448 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5450 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5453 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5454 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5455 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5456 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5457 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5458 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5460 if !self.is_usable() {
5461 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5464 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5465 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5466 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5467 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5469 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5470 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5472 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5473 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5474 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5475 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5476 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5477 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5483 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5484 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5485 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5486 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5488 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5491 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5495 if !self.is_usable() {
5499 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5500 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5504 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5508 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5509 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5512 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5516 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5518 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5523 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5525 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5530 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5532 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5533 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5534 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5535 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5536 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5540 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5542 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5543 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5544 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5545 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5546 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5547 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5548 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5550 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5551 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5552 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5553 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5554 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5555 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5556 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5557 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5558 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5559 contents: announcement,
5562 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5566 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5567 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5568 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5569 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5570 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5571 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5572 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5573 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5575 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5577 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5578 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5579 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5580 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5582 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5583 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5584 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5585 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5588 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5589 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5590 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5591 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5594 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5597 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5598 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5599 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5600 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5601 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5602 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5605 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5607 Err(_) => return None,
5609 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5610 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5615 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5616 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5617 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5618 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5619 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5620 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5621 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5622 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5623 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5624 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5625 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5626 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5627 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5628 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5629 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5630 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5631 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5632 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5633 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5636 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5637 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5638 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5639 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5642 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5643 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5644 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5645 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5646 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5647 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5648 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5649 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5651 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5652 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5653 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5654 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5655 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5656 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5657 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5658 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5659 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5661 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5667 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5669 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5670 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5671 /// commitment update.
5673 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5674 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5675 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5676 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5678 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5679 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5681 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5682 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5687 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5688 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5690 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5692 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5693 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5695 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5696 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5697 /// regenerate them.
5699 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5700 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5702 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5703 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5704 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5705 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5706 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5707 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5709 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5710 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5711 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5714 if amount_msat == 0 {
5715 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5718 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5719 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5722 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5723 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5724 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5725 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5726 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5727 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5728 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5729 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5732 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5733 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5734 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5735 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5737 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5738 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5739 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5742 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5743 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5744 if !self.is_outbound() {
5745 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5746 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5747 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5748 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5749 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5750 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5754 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5757 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5758 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5759 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5761 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5762 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5763 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5764 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5765 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5766 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5770 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5771 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5772 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5773 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5774 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5775 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5779 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5780 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5781 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5784 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5785 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5786 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5787 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5789 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5790 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5793 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5794 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5795 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5796 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5797 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5800 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5801 force_holding_cell = true;
5804 // Now update local state:
5805 if force_holding_cell {
5806 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5811 onion_routing_packet,
5816 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5817 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5819 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5821 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5825 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5826 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5827 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5831 onion_routing_packet,
5833 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5838 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5839 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5840 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5841 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5843 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5844 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5845 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5847 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5848 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5852 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5853 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5854 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5855 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5856 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5857 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5858 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5861 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5862 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5863 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5864 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5865 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5866 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5869 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5871 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5872 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5873 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5875 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5876 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5879 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5880 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5881 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5882 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5883 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5884 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5885 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5886 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5889 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5893 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5894 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5895 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5896 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5900 if !self.is_outbound() {
5901 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5902 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5903 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5904 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5905 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5906 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5907 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5908 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5909 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5910 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5916 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5919 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5920 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5921 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5922 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5923 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5924 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5926 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5927 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5928 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5929 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5932 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5933 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5937 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5938 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5940 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5942 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5943 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5944 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5945 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5947 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5948 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5949 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5950 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5951 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5952 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5956 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5957 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5961 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5962 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5965 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5966 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5968 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5969 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5970 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5971 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5972 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5975 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5976 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5977 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5978 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
5984 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5985 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5986 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5989 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5990 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5993 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5994 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5995 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5996 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6002 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6003 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6005 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6006 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6007 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6008 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
6009 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6010 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6011 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6012 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6013 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6016 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6017 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6018 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6020 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6021 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6024 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6025 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6026 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6029 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6030 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6031 let mut chan_closed = false;
6032 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6036 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6038 None if !chan_closed => {
6039 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6040 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6041 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6043 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6049 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6050 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6051 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6052 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6054 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6056 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6058 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6059 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6060 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6061 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6062 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6063 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6066 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6067 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6068 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6070 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6071 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6072 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6075 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6076 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6077 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6078 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6079 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6081 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6082 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6089 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6090 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6092 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6095 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6096 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6097 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6098 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6099 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6100 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6101 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6102 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6103 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6104 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6105 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6107 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6108 // return them to fail the payment.
6109 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6110 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6111 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6113 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6114 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6119 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6120 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6121 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6122 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6123 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6124 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6125 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6126 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6127 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6128 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6129 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6130 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6131 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6136 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6137 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6138 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6141 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6142 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6143 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6145 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6146 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6150 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6154 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6155 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6157 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6163 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6164 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6165 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6166 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6167 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6169 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6170 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6171 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6172 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6178 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6179 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6180 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6181 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6182 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6183 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6188 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6189 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6190 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6191 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6193 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6194 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6195 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6196 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6201 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6202 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6203 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6204 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6205 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6206 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6211 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6212 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6213 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6216 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6218 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6219 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6220 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6221 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6222 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6224 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6225 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6226 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6227 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6229 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6230 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6231 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6233 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6235 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6236 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6237 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6238 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6239 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6240 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6242 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6243 // deserialized from that format.
6244 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6245 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6246 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6248 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6250 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6251 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6252 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6254 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6255 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6256 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6257 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6260 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6261 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6262 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6265 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6266 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6267 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6268 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6270 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6271 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6273 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6275 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6277 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6279 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6282 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6284 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6289 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6291 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6292 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6293 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6294 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6295 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6296 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6297 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6299 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6301 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6303 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6306 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6307 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6308 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6311 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6313 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6314 preimages.push(preimage);
6316 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6317 reason.write(writer)?;
6319 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6321 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6322 preimages.push(preimage);
6324 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6325 reason.write(writer)?;
6330 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6331 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6333 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6335 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6336 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6337 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6338 source.write(writer)?;
6339 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6341 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6343 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6344 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6346 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6348 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6349 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6354 match self.resend_order {
6355 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6356 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6359 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6360 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6361 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6363 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6364 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6365 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6366 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6369 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6370 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6371 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6372 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6373 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6376 if self.is_outbound() {
6377 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6378 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6379 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6381 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6382 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6383 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6385 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6387 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6388 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6389 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6390 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6392 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6393 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6394 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6395 // consider the stale state on reload.
6398 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6399 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6400 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6402 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6403 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6404 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6406 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6407 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6409 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6410 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6411 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6413 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6414 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6416 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6419 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6420 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6421 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6423 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6426 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6427 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6429 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6430 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6431 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6433 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6435 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6437 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6439 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6440 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6441 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6442 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6443 htlc.write(writer)?;
6446 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6447 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6448 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6450 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6451 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6453 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6454 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6455 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6456 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6457 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6458 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6459 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6461 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6462 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6463 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6464 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6465 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6467 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6468 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6470 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6471 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6472 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6473 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6475 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6476 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6477 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6478 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6479 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6480 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6481 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6483 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6484 (2, chan_type, option),
6485 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6486 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6487 (5, self.config, required),
6488 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6489 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6490 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6491 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6492 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6493 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6494 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6495 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6496 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6497 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6498 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6499 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6500 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6501 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6508 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6509 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6511 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6512 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6514 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6515 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6516 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6518 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6519 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6520 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6521 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6525 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6526 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6527 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6528 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6531 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6532 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6535 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6536 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6537 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6539 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6541 let mut keys_data = None;
6543 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6544 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6545 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6546 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6547 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6548 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6549 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6550 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6551 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6552 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6556 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6557 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6558 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6561 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6563 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6564 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6565 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6567 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6568 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6569 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6570 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6571 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6572 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6573 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6574 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6575 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6576 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6577 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6578 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6579 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6580 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6585 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6586 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6587 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6588 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6589 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6590 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6591 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6592 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6593 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6594 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6595 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6596 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6598 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6599 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6602 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6603 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6606 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6607 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6609 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6614 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6615 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6616 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6617 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6618 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6619 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6620 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6621 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6622 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6623 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6625 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6626 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6627 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6629 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6630 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6631 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6633 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6637 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6638 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6639 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6640 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6643 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6647 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6648 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6649 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6650 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6653 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6655 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6656 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6659 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6661 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6663 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6664 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6665 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6666 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6668 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6669 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6670 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6671 // consider the stale state on reload.
6672 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6675 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6676 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6677 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6679 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6682 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6683 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6684 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6686 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6687 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6688 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6689 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6691 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6692 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6694 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6695 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6697 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6698 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6699 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6701 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6703 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6704 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6706 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6707 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6710 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6712 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6713 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6714 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6715 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6717 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6720 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6721 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6723 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6725 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6726 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6728 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6729 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6731 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6733 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6734 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6735 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6737 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6738 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6739 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6743 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6744 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6745 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6747 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6753 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6754 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6755 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6756 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6757 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6758 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6759 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6760 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6761 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6762 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6764 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6765 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6766 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6767 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6768 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6769 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6770 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6772 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6773 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6774 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6776 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6777 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6778 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6779 (2, channel_type, option),
6780 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6781 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6782 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6783 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6784 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6785 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6786 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6787 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6788 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6789 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6790 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6791 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6792 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6793 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6794 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6795 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6796 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6799 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6800 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6801 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6802 // required channel parameters.
6803 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6804 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6805 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6807 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6809 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6810 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6811 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6812 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6815 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6816 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6817 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6819 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6820 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6822 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6823 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6828 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6829 if iter.next().is_some() {
6830 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6834 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6835 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6836 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6837 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6838 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6841 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6842 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6844 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6845 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6846 // separate u64 values.
6847 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6852 config: config.unwrap(),
6856 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6857 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6858 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6861 temporary_channel_id,
6863 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6865 channel_value_satoshis,
6867 latest_monitor_update_id,
6870 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6873 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6874 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6877 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6878 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6879 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6883 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6884 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6885 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6886 monitor_pending_forwards,
6887 monitor_pending_failures,
6888 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6891 holding_cell_update_fee,
6892 next_holder_htlc_id,
6893 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6894 update_time_counter,
6897 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6898 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6899 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6900 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6902 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6903 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6904 closing_fee_limits: None,
6905 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6907 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6909 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6910 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6912 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6914 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6915 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6916 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6917 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6918 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6919 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6920 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6921 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6922 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6925 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6927 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6928 funding_transaction,
6930 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6931 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6932 counterparty_node_id,
6934 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6938 channel_update_status,
6939 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6944 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6945 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6946 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6948 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6950 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6951 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6952 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6954 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6955 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6957 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6958 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6960 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6963 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6971 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6972 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6973 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6974 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6975 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6977 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6978 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6980 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6981 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6982 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6983 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6984 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6985 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6986 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6987 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6988 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6989 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6990 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6991 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6992 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6993 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6994 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6995 use crate::util::test_utils;
6996 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6997 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6998 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6999 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7000 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7001 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7002 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7003 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7004 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7005 use crate::prelude::*;
7007 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7010 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7011 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7017 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7018 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7019 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7020 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7024 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7025 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7026 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7027 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7028 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7029 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7030 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7034 signer: InMemorySigner,
7037 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7038 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7041 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7042 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7044 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7045 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7048 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7052 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7054 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7055 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7056 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7057 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7058 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7061 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7062 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7063 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7064 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7068 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7069 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7070 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7074 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7075 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7076 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7077 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7079 let seed = [42; 32];
7080 let network = Network::Testnet;
7081 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7082 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7083 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7086 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7087 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7088 let config = UserConfig::default();
7089 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7090 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7091 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7093 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7094 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7098 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7099 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7101 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7102 let original_fee = 253;
7103 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7104 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7105 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7106 let seed = [42; 32];
7107 let network = Network::Testnet;
7108 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7110 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7111 let config = UserConfig::default();
7112 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7114 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7115 // same as the old fee.
7116 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7117 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7118 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7122 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7123 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7124 // dust limits are used.
7125 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7126 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7127 let seed = [42; 32];
7128 let network = Network::Testnet;
7129 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7130 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7132 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7133 // they have different dust limits.
7135 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7136 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7137 let config = UserConfig::default();
7138 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7140 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7141 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7142 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7143 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7144 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7146 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7147 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7148 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7149 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7150 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7152 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7153 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7154 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7156 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7157 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7158 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7159 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7162 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7164 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7165 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7166 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7167 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7168 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7170 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7171 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7172 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7173 payment_secret: None,
7177 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7178 // the dust limit check.
7179 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7180 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7181 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7182 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7184 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7185 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7186 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7187 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7188 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7189 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7190 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7194 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7195 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7196 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7197 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7198 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7199 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7200 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7201 let seed = [42; 32];
7202 let network = Network::Testnet;
7203 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7205 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7206 let config = UserConfig::default();
7207 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7209 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7210 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7212 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7213 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7214 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7215 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7216 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7217 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7219 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7220 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7221 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7222 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7223 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7225 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7227 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7228 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7229 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7230 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7231 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7233 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7234 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7235 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7236 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7237 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7241 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7242 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7243 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7244 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7245 let seed = [42; 32];
7246 let network = Network::Testnet;
7247 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7248 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7249 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7251 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7253 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7254 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7255 let config = UserConfig::default();
7256 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7258 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7259 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7260 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7261 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7263 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7264 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7265 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7267 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7268 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7269 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7270 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7272 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7273 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7274 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7276 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7277 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7279 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7280 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7281 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7282 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7283 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7284 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7285 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7286 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7287 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7292 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7294 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7295 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7296 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7297 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7298 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7299 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7300 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7307 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7308 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7309 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7310 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7311 let seed = [42; 32];
7312 let network = Network::Testnet;
7313 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7314 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7315 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7317 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7318 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7319 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7320 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7321 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7322 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7323 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7324 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7326 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7327 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7328 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7329 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7330 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7331 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7333 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7334 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7335 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7336 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7338 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7340 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7341 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7342 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7343 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7344 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7345 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7347 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7348 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7349 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7350 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7352 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7353 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7354 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7355 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7356 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7358 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7359 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7361 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7362 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7363 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7365 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7366 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7367 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7368 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7369 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7371 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7372 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7374 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7375 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7376 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7380 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7382 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7383 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7384 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7386 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7387 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7388 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7389 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7391 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7392 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7393 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7395 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7397 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7398 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7401 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7402 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7403 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7404 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7405 let seed = [42; 32];
7406 let network = Network::Testnet;
7407 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7408 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7409 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7412 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7413 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7414 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7416 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7417 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7419 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7420 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7421 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7423 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7424 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7426 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7428 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7429 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7431 // Channel Negotiations failed
7432 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7433 assert!(result.is_err());
7438 fn channel_update() {
7439 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7440 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7441 let seed = [42; 32];
7442 let network = Network::Testnet;
7443 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7444 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7446 // Create a channel.
7447 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7448 let config = UserConfig::default();
7449 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7450 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7451 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7452 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7454 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7455 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7456 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7458 short_channel_id: 0,
7461 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7462 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7463 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7465 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7466 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7468 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7470 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7472 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7473 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7474 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7475 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7477 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7478 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7479 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7481 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7485 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7487 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7488 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7489 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7490 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7491 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7492 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7493 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7494 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7495 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7496 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7497 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7498 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7499 use crate::sync::Arc;
7501 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7502 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7503 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7504 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7506 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7508 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7509 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7510 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7511 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7512 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7514 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7515 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7520 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7521 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7522 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7524 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7525 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7526 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7527 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7528 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7529 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7531 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7533 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7534 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7535 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7536 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7537 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7538 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7540 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7541 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7542 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7543 selected_contest_delay: 144
7545 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7546 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7548 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7549 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7551 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7552 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7554 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7555 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7557 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7558 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7559 // build_commitment_transaction.
7560 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7561 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7562 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7563 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7564 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7566 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7567 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7568 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7569 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7573 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7574 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7575 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7576 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7580 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7581 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7582 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7584 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7585 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7587 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7588 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7590 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7592 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7593 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7594 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7595 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7596 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7597 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7598 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7600 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7601 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7602 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7603 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7605 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7606 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7607 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7609 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7611 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7612 commitment_tx.clone(),
7613 counterparty_signature,
7614 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7615 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7616 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7618 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7619 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7621 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7622 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7623 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7625 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7626 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7629 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7630 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7632 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7633 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7634 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7635 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7636 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7637 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7638 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7639 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7641 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7644 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7645 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7646 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7650 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7653 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7654 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7655 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7657 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7658 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7659 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7660 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7661 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7662 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7663 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7664 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7666 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7670 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7671 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7672 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7673 "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", {});
7675 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7676 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7678 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7679 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7680 "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", {});
7682 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7683 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7684 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7685 "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", {});
7687 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7688 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7690 amount_msat: 1000000,
7692 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7693 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7695 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7698 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7699 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7701 amount_msat: 2000000,
7703 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7704 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7706 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7709 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7710 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7712 amount_msat: 2000000,
7714 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7715 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7716 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7718 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7721 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7722 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7724 amount_msat: 3000000,
7726 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7727 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7728 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7730 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7733 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7734 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7736 amount_msat: 4000000,
7738 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7739 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7741 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7745 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7746 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7747 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7749 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7750 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7751 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7754 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7755 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7756 "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" },
7759 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7760 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7761 "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" },
7764 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7765 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7766 "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" },
7769 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7770 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7771 "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" },
7774 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7775 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7776 "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" }
7779 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7780 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7781 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7783 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7784 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7785 "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", {
7788 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7789 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7790 "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" },
7793 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7794 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7795 "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" },
7798 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7799 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7800 "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" },
7803 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7804 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7805 "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" },
7808 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7809 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7810 "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" }
7813 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7814 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7815 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7817 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7818 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7819 "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", {
7822 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7823 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7824 "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" },
7827 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7828 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7829 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7832 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7833 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7834 "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" },
7837 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7838 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7839 "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" }
7842 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7843 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7844 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7845 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7847 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7848 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7849 "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", {
7852 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7853 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7854 "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" },
7857 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7858 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7859 "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" },
7862 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7863 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7864 "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" },
7867 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7868 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7869 "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" }
7872 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7873 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7874 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7875 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7877 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7878 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7879 "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", {
7882 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7883 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7884 "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" },
7887 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7888 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7889 "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" },
7892 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7893 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7894 "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" },
7897 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7898 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7899 "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" }
7902 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7903 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7904 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7906 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7907 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7908 "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", {
7911 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7912 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7913 "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" },
7916 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7917 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7918 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7921 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7922 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7923 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7926 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7927 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7928 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7930 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7931 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7932 "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", {
7935 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7936 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7937 "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" },
7940 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7941 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7942 "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" },
7945 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7946 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7947 "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" }
7950 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7951 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7952 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7954 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7955 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7956 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7959 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7960 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7961 "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" },
7964 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7965 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7966 "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" }
7969 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7970 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7971 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7972 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7974 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7975 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7976 "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", {
7979 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7980 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7981 "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" },
7984 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7985 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7986 "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" }
7989 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7990 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7991 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7992 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7994 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7995 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7996 "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", {
7999 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8000 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8001 "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" },
8004 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8005 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8006 "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" }
8009 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8010 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8011 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8013 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8014 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8015 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8018 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8019 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8020 "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" }
8023 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8024 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8025 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8026 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8028 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8029 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8030 "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", {
8033 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8034 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8035 "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" }
8038 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8039 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8040 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8041 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8043 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8044 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8045 "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", {
8048 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8049 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8050 "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" }
8053 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8054 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8055 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8056 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8058 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8059 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8060 "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", {});
8062 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8063 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8064 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8065 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8067 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8068 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8069 "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", {});
8071 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8072 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8073 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8074 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8076 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8077 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8078 "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", {});
8080 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8081 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8082 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8084 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8085 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8086 "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", {});
8088 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8089 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8090 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8091 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8093 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8094 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8095 "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", {});
8097 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8098 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8099 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8100 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8102 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8103 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8104 "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", {});
8106 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8107 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8108 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8109 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8110 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8111 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8113 amount_msat: 2000000,
8115 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8116 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8118 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8121 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8122 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8123 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8125 amount_msat: 5000001,
8127 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8128 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8129 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8131 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8134 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8135 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8137 amount_msat: 5000000,
8139 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8140 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8141 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8143 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8147 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8148 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8149 "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", {
8152 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8153 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8154 "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" },
8156 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8157 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8158 "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" },
8160 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8161 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8162 "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" }
8165 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8166 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8167 "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", {
8170 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8171 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8172 "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" },
8174 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8175 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8176 "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" },
8178 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8179 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8180 "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" }
8185 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8186 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8188 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8189 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8190 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8191 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8193 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8194 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8195 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8197 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8198 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8200 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8201 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8203 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8204 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8205 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8209 fn test_key_derivation() {
8210 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8211 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8213 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8214 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8216 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8217 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8219 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8220 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8222 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8223 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8225 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8226 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8228 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8229 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8231 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8232 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8236 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8237 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8238 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8239 let seed = [42; 32];
8240 let network = Network::Testnet;
8241 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8242 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8244 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8245 let config = UserConfig::default();
8246 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8247 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8249 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8250 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8252 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8253 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8254 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8255 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8256 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8257 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8258 assert!(res.is_ok());
8263 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8264 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8265 // resulting `channel_type`.
8266 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8267 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8268 let network = Network::Testnet;
8269 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8270 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8272 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8273 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8275 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8276 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8278 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8279 // need to signal it.
8280 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8281 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8282 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8285 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8287 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8288 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8289 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8291 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8292 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8293 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8296 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8297 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8298 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8299 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8300 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8303 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8304 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8309 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8310 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8311 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8312 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8313 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8314 let network = Network::Testnet;
8315 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8316 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8318 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8319 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8321 let config = UserConfig::default();
8323 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8324 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8325 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8326 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8327 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8329 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8330 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8331 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8334 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8335 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8336 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8338 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8339 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8340 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8341 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8342 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8343 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8345 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8350 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8351 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8353 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8354 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8355 let network = Network::Testnet;
8356 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8357 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8359 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8360 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8362 let config = UserConfig::default();
8364 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8365 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8366 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8367 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8368 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8369 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8370 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8371 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8373 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8374 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8375 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8376 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8377 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8378 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8381 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8382 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8384 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8385 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8386 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8387 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8389 assert!(res.is_err());
8391 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8392 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8393 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8395 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8396 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8397 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8400 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8402 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8403 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8404 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8405 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8408 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8409 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8411 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8412 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8414 assert!(res.is_err());