1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
13 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
30 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
33 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
34 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
35 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
36 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
37 use util::transaction_utils;
38 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::errors::APIError;
41 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
42 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
48 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
50 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
51 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
66 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
67 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
68 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
71 enum InboundHTLCState {
72 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
73 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
74 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
75 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
76 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
77 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
78 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
79 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
80 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
81 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
82 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
83 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
84 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
85 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
86 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
88 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
89 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
90 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
91 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
92 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
93 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
94 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
95 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
96 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
97 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
98 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
99 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
100 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
101 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
103 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
104 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
106 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
107 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
108 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
109 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
110 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
112 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
113 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
115 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
116 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
117 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
118 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
119 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
120 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
121 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
122 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
125 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
129 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
130 state: InboundHTLCState,
133 enum OutboundHTLCState {
134 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
135 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
136 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
137 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
138 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
139 /// money back (though we won't), and,
140 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
141 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
142 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
143 /// we'll never get out of sync).
144 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
145 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
146 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
148 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
149 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
150 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
151 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
152 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
153 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
154 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
155 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
156 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
157 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
158 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
159 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
160 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
161 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
162 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
165 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
169 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
170 state: OutboundHTLCState,
174 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
175 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
176 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
180 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
182 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
185 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
190 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
194 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
195 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
196 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
197 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
198 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
199 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
200 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
202 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
203 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
204 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
205 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
206 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
207 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
208 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
210 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
211 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
212 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
214 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
215 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
216 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
217 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
218 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
219 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
221 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
222 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
224 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
225 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
226 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
227 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
228 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
229 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
230 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
231 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
232 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
234 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
235 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
236 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
237 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
238 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
239 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
240 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
241 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
242 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
243 /// us their shutdown.
244 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
245 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
246 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
247 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
249 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
250 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
252 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
254 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
255 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
256 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
257 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
258 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
259 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
260 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
261 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
263 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
265 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
267 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
271 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
277 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
280 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
281 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
282 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
285 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
286 struct HTLCCandidate {
288 origin: HTLCInitiator,
292 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
300 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
301 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
302 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
303 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
304 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
305 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
306 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
307 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
308 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
309 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
310 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
313 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
315 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
317 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
318 htlc_value_msat: u64,
319 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
324 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
325 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
326 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
327 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
328 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
330 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
331 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
332 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
333 htlc_value_msat: u64,
334 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
335 /// in the holding cell).
336 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
338 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
339 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
343 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
344 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
345 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
348 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
349 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
350 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
351 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
352 pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
353 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
354 config: ChannelConfig,
358 channel_id: [u8; 32],
360 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
361 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
363 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
365 holder_signer: Signer,
366 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
367 destination_script: Script,
369 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
370 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
371 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
373 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
374 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
375 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
376 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
377 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
378 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
380 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
381 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
382 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
383 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
384 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
385 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
387 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
389 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
390 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
391 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
392 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
393 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
395 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
396 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
397 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
399 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
400 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
401 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
402 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
403 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
404 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
405 // commitment_signed.
406 pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
407 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
408 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
409 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
410 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
411 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
412 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
413 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
414 update_time_counter: u32,
417 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
418 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
419 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
420 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
421 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
422 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
424 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
426 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
427 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
428 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
429 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
431 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
433 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
435 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
437 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
439 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
440 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
441 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
442 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
443 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
444 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
445 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
447 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
449 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
450 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
451 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
453 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
455 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
456 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
458 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
459 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
460 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
462 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
464 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
466 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
468 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
469 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
470 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
472 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
473 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
474 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
475 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
476 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
477 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
478 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
479 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
481 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
482 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
483 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
484 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
485 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
487 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
488 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
490 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
491 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
492 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
493 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
494 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
495 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
496 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
497 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
500 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
501 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
503 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
504 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
505 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
509 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
512 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
514 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
516 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
518 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
520 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
522 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
524 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
525 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
526 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
527 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
528 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
529 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
530 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
531 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
532 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
534 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
535 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
536 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
537 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
538 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
540 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
541 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
542 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
543 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
546 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
549 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
550 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
552 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
553 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
554 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
559 macro_rules! secp_check {
560 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
563 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
568 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
569 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
570 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
571 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
574 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
577 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
578 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
579 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
580 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
584 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
585 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
586 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
588 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
589 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
590 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
592 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
595 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
596 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
597 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
599 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
600 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
602 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
603 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
604 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
607 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
609 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
610 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
614 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
616 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
617 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
619 channel_value_satoshis,
621 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
624 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
625 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
627 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
628 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
629 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
631 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
632 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
633 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
634 pending_update_fee: None,
635 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
636 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
637 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
638 update_time_counter: 1,
640 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
642 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
643 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
644 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
645 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
646 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
648 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
649 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
650 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
651 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
653 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
655 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
656 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
657 short_channel_id: None,
659 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
660 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
661 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
662 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
663 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
664 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
665 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
666 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
667 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
669 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
671 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
672 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
673 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
674 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
675 counterparty_parameters: None,
676 funding_outpoint: None
678 funding_transaction: None,
680 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
681 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
682 counterparty_node_id,
684 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
686 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
688 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
690 announcement_sigs: None,
692 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
693 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
694 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
695 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
697 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
700 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
704 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
705 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
707 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
708 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
709 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
711 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
712 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
713 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
718 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
719 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
720 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
721 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
722 F::Target: FeeEstimator
724 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
725 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
726 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
727 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
728 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
729 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
730 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
731 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
733 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
735 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
736 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
739 // Check sanity of message fields:
740 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
741 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
743 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
744 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
746 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
747 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
748 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
750 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
751 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
753 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
754 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
756 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
757 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
760 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
762 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
763 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
764 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
766 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
767 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
769 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
770 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
773 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
774 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
775 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
777 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
778 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
780 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
781 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
783 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
784 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
786 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
787 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
789 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
790 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
792 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
793 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
796 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
798 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
799 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
800 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
801 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
804 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
805 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
807 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
809 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
810 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
811 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
813 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
816 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
820 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
821 // for full fee payment
822 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
823 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
824 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
825 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
828 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
829 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
830 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
834 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
835 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
836 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
837 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
838 if script.len() == 0 {
840 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
841 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
842 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
847 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
848 &OptionalField::Absent => {
849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
854 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
855 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
859 config: local_config,
861 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
862 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
865 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
868 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
869 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
871 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
872 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
873 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
875 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
876 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
877 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
878 pending_update_fee: None,
879 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
880 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
881 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
882 update_time_counter: 1,
884 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
886 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
887 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
888 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
889 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
890 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
892 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
893 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
894 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
895 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
897 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
899 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
900 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
901 short_channel_id: None,
903 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
904 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
905 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
906 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
907 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
908 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
909 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
910 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
911 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
912 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
914 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
916 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
917 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
918 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
919 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
920 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
921 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
922 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
924 funding_outpoint: None
926 funding_transaction: None,
928 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
929 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
930 counterparty_node_id,
932 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
934 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
936 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
938 announcement_sigs: None,
940 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
941 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
942 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
943 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
945 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
947 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
948 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
954 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
955 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
956 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
957 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
958 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
960 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
961 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
962 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
963 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
964 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
965 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
966 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
967 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
968 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
969 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
970 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
972 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
973 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
974 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
975 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
977 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
978 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
979 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
980 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
982 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
983 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
984 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
985 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
987 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
988 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
989 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
991 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
992 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
993 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
994 transaction_output_index: None
999 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1000 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1001 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1002 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1003 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1004 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1005 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1007 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1008 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1011 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1012 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1013 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1014 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1016 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1017 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1023 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1024 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1025 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1026 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1027 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1028 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1029 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1033 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1034 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1036 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1038 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1039 if generated_by_local {
1040 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1041 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1050 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1051 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1052 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1053 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1054 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1055 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1056 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1060 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1061 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1063 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1065 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1066 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1068 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1069 if !generated_by_local {
1070 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1078 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1079 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1080 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1081 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1082 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1083 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1084 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1085 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1087 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1089 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1090 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1091 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1092 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1094 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1096 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1097 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1098 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1099 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1102 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1103 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1104 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1106 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1109 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1110 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1112 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1113 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1118 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1119 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1124 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1126 let channel_parameters =
1127 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1128 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1129 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1134 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1137 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1138 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1139 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1140 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1142 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1146 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1147 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1148 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1152 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1157 1 + // script length (0)
1161 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1162 2 + // witness marker and flag
1163 1 + // witness element count
1164 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1165 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1166 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1167 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1168 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1169 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1171 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1172 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1173 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1179 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1181 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1183 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1184 script_sig: Script::new(),
1185 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1186 witness: Vec::new(),
1191 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1192 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1193 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1195 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1196 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1197 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1199 if value_to_self < 0 {
1200 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1201 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1202 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1203 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1204 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1207 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1208 txouts.push((TxOut {
1209 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1210 value: value_to_remote as u64
1214 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1215 txouts.push((TxOut {
1216 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1217 value: value_to_self as u64
1221 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1223 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1224 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1225 outputs.push(out.0);
1233 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1236 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1237 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1241 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1242 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1243 /// our counterparty!)
1244 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1245 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1246 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1247 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1248 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1249 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1250 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1252 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1256 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1257 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1258 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1259 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1260 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1261 //may see payments to it!
1262 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1263 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1264 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1266 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1269 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1270 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1271 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1272 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1273 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1276 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1277 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1278 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1279 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1281 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1282 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1284 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1286 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1288 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1289 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1290 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1292 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1293 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1294 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1295 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1296 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1298 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1299 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1300 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1302 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1303 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1305 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1308 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1309 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1313 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1317 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1318 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1319 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1320 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1321 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1322 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1325 // Now update local state:
1327 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1328 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1329 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1330 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1331 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1332 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1333 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1337 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1338 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1339 match pending_update {
1340 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1341 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1342 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1343 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1344 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1345 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1346 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1349 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1350 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1351 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1352 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1353 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1354 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1355 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1361 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1362 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1363 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1365 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1366 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1367 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1369 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1370 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1373 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1374 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1376 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1377 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1379 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1380 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1383 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1386 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1387 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1388 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1389 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1394 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1395 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1396 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1397 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1398 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1401 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1402 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1403 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1404 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1405 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1407 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1408 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1409 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1413 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1414 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1415 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1416 /// before we fail backwards.
1417 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1418 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1419 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1420 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1421 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1423 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1425 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1426 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1427 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1429 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1430 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1431 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1433 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1434 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1435 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1437 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1442 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1443 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1449 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1450 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1451 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1452 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1453 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1457 // Now update local state:
1458 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1459 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1460 match pending_update {
1461 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1462 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1463 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1464 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1468 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1469 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1470 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1471 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1477 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1478 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1479 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1485 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1487 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1488 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1491 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1492 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1493 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1498 // Message handlers:
1500 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1501 // Check sanity of message fields:
1502 if !self.is_outbound() {
1503 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1505 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1506 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1508 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1511 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1512 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1514 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1515 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1517 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1518 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1519 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1521 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1522 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1523 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1525 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1526 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1527 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1529 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1530 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1532 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1536 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1537 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1538 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1540 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1541 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1543 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1544 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1546 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1547 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1549 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1550 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1552 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1555 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1556 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1558 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1559 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1560 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1562 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1565 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1566 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1567 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1568 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1569 if script.len() == 0 {
1571 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1572 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1573 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1575 Some(script.clone())
1578 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1579 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1580 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1585 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1586 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1587 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1588 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1589 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1590 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1592 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1593 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1594 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1595 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1596 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1597 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1600 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1601 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1602 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1605 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1606 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1608 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1613 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1614 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1616 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1617 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1619 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1620 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1621 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1622 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1623 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1624 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1625 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1626 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1627 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1630 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1631 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1633 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1634 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1635 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1636 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1638 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1639 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1641 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1642 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1645 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1646 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1649 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1650 if self.is_outbound() {
1651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1653 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1654 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1655 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1657 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1659 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1660 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1661 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1662 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1665 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1666 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1667 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1668 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1669 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1671 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1673 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1674 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1678 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1679 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1680 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1684 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1685 initial_commitment_tx,
1688 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1689 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1692 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1694 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1695 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1696 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1697 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1698 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1699 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1700 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1701 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1703 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1705 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1707 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1708 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1709 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1710 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1712 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1714 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1715 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1717 }, channel_monitor))
1720 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1721 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1722 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1723 if !self.is_outbound() {
1724 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1726 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1727 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1729 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1730 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1731 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1732 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1735 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1737 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1738 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1739 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1740 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1742 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1743 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1745 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1746 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1748 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1749 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1750 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1751 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1752 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1757 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1758 initial_commitment_tx,
1761 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1762 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1766 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1767 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1768 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1769 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1770 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1771 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1772 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1773 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1774 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1776 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1778 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1780 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1781 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1782 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1783 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1785 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1787 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1790 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1791 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1792 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1793 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1796 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1798 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1799 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1800 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1801 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1802 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1803 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1804 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1805 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1806 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1807 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1808 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1809 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1810 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1811 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1813 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1816 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1819 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1820 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1822 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1827 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1828 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1829 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1830 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1831 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1832 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1833 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1836 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1837 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1838 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1839 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1840 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1841 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1843 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1844 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1850 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1851 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1852 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1853 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1854 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1855 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1856 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1859 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1860 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1861 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1862 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1863 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1864 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1866 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1867 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1871 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1872 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1873 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1874 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1875 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1876 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1878 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1879 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1886 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1887 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1888 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1889 /// corner case properly.
1890 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1891 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1893 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1894 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1895 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1896 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
1898 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1899 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1900 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
1905 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1906 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
1907 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1910 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1911 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1912 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1913 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1914 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1915 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1918 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1919 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1920 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1922 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1923 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1925 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1926 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1928 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1929 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1931 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1932 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1936 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1937 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1943 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1944 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1945 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1948 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1949 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1950 included_htlcs += 1;
1953 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1954 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1958 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1959 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1960 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1961 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1962 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1963 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1968 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1970 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1971 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1976 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1977 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1981 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1982 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1983 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1986 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1987 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1989 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1990 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1991 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1993 total_pending_htlcs,
1994 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1995 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1996 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1998 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1999 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2000 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2002 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2004 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2009 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2010 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2011 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2013 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2014 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2016 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2017 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2019 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2020 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2022 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2023 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2027 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2028 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2034 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2035 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2036 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2037 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2038 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2039 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2042 included_htlcs += 1;
2045 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2046 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2049 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2050 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2052 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2053 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2054 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2059 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2060 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2061 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2064 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2065 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2067 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2068 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2070 total_pending_htlcs,
2071 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2072 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2073 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2075 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2076 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2077 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2079 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2081 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2086 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2087 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2088 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2089 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2090 if local_sent_shutdown {
2091 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
2093 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2094 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2095 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2098 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2101 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2104 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2105 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2107 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2108 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2111 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2112 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2113 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2116 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2117 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2120 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2121 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2122 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2123 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2124 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2125 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2126 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2127 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2128 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2129 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2130 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2132 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2133 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2134 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2135 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2136 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2137 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2141 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2142 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2143 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2144 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2145 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2146 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2147 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2151 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2152 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2153 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2154 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2155 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2156 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2157 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2161 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2162 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2163 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2164 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2165 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2166 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2169 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2170 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2171 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2172 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2173 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2175 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2179 let chan_reserve_msat =
2180 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2181 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2185 if !self.is_outbound() {
2186 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2187 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2188 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2189 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2190 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2191 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2192 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2193 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2194 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2195 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2196 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2197 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2198 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2199 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2200 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2203 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2204 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2205 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2206 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2210 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2213 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2217 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2218 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2219 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2223 // Now update local state:
2224 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2225 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2226 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2227 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2228 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2229 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2230 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2235 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2237 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2238 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2239 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2240 match check_preimage {
2242 Some(payment_hash) =>
2243 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2248 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2250 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2251 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2253 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2259 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2262 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2263 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2266 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2267 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2270 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2271 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2274 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2275 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2278 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2279 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2282 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2286 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2287 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2290 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2291 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2294 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2298 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2299 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2302 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2303 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2305 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2306 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2308 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2309 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2312 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2314 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2316 let mut update_fee = false;
2317 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2319 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2324 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2325 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2326 let commitment_txid = {
2327 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2328 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2329 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2331 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2332 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2333 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2334 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2335 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2336 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2340 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2341 (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2344 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2345 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2347 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2348 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2349 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2352 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2354 if self.is_outbound() {
2355 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2356 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2357 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2358 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2359 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2360 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2361 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2362 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2363 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2364 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2370 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2371 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2374 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2375 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2376 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2377 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2378 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2379 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2380 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2382 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2383 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2384 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2385 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2386 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2387 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2388 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2390 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2392 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2396 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2399 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2400 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2401 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2404 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2405 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2407 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2408 let mut need_commitment = false;
2409 if !self.is_outbound() {
2410 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2411 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2412 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2413 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2414 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2415 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2416 need_commitment = true;
2417 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2422 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2423 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2424 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2425 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2426 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2427 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2431 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2432 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2433 Some(forward_info.clone())
2435 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2436 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2437 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2438 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2439 need_commitment = true;
2442 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2443 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2444 Some(fail_reason.take())
2446 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2447 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2448 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2449 need_commitment = true;
2453 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2454 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2455 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2456 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2458 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2459 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2460 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2461 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2462 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2463 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2464 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2465 // includes the right HTLCs.
2466 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2467 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2468 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2469 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2470 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2471 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2473 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2474 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2475 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2476 // re-send the message on restoration)
2477 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2480 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2481 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2482 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2483 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2484 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2485 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2486 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2487 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2488 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2490 } else if !need_commitment {
2491 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2492 } else { (None, None) };
2494 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2495 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2497 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2498 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2499 per_commitment_secret,
2500 next_per_commitment_point,
2501 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2504 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2505 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2506 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2507 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2508 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2509 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2510 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2511 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2514 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2515 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2516 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2517 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2518 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2519 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2520 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2522 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2523 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2524 updates: Vec::new(),
2527 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2528 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2529 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2530 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2531 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2532 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2533 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2534 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2535 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2536 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2537 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2538 // to rebalance channels.
2539 match &htlc_update {
2540 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2541 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2542 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2545 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2546 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2547 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2548 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2549 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2550 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2551 // into the holding cell without ever being
2552 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2553 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2554 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2557 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2563 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2564 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2565 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2566 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2567 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2568 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2569 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2570 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2571 (msg, monitor_update)
2572 } else { unreachable!() };
2573 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2574 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2576 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2577 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2578 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2579 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2580 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2581 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2582 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2583 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2584 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2587 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2589 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2596 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2597 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2599 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2600 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2601 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2602 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2603 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2609 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2610 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2611 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2612 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2613 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2615 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2616 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2617 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2619 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2621 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2623 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2626 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2628 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2632 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2633 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2634 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2635 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2636 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2637 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2638 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2641 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2642 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2644 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2645 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2647 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2651 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2652 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2653 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2657 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2658 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2659 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2660 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2661 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2662 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2663 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2664 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2668 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2670 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2671 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2674 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2675 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2676 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2677 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2678 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2679 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2680 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2681 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2685 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2686 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2687 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2688 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2689 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2690 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2691 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2692 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2694 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2695 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2696 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2697 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2698 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2699 let mut require_commitment = false;
2700 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2703 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2704 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2705 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2707 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2708 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2709 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2710 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2711 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2712 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2717 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2718 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2719 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2720 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2721 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2723 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2724 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2729 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2730 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2732 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2736 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2737 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2739 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2740 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2741 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2742 require_commitment = true;
2743 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2744 match forward_info {
2745 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2746 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2747 require_commitment = true;
2749 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2750 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2751 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2753 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2754 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2755 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2759 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2760 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2761 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2762 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2768 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2769 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2770 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2771 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2773 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2774 Some(fail_reason.take())
2776 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2777 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2778 require_commitment = true;
2782 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2784 if self.is_outbound() {
2785 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2786 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2789 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2790 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2791 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2792 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2793 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2794 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2795 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2796 require_commitment = true;
2797 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2802 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2803 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2804 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2805 if require_commitment {
2806 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2807 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2808 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2809 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2810 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2811 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2812 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2813 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2814 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2816 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2817 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2818 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2819 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2822 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2823 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2824 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2825 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2826 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2828 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2829 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2830 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2833 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2834 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2835 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2836 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2838 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2840 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2841 if require_commitment {
2842 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2844 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2845 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2846 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2847 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2849 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2850 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2851 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2852 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2853 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2855 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2858 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2860 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2861 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2868 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2869 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2870 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2871 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2872 if !self.is_outbound() {
2873 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2875 if !self.is_usable() {
2876 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2878 if !self.is_live() {
2879 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2882 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2883 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2887 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2888 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2890 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2891 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2896 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2897 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2898 Some(update_fee) => {
2899 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2900 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2906 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2907 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2909 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2911 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2912 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2913 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2914 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2917 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2918 // will be retransmitted.
2919 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2921 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2922 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2924 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2925 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2926 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2927 // this HTLC accordingly
2928 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2931 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2932 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2933 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2934 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2937 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2938 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2939 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2940 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2941 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2942 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2947 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2949 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2950 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2951 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2952 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2953 // the update upon reconnection.
2954 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2958 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2959 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2962 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2963 /// updates are partially paused.
2964 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2965 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2966 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2967 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2968 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2969 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2970 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2971 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2972 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2973 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2974 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2975 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2976 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2979 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2980 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2981 /// to the remote side.
2982 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2983 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2984 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2986 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
2987 self.funding_transaction.take()
2990 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
2991 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
2992 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
2993 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
2994 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
2995 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2996 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
2997 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2998 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2999 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3000 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3001 next_per_commitment_point,
3005 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
3006 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3007 let mut failures = Vec::new();
3008 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3010 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3011 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3012 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3013 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3016 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3017 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3019 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3020 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3023 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3024 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3025 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3026 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3027 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3028 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3029 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3030 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
3033 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3034 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3036 if self.is_outbound() {
3037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3039 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3042 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3043 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
3044 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3048 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3049 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3050 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3051 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3052 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3053 per_commitment_secret,
3054 next_per_commitment_point,
3058 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3059 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3060 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3061 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3062 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3064 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3065 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3066 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3067 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3068 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3069 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3070 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3071 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3072 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3077 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3078 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3080 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3081 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3082 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3083 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3084 reason: err_packet.clone()
3087 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3088 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3089 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3090 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3091 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3092 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3095 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3096 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3097 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3098 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3099 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3106 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3107 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3108 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3109 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3111 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3115 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3116 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3117 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3118 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3119 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3120 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3121 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3125 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3126 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3130 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3131 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3132 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3133 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3134 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3135 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3136 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3139 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3140 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3141 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3145 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3149 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3150 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3151 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3153 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3154 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3155 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3156 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3160 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3161 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3162 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3163 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3164 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3165 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3167 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3168 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3171 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3172 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3173 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3174 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3175 next_per_commitment_point,
3176 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3179 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3180 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3181 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3183 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3184 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3185 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3188 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3194 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3195 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3196 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3197 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3198 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3200 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3201 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3202 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3203 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3204 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3205 next_per_commitment_point,
3209 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3210 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3211 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3213 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3216 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3217 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3218 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3219 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3221 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3222 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3223 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3224 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3225 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3227 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3228 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3232 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3234 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3235 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3236 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3238 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3241 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3242 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3243 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3246 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3252 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3253 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3255 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3256 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3257 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3261 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3262 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3263 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3265 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3266 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3268 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3269 let sig = self.holder_signer
3270 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3272 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3273 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3275 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3276 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3277 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3278 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3279 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3283 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3284 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3286 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3289 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3290 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3291 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3292 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3295 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3296 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3300 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3302 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3306 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3307 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3311 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3314 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3316 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3317 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3319 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3320 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3321 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3322 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3323 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3324 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3326 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3327 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3333 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3334 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3335 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3337 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3340 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3341 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3342 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3346 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3347 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3349 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3352 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3353 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3354 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3355 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3357 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3359 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3360 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3361 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3362 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3363 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3365 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3366 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3368 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3369 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3371 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3374 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3375 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3377 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3380 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3383 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3386 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3390 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3391 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3392 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3393 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3395 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3397 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3400 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3401 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3402 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3403 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3404 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3408 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3409 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3410 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3411 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3412 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3413 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3414 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3415 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3416 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3417 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3418 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3422 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3423 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3424 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3425 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3426 let sig = self.holder_signer
3427 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3428 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3429 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3430 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3431 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3432 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3433 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3439 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3440 if self.is_outbound() {
3441 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3442 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3443 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3444 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3445 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3448 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3451 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3453 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3454 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3455 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3456 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3459 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3462 let sig = self.holder_signer
3463 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3464 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3465 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3466 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3467 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3469 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3470 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3472 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3473 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3474 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3476 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3479 // Public utilities:
3481 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3485 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3489 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3490 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3491 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3495 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3496 /// is_usable() returns true).
3497 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3498 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3499 self.short_channel_id
3502 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3503 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3504 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3505 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3508 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3509 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3512 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3513 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3516 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3517 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3518 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3521 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3522 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3525 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3526 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3527 self.counterparty_node_id
3530 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3532 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3533 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3536 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3537 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3539 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3540 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3541 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3542 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3544 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3548 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3549 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3550 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3553 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3554 self.channel_value_satoshis
3557 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3558 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3561 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3562 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3565 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3566 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
3570 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3574 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3575 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
3576 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
3577 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
3578 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
3579 // which are near the dust limit.
3580 cmp::max(2530, self.feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
3583 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3584 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3587 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3588 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3591 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3592 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3596 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3601 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3603 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3604 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3605 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3606 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3607 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3608 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3610 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3612 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3620 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3621 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3625 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3626 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3627 self.update_time_counter
3630 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3631 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3634 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3635 self.config.announced_channel
3638 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3639 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3642 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3643 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3644 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3645 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3648 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3649 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3650 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3653 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3654 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3655 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3656 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3657 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3660 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3661 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3662 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3663 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3664 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3667 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3668 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3669 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3670 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3673 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3674 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3675 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3678 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3679 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3680 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3681 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3682 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3683 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3688 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3689 self.channel_update_status
3692 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3693 self.channel_update_status = status;
3696 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3697 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3701 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3702 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3703 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3706 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
3710 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3711 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3712 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3714 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3715 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3716 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3718 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3719 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3721 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3722 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3724 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3728 if need_commitment_update {
3729 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3730 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3731 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3732 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3733 next_per_commitment_point,
3736 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3742 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3743 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3744 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3745 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3746 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3747 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3748 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3749 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3750 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3751 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3752 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3753 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3754 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3755 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3756 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3757 if self.is_outbound() {
3758 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3759 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3760 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3761 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3762 // channel and move on.
3763 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3764 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3766 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3767 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3768 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3769 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3772 if self.is_outbound() {
3773 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3774 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3775 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3776 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3777 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3778 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3782 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3783 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3784 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3785 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3786 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3790 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3791 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3792 // may have already happened for this block).
3793 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3794 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3795 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3798 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3799 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3800 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3801 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3802 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3803 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3812 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3813 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3814 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3815 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3817 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3818 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3821 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3823 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
3824 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3825 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3826 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3827 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3829 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3830 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3831 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3839 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3841 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3842 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3843 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3846 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3847 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3848 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3849 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3850 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3851 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3852 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3853 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3854 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3857 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3858 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3859 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3860 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3861 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
3862 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3863 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3864 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
3869 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3872 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3873 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3874 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3875 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3876 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3877 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3878 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3879 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3880 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3881 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3882 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3883 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3884 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
3885 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3886 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3887 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3893 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3898 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3899 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3901 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3902 if !self.is_outbound() {
3903 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3905 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3906 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3909 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3910 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3913 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3914 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3918 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3919 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3920 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3921 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3922 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3923 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3924 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3925 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3926 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3927 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3928 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3929 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3930 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3931 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3932 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3933 first_per_commitment_point,
3934 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3935 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3939 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3940 if self.is_outbound() {
3941 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3943 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3944 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3946 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3947 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3950 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3951 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3953 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3954 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3955 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3956 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3957 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3958 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3959 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
3960 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3961 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3962 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3963 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3964 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3965 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3966 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3967 first_per_commitment_point,
3968 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3972 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3973 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3974 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3975 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3976 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3977 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3980 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3981 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3982 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3983 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3984 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3985 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3986 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3987 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3988 if !self.is_outbound() {
3989 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3991 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3992 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3994 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3995 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3996 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3997 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4000 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4001 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4003 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4006 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4007 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4012 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4014 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4016 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4017 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4018 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4020 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4021 temporary_channel_id,
4022 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4023 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4028 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4029 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4030 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4031 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4032 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4034 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4035 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4037 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4038 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4039 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4040 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4042 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4043 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4045 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4046 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4049 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4051 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4052 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4054 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4055 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4056 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4057 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4058 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4059 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4062 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4063 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4068 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4070 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4071 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4072 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4074 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4075 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4076 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4077 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4078 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4079 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4080 contents: announcement,
4083 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4087 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4088 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4089 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4090 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4091 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4093 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4095 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4097 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4098 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4100 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4101 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4102 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4103 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4106 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4108 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4111 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4112 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4113 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4114 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4116 Err(_) => return None,
4118 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4119 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4120 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4125 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4126 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4127 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4128 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4129 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4130 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4131 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4132 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4133 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4134 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4135 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4136 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4137 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4138 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4139 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4140 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4141 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4142 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4143 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4146 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4147 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4148 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4149 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4152 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4153 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4154 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4155 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4156 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4157 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4158 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4159 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4161 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4162 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4163 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4164 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4165 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4166 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4167 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4168 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4169 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4171 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4177 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4179 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4180 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4182 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4184 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4185 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4187 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4188 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4191 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4193 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4194 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4195 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4196 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4198 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4199 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4203 if amount_msat == 0 {
4204 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4207 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4208 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4211 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4212 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4213 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4214 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4215 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4216 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4217 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4218 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4221 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4222 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4223 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4224 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4226 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4227 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4228 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4231 if !self.is_outbound() {
4232 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4233 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4234 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4235 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4236 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4237 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4238 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4242 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4243 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4244 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4245 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4246 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4247 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4251 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4252 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4253 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4254 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4255 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4256 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4260 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
4261 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4262 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4265 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4266 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4267 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4268 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4270 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4271 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4274 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4275 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4276 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4277 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4278 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4281 // Now update local state:
4282 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4283 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4288 onion_routing_packet,
4293 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4294 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4296 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4298 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4302 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4303 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4304 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4308 onion_routing_packet,
4310 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4315 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4316 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4317 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4318 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4319 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4320 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4321 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4323 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4324 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4326 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4327 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4329 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4330 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4332 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4333 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4334 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4335 have_updates = true;
4337 if have_updates { break; }
4339 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4340 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4341 have_updates = true;
4343 if have_updates { break; }
4346 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4348 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4350 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4351 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4352 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4353 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4355 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4356 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4357 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4359 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4363 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4364 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4365 Some(fail_reason.take())
4367 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4370 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4372 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4373 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4374 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4375 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4376 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4377 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4379 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4382 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4383 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4384 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4385 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4386 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4387 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4388 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4389 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4392 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4393 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4396 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4397 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4398 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4399 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4400 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4401 if self.is_outbound() {
4402 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4406 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4407 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4408 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4409 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4411 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4413 if !self.is_outbound() {
4414 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4415 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4416 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4417 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4418 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4419 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4420 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4421 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4422 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4423 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4430 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4431 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4435 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4436 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4438 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4440 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4441 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4442 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4443 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4445 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4446 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4447 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4448 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4449 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4450 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4454 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4455 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4458 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4461 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4462 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4463 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4465 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4466 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4467 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4468 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4469 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4475 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4476 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4477 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4480 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4481 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4484 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4485 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4486 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4487 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4493 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4494 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4495 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4496 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4497 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4498 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4501 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4502 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4503 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4505 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4506 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4509 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4510 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4511 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4514 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4516 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4517 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4518 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4520 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4522 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4524 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4525 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4526 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4527 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4528 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4530 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4531 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4538 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4539 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4540 scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4541 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4544 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4545 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4546 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4547 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4548 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4549 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4550 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4551 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4552 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4553 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4554 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4556 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4557 // return them to fail the payment.
4558 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4559 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4561 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4562 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4567 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4568 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4569 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4570 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4571 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4572 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4573 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4574 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4575 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4576 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4577 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4578 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4579 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4584 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4585 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4586 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4590 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4591 // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4593 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4594 // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4595 // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4596 let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4597 if is_script_too_long {
4601 if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4605 return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4608 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4609 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4611 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4617 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4618 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4619 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4620 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4621 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4623 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4624 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4625 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4626 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4632 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4633 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4634 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4635 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4636 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4637 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4642 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4643 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4644 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4647 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4649 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4651 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4652 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4653 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4654 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4655 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4656 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4658 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4659 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4660 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4662 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4664 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4665 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4666 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4667 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4668 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4669 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4671 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4672 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4674 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4675 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4676 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4678 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4679 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4680 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4681 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4684 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4685 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4686 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4689 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4690 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4691 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4692 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4694 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4695 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4697 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4699 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4701 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4703 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4706 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4708 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4713 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4714 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4715 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4716 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4717 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4718 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4719 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4721 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4723 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4725 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4728 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
4729 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
4730 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
4733 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4735 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4737 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4739 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4744 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4745 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4747 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4749 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4750 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4751 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4752 source.write(writer)?;
4753 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4755 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4757 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4758 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4760 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4762 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4763 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4768 match self.resend_order {
4769 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4770 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4773 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4774 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4775 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4777 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4778 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4779 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4780 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4783 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4784 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4785 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4786 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4787 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4790 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4791 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4793 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4794 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4795 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4796 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4798 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4799 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4801 feerate.write(writer)?;
4805 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4808 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4809 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4810 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4812 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4813 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4814 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4816 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4817 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4819 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4820 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4821 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4823 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4824 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4826 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4829 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4830 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4831 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4833 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4836 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4837 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4839 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4840 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4841 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4843 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4845 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4847 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4849 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4850 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4851 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4852 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
4853 htlc.write(writer)?;
4856 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
4857 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
4858 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
4859 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
4860 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
4861 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
4862 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
4864 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
4865 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
4866 (5, self.config, required),
4873 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4874 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4875 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4876 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4877 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4879 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4881 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
4883 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
4884 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
4885 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
4886 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
4887 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4889 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
4890 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4893 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4894 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4895 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4897 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4899 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4900 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4901 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4902 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4903 let mut data = [0; 1024];
4904 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4905 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4906 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4908 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4910 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4911 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4913 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4914 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4915 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4917 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4918 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4919 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4920 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4921 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4922 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4923 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4924 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4925 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4926 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4927 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4928 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4929 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4930 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4935 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4936 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4937 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4938 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4939 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4940 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4941 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4942 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4943 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4944 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4945 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4946 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4947 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4948 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4949 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4950 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4955 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4956 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4957 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4958 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4959 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4960 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4961 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4962 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4963 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4964 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4966 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4967 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4968 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4970 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4971 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4972 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4974 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4978 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4979 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4980 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4981 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4984 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4985 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4986 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4988 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4989 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4990 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4991 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4994 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4995 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4996 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4997 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5000 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5001 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5003 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5004 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5005 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5006 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5008 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5010 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
5011 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5014 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5015 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5016 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5018 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5019 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5020 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5021 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5023 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5024 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5026 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5027 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5029 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5030 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5031 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5033 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5035 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5036 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5038 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5039 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5042 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5044 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5045 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5046 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5047 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5049 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5052 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5053 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5055 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5057 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5058 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5060 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5061 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5063 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5065 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5066 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5067 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5069 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5070 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5071 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5075 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5076 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5077 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5078 (1, minimum_depth, option),
5079 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5080 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5083 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5084 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5089 config: config.unwrap(),
5093 channel_value_satoshis,
5095 latest_monitor_update_id,
5101 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5102 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5105 pending_inbound_htlcs,
5106 pending_outbound_htlcs,
5107 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5111 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5112 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5113 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5114 monitor_pending_forwards,
5115 monitor_pending_failures,
5118 holding_cell_update_fee,
5119 next_holder_htlc_id,
5120 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5121 update_time_counter,
5124 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5125 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5126 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5127 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5129 last_sent_closing_fee,
5131 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5132 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5135 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5136 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5137 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5138 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5139 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5140 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5141 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5144 counterparty_forwarding_info,
5146 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5147 funding_transaction,
5149 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5150 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5151 counterparty_node_id,
5153 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5157 channel_update_status,
5161 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5162 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5163 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5164 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5166 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5168 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5169 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5176 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5177 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5178 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5179 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5180 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5181 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5182 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5183 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5185 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5186 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5187 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5188 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5189 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5190 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5192 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5193 use chain::BestBlock;
5194 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5195 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5196 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5197 use util::config::UserConfig;
5198 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5199 use util::test_utils;
5200 use util::logger::Logger;
5201 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5202 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5203 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5204 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5205 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5206 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5207 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5211 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5214 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5215 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5221 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5222 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5223 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5227 signer: InMemorySigner,
5229 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5230 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5232 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5233 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5234 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5235 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5236 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5237 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5240 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
5241 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5242 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5243 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
5246 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5249 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5250 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5251 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5254 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5255 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5258 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5259 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5261 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5262 let original_fee = 253;
5263 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5264 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5265 let seed = [42; 32];
5266 let network = Network::Testnet;
5267 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5269 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5270 let config = UserConfig::default();
5271 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5273 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5274 // same as the old fee.
5275 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5276 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5277 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5281 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5282 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5283 // dust limits are used.
5284 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5285 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5286 let seed = [42; 32];
5287 let network = Network::Testnet;
5288 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5290 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5291 // they have different dust limits.
5293 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5294 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5295 let config = UserConfig::default();
5296 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5298 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5299 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5300 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5301 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5302 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5304 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5305 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5306 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5307 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5308 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5310 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5311 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5312 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5314 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5315 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5316 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5317 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5320 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5322 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5323 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5324 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5325 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5326 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5328 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5329 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5333 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5334 // the dust limit check.
5335 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5336 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5337 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5338 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5340 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5341 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5342 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5343 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5344 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5345 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5346 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5350 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5351 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5352 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5353 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5354 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5355 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5356 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5357 let seed = [42; 32];
5358 let network = Network::Testnet;
5359 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5361 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5362 let config = UserConfig::default();
5363 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5365 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5366 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5368 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5369 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5370 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5371 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5372 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5373 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5375 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5376 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5377 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5378 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5379 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5381 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5383 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5384 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5385 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5386 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5387 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5389 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5390 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5391 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5392 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5393 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5397 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5398 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5399 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5400 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5401 let seed = [42; 32];
5402 let network = Network::Testnet;
5403 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5404 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5405 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5407 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5409 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5410 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5411 let config = UserConfig::default();
5412 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5414 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5415 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5416 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5417 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5419 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5420 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5421 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5423 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5424 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5425 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5426 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5428 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5429 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5430 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5432 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5433 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5435 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5436 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5437 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5438 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5439 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5440 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5441 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5442 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5443 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5448 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5450 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5451 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5452 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5453 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5454 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5455 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5456 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5463 fn channel_update() {
5464 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5465 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5466 let seed = [42; 32];
5467 let network = Network::Testnet;
5468 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5469 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5471 // Create a channel.
5472 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5473 let config = UserConfig::default();
5474 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5475 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5476 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5477 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5479 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5480 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5481 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5483 short_channel_id: 0,
5486 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5487 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5488 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5490 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5491 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5493 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5495 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5497 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5498 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5499 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5500 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5502 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5503 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5504 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5506 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5511 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5512 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5513 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5514 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5515 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5517 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5519 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5520 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5521 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5522 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5523 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5525 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5526 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5531 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5532 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5533 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5535 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5536 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5537 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5538 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5539 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5540 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5542 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5544 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5545 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5546 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5547 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5548 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5549 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5551 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5552 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5553 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5554 selected_contest_delay: 144
5556 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5557 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5559 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5560 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5562 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5563 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5565 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5566 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5568 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5569 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5570 // build_commitment_transaction.
5571 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5572 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5573 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5574 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5575 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5577 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5578 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5579 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5581 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5582 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5584 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5585 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5589 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5590 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5591 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5592 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5593 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5594 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5596 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5597 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5598 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5599 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5601 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5602 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5603 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5605 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5607 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5608 commitment_tx.clone(),
5609 counterparty_signature,
5610 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5611 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5612 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5614 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5615 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5617 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5618 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5619 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5621 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5622 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5625 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5627 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5628 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
5629 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
5630 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
5631 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5632 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5633 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5635 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5638 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5639 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5640 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5644 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5647 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5648 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5650 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5651 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5652 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5653 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5654 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5655 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5656 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5658 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5662 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5663 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5665 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5666 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5667 "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", {});
5669 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5670 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5672 amount_msat: 1000000,
5674 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5675 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5677 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5680 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5681 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5683 amount_msat: 2000000,
5685 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5686 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5688 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5691 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5692 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5694 amount_msat: 2000000,
5696 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5697 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5698 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5700 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5703 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5704 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5706 amount_msat: 3000000,
5708 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5709 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5710 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5712 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5715 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5716 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5718 amount_msat: 4000000,
5720 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5721 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5723 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5727 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5728 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5729 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5731 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5732 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5733 "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", {
5736 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5737 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5738 "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" },
5741 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5742 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5743 "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" },
5746 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5747 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5748 "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" },
5751 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5752 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5753 "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" },
5756 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5757 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5758 "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" }
5761 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5762 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5763 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5765 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5766 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5767 "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", {
5770 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5771 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5772 "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" },
5775 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5776 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5777 "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" },
5780 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5781 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5782 "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" },
5785 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5786 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5787 "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" },
5790 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5791 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5792 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5795 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5796 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5797 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5799 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5800 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5801 "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", {
5804 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5805 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5806 "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" },
5809 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5810 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5811 "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" },
5814 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5815 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5816 "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" },
5819 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5820 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5821 "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" }
5824 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5825 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5826 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5828 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5829 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5830 "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", {
5833 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5834 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5835 "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" },
5838 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5839 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5840 "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" },
5843 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5844 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5845 "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" },
5848 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5849 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5850 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5853 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5854 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5855 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5857 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5858 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5859 "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", {
5862 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5863 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5864 "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" },
5867 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5868 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5869 "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" },
5872 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5873 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5874 "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" }
5877 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5878 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5879 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5881 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5882 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5883 "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", {
5886 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5887 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5888 "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" },
5891 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5892 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5893 "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" },
5896 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5897 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5898 "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" }
5901 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5902 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5903 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5905 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5906 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5907 "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", {
5910 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5911 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5912 "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" },
5915 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5916 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5917 "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" }
5920 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5921 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5922 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5924 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5925 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5926 "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", {
5929 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5930 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5931 "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" },
5934 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5935 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5936 "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" }
5939 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5940 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5941 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5943 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5944 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5945 "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", {
5948 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5949 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5950 "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" }
5953 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5954 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5955 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5957 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5958 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5959 "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", {
5962 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5963 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5964 "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" }
5967 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5968 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5969 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5971 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5972 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5973 "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", {});
5975 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5976 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5977 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5979 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5980 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5981 "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", {});
5983 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5984 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5985 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5987 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5988 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5989 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5991 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5992 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5993 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5995 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5996 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5997 "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", {});
5999 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6000 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6001 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6002 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6003 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6004 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6006 amount_msat: 2000000,
6008 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6009 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6011 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6014 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6015 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6016 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6018 amount_msat: 5000000,
6020 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6021 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6022 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6024 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6027 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6028 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6030 amount_msat: 5000000,
6032 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6033 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6034 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6036 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6040 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6041 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6042 "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", {
6045 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6046 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6047 "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" },
6049 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6050 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6051 "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" },
6053 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6054 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6055 "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" }
6060 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6061 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6063 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6064 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6065 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6066 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6068 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6069 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6070 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6072 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6073 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6075 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6076 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6078 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6079 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6080 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6084 fn test_key_derivation() {
6085 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6086 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6088 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6089 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6091 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6092 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6094 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6095 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6097 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6098 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6100 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6101 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6103 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6104 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6106 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6107 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());