1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use ln::channelmanager::{CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
277 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
278 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub mon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
443 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
742 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
744 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
745 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
746 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
750 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
752 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
753 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
754 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
755 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
761 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
763 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
765 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
766 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
767 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
768 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
769 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
771 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
772 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
774 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
776 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
777 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
779 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
780 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
781 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
782 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
783 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
784 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
786 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
787 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
789 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
790 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
791 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
792 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
793 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
795 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
796 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
798 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
799 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
800 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
801 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
807 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
808 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
810 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
811 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
812 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
817 macro_rules! secp_check {
818 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
821 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
826 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
827 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
828 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
829 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
831 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
833 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
834 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
835 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
837 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
840 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
842 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
845 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
848 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
850 /// This is used both for new channels and to figure out what reserve value we sent to peers
851 /// for channels serialized before we included our selected reserve value in the serialized
853 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
854 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
855 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
858 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
859 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
862 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
863 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
864 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
865 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
866 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
867 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
868 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
869 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
874 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
875 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
876 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
877 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
878 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
879 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
880 // We've exhausted our options
883 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
884 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
888 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
889 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
890 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
891 outbound_scid_alias: u64
892 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
893 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
896 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
898 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
899 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
900 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
902 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
903 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
905 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
906 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
908 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
909 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
912 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
913 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
915 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
916 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
920 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
922 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
923 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
924 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
928 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
929 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
931 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
932 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
935 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
936 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
937 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
944 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
945 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
946 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
947 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
952 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
954 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
955 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
956 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
958 channel_value_satoshis,
960 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
963 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
964 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
966 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
967 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
970 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
971 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
972 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
973 pending_update_fee: None,
974 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
975 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
976 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
977 update_time_counter: 1,
979 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
981 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
982 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
983 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
984 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
985 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
986 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
988 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
989 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
990 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
991 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
993 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
994 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
995 closing_fee_limits: None,
996 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
998 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1000 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1001 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1002 short_channel_id: None,
1003 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1005 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1006 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1007 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1008 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1009 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1010 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1011 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1012 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1013 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1014 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1015 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1017 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1019 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1020 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1021 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1022 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1023 counterparty_parameters: None,
1024 funding_outpoint: None,
1025 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1027 funding_transaction: None,
1029 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1030 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1031 counterparty_node_id,
1033 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1035 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1037 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1038 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1040 announcement_sigs: None,
1042 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1043 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1044 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1045 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1047 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1049 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1050 outbound_scid_alias,
1052 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1053 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1055 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1059 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1060 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1062 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1063 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1064 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1065 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1066 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1067 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1068 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1071 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1072 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1073 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1074 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1075 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1076 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1082 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1083 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1084 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1085 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1086 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1087 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1088 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1089 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1090 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1093 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1094 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1096 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1097 // support this channel type.
1098 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1099 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1103 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1107 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1108 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1109 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1110 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1111 // publicly announced.
1112 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1113 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1117 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1121 channel_type.clone()
1123 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1125 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1129 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1130 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1131 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1132 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1133 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1134 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1135 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1136 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1139 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1143 // Check sanity of message fields:
1144 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1147 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1150 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1153 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1154 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1157 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1160 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1163 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
1165 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1166 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1169 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1172 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1176 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1177 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1178 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1180 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1183 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1186 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1189 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1192 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1195 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1199 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1201 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1202 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1207 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
1208 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1211 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). Channel value is ({} - {}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1214 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1215 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1216 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1218 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1222 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1223 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1224 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1225 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1226 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1230 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1231 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1232 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1233 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1237 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1238 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1239 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1240 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1241 if script.len() == 0 {
1244 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1247 Some(script.clone())
1250 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1251 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1257 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1258 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1261 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1262 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1267 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1268 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1270 let chan = Channel {
1273 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1274 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1276 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1281 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1283 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1284 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1285 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1288 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1291 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1292 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1294 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1295 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1296 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1298 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1299 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1300 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1301 pending_update_fee: None,
1302 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1303 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1304 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1305 update_time_counter: 1,
1307 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1309 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1310 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1311 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1312 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1313 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1314 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1316 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1317 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1321 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1322 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1323 closing_fee_limits: None,
1324 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1326 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1328 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1329 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1330 short_channel_id: None,
1331 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1333 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1334 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1335 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1336 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1337 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1338 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1339 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1340 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1341 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1342 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1343 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1344 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1346 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1348 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1349 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1350 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1351 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1352 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1353 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1354 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1356 funding_outpoint: None,
1357 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1359 funding_transaction: None,
1361 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1362 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1363 counterparty_node_id,
1365 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1367 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1369 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1370 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1372 announcement_sigs: None,
1374 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1375 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1376 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1377 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1379 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1381 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1382 outbound_scid_alias,
1384 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1385 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1393 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1394 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1395 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1396 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1397 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1399 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1400 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1401 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1402 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1403 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1404 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1405 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1407 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1408 where L::Target: Logger
1410 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1411 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1412 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1414 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1415 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1416 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1417 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1419 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1420 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1421 if match update_state {
1422 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1423 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1424 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1425 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1426 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1428 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1432 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1433 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1434 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1435 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1437 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1438 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1439 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1441 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1442 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1443 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1444 transaction_output_index: None
1449 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1450 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1451 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1452 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1453 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) {
1454 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1455 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1458 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1461 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1462 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) {
1463 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1464 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1466 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1467 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1473 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1474 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1475 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1476 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1477 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1478 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1479 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1483 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1484 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1486 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1488 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1489 if generated_by_local {
1490 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1491 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1500 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1502 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1503 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1504 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1505 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1506 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1507 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1508 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1511 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1512 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1513 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1514 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1518 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1519 preimages.push(preimage);
1523 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1524 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1526 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1528 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1529 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1531 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1532 if !generated_by_local {
1533 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1541 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1542 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1543 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1544 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1545 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1546 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1547 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1548 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1550 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1552 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1553 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1554 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1555 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1557 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1559 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1560 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1561 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1562 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1565 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1566 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1567 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1568 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1570 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1573 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1574 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1575 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1576 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1578 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1581 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1582 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1587 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1588 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1593 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1595 let channel_parameters =
1596 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1597 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1598 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1601 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1606 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1609 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1610 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1611 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1612 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1614 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1615 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1616 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1624 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1625 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1631 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1632 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1633 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1634 // outside of those situations will fail.
1635 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1639 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1644 1 + // script length (0)
1648 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1649 2 + // witness marker and flag
1650 1 + // witness element count
1651 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1652 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1653 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1654 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1655 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1656 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1658 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1659 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1660 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1666 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1667 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1668 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1669 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1671 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1672 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1673 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1675 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1676 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1677 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1678 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1679 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1680 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1683 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1684 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1687 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1688 value_to_holder = 0;
1691 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1692 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1693 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1694 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1696 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1697 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1700 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1701 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1705 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1706 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1707 /// our counterparty!)
1708 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1709 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1710 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1711 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1712 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1713 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1714 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1716 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1720 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1721 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1722 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1723 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1724 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1725 //may see payments to it!
1726 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1727 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1728 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1730 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1733 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1734 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1735 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1736 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1737 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1740 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1743 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1744 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1746 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1748 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1749 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1750 where L::Target: Logger {
1751 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1752 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1753 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0);
1754 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1755 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1756 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1757 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1758 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1762 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1763 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1764 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1765 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1767 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1768 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1770 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1772 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1774 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1775 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1776 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1778 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1779 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1780 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1781 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1782 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1784 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1785 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1786 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1788 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1789 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1791 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1794 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1795 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1799 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1803 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1805 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1806 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1807 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1808 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1811 // Now update local state:
1813 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1814 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1815 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1816 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1817 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1818 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1819 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1823 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1824 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1825 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1826 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1827 // do not not get into this branch.
1828 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1829 match pending_update {
1830 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1831 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1832 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1833 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1835 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1836 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1839 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1840 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1841 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1842 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1843 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1844 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1845 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1851 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1852 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1853 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1855 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1856 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1857 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1860 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1863 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1864 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1866 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1867 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1869 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1870 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1873 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1876 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1877 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1878 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1879 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1884 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1885 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1886 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1887 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1888 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1891 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1892 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1893 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1894 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1895 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1897 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1898 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1899 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1903 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1904 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1905 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1906 /// before we fail backwards.
1907 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1908 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1909 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1910 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1911 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1913 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1915 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1916 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1917 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1919 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1920 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1921 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1923 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1924 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1925 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1927 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1932 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1933 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1939 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1940 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1941 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1942 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1943 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1947 // Now update local state:
1948 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1949 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1950 match pending_update {
1951 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1952 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1953 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1954 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1958 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1959 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1960 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1961 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1967 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1968 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1969 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1975 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1977 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1978 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1981 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1982 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1983 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1988 // Message handlers:
1990 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1991 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
1993 // Check sanity of message fields:
1994 if !self.is_outbound() {
1995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1997 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2000 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2001 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2003 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2006 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2007 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2009 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2010 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2011 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2013 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2014 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2017 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2018 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2021 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2024 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2028 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2029 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2032 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2035 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2038 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2039 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2041 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2044 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2047 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2051 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2052 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2055 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2056 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2058 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2061 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2062 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2063 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2064 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2065 if script.len() == 0 {
2068 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2071 Some(script.clone())
2074 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2075 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2081 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2082 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2083 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2084 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2085 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2087 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2088 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2090 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2093 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2094 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2095 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2096 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2097 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2098 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2101 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2102 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2103 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2106 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2107 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2109 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2110 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2115 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2116 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2118 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2119 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2121 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2122 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2123 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2124 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2125 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2126 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2127 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2128 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2129 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2132 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2133 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2135 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2136 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2137 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2138 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2140 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2141 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2143 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2144 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2147 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2148 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2151 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2152 if self.is_outbound() {
2153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2155 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2156 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2157 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2161 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2164 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2165 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2166 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2167 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2170 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2171 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2172 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2173 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2174 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2176 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2178 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2179 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2183 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2184 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2185 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2189 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2190 initial_commitment_tx,
2193 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2194 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2197 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2198 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2200 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2202 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2203 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2204 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2205 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2206 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2207 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2208 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2209 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2210 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2212 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2214 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2216 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2217 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2218 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2219 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2221 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2223 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2224 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2226 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2229 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2230 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2231 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2232 if !self.is_outbound() {
2233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2235 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2238 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2239 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2240 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2241 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2244 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2246 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2247 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2248 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2249 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2251 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2252 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2254 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2255 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2257 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2258 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2259 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2260 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2261 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2266 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2267 initial_commitment_tx,
2270 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2271 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2274 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2275 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2278 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2279 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2280 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2281 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2282 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2283 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2284 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2285 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2286 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2287 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2289 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2291 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2293 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2294 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2295 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2296 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2298 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2300 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2303 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2304 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2306 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2307 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2308 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2309 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2312 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2313 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2314 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2315 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2316 // when routing outbound payments.
2317 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2321 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2323 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2324 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2325 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2326 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2327 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2328 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 ||
2329 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2330 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2331 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2333 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2334 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2335 let expected_point =
2336 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2337 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2339 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2341 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2342 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2343 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2344 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2345 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2347 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2355 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2356 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2358 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2360 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2363 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2364 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2365 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2366 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2372 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2373 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2374 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2375 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2376 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2377 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2378 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2379 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2380 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2383 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2384 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2385 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2386 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2387 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2388 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2390 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2391 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2397 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2398 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2399 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2400 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2401 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2402 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2403 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2404 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2405 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2408 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2409 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2410 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2411 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2412 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2413 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2415 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2416 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2420 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2421 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2422 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2423 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2424 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2425 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2426 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2428 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2429 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2431 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2438 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2439 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2440 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2441 /// corner case properly.
2442 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2443 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2444 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2446 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2447 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2448 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2449 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2452 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2454 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2455 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2456 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2459 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2460 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2461 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2462 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2464 outbound_capacity_msat,
2465 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2466 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2467 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2473 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2474 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2477 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2478 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2479 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2480 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2481 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2482 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2485 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2486 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2488 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2489 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2492 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2493 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2494 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2496 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2497 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2499 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2500 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2502 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2503 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2505 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2506 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2510 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2511 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2517 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2518 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2519 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2522 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2523 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2524 included_htlcs += 1;
2527 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2528 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2532 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2533 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2534 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2535 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2536 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2537 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2542 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2544 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2545 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2550 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2551 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2555 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2556 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2557 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2560 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2561 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2563 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2564 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2565 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2567 total_pending_htlcs,
2568 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2569 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2570 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2572 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2573 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2574 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2576 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2578 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2583 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2584 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2585 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2587 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2588 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2590 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2591 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2593 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2594 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2596 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2597 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2601 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2602 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2608 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2609 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2610 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2611 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2612 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2613 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2616 included_htlcs += 1;
2619 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2620 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2623 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2624 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2626 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2627 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2628 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2633 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2634 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2635 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2638 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2639 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2641 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2642 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2644 total_pending_htlcs,
2645 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2646 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2647 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2649 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2650 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2651 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2653 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2655 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2660 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2661 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2662 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2663 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2664 if local_sent_shutdown {
2665 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2667 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2668 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2669 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2670 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2672 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2675 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2678 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2681 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2682 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2685 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2686 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2687 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2690 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2693 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2694 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2695 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2696 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2697 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2698 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2699 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2700 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2701 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2702 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2703 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2705 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2706 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2707 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2708 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2709 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2710 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2714 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2715 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2716 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2717 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2718 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2719 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2720 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2724 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2725 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2726 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2727 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2728 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2729 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2730 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2734 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2735 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2736 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2737 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2738 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2742 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2743 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2744 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2745 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2746 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2748 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2752 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2756 if !self.is_outbound() {
2757 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2758 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2759 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2760 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2761 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2762 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2763 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2764 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2765 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2766 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2767 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2768 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2769 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2770 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2771 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2774 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2775 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2776 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2777 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2781 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2782 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2784 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2788 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2789 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2790 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2794 // Now update local state:
2795 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2796 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2797 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2798 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2799 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2800 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2801 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2806 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2808 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2809 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2810 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2811 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2812 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2813 None => fail_reason.into(),
2814 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2815 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2816 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2819 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2823 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2825 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2826 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2828 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2834 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2837 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2838 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2841 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2845 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2848 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2849 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2852 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2856 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2860 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2861 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2864 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2868 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2872 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2873 where L::Target: Logger
2875 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2876 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2878 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2879 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2881 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2882 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2885 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2887 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2889 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2890 let commitment_txid = {
2891 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2892 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2893 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2895 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2896 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2897 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2898 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2899 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2900 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2904 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2906 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2907 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2908 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2909 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2912 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2913 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2914 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2915 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2918 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2920 if self.is_outbound() {
2921 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2922 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2923 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2924 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2925 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2926 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2927 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2928 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2929 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2930 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2936 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2937 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
2940 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2941 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2942 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2943 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2944 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2945 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
2946 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2948 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2949 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2950 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2951 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2952 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2953 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2954 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2955 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2957 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2959 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2963 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2964 commitment_stats.tx,
2966 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2967 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2968 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2971 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2972 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2973 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
2974 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2976 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2977 let mut need_commitment = false;
2978 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2979 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2980 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2981 need_commitment = true;
2985 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2986 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2987 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2988 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2989 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2990 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2994 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2995 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2996 Some(forward_info.clone())
2998 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2999 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3000 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3001 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3002 need_commitment = true;
3005 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3006 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3007 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3008 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3009 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3010 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3011 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3012 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3013 need_commitment = true;
3017 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3018 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3019 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3020 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3022 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3023 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3024 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3025 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3026 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3027 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3028 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3029 // includes the right HTLCs.
3030 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3031 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3032 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3033 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3034 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3035 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3037 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3038 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3039 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3042 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3043 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3044 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3045 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3046 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3047 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3048 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3049 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3050 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3054 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3055 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3057 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3058 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3059 per_commitment_secret,
3060 next_per_commitment_point,
3061 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3064 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3065 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3066 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3067 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3068 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
3069 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3070 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3071 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3074 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3075 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3076 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3077 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3078 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3079 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3080 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3082 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3083 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3084 updates: Vec::new(),
3087 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3088 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3089 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3090 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3091 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3092 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3093 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3094 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3095 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3096 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3097 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3098 // to rebalance channels.
3099 match &htlc_update {
3100 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3101 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3102 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3105 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3106 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3107 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3108 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3109 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3110 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3111 // into the holding cell without ever being
3112 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3113 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3114 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3117 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3123 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3124 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3125 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3126 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3127 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3128 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3129 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3130 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3131 (msg, monitor_update)
3132 } else { unreachable!() };
3133 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3134 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3136 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3137 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3138 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3139 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3140 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3141 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3142 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3143 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3144 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3147 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3149 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3156 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3157 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3159 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3160 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3165 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3166 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3167 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3168 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3169 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3171 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3172 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3173 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3175 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3177 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3179 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3182 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3184 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3188 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3189 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3190 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3191 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3192 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3193 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3194 where L::Target: Logger,
3196 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3199 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3202 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3206 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3208 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3209 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3214 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3215 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3216 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3217 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3218 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3219 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3220 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3221 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3225 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3227 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3228 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3231 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3232 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3234 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3236 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3237 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3238 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3239 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3240 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3241 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3242 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3243 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3247 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3248 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3249 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3250 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3251 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3252 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3253 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3254 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3256 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3257 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3260 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3261 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3262 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3263 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3264 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3265 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3266 let mut require_commitment = false;
3267 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3270 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3271 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3272 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3274 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3275 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3276 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3277 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3278 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3279 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3284 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3285 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3286 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3287 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3288 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3290 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3291 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3292 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3297 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3298 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3300 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3304 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3305 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3307 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3308 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3309 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3310 require_commitment = true;
3311 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3312 match forward_info {
3313 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3314 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3315 require_commitment = true;
3317 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3318 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3319 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3321 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3322 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3323 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3327 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3328 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3329 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3330 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3336 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3337 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3338 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3339 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3341 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3342 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3343 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3344 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3345 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3346 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3347 require_commitment = true;
3351 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3353 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3354 match update_state {
3355 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3356 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3357 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3358 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3359 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3361 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3362 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3363 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3364 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3365 require_commitment = true;
3366 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3367 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3372 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
3373 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3374 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3375 if require_commitment {
3376 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3377 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3378 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3379 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3380 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3381 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3382 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3383 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3384 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3386 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3387 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3388 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3389 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3390 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3391 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3392 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3394 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3398 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3399 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3400 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3401 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3402 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3404 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3405 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3406 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3409 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3410 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3411 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3412 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3415 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3416 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3417 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3418 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3420 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3423 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3424 if require_commitment {
3425 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3427 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3428 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3429 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3430 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3432 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3433 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3435 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3436 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3437 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3439 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3443 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3444 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3445 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3448 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3450 commitment_update: None,
3451 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3452 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3453 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3460 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3461 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3462 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3463 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3464 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3465 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3466 if !self.is_outbound() {
3467 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3469 if !self.is_usable() {
3470 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3472 if !self.is_live() {
3473 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3476 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3477 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3478 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3479 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3480 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3481 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3482 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3483 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3484 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3485 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3489 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3490 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3491 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3492 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3493 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3496 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3497 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3501 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3502 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3506 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3507 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3509 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3510 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3515 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3516 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3517 Some(update_fee) => {
3518 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3519 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3525 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3526 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3528 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3530 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3531 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3532 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3533 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3537 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3538 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3541 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3542 // will be retransmitted.
3543 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3544 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3545 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3547 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3548 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3550 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3551 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3552 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3553 // this HTLC accordingly
3554 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3557 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3558 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3559 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3560 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3563 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3564 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3565 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3566 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3567 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3568 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3573 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3575 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3576 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3577 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3578 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3582 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3583 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3584 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3585 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3586 // the update upon reconnection.
3587 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3591 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3592 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3595 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3596 /// updates are partially paused.
3597 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3598 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3599 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3600 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3601 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3602 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3603 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3604 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3606 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3607 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3608 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3609 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3610 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3611 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3612 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3615 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3616 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3617 /// to the remote side.
3618 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3619 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3620 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3622 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3623 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3624 // first received the funding_signed.
3625 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3626 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3627 self.funding_transaction.take()
3629 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3630 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3631 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3632 funding_broadcastable = None;
3635 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3636 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3637 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3638 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3639 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3640 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3641 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3642 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3643 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3644 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3645 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3646 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3647 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3648 next_per_commitment_point,
3649 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3653 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3655 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3656 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3657 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3658 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3659 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3660 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3662 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3663 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3664 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3665 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3666 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3667 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3671 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3672 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3674 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3675 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3678 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3679 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3680 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3681 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3682 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3683 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3684 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3685 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3686 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3690 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3691 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3693 if self.is_outbound() {
3694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3696 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3697 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3699 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3700 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3702 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3703 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3704 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3705 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3706 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3707 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3708 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3709 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3710 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3711 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3712 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3713 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3714 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3716 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3717 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3718 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3724 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3725 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3726 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3727 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3728 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3729 per_commitment_secret,
3730 next_per_commitment_point,
3734 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3735 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3736 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3737 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3738 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3740 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3741 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3742 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3743 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3744 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3745 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3746 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3747 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3748 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3753 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3754 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3756 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3757 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3758 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3759 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3760 reason: err_packet.clone()
3763 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3764 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3765 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3766 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3767 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3768 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3771 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3772 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3773 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3774 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3775 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3782 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3783 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3784 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3785 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3789 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3790 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3791 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3792 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3793 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3794 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3798 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3799 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3801 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3802 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3803 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3804 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3805 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3806 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3807 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3808 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3809 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3810 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3811 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3815 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3816 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3817 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3820 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3821 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3822 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3823 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3824 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3825 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3826 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3829 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3830 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3831 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3832 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3833 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3836 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3837 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3838 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3839 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3840 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3841 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3842 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3843 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3846 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3850 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3851 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3852 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3853 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3855 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3859 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3860 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3861 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3863 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3864 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3865 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3866 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3867 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3871 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3873 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3874 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3875 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3876 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3877 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3880 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3881 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3882 channel_ready: None,
3883 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3884 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3885 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3886 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3890 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3891 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3892 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3893 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3894 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3895 next_per_commitment_point,
3896 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3898 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3899 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3900 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3901 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3905 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3906 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3907 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3909 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3910 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3911 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3914 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3920 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3921 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3922 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3923 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3924 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3926 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3927 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending ChannelReady
3928 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3929 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3930 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3931 next_per_commitment_point,
3932 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3936 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3937 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3938 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3940 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3943 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3944 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3945 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3946 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3948 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3949 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3950 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) =>
3951 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3952 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3953 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3954 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3955 raa: required_revoke,
3956 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3957 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3958 mon_update: Some(monitor_update),
3959 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
3962 Ok((None, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3963 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3964 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3965 raa: required_revoke,
3966 commitment_update: None,
3967 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3969 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
3974 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3975 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3976 raa: required_revoke,
3977 commitment_update: None,
3978 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3980 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3983 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3984 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3985 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3987 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3990 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3991 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3992 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3993 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3994 commitment_update: None, raa: None, mon_update: None,
3995 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
3996 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3999 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4000 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4001 raa: required_revoke,
4002 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4003 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4005 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4009 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4013 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4014 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4015 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4016 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4018 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4020 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4022 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4023 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4024 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4025 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4026 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4027 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4029 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4030 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4031 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4032 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4033 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4035 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4036 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4037 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4038 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4041 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4042 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4043 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4044 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4045 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4046 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4047 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4048 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4049 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4050 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4051 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4052 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4053 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4054 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4055 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4057 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4060 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4061 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4064 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4065 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4066 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4067 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4068 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4069 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4070 self.channel_state &
4071 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4072 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
4073 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4074 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4077 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4078 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4079 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4080 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4081 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4082 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4085 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4091 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4092 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4093 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4094 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4096 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4097 return Ok((None, None));
4100 if !self.is_outbound() {
4101 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4102 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4104 return Ok((None, None));
4107 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4109 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4110 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4111 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4112 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4114 let sig = self.holder_signer
4115 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4116 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4118 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4119 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4120 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4121 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4123 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4124 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4125 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4130 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4131 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4132 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4133 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
4135 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4138 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4139 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4140 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4141 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4144 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4145 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4146 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4149 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4151 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4152 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4155 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4156 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4157 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4160 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4163 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4164 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4165 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4166 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4168 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4171 assert!(send_shutdown);
4172 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4173 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4176 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4181 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4183 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4184 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4186 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4187 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4188 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4189 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4190 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4191 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4195 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4196 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4197 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4198 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4202 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4203 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4204 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4205 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4206 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4207 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4209 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4210 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4217 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4218 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4220 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4223 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4224 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4226 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4228 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4229 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4230 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4231 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4232 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4233 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4234 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4235 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4236 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4238 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4239 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4242 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4246 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4247 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4248 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4249 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4251 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4254 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4257 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4260 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4264 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4268 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
4269 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4270 return Ok((None, None));
4273 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4274 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4275 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4276 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4278 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4280 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4283 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4284 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4285 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4286 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4287 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4291 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4292 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4297 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4298 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4299 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4300 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4301 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4302 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4303 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4307 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4309 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4310 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4311 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4312 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4314 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4317 let sig = self.holder_signer
4318 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4319 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4321 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4322 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4323 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4324 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4328 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4329 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4330 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4331 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4333 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4334 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4335 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4341 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4342 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4343 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4345 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4346 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4348 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4349 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4352 if !self.is_outbound() {
4353 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4354 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4355 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4356 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4358 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4360 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4362 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4363 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4366 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4367 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4368 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4369 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4370 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4371 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4372 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4373 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4375 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4378 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4379 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4380 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4381 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4383 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4387 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4388 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4389 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4390 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4392 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4398 // Public utilities:
4400 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4404 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4408 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4409 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4410 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
4414 /// Gets the channel's type
4415 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4419 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4420 /// is_usable() returns true).
4421 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4422 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4423 self.short_channel_id
4426 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4427 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4428 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4431 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4432 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4433 self.outbound_scid_alias
4435 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4436 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4437 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4438 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4439 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4442 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4443 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4444 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4445 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4448 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4449 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4452 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4453 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4456 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4457 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4458 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4461 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4462 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4465 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4466 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4467 self.counterparty_node_id
4470 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4471 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4472 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4475 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4476 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4477 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4480 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4481 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4483 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4484 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4485 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4486 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4488 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4492 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4493 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4494 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4497 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4498 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4499 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4502 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4503 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4504 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4506 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4507 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4512 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4513 self.channel_value_satoshis
4516 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4517 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4520 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4521 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4524 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4525 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4528 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4529 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4530 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4533 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4534 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4535 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4536 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4537 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4540 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4542 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4543 self.prev_config = None;
4547 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4548 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4552 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4553 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4554 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4555 let did_channel_update =
4556 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4557 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4558 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4559 if did_channel_update {
4560 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4561 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4562 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4563 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4565 self.config.options = *config;
4569 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4570 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4571 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4572 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4573 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4574 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4575 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4577 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4578 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4581 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4583 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4584 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4590 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4591 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4592 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4593 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4594 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4595 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4596 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4598 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4599 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4606 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4610 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4611 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4612 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4613 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4614 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4615 // which are near the dust limit.
4616 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4617 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4618 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4619 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4620 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4622 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4623 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4625 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4628 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4629 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4632 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4633 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4636 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4637 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4641 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4646 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4648 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4649 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4650 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4651 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4652 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4653 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4655 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4657 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4665 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4666 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4670 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4671 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4672 self.update_time_counter
4675 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4676 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4679 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4680 self.config.announced_channel
4683 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4684 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4687 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4688 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4689 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4690 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4693 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4694 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4695 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4698 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4699 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4700 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4701 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4702 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4705 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4706 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4707 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4708 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4709 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4712 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4713 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4714 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4715 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
4718 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4719 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4720 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4723 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4724 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4725 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32
4728 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4729 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4730 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4733 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4734 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4735 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4738 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4739 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4740 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4741 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4742 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4743 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4748 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4749 self.channel_update_status
4752 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4753 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4754 self.channel_update_status = status;
4757 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4759 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4760 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4761 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4765 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4766 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4767 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4770 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4774 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4775 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4776 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4778 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4779 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4780 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4782 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4783 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4786 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4787 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4788 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4789 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4790 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4791 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4792 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4793 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4794 self.channel_state);
4796 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4800 if need_commitment_update {
4801 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
4802 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4803 let next_per_commitment_point =
4804 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4805 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4806 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4807 next_per_commitment_point,
4808 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4812 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4818 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4819 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4820 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4821 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4822 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4823 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4824 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4825 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4826 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4827 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4828 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4829 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4830 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4831 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4832 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4833 if self.is_outbound() {
4834 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4835 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4836 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4837 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4838 // channel and move on.
4839 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4840 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4842 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4843 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4844 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4846 if self.is_outbound() {
4847 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4848 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4849 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4850 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4851 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4852 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4856 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4857 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4858 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4859 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4860 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4864 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4865 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4866 // may have already happened for this block).
4867 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4868 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4869 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4870 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4873 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4874 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4875 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4876 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4884 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4885 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4886 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4887 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4889 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4890 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4893 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4895 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4896 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4897 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
4900 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
4901 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4902 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4903 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4904 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4906 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4907 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4909 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4910 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4911 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4919 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4921 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4922 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
4923 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
4925 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4926 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4929 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4930 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
4931 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4932 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4933 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4934 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4935 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4936 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4937 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4940 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4941 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4942 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4943 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4945 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4946 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4947 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4949 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4950 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4951 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4952 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4954 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4955 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4956 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4957 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4958 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
4959 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4960 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4963 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
4964 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
4966 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4969 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4970 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4971 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4972 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4973 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4974 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4975 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4976 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4977 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4978 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4979 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4980 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4981 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
4982 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4983 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4984 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4985 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4991 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4996 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4997 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4999 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5000 if !self.is_outbound() {
5001 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5003 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5004 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5007 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5008 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5011 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5012 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5016 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5017 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5018 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5019 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5020 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5021 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5022 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5023 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5024 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5025 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5026 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5027 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5028 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5029 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5030 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5031 first_per_commitment_point,
5032 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5033 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5034 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5035 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5037 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5041 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5042 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5045 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5046 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5047 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5048 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5051 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5052 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5054 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5055 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u64) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5056 if self.is_outbound() {
5057 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5059 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5060 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5062 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5063 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5065 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5066 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5069 self.user_id = user_id;
5070 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5072 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5075 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5076 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5077 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5079 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5080 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5081 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5082 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5084 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5085 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5086 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5087 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5088 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5089 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5090 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5091 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5092 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5093 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5094 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5095 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5096 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5097 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5098 first_per_commitment_point,
5099 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5100 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5101 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5103 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5107 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5108 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5110 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5112 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5113 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5116 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5117 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5118 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5119 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5120 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5121 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5124 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5125 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5126 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5127 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5128 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5129 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5130 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5131 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5132 if !self.is_outbound() {
5133 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5135 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5136 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5138 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5139 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5140 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5141 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5144 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5145 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5147 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5150 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5151 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5156 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5158 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5160 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5161 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5162 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5164 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5165 temporary_channel_id,
5166 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5167 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5172 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5173 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5174 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5175 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5177 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5180 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5181 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5182 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5183 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5185 if !self.is_usable() {
5186 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5189 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5191 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5192 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
5194 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5195 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5196 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5197 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5198 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5199 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5205 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5206 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5207 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5211 if !self.is_usable() {
5215 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5216 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5220 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5224 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5225 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5228 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5232 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5234 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5239 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5241 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5242 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5243 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5244 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5245 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5249 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5251 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5252 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5253 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5255 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5256 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5257 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5258 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5259 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5260 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5261 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5262 contents: announcement,
5265 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5269 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5270 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5271 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5272 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5273 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5275 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5277 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5279 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5280 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5282 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5284 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5285 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5288 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5289 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5290 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5291 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5294 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5297 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5298 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5299 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5300 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5303 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5305 Err(_) => return None,
5307 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5308 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5313 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5314 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5315 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5316 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5317 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5318 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5319 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5320 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5321 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5322 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5323 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5324 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5325 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5326 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5327 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5328 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5329 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5330 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5331 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5334 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5335 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5336 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5337 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5340 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5341 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5342 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5343 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5344 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5345 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5346 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5347 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5349 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5350 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5351 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5352 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5353 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5354 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5355 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5356 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5357 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5359 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5365 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5367 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5368 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5370 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5372 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5373 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5375 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
5376 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
5379 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5381 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5382 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5383 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5384 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5386 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5387 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5388 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5391 if amount_msat == 0 {
5392 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5395 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5396 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5399 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5400 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5401 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5402 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5403 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5404 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5405 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5406 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5409 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5410 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5411 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5412 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5414 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5415 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5416 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5419 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5420 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5421 if !self.is_outbound() {
5422 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5423 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5424 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5425 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5426 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5427 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5431 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5432 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5433 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5434 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5435 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5436 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5440 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5441 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5442 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5443 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5444 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5445 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5449 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5450 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5451 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5454 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5455 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5456 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5457 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5459 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5460 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5463 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5464 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5465 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5466 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5467 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5470 // Now update local state:
5471 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
5472 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5477 onion_routing_packet,
5482 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5483 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5485 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5487 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5491 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5492 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5493 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5497 onion_routing_packet,
5499 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5504 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5505 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5506 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5507 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5508 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5509 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
5510 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5512 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5513 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5515 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5516 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5518 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
5519 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5521 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5522 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5523 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5524 have_updates = true;
5526 if have_updates { break; }
5528 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5529 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5530 have_updates = true;
5532 if have_updates { break; }
5535 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5537 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5539 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5540 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5541 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5542 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5543 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5545 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5546 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5547 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5549 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5550 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5554 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5555 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5556 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5557 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5558 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5559 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5560 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5563 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5564 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5565 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5566 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5567 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5568 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5571 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5573 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5574 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5575 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5576 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5577 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5578 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5580 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5583 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5584 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5587 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5588 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5589 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5590 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5591 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5592 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5593 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5594 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5597 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5598 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5601 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5602 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5603 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5604 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5605 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5606 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5607 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5609 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5611 if !self.is_outbound() {
5612 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5613 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5614 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5615 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5616 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5617 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5618 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5619 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5620 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5621 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5628 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5629 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5633 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5634 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5636 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5638 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5639 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5640 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5641 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5643 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5644 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5645 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5646 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5647 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5648 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5652 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5653 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5656 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5659 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5660 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5661 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5663 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5664 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5665 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5666 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5667 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5673 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5674 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5675 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5678 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5679 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5680 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5682 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5683 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5684 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5685 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5691 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5692 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5693 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5694 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5695 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5696 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5697 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5698 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5701 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5702 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5703 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5705 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5706 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5709 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5710 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
5711 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5714 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5717 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5718 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5719 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5721 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5726 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5727 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5728 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5729 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5731 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5733 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5735 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5736 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5737 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5738 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5739 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5740 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5744 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5745 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5746 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5749 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5750 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5751 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5752 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5753 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5755 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5756 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5763 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5766 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5767 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5768 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5769 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5770 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5771 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5772 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5773 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5774 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5775 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5776 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5778 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5779 // return them to fail the payment.
5780 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5781 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5782 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5784 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5785 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5790 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5791 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5792 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5793 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5794 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5795 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5796 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5797 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5798 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5799 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5800 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5801 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5802 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5807 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5808 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5809 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5813 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5814 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5816 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5822 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5823 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5824 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5825 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5826 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5828 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5829 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5830 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5831 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5837 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5838 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5839 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5840 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5841 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5842 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5847 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5848 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5849 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5850 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5852 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5853 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5854 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5855 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5860 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5861 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5862 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5863 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5864 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5865 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5870 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5871 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5872 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
5875 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5877 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
5879 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
5880 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
5881 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
5882 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
5884 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
5885 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
5886 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5888 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
5890 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
5891 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
5892 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
5893 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
5894 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
5895 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
5897 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
5898 // deserialized from that format.
5899 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
5900 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
5901 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
5903 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
5905 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5906 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5907 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
5909 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
5910 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5911 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5912 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
5915 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5916 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5917 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
5920 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5921 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5922 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5923 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5925 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
5926 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
5928 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5930 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
5932 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5934 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5937 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
5939 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
5944 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
5946 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5947 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5948 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5949 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5950 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5951 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5952 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
5954 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
5956 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
5958 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5961 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
5962 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
5963 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
5966 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
5968 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
5969 preimages.push(preimage);
5971 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
5972 reason.write(writer)?;
5974 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
5976 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
5977 preimages.push(preimage);
5979 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
5980 reason.write(writer)?;
5985 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5986 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5988 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
5990 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5991 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5992 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5993 source.write(writer)?;
5994 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
5996 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
5998 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
5999 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6001 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6003 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6004 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6009 match self.resend_order {
6010 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6011 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6014 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6015 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6016 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6018 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6019 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6020 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6021 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6024 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6025 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6026 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6027 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6028 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6031 if self.is_outbound() {
6032 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6033 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6034 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6036 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6037 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6038 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6040 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6042 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6043 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6044 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6045 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6047 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6048 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6049 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6050 // consider the stale state on reload.
6053 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6054 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6055 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6057 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6058 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6059 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6061 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6062 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6064 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6065 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6066 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6068 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6069 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6071 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6074 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6075 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6076 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6078 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6081 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6082 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6084 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6085 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6086 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6088 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6090 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6092 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6094 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6095 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6097 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6098 htlc.write(writer)?;
6101 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6102 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6103 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6105 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6106 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6108 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6109 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6110 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6111 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6112 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6113 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6114 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6116 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6117 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6118 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6119 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6120 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6122 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6123 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6124 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6125 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6126 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6127 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6128 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6130 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6131 (2, chan_type, option),
6132 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6133 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6134 (5, self.config, required),
6135 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6136 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6137 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6138 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6139 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6140 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6141 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6142 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6143 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6150 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6151 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<Signer>
6152 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
6153 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6154 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6155 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6157 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6159 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6161 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6162 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6163 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6164 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6165 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6167 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6168 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6171 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6172 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6173 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6175 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6177 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6178 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6179 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6180 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6181 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6182 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6183 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6184 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6186 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6188 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6189 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6190 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6193 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6195 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6196 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6197 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6199 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6200 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6201 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6202 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6203 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6204 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6205 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6206 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6207 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6208 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6209 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6210 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6211 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6212 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6217 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6218 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6219 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6220 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6221 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6222 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6223 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6224 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6225 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6226 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6227 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6228 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6230 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6231 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6234 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6235 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6238 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6239 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6241 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6246 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6247 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6248 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6249 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6250 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6251 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6252 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6253 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6254 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6255 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6257 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6258 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6259 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6261 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6262 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6263 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6265 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6269 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6270 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6271 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6272 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6275 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6276 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6277 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6279 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6280 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6281 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6282 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6285 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6286 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6287 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6288 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6291 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6293 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6295 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6296 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6297 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6298 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6300 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6301 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6302 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6303 // consider the stale state on reload.
6304 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6307 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6308 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6309 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6311 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6314 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6315 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6316 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6318 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6319 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6320 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6321 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6323 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6324 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6326 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6327 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6329 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6330 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6331 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6333 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6335 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6336 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6338 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6339 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6342 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6344 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6345 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6346 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6347 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6349 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6352 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6353 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6355 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6357 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6358 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6360 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6361 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6363 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6365 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6366 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6367 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6369 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6370 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6371 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6375 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6376 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6377 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6379 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6385 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6386 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6387 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6388 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6389 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6390 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6391 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6392 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6393 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6394 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6396 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6397 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6398 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6399 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6400 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6402 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6403 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6404 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6405 (2, channel_type, option),
6406 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6407 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6408 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6409 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6410 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6411 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6412 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6413 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6414 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6415 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6416 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6417 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6420 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6421 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6422 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6424 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6425 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6427 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6428 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6433 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6434 if iter.next().is_some() {
6435 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6439 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6440 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6441 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6442 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6443 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6446 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6447 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6448 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6451 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6452 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6457 config: config.unwrap(),
6461 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6462 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6463 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6467 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6469 channel_value_satoshis,
6471 latest_monitor_update_id,
6474 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6477 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6478 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6481 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6482 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6483 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6487 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6488 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6489 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6490 monitor_pending_forwards,
6491 monitor_pending_failures,
6492 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6495 holding_cell_update_fee,
6496 next_holder_htlc_id,
6497 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6498 update_time_counter,
6501 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6502 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6503 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6504 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6506 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6507 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6508 closing_fee_limits: None,
6509 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6511 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6513 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6514 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6516 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6518 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6519 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6520 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6521 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6522 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6523 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6524 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6525 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6526 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6529 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6531 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6532 funding_transaction,
6534 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6535 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6536 counterparty_node_id,
6538 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6542 channel_update_status,
6543 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6547 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6548 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6549 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6550 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6552 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6554 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6555 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6556 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6558 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6559 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6561 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6568 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6569 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6570 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6571 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6572 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6574 use ln::PaymentHash;
6575 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6576 use ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6577 use ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS};
6578 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures};
6579 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6580 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6582 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6583 use chain::BestBlock;
6584 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6585 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6586 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6587 use util::config::UserConfig;
6588 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6589 use util::errors::APIError;
6590 use util::test_utils;
6591 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6592 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6593 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6594 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6595 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6596 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6597 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6598 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6599 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6600 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6603 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6606 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6607 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6613 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6614 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6615 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6616 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6620 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6621 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6622 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6623 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6624 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6625 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator, u32::max_value()).is_err());
6629 signer: InMemorySigner,
6631 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6632 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6634 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6635 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6636 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6637 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6638 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6639 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6640 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6643 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6644 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6645 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6646 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6649 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6652 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6653 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6654 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6657 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6658 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6659 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6663 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6664 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6665 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6666 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6668 let seed = [42; 32];
6669 let network = Network::Testnet;
6670 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6671 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6672 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6675 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6676 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6677 let config = UserConfig::default();
6678 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6679 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6680 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6682 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6683 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6687 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6688 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6690 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6691 let original_fee = 253;
6692 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6693 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6694 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6695 let seed = [42; 32];
6696 let network = Network::Testnet;
6697 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6699 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6700 let config = UserConfig::default();
6701 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6703 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6704 // same as the old fee.
6705 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6706 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6707 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6711 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6712 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6713 // dust limits are used.
6714 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6715 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6716 let seed = [42; 32];
6717 let network = Network::Testnet;
6718 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6719 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6721 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6722 // they have different dust limits.
6724 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6725 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6726 let config = UserConfig::default();
6727 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6729 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6730 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6731 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6732 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6733 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6735 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6736 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6737 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6738 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6739 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6741 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6742 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6743 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6745 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6746 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6747 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6748 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6751 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6753 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6754 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6755 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6756 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6757 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6759 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6760 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6761 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6762 payment_secret: None,
6763 payment_params: None,
6767 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6768 // the dust limit check.
6769 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6770 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6771 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6772 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6774 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6775 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6776 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6777 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6778 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6779 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6780 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6784 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6785 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6786 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6787 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6788 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6789 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6790 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6791 let seed = [42; 32];
6792 let network = Network::Testnet;
6793 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6795 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6796 let config = UserConfig::default();
6797 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6799 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6800 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6802 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6803 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6804 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6805 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6806 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6807 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6809 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6810 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6811 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6812 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6813 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6815 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6817 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6818 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6819 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6820 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6821 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6823 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6824 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6825 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6826 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6827 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6831 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6832 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6833 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6834 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6835 let seed = [42; 32];
6836 let network = Network::Testnet;
6837 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6838 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6839 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6841 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6843 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6844 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6845 let config = UserConfig::default();
6846 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6848 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6849 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
6850 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6851 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6853 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
6854 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6855 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
6857 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
6858 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6859 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6860 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
6862 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
6863 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
6864 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
6866 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
6867 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
6869 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
6870 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
6871 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6872 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6873 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6874 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6875 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6876 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6877 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6882 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
6884 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
6885 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
6886 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
6887 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
6888 match msg.data_loss_protect {
6889 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
6890 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
6897 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6898 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6899 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6900 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6901 let seed = [42; 32];
6902 let network = Network::Testnet;
6903 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6904 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6905 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6907 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
6908 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
6909 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
6910 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
6911 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
6912 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
6913 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
6914 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
6916 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
6917 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
6918 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
6919 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6920 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6921 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
6923 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
6924 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6925 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6926 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
6928 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6930 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
6931 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
6932 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
6933 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6934 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6935 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
6937 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
6938 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6939 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6940 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
6942 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
6943 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
6944 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6945 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6946 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
6948 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
6949 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
6951 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
6952 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6953 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
6955 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
6956 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
6957 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6958 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6959 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
6961 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
6962 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
6964 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6965 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6966 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
6970 fn channel_update() {
6971 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6972 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6973 let seed = [42; 32];
6974 let network = Network::Testnet;
6975 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6976 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6978 // Create a channel.
6979 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6980 let config = UserConfig::default();
6981 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6982 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
6983 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
6984 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
6986 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
6987 let update = ChannelUpdate {
6988 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
6990 short_channel_id: 0,
6993 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
6994 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
6995 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
6997 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
6998 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7000 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7002 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7004 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7005 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7006 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7007 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7009 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7010 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7011 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7013 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7017 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7019 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7020 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7021 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7022 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7023 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7024 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7025 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7026 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7027 use ln::PaymentPreimage;
7028 use ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7029 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7030 use util::logger::Logger;
7033 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7034 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7035 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7036 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7038 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7040 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7041 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7042 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7043 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7044 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7045 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7047 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7048 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7053 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7054 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7055 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7057 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7058 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7059 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7060 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7061 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7062 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7064 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7066 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7067 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7068 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7069 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7070 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7071 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7073 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7074 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7075 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7076 selected_contest_delay: 144
7078 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7079 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7081 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7082 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7084 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7085 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7087 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7088 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7090 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7091 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7092 // build_commitment_transaction.
7093 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7094 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7095 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7096 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7097 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7099 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7100 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7101 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7102 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7106 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7107 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7108 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7109 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7113 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7114 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7115 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7117 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7118 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7120 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7121 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7123 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7125 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7126 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7127 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7128 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7129 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7130 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7131 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7133 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7134 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7135 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7136 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7138 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7139 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7140 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7142 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7144 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7145 commitment_tx.clone(),
7146 counterparty_signature,
7147 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7148 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7149 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7151 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7152 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7154 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7155 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7156 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7158 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7159 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7162 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7163 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7165 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7166 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7167 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7168 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7169 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7170 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7171 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7172 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7174 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7177 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7178 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7179 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7183 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7186 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7187 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7188 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7190 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7191 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7192 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7193 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7194 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7195 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7196 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7197 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7199 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7203 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7204 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7206 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7207 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7208 "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", {});
7210 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7211 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7212 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7213 "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", {});
7215 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7216 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7218 amount_msat: 1000000,
7220 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7221 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7223 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7226 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7227 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7229 amount_msat: 2000000,
7231 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7232 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7234 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7237 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7238 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7240 amount_msat: 2000000,
7242 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7243 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7244 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7246 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7249 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7250 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7252 amount_msat: 3000000,
7254 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7255 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7256 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7258 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7261 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7262 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7264 amount_msat: 4000000,
7266 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7267 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7269 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7273 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7274 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7275 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7277 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7278 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7279 "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", {
7282 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7283 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7284 "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" },
7287 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7288 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7289 "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" },
7292 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7293 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7294 "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" },
7297 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7298 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7299 "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" },
7302 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7303 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7304 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7307 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7308 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7309 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7311 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7312 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7313 "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", {
7316 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7317 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7318 "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" },
7321 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7322 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7323 "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" },
7326 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7327 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7328 "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" },
7331 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7332 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7333 "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" },
7336 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7337 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7338 "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" }
7341 // anchors: commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7342 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7343 chan.feerate_per_kw = 644;
7345 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e0106830467a558c07544a3de7715610c1147062e7d091deeebe8b5c661cda9402202ad049c1a6d04834317a78483f723c205c9f638d17222aafc620800cc1b6ae35",
7346 "3045022100ef82a405364bfc4007e63a7cc82925a513d79065bdbc216d60b6a4223a323f8a02200716730b8561f3c6d362eaf47f202e99fb30d0557b61b92b5f9134f8e2de3681",
7347 "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", {
7350 "304402205912d91c58016f593d9e46fefcdb6f4125055c41a17b03101eaaa034b9028ab60220520d4d239c85c66e4c75c5b413620b62736e227659d7821b308e2b8ced3e728e",
7351 "30440220473166a5adcca68550bab80403f410a726b5bd855030527e3fefa8c1e4b4fd7b02203b1dc91d8d69039473036cb5c34398b99e8eb90ae500c22130a557b62294b188",
7352 "02000000000101b8cefef62ea66f5178b9361b2371be0759cbc8c689bcfa7a8e6746d497ec221a0200000000010000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205912d91c58016f593d9e46fefcdb6f4125055c41a17b03101eaaa034b9028ab60220520d4d239c85c66e4c75c5b413620b62736e227659d7821b308e2b8ced3e728e834730440220473166a5adcca68550bab80403f410a726b5bd855030527e3fefa8c1e4b4fd7b02203b1dc91d8d69039473036cb5c34398b99e8eb90ae500c22130a557b62294b188012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
7355 "3045022100c6b4113678039ee1e43a6cba5e3224ed2355ffc05e365a393afe8843dc9a76860220566d01fd52d65a89ba8595023884f9e8f2e9a310a6b9b85281c0bce06863430c",
7356 "3045022100d0d86307ea55d5daa80f453ad6d64b78fe8a6504aac25407c73e8502c0702c1602206a0809a02aa00c8dc4a53d976bb05d4605d8bb0b7b26b973a5c4e2734d8afbb4",
7357 "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" },
7360 "304402203c3a699fb80a38112aafd73d6e3a9b7d40bc2c3ed8b7fbc182a20f43b215172202204e71821b984d1af52c4b8e2cd4c572578c12a965866130c2345f61e4c2d3fef4",
7361 "304402205bcfa92f83c69289a412b0b6dd4f2a0fe0b0fc2d45bd74706e963257a09ea24902203783e47883e60b86240e877fcbf33d50b1742f65bc93b3162d1be26583b367ee",
7362 "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" },
7365 "304402200f089bcd20f25475216307d32aa5b6c857419624bfba1da07335f51f6ba4645b02206ce0f7153edfba23b0d4b2afc26bb3157d404368cb8ea0ca7cf78590dcdd28cf",
7366 "3045022100e4516da08f72c7a4f7b2f37aa84a0feb54ae2cc5b73f0da378e81ae0ca8119bf02207751b2628d8e2f62b4b9abccda4866246c1bfcc82e3d416ad562fd212102c28f",
7367 "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" },
7370 "3045022100aa72cfaf0965020c73a12c77276c6411ca68c4de36ac1998adf86c917a899a43022060da0a159fecfe0bed37c3962d767f12f90e30fed8a8f34b1301775c21a2bd3a",
7371 "304402203cd12065c2a42963c762e6b1a981e17695616ecb6f9fb33d8b0717cdd7ca0ee4022065500005c491c1dcf2fe9c4024f74b1c90785d572527055a491278f901143904",
7372 "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" }
7375 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7376 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7377 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7379 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7380 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7381 "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", {
7384 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7385 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7386 "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" },
7389 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7390 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7391 "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" },
7394 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7395 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7396 "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" },
7399 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7400 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7401 "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" }
7404 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7405 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7406 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7408 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7409 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7410 "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", {
7413 "30440220446f9e5c375db6a61d6eeee8b59219a30a4a37372afc2670a1a2889c78e9b943022061895f6088fb48b490ab2140a4842c277b64bf25ff591625dd0356e0c96ab7a8",
7414 "3045022100c1621ba26a99c263fd885feff5fda5ca2cc73df080b3a49ecf15164ee244d2a5022037f4cc7fd4441af39a83a0e44c3b1db7d64a4c8080e8697f9e952f85421a34d8",
7415 "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" },
7418 "3044022027a3ffcb8a007e3349d75382efbd4b3fb99fcbd479a18555e58697bd1278d5c402205c8303d46211c3ae8975fe84a0df08b4623119fecd03bc93b49d7f7a0c64c710",
7419 "3045022100b697aca55c6fb15e5348bb7387b584815fd15e8dd306afe0c477cb550d0c2d40022050b0f7e370f7604d2fec781fefe86715dbe95dff4dab88d628f509d62f854de1",
7420 "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" },
7423 "30440220013975ae356e6daf22a86a29f21c4f35aca82ed8f731a1103c60c74f5ed1c5aa02200350d4e5455cdbcacb7ccf174db5bed8286019e509a113f6b4c5e606ee12c9d7",
7424 "3045022100e69a29f78779577830e73f327073c93168896f1b89432124b7846f5def9cd9cb02204433db3697e6ed7ac89574ca066a749640e0c9e114ac2e0ee4545741fcf7b7e9",
7425 "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" },
7428 "304402205257017423644c7e831f30bc0c334eecfe66e9a6d2e92d157c5bece576b2be4f022047b21cf8e955e22b7471940563922d1a5852fb95459ca32905c7d46a19141664",
7429 "304402204f5de65a624e3f757adffb678bd887eb4e656538c5ea7044922f6ee3eed8a06202206ff6f7bfe73b565343cae76131ac658f1a9c60d3ca2343358cda60b9e35f94c8",
7430 "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" }
7433 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7434 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7435 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7437 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7438 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7439 "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", {
7442 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7443 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7444 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7447 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7448 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7449 "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" },
7452 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7453 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7454 "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" },
7457 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7458 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7459 "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" }
7462 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7463 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7464 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2060;
7466 test_commitment_with_anchors!("304402206208aeb34e404bd052ce3f298dfa832891c9d42caec99fe2a0d2832e9690b94302201b034bfcc6fa9faec667a9b7cbfe0b8d85e954aa239b66277887b5088aff08c3",
7467 "304402201ce37a44b95213358c20f44404d6db7a6083bea6f58de6c46547ae41a47c9f8202206db1d45be41373e92f90d346381febbea8c78671b28c153e30ad1db3441a9497",
7468 "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", {
7471 "30440220011f999016570bbab9f3125377d0f35096b4dbe155f97c20f71829ead2817d1602201f23f7e17f6928734601c5d8613431eed5c90aa41c3106e8c1cb02ce32aacb5d",
7472 "3044022017da96dfb0eb4061fa0162dc6fa6b2e07ecc5040ab5e6cb07be59838460b3e58022079371ffc95002cc1dc2891ec38198c9c25aca8164304fe114f1b55e2ffd1ddd5",
7473 "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" },
7476 "304402202d2d9681409b0a0987bd4a268ffeb112df85c4c988ac2a3a2475cb00a61912c302206aa4f4d1388b7d3282bc847871af3cca30766cc8f1064e3a41ec7e82221e10f7",
7477 "304402206426d67911aa6ff9b1cb147b093f3f65a37831a86d7c741d999afc0666e1773d022000bb71821650c70ea58d9bcdd03af736c41a5a8159d436c3ee0408a07394dcce",
7478 "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" },
7481 "3045022100f51cdaa525b7d4304548c642bb7945215eb5ae7d32874517cde67ca23ab0a12202206286d59e4b19926c6ac844be6f3ab8149a1ddb9c70f5026b7e83e40a6c08e6e1",
7482 "304502210091b16b1ac63b867e7a5ca0344f7b2aa1cdd49d4b72eac86a31e7ec6f069e20640220402bfb571ba3a9c49e3b0061c89303453803d0241059d899222aaac4799b5076",
7483 "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" },
7486 "304402202f058d99cb5a54f90773d43ba4e7a0089efd9f8269ef2da1b85d48a3e230555402205acc4bd6561830867d45cd7b84bba9fa35ad2b345016471c1737142bc99782c4",
7487 "304402202913f9cacea54efd2316cffa91219def9e0e111977216c1e76e9da80befab14f022000a9a69e8f37ebe4a39107ab50fab0dde537334588f8f412bbaca57b179b87a6",
7488 "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" }
7491 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7492 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7493 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7495 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7496 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7497 "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", {
7500 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7501 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7502 "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" },
7505 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7506 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7507 "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" },
7510 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7511 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7512 "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" }
7515 // anchors: commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7516 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7517 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2061;
7519 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100a2faf2ad7e323b2a82e07dc40b6847207ca6ad7b089f2c21dea9a4d37e52d59d02204c9480ce0358eb51d92a4342355a97e272e3cc45f86c612a76a3fe32fc3c4cb4",
7520 "304402204ab07c659412dd2cd6043b1ad811ab215e901b6b5653e08cb3d2fe63d3e3dc57022031c7b3d130f9380ef09581f4f5a15cb6f359a2e0a597146b96c3533a26d6f4cd",
7521 "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", {
7524 "3045022100e10744f572a2cd1d787c969e894b792afaed21217ee0480df0112d2fa3ef96ea02202af4f66eb6beebc36d8e98719ed6b4be1b181659fcb561fc491d8cfebff3aa85",
7525 "3045022100c3dc3ea50a0ca20e350f97b50c52c5514717cfa36cb9600918caac5cb556842b022049af018d676dde0c8e28ecf325f3ff5c1594261c4f7511d501f9d62d0594d2a2",
7526 "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" },
7529 "3045022100e1f51fb72fec604b029b348a3bb6363454e1869f5b1e24fd736f860c8039f8070220030a2c90186437d8c9b47d4897798c024521b1274991c4cdc125970b346094b1",
7530 "3045022100ec7ade6037e531629f24390ca9713782a04d648065d17fbe6b015981cdb296c202202d61049a6ecba2fb5314f3edcda2361cad187a89bea6e5d15185354d80c0c085",
7531 "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" },
7534 "304402203479f81a1d83c516957679dc98bf91d35deada967739a8e3869e3e8db08246130220053c8e154b97e3019048dcec3d51bfaf396f36861fbda6d33f0e2a57155c8b9f",
7535 "3045022100a558eb5caa04e35a4417c1f0123ac12eec5f6badee28f5764dc6b69486e594f802201589b12784e242f205832d2d032149bd4e79433ec304c05394241fc7dcba5a71",
7536 "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" }
7539 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7540 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7541 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7543 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7544 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7545 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7548 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7549 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7550 "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" },
7553 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7554 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7555 "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" },
7558 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7559 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7560 "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" }
7563 // anchors: commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7564 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7565 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2184;
7567 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022013d326f80ff7607cf366c823fcbbcb7a2b10322484825f151e6c4c756af24b8f02201ba05b9d8beb7cea2947f9f4d9e03f90435e93db2dd48b32eb9ca3f3dd042c79",
7568 "30440220555c05261f72c5b4702d5c83a608630822b473048724b08640d6e75e345094250220448950b74a96a56963928ba5db8b457661a742c855e69d239b3b6ab73de307a3",
7569 "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", {
7572 "304402202e03ba1390998b3487e9a7fefcb66814c09abea0ef1bcc915dbaefbcf310569a02206bd10493a105ac69048e9bcedcb8e3301ef81b55018d911a4afd297297f98d30",
7573 "304402200c3952ca04be0c60dcc0b7873a0829f560607524943554ae4a27d8d967166199022021a68657b88e22f9bf9ac6065be412685aff643d17049f04f2e99e86197dabb1",
7574 "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" },
7577 "304402201f8a6adda2403bc400c919ea69d72d315337291e00d02cde085ea32953dbc50002202d65230da98df7af8ebefd2b60b457d0945232988ee2d7460a94a77d414a9acc",
7578 "3045022100ea69c9273b8914ac62b5b7082d6ac1da2b7b065ebf2ef3cd6403f5305ce3f26802203d98736ea97638895a898dfcc5ee0d0c55eb496b3964df0bb25d223688ea8b87",
7579 "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" },
7582 "3045022100ea6e4c9b8f56dd9cf5799492a201cdd65b8bc9bc089c3cff34107896ae313f90022034760f7760975cc68e8917a7f62894e25583da7be11af557c4fc402661d0cbf8",
7583 "30440220717012f2f7ef6cac590aaf66c2109132c93ffba245959ac62d82e394ba80191302203f00fd9cb37c92c6b0ad4b33e62c3e55b04e5c2cfa0adcca5a9bc49774eeca8a",
7584 "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" }
7587 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7588 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7589 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7591 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7592 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7593 "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", {
7596 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7597 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7598 "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" },
7601 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7602 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7603 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7606 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7607 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7608 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7610 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7611 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7612 "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", {
7615 "304502210094480e38afb41d10fae299224872f19c53abe23c7033a1c0642c48713e7863a10220726dd9456407682667dc4bd9c66975acb3744961770b5002f7eb9c0df9ef2f3e",
7616 "304402203148dac61513dc0361738cba30cb341a1e580f8acd5ab0149bf65bd670688cf002207e5d9a0fcbbea2c263bc714fa9e9c44d7f582ea447f366119fc614a23de32f1f",
7617 "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" },
7620 "304402200dbde868dbc20c6a2433fe8979ba5e3f966b1c2d1aeb615f1c42e9c938b3495402202eec5f663c8b601c2061c1453d35de22597c137d1907a2feaf714d551035cb6e",
7621 "3045022100b896bded41d7feac7af25c19e35c53037c53b50e73cfd01eb4ba139c7fdf231602203a3be049d3d89396c4dc766d82ce31e237da8bc3a93e2c7d35992d1932d9cfeb",
7622 "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" }
7625 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7626 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7627 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7629 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7630 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7631 "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", {
7634 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7635 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7636 "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" },
7639 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7640 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7641 "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" }
7644 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7645 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7646 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3686;
7648 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220784485cf7a0ad7979daf2c858ffdaf5298d0020cea7aea466843e7948223bd9902206031b81d25e02a178c64e62f843577fdcdfc7a1decbbfb54cd895de692df85ca",
7649 "3045022100c268496aad5c3f97f25cf41c1ba5483a12982de29b222051b6de3daa2229413b02207f3c82d77a2c14f0096ed9bb4c34649483bb20fa71f819f71af44de6593e8bb2",
7650 "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", {
7653 "304402202cfe6618926ca9f1574f8c4659b425e9790b4677ba2248d77901290806130ffe02204ab37bb0287abcdb8b750b018d41a09effe37cb65ff801fa70d3f1a416599841",
7654 "3044022030b318139715e3b34f19be852cc01c1c0e1599e8b926a73df2bfb70dd186ddee022062a2b7398aed9f563b4014da04a1a99debd0ff663ceece68a547df5982dc2d72",
7655 "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" },
7658 "30440220687af8544d335376620a6f4b5412bfd0da48de047c1785674f26e669d4a3ff82022058591c1e3a6c50017427d38a8f756eb685bdab88ec73838eed3530048861f9d5",
7659 "30440220109f1a62b5a13d28d5b7634dd7693b1d5994eb404c4bb4a9a80aa540d3984d170220307251107ff8499a23e99abce7dda4f1c707c98abddb9405a83de0081cde8ace",
7660 "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" }
7663 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7664 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7665 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7667 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7668 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7669 "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", {
7672 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7673 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7674 "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" }
7677 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7678 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7679 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7681 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7682 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7683 "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", {
7686 "3045022100b287bb8e079a62dcb3aaa8b6c67c0f434a87ebf64ab0bcfb2fc14b55576b859f02206d37c2eb5fd04cfc9eb0534c76a28a98da251b84a931377cce307af39dfaed74",
7687 "3045022100a497c64faea286ec4221f48628086dc6403fd7b60a23c4176e8ebbca15ae70dc0220754e20e968e96cf6421fd2a672c8c26d3bc6e19218cfc8fc2aa51fce026c14b1",
7688 "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" }
7691 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7692 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7693 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7695 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7696 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7697 "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", {
7700 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7701 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7702 "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" }
7705 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7706 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7707 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4893;
7709 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100a8771147109e4d3f44a5976c3c3de98732bbb77308d21444dbe0d76faf06480e02200b4e916e850c3d1f918de87bbbbb07843ffea1d4658dfe060b6f9ccd96d34be8",
7710 "30440220086288faceab47461eb2d808e9e9b0cb3ffc24a03c2f18db7198247d38f10e58022031d1c2782a58c8c6ce187d0019eb47a83babdf3040e2caff299ab48f7e12b1fa",
7711 "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", {
7714 "30450221008db80f8531104820b3e894492b4463f074f965b542e1b5c153ddfb108a5ea642022030b203d857a2b3581c2087a7bf17c95d04fadc1c6cdae88c620477f2dccb1ee4",
7715 "3045022100e5fbae857c47dbfc050a05924bd449fc9804798bd6442002c578437dc34450810220296589bc387645512345299e307116aaac4ce9fc752abcd1936b802d03526312",
7716 "02000000000101d515a15e9175fd315bb8d4e768f28684801a9e5a9acdfeba34f7b3b3b3a9ba1d0200000000010000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008db80f8531104820b3e894492b4463f074f965b542e1b5c153ddfb108a5ea642022030b203d857a2b3581c2087a7bf17c95d04fadc1c6cdae88c620477f2dccb1ee483483045022100e5fbae857c47dbfc050a05924bd449fc9804798bd6442002c578437dc34450810220296589bc387645512345299e307116aaac4ce9fc752abcd1936b802d03526312012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7719 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7720 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7721 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7723 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7724 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7725 "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", {});
7727 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7728 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7729 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7731 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7732 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7733 "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", {});
7735 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7736 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7737 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7739 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7740 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7741 "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", {});
7743 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7744 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7745 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7747 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7748 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7749 "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", {});
7751 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7752 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7753 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7755 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7756 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7757 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7759 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7760 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7761 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7763 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7764 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7765 "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", {});
7767 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7768 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7769 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7770 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7771 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7772 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7774 amount_msat: 2000000,
7776 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7777 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7779 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7782 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7783 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7784 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7786 amount_msat: 5000000,
7788 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7789 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7790 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7792 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7795 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7796 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7798 amount_msat: 5000000,
7800 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7801 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7802 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7804 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7808 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7809 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7810 "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", {
7813 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7814 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7815 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc34000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050048304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c60148304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7817 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7818 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7819 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3401000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5014830450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d3901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
7821 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7822 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7823 "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" }
7826 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7827 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7828 "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", {
7831 "304402202060a5acb12105e92f27d7b86e6caf1e003d9d82068338e5a8a9a0d14cba11260220030ca4dba8fad24a2e395906220c991eccd5369bc4b0f216d217b5f86d1fc61d",
7832 "3044022044f5425fe630fa614f349f55642e4a0b76e2583054b21543821660d9e8f3735702207f70424835b541874ca8bf0443cca4028afa2f6c03a17b0688df85d5c44eeefc",
7833 "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" },
7835 "304402206fde7eb6d7a47fdc63705d3db2169054e229f10342dea66f150b163381f48a0802201be28509c2de9be4b7ab72c569c6fd51c0ce0904fea459142f31d442cd043eb8",
7836 "3045022100ad0236a78dbd029d3a8f583f7f82ee62892273d45303d00ef5a03fecf8903a36022004b2db33f8ff2f4a08ca6127c9cbfd9144c691a2feb9287e36ae6bc7c83c5a5f",
7837 "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" },
7839 "304402205eebc78d8ae6a36c27ef80172359eb757fb18e99fa75b28c37ffe3444b967bc7022060a01c33398d4d8244c42c762fb699e9f61c1f034ff976df2c94350c5a6032a7",
7840 "3045022100ad3fd523594e1b876316401774a30ee6c48bb7fa0efd768bf9a2d022201311ff02207bed627ed8e01041137f03dbaf03c836970be27a4d50f69d90cf1282ff2815e3",
7841 "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" }
7846 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7847 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7849 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7850 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7851 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7852 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7854 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7855 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7856 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7858 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7859 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7861 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7862 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7864 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7865 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7866 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7870 fn test_key_derivation() {
7871 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7872 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7874 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7875 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7877 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7878 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7880 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7881 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7883 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7884 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7886 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7887 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7889 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7890 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7892 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7893 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7897 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7898 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7899 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7900 let seed = [42; 32];
7901 let network = Network::Testnet;
7902 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7903 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7905 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7906 let config = UserConfig::default();
7907 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7908 node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7910 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7911 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7913 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7914 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7915 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7916 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7917 node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7918 assert!(res.is_ok());