1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
74 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
228 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
229 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
230 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
234 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
236 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
238 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
241 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
246 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
250 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
251 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
252 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
253 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
254 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
255 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
256 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
258 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
259 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
260 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
261 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
262 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
263 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
264 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
266 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
267 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
268 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
270 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
271 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
272 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
273 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
274 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
275 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
277 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
278 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
280 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
282 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
283 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
284 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
285 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
286 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
287 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
288 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
290 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
291 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
292 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
293 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
294 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
295 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
297 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
298 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
299 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
300 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
301 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
303 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
304 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
306 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
308 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
310 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
313 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
317 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
319 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
323 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
324 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
325 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
326 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
327 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
329 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
330 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
332 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
334 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
335 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
337 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
338 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
339 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
340 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
341 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
342 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
344 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
345 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
347 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
348 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
349 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
350 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
351 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
353 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
354 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
356 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
357 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
359 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
360 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
361 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
362 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
368 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
369 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
371 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
378 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
379 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
381 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
382 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
388 macro_rules! secp_check {
389 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
392 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
397 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
398 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
399 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
400 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
401 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
402 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
403 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
404 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
406 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
408 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
410 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
414 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
416 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
417 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
418 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
420 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
421 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
423 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
424 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
425 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
426 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
427 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
429 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
430 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
434 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
440 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
443 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
444 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
445 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 holding_cell_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
450 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
451 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
452 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
453 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
454 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
455 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
456 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
457 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
458 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
462 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
463 struct HTLCCandidate {
465 origin: HTLCInitiator,
469 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
477 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
479 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
481 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
482 htlc_value_msat: u64,
483 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
488 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
489 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
490 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
491 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
492 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
494 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
495 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
496 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
497 htlc_value_msat: u64,
499 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
500 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
504 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
505 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
506 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
507 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
508 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
509 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
510 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
511 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
512 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
513 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
514 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
517 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
518 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
519 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
520 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
521 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
522 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
523 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
524 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
527 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
529 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
530 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
531 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
532 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
533 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
534 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
537 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
538 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
539 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
540 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
541 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
542 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
543 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
544 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
545 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
546 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
547 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
548 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
549 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
550 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
551 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
553 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
554 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
555 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
556 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
558 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
559 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
560 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
561 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
563 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
564 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
565 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
566 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
567 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
569 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
570 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
571 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
572 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
574 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
575 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
576 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
578 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
579 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
580 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
581 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
582 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
584 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
585 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
588 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
589 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
591 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
592 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
593 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
594 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
596 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
597 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
600 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
601 (0, update, required),
604 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
605 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
606 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
607 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
608 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
610 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
611 /// in a timely manner.
612 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
615 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
616 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
617 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
619 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
620 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
621 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
622 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
626 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
627 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
628 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
630 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
631 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
632 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
633 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
635 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
639 channel_id: [u8; 32],
640 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
643 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
644 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
646 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
647 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
648 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
650 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
651 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
652 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
653 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
655 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
656 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
658 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
660 holder_signer: Signer,
661 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
662 destination_script: Script,
664 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
665 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
666 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
668 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
669 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
670 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
671 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
672 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
673 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
675 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
676 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
677 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
678 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
679 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
680 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
682 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
684 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
685 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
686 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
688 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
689 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
690 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
691 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
692 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
693 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
694 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
696 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
698 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
699 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
700 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
701 // HTLCs with similar state.
702 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
703 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
704 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
705 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
706 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
707 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
708 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
709 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
710 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
713 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
714 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
715 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
717 update_time_counter: u32,
719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
720 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
721 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
722 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
723 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
724 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
726 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
727 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
729 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
730 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
731 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
732 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
734 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
735 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
737 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
739 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
741 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
742 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
743 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
744 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
745 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
746 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
747 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
748 channel_creation_height: u32,
750 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
753 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
755 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
758 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
760 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
763 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
765 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
767 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
768 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
771 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
773 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
775 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
776 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
778 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
780 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
781 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
782 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
784 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
786 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
787 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
789 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
790 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
791 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
793 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
795 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
797 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
798 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
799 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
800 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
802 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
803 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
804 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
806 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
807 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
808 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
810 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
811 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
812 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
813 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
814 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
815 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
817 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
819 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
820 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
821 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
822 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
823 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
825 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
826 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
828 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
829 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
830 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
831 /// unblock the state machine.
833 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
834 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
835 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
837 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
838 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
839 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
841 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
842 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
843 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
844 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
845 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
846 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
847 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
848 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
850 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
851 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
853 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
854 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
855 // the channel's funding UTXO.
857 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
858 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
859 // associated channel mapping.
861 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
862 // to store all of them.
863 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
865 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
866 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
867 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
868 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
869 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
871 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
872 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
874 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
875 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
877 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
878 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
879 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
881 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
882 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
883 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
886 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
887 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
888 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
889 self.update_time_counter
892 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
893 self.latest_monitor_update_id
896 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
897 self.config.announced_channel
900 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
901 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
904 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
905 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
906 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
907 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
910 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
911 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
912 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
915 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
916 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
917 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
918 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
919 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
922 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
923 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
924 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
925 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
927 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
928 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
930 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
931 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
933 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
934 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
936 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
939 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
940 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
941 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
942 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
944 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
945 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
946 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
947 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
950 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
951 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
952 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
953 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
954 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
959 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
963 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
965 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
966 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
967 self.temporary_channel_id
970 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
974 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
975 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
976 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
980 /// Gets the channel's type
981 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
985 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
987 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
988 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
989 self.short_channel_id
992 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
993 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
994 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
997 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
998 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
999 self.outbound_scid_alias
1002 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1003 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1004 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1005 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1006 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1007 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1010 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1011 /// get_funding_created.
1012 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1013 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1016 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1017 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1018 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1021 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1022 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1023 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1024 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1028 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1031 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1032 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1035 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1036 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1039 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1040 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1041 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1044 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1045 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1049 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1050 self.counterparty_node_id
1053 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1054 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1055 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1058 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1059 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1060 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1063 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1064 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1066 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1067 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1068 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1069 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1071 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1075 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1076 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1077 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1080 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1081 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1082 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1085 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1086 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1087 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1089 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1090 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1095 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1096 self.channel_value_satoshis
1099 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1100 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1103 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1104 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1107 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1108 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1109 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1111 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1112 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1113 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1114 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1115 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1117 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1121 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1122 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1123 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1126 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1127 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1128 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1131 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1132 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1133 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1136 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1137 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1138 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1141 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1142 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1143 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1146 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1147 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1148 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1151 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1152 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1153 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1154 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1155 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1158 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1160 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1161 self.prev_config = None;
1165 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1166 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1170 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1171 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1172 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1173 let did_channel_update =
1174 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1175 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1176 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1177 if did_channel_update {
1178 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1179 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1180 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1181 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1183 self.config.options = *config;
1187 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1188 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1189 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1192 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1193 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1194 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1195 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1196 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1198 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1199 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1200 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1201 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1202 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1203 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1204 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1206 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1207 where L::Target: Logger
1209 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1210 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1211 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1213 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1214 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1215 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1216 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1218 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1219 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1220 if match update_state {
1221 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1222 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1223 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1224 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1225 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1227 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1231 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1232 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1233 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1234 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1236 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1237 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1238 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1240 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1241 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1242 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1243 transaction_output_index: None
1248 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1249 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1250 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1251 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1252 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1255 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1257 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1258 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1259 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1261 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1262 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1265 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1266 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1269 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1271 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1272 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1273 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1275 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1276 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1282 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1283 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1284 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1285 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1286 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1287 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1288 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1292 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1293 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1295 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1297 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1298 if generated_by_local {
1299 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1300 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1309 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1311 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1312 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1313 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1314 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1315 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1316 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1317 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1320 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1321 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1322 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1323 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1327 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1328 preimages.push(preimage);
1332 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1333 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1335 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1337 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1338 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1340 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1341 if !generated_by_local {
1342 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1350 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1351 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1352 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1353 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1354 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1355 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1356 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1357 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1361 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1362 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1363 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1364 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1366 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1368 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1369 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1370 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1371 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1374 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1375 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1376 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1377 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1379 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1382 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1383 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1384 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1385 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1387 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1390 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1391 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1396 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1397 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1402 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1404 let channel_parameters =
1405 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1406 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1407 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1414 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1417 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1418 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1419 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1420 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1422 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1423 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1424 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1432 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1433 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1439 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1440 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1441 /// our counterparty!)
1442 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1443 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1444 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1445 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1446 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1447 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1448 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1450 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1454 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1455 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1456 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1457 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1458 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1459 //may see payments to it!
1460 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1461 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1462 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1464 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1467 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1468 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1469 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1470 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1471 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1474 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1475 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1478 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1482 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1483 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1484 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1485 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1486 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1487 // which are near the dust limit.
1488 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1489 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1490 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1491 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1492 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1494 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1495 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1497 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1500 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1501 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1502 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1505 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1506 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1508 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1509 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1510 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1511 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1512 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1513 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1514 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1517 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1520 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1521 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1522 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1524 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1525 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1526 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1527 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1529 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1531 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1532 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1538 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1539 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1541 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1542 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1543 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1544 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1545 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1546 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1547 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1550 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1553 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1554 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1555 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1557 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1558 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1559 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1560 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1561 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1562 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1564 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1565 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1569 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1570 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1571 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1572 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1573 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1574 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1575 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1577 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1578 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1580 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1587 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1588 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1589 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1590 /// corner case properly.
1591 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1592 -> AvailableBalances
1593 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1595 let context = &self;
1596 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1597 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1598 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1600 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1601 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1603 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1605 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1607 if context.is_outbound() {
1608 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1609 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1611 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1612 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1614 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1615 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1616 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1617 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1620 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1621 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1622 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1623 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1625 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1626 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1627 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1628 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1629 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1630 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1631 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1632 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1633 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1634 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1636 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1639 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1640 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1641 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1642 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1643 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1646 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1647 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1649 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1650 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1651 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1653 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1654 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1655 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1656 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1660 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1662 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1663 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1664 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1665 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1666 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1667 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1668 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1670 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1671 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1673 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1674 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1675 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1677 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1678 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1679 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1680 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1681 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1684 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1685 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1686 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1687 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1688 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1689 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1692 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1693 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1694 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1696 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1700 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1701 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1703 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1704 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1708 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1709 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1710 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1711 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1713 outbound_capacity_msat,
1714 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1715 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1719 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1720 let context = &self;
1721 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1724 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1725 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1727 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1728 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1730 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1731 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1733 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1734 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1735 let context = &self;
1736 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1738 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1741 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1742 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1744 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1745 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1747 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1748 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1750 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1751 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1755 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1756 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1762 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1763 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1764 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1767 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1768 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1769 included_htlcs += 1;
1772 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1773 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1777 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1778 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1779 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1780 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1781 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1782 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1787 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1789 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1790 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1795 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1796 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1800 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1801 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1805 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1806 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1808 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1809 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1810 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1812 total_pending_htlcs,
1813 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1814 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1815 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1817 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1819 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1821 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1823 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1828 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1829 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1831 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1832 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1834 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1835 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1837 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1838 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1839 let context = &self;
1840 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1842 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1845 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1846 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1848 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1849 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1851 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1852 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1854 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1855 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1859 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1860 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1866 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1867 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1868 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1869 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1870 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1871 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1874 included_htlcs += 1;
1877 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1878 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1881 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1882 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1884 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1885 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1886 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1891 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1892 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1893 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1896 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1897 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1899 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1900 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1902 total_pending_htlcs,
1903 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1904 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1905 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1907 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1908 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1909 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1911 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1913 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1918 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1919 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1920 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1921 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1927 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1928 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1929 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1930 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1931 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1932 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1933 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1934 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1935 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1936 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1937 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1939 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1940 // return them to fail the payment.
1941 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1942 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1943 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1945 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1946 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1951 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1952 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1953 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1954 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1955 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1956 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1957 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1958 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1959 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1960 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1961 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1962 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1963 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1968 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1969 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1970 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1974 // Internal utility functions for channels
1976 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1977 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1978 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1980 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1982 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1983 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1984 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1986 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1989 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1991 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1994 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1995 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1996 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1998 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2000 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2001 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2002 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2003 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2004 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2007 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2008 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2009 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2010 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2011 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2012 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2013 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2016 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2017 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2019 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2020 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2023 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2024 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2025 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2026 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2027 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2028 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2031 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2032 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2033 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2036 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2037 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2038 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2039 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2042 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2043 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2045 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2046 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2047 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2051 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2052 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2053 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2054 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2055 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2057 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2058 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2059 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2060 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2061 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2062 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2063 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2064 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2065 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2066 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2071 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2072 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2073 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2074 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2075 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2076 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2078 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2080 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2081 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2082 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2083 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2084 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2085 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2086 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2087 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2089 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2090 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2100 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2101 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2102 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2103 // outside of those situations will fail.
2104 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2108 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2113 1 + // script length (0)
2117 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2118 2 + // witness marker and flag
2119 1 + // witness element count
2120 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2121 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2122 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2123 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2124 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2125 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2127 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2128 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2129 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2135 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2136 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2137 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2138 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2140 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2141 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2142 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2144 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2145 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2146 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2147 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2148 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2149 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2152 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2153 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2156 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2157 value_to_holder = 0;
2160 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2161 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2162 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2163 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2165 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2166 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2169 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2170 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2173 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2176 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2177 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2179 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2181 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2182 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2183 where L::Target: Logger {
2184 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2185 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2186 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2187 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2188 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2189 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2190 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2191 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2195 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2196 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2197 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2198 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2200 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2201 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2203 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2205 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2207 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2208 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2209 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2211 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2212 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2213 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2214 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2215 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2217 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2218 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2219 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2221 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2222 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2224 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2227 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2228 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2232 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2236 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2238 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2239 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2240 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2241 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2244 // Now update local state:
2246 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2247 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2248 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2249 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2250 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2251 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2252 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2256 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2257 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2258 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2259 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2260 // do not not get into this branch.
2261 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2262 match pending_update {
2263 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2264 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2265 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2266 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2267 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2268 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2269 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2273 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2274 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2275 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2276 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2277 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2278 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2284 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2285 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2286 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2288 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2289 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2290 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2292 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2293 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2296 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2297 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2299 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2300 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2302 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2303 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2306 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2309 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2310 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2311 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2312 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2317 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2318 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2319 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2320 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2321 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2322 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2323 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2324 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2325 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2326 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2327 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2328 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2329 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2330 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2331 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2333 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2334 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2335 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2336 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2337 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2340 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2341 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2342 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2348 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2349 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2351 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2355 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2356 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2357 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2358 /// before we fail backwards.
2360 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2361 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2362 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2363 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2364 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2365 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2366 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2369 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2370 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2371 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2372 /// before we fail backwards.
2374 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2375 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2376 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2377 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2378 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2379 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2380 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2382 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2384 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2385 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2386 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2388 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2389 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2390 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2392 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2393 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2394 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2396 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2401 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2402 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2408 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2409 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2410 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2411 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2412 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2416 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2417 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2418 force_holding_cell = true;
2421 // Now update local state:
2422 if force_holding_cell {
2423 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2424 match pending_update {
2425 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2426 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2427 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2428 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2432 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2433 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2434 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2435 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2441 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2442 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2443 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2449 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2451 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2452 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2455 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2456 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2457 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2462 // Message handlers:
2464 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2465 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2466 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2467 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2468 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2470 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2473 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2476 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2479 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2480 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2481 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2482 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2485 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2487 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2488 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2489 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2490 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2492 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2493 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2495 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2496 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2498 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2499 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2500 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2501 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2502 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2503 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2507 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2508 initial_commitment_tx,
2511 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2512 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2515 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2516 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2519 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2520 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2521 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2522 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2523 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2524 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2525 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2526 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2527 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2528 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2529 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2530 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2532 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2534 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2536 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2537 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2538 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2539 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2541 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2543 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2544 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2548 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2549 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2551 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2552 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2553 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2554 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2556 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2559 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2560 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2561 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2564 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2565 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2566 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2567 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2568 // when routing outbound payments.
2569 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2573 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2575 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2576 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2577 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2578 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2579 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2580 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2581 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2582 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2583 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2585 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2586 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2587 let expected_point =
2588 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2589 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2591 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2592 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2593 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2594 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2595 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2596 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2598 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2599 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2600 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2601 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2602 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2604 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2612 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2613 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2615 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2617 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2620 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2621 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2622 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2623 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2624 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2625 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2627 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2628 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2629 if local_sent_shutdown {
2630 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2632 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2633 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2634 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2635 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2637 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2638 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2640 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2643 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2646 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2647 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2650 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2651 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2652 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2653 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2655 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2658 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2659 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2660 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2661 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2662 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2663 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2664 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2665 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2666 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2667 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2668 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2670 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2671 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2672 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2673 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2674 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2675 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2679 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2680 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2683 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2684 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2685 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2687 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2688 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2689 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2690 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2691 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2692 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2693 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2697 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2698 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2699 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2700 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2701 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2702 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2703 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2707 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2708 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2709 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2710 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2711 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2715 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2716 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2717 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2718 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2719 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2721 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2725 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2726 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2729 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2730 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2731 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2732 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2733 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2734 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2735 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2736 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2737 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2738 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2739 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2740 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2741 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2742 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2743 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2744 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2747 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2748 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2749 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2750 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2754 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2757 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2761 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2762 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2763 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2767 // Now update local state:
2768 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2769 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2770 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2771 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2772 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2773 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2774 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2779 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2781 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2782 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2783 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2784 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2785 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2786 None => fail_reason.into(),
2787 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2788 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2789 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2790 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2792 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2796 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2798 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2799 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2801 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2802 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2807 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2810 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2811 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2814 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2818 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2821 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2822 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2825 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2829 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2833 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2834 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2837 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2841 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2845 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2846 where L::Target: Logger
2848 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2851 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2854 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2858 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2860 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2862 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2863 let commitment_txid = {
2864 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2865 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2866 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2868 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2869 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2870 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2871 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2872 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2877 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2879 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2880 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2881 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2882 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2885 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2886 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2887 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2891 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2893 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2894 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2895 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2896 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2897 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2898 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2899 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2900 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2901 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2902 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2903 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2909 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2910 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2913 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2914 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2915 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2916 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2917 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2918 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2919 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2920 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2921 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2922 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2923 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2924 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2925 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2928 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2929 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2930 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2931 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2932 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2933 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2934 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2936 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2937 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2938 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2939 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2940 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2941 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2942 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2945 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2946 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2949 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2951 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2952 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2953 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2956 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2959 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2960 commitment_stats.tx,
2962 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2963 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2964 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2967 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2968 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2970 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2971 let mut need_commitment = false;
2972 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2973 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2974 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2975 need_commitment = true;
2979 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2980 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2981 Some(forward_info.clone())
2983 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2984 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2985 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2986 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2987 need_commitment = true;
2990 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2991 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2992 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2993 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2994 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2995 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2996 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2997 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2998 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2999 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3000 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3001 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3002 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3003 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3005 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3007 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3008 need_commitment = true;
3012 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3013 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3014 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3015 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3016 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3017 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3019 nondust_htlc_sources,
3023 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3024 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3025 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3026 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3028 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3029 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3030 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3031 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3032 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3033 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3034 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3035 // includes the right HTLCs.
3036 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3037 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3038 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3039 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3040 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3041 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3043 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3044 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3045 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3048 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3049 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3050 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3051 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3052 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3053 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3054 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3055 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3056 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3060 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3061 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3062 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3063 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3066 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3067 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3068 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3069 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3070 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3071 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3072 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3074 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3075 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3076 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3077 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3080 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3081 /// for our counterparty.
3082 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3083 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3084 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3085 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3087 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3088 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3089 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3090 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3092 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3093 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3094 updates: Vec::new(),
3097 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3098 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3099 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3100 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3101 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3102 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3103 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3104 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3105 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3106 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3107 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3108 // to rebalance channels.
3109 match &htlc_update {
3110 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3111 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3112 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3114 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3115 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3117 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3120 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3121 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3122 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3123 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3124 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3125 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3126 // into the holding cell without ever being
3127 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3128 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3129 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3132 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3138 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3139 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3140 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3141 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3142 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3143 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3144 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3145 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3146 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3147 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3148 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3149 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3151 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3152 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3153 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3154 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3155 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3156 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3157 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3158 // for a full revocation before failing.
3159 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3160 update_fail_count += 1;
3163 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3165 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3172 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3173 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3175 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3176 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3181 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3182 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3183 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3184 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3185 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3187 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3188 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3189 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3191 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3192 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3198 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3199 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3200 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3201 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3202 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3203 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3204 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3205 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3206 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3208 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3211 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3214 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3218 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3220 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3221 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3226 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3227 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3228 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3229 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3230 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3231 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3232 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3233 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3239 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3240 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3243 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3244 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3246 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3248 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3249 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3250 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3251 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3252 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3253 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3254 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3255 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3259 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3260 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3261 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3262 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3263 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3264 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3265 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3266 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3267 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3269 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3270 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3273 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3274 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3275 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3276 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3277 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3278 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3279 let mut require_commitment = false;
3280 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3283 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3284 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3285 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3287 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3288 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3289 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3290 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3291 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3292 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3297 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3298 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3299 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3300 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3301 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3303 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3304 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3305 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3310 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3311 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3313 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3317 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3318 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3320 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3321 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3322 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3323 require_commitment = true;
3324 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3325 match forward_info {
3326 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3327 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3328 require_commitment = true;
3330 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3331 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3332 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3334 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3335 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3336 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3340 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3341 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3342 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3343 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3349 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3350 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3351 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3352 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3354 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3355 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3356 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3357 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3358 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3359 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3360 require_commitment = true;
3364 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3366 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3367 match update_state {
3368 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3369 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3370 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3371 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3372 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3374 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3375 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3376 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3377 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3378 require_commitment = true;
3379 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3380 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3385 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3386 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3387 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3388 if require_commitment {
3389 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3390 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3391 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3392 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3393 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3394 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3395 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3396 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3397 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3399 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3400 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3401 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3402 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3403 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3406 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3407 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3408 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3409 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3410 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3411 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3413 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3414 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3416 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3417 if require_commitment {
3418 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3420 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3421 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3422 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3423 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3425 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3426 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3427 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3428 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3430 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3431 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3432 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3438 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3439 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3440 /// commitment update.
3441 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3442 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3443 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3445 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3446 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3449 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3450 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3451 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3452 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3454 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3455 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3456 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3457 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3458 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3459 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3460 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3462 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3463 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3465 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3466 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3468 if !self.context.is_live() {
3469 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3472 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3473 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3474 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3475 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3476 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3477 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3478 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3479 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3480 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3481 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3485 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3486 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3487 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3488 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3489 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3490 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3493 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3494 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3498 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3499 force_holding_cell = true;
3502 if force_holding_cell {
3503 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3507 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3508 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3510 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3511 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3516 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3517 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3519 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3521 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3522 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3523 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3524 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3528 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3529 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3530 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3534 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3535 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3538 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3539 // will be retransmitted.
3540 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3541 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3542 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3544 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3545 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3547 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3548 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3549 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3550 // this HTLC accordingly
3551 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3554 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3555 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3556 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3557 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3560 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3561 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3562 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3563 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3564 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3565 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3570 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3572 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3573 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3574 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3575 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3579 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3580 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3581 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3582 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3583 // the update upon reconnection.
3584 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3588 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3590 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3591 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3594 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3595 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3596 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3597 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3598 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3599 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3600 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3602 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3603 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3604 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3605 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3606 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3607 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3608 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3610 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3611 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3612 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3613 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3614 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3615 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3616 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3619 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3620 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3621 /// to the remote side.
3622 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3623 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3624 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3625 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3628 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3630 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3631 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3633 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3634 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3635 // first received the funding_signed.
3636 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3637 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3638 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3640 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3641 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3642 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3643 funding_broadcastable = None;
3646 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3647 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3648 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3649 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3650 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3651 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3652 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3653 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3654 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3655 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3656 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3657 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3658 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3659 next_per_commitment_point,
3660 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3664 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3666 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3667 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3668 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3669 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3670 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3671 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3673 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3674 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3675 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3676 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3677 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3678 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3682 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3683 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3685 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3686 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3687 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3690 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3691 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3692 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3693 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3694 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3695 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3696 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3697 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3698 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3702 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3703 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3705 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3706 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3708 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3709 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3711 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3712 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3714 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3715 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3716 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3717 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3718 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3719 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3720 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3721 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3722 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3723 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3724 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3725 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3726 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3727 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3729 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3730 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3731 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3737 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3738 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3739 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3740 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3741 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3742 per_commitment_secret,
3743 next_per_commitment_point,
3745 next_local_nonce: None,
3749 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3750 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3751 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3752 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3753 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3755 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3756 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3757 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3758 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3759 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3760 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3761 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3762 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3763 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3764 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3769 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3770 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3772 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3773 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3774 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3775 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3776 reason: err_packet.clone()
3779 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3780 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3781 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3782 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3783 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3784 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3787 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3788 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3789 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3790 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3791 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3798 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3799 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3800 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3801 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3805 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3806 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3807 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3808 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3809 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3810 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3814 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3815 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3817 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3818 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3819 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3820 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3821 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3822 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3823 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3824 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3827 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3829 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3830 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3831 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3832 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3836 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3837 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3841 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3842 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3843 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3844 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3845 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3848 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3849 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3850 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3851 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3852 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3855 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3856 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3857 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3858 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3859 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3860 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3861 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3862 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3866 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3867 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3868 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3869 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3871 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3875 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3876 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3877 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3878 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3880 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3881 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3882 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3883 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3884 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3888 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3890 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3891 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3892 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3893 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3894 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3895 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3897 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3898 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3899 channel_ready: None,
3900 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3901 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3902 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3906 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3907 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3908 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3909 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3910 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3911 next_per_commitment_point,
3912 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3914 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3915 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3916 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3920 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3921 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3922 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3924 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3925 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3926 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3929 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3932 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3935 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3936 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3937 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3938 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3939 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3940 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3941 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3943 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3945 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3946 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3947 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3948 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3949 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3950 next_per_commitment_point,
3951 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3955 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3956 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3957 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3959 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3962 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3963 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3964 raa: required_revoke,
3965 commitment_update: None,
3966 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3968 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3969 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3970 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3972 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3975 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3976 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3977 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3978 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3979 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3980 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3983 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3984 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3985 raa: required_revoke,
3986 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3987 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3991 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3995 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3996 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3997 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3998 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4000 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4002 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4004 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4005 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4006 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4007 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4008 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4009 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4011 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4012 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4013 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4014 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4015 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4017 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4018 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4019 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4020 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4023 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4024 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4025 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4026 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4027 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4028 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4029 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4030 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4031 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4032 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4033 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4034 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4035 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4036 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4037 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4039 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4042 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4043 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4046 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4047 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4048 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4049 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4050 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4051 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4054 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4055 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4056 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4057 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4058 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4059 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4062 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4068 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4069 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4070 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4071 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4073 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4074 return Ok((None, None));
4077 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4078 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4079 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4081 return Ok((None, None));
4084 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4086 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4087 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4088 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4089 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4091 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4092 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4093 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4095 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4096 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4097 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4098 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4100 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4101 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4102 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4107 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4108 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4110 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4111 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4114 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4115 /// within our expected timeframe.
4117 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4118 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4119 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4122 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4125 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4126 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4129 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4130 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4131 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4132 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4134 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4135 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4137 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4138 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4139 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4140 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4143 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4144 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4148 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4150 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4151 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4154 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4155 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4156 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4159 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4162 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4163 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4164 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4165 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4167 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4170 assert!(send_shutdown);
4171 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4172 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4173 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4175 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4176 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4178 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4183 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4185 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4186 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4188 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4189 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4190 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4191 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4192 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4193 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4196 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4197 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4199 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4200 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4201 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4202 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4206 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4207 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4208 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4209 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4210 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4211 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4213 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4214 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4221 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4222 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4224 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4227 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4228 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4230 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4232 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4233 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4234 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4235 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4236 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4237 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4238 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4239 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4240 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4242 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4243 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4246 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4250 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4251 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4252 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4253 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4255 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4258 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4261 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4264 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4268 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4272 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4273 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4274 return Ok((None, None));
4277 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4278 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4279 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4282 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4284 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4287 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4288 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4289 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4290 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4291 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4295 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4296 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4301 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4302 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4303 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4304 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4305 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4306 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4307 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4311 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4313 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4314 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4315 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4316 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4318 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4321 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4322 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4323 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4325 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4326 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4327 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4328 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4332 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4333 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4334 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4335 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4337 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4338 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4339 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4345 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4346 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4347 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4349 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4350 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4352 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4353 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4356 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4357 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4358 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4359 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4360 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4362 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4363 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4364 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4366 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4367 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4370 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4371 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4372 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4373 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4374 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4375 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4376 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4377 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4379 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4382 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4383 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4384 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4385 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4387 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4391 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4392 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4393 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4394 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4396 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4402 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4403 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4404 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4405 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4406 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4407 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4408 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4410 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4411 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4414 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4416 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4417 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4423 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4424 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4425 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4426 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4427 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4428 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4429 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4431 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4432 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4439 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4440 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4443 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4444 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4447 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4448 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4452 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4453 &self.context.holder_signer
4457 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4459 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4460 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4461 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4462 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4463 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4464 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4466 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4468 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4476 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4477 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4481 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4482 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4483 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4484 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4487 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4488 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4489 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4490 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4493 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4494 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4495 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4496 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4497 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4498 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4501 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4502 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4503 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4504 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4505 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4506 if !release_monitor {
4507 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4516 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4517 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4520 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4521 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4522 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4524 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4525 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4526 if self.context.channel_state &
4527 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4528 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4529 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4530 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4531 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4534 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4535 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4536 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4537 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4538 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4539 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4541 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4542 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4543 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4545 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4546 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4547 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4548 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4549 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4550 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4556 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4557 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4558 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4561 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4562 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4563 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4566 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4567 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4568 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4571 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4572 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4573 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4574 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4575 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4576 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4581 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4582 self.context.channel_update_status
4585 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4586 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4587 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4590 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4592 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4593 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4594 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4598 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4599 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4600 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4603 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4607 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4608 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4609 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4611 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4612 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4613 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4615 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4616 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4619 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4620 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4621 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4622 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4623 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4624 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4625 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4626 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4627 self.context.channel_state);
4629 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4633 if need_commitment_update {
4634 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4635 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4636 let next_per_commitment_point =
4637 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4638 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4639 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4640 next_per_commitment_point,
4641 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4645 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4651 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4652 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4653 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4654 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4655 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4656 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4657 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4659 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4662 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4663 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4664 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4665 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4666 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4667 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4668 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4669 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4670 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4671 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4672 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4673 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4674 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4675 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4676 // channel and move on.
4677 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4678 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4680 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4681 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4682 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4684 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4685 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4686 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4687 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4688 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4689 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4690 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4694 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4695 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4696 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4697 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4698 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4702 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4703 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4704 // may have already happened for this block).
4705 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4706 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4707 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4708 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4711 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4712 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4713 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4714 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4722 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4723 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4724 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4725 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4727 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4728 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4731 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4733 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4734 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4735 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4736 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4738 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4741 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4744 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4745 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4746 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4747 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4749 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4752 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4753 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4754 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4756 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4757 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4759 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4760 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4761 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4769 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4771 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4772 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4773 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4775 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4776 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4779 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4780 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4781 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4782 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4783 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4784 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4785 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4786 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4787 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4790 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4791 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4792 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4793 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4795 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4796 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4797 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4799 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4800 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4801 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4802 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4804 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4805 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4806 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4807 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4808 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4809 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4810 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4813 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4814 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4816 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4819 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4820 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4821 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4822 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4823 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4824 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4825 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4826 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4827 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4828 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4829 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4830 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4831 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4832 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4833 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4834 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4835 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4841 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4846 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4847 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4849 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4850 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4851 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4852 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4854 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4857 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4859 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4860 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4861 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4862 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4863 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4864 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4866 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4867 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4870 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4871 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4872 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4873 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4874 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4875 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4877 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4878 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4881 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4882 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4883 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4884 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4885 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4891 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4892 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4893 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4894 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4896 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4899 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4903 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4907 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4908 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4912 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4916 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4917 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4920 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4924 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4926 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4931 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4933 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4938 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4940 None => return None,
4943 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4945 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4946 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4948 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4949 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4953 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4955 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4956 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4957 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4958 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4959 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4960 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4961 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4963 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4964 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4965 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4966 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4967 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4968 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4969 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4970 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4971 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4972 contents: announcement,
4975 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4979 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4980 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4981 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4982 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4983 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4984 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4985 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4986 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4988 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4990 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4991 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4992 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4993 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4995 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4997 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4998 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5001 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5002 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5003 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5004 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5007 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5010 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5011 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5012 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5013 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5014 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5015 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5018 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5020 Err(_) => return None,
5022 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5023 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5028 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5029 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5030 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5031 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5032 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5033 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5034 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5035 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5036 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5037 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5038 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5039 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5040 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5041 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5042 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5043 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5046 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5049 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5050 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5051 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5052 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5053 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5054 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5055 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5056 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5057 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5059 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5060 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5061 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5062 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5063 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5064 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5065 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5066 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5067 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5069 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5070 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5071 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5072 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5073 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5074 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5075 next_funding_txid: None,
5080 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5082 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5083 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5084 /// commitment update.
5086 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5087 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5088 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5089 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5090 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5091 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5092 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5095 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5096 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5097 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5099 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5100 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5105 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5106 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5108 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5110 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5111 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5113 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5114 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5115 /// regenerate them.
5117 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5118 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5120 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5121 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5122 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5123 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5124 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5125 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5126 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5128 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5129 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5131 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5132 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5133 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5136 if amount_msat == 0 {
5137 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5140 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5141 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5142 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5143 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5146 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5147 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5148 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5151 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5152 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5153 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5154 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5155 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5156 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5157 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5158 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5161 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5162 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5163 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5164 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5165 else { "to peer" });
5167 if need_holding_cell {
5168 force_holding_cell = true;
5171 // Now update local state:
5172 if force_holding_cell {
5173 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5178 onion_routing_packet,
5184 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5185 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5187 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5189 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5194 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5195 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5196 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5200 onion_routing_packet,
5203 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5208 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5209 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5210 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5211 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5213 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5214 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5215 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5217 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5218 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5222 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5223 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5224 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5225 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5226 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5227 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5228 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5231 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5232 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5233 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5234 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5235 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5236 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5239 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5241 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5242 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5243 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5245 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5246 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5249 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5250 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5251 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5252 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5253 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5254 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5255 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5256 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5259 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5263 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5264 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5265 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5266 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5268 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5270 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5271 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5272 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5273 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5274 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5275 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5276 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5277 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5278 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5279 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5280 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5286 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5289 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5290 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5291 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5292 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5293 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5294 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5296 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5297 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5298 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5299 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5302 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5303 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5307 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5308 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5310 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5312 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5313 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5314 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5315 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5317 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5318 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5319 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5320 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5321 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5322 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5326 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5327 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5331 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5332 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5335 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5336 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5338 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5339 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5340 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5341 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5342 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5343 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5344 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5345 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5347 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5348 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5349 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5352 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5353 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5354 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5360 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5361 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5364 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5365 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5366 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5367 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5373 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5374 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5376 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5377 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5378 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5379 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5380 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5381 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5382 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5383 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5384 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5387 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5388 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5389 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5391 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5392 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5395 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5396 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5398 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5399 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5400 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5403 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5404 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5405 let mut chan_closed = false;
5406 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5410 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5412 None if !chan_closed => {
5413 // use override shutdown script if provided
5414 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5415 Some(script) => script,
5417 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5418 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5419 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5420 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5424 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5425 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5427 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5433 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5434 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5435 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5436 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5438 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5440 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5442 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5443 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5444 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5445 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5446 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5447 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5450 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5451 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5453 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5454 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5455 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5458 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5459 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5460 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5461 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5462 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5464 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5465 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5472 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5473 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5475 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5478 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5479 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5480 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5482 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5483 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5487 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5491 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5492 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5493 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5494 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5497 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5498 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5499 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5500 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5501 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5502 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5503 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5504 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5505 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5507 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5508 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5509 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5510 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5512 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5513 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5515 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5516 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5518 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5519 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5520 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5522 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5523 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5525 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5526 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5527 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5528 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5529 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5532 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5533 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5535 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5536 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5538 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5540 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5542 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5543 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5544 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5545 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5548 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5549 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5551 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5552 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5553 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5554 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5558 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5559 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5560 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5564 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5565 Ok(script) => script,
5566 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5569 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5572 context: ChannelContext {
5575 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5576 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5577 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5578 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5583 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5585 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5586 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5587 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5588 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5590 channel_value_satoshis,
5592 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5595 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5598 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5599 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5602 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5603 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5604 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5605 pending_update_fee: None,
5606 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5607 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5608 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5609 update_time_counter: 1,
5611 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5613 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5614 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5615 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5616 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5617 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5618 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5620 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5621 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5622 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5623 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5625 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5626 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5627 closing_fee_limits: None,
5628 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5630 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5631 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5632 short_channel_id: None,
5633 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5635 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5636 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5638 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5639 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5640 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5641 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5642 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5643 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5644 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5645 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5646 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5648 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5650 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5651 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5652 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5653 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5654 counterparty_parameters: None,
5655 funding_outpoint: None,
5656 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5658 funding_transaction: None,
5660 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5661 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5662 counterparty_node_id,
5664 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5666 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5668 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5669 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5671 announcement_sigs: None,
5673 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5674 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5675 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5676 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5678 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5679 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5681 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5682 outbound_scid_alias,
5684 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5685 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5688 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5693 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5695 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5699 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5700 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5701 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5702 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5703 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5704 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5707 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5708 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5709 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5710 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5711 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5712 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5713 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5714 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5715 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5716 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5717 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5719 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5720 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5722 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5723 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5724 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5725 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5728 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5729 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5731 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5734 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5735 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5736 return Err((self, e));
5740 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5742 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5744 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5745 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5746 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5748 let channel = Channel {
5749 context: self.context,
5752 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5753 temporary_channel_id,
5754 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5755 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5758 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5760 next_local_nonce: None,
5764 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5765 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5766 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5767 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5768 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5769 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5770 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5771 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5772 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5773 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5776 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5777 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5778 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5779 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5780 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5781 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5787 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5788 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5789 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5790 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5791 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5792 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5794 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5796 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5797 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5798 // We've exhausted our options
5801 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5802 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5805 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5806 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5807 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5808 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5810 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5811 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5812 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5813 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5814 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5815 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5817 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5819 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5820 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5823 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5824 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5825 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5827 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5828 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5831 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5832 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5835 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5836 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5840 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5841 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5842 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5843 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5844 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5845 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5846 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5847 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5848 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5849 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5850 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5851 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5852 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5853 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5854 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5855 first_per_commitment_point,
5856 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5857 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5858 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5859 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5861 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5866 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5867 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5869 // Check sanity of message fields:
5870 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5871 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5873 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5874 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5876 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5877 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5879 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5880 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5882 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5885 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5886 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5887 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5889 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5890 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5891 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5893 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5894 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5897 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5900 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5904 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5905 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5906 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5908 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5909 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5911 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5912 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5914 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5915 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5917 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5918 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5920 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5921 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5923 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5924 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5927 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5928 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5931 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5932 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5934 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5935 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5938 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5939 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5942 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5943 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5944 &Some(ref script) => {
5945 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5946 if script.len() == 0 {
5949 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5950 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5952 Some(script.clone())
5955 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5957 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5962 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5963 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5964 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5965 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5966 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5968 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5969 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5971 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5974 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5975 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5976 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5977 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5978 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5979 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5982 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5983 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5984 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5987 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5988 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5990 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5991 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5997 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5998 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5999 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
6000 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6003 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
6004 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6005 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6006 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6007 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6008 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6009 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6010 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6011 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
6012 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6013 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6014 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6017 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6019 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6020 // support this channel type.
6021 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6022 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6023 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6026 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6027 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6028 // `static_remote_key`.
6029 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6032 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6033 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6036 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6039 channel_type.clone()
6041 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6042 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6043 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6048 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6049 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6050 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6051 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6052 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6053 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6054 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6055 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6056 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6059 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6060 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6063 // Check sanity of message fields:
6064 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6067 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6068 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6070 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6073 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6074 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6077 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6080 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6083 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6085 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6086 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6089 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6090 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6092 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6093 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6096 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6097 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6100 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6101 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6103 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6104 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6106 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6107 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6109 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6110 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6112 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6113 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6115 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6119 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6121 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6122 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6127 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6128 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6129 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6130 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6131 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6133 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6136 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6137 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6138 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6140 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6144 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6145 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6146 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6147 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6148 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6149 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6152 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6153 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6154 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6155 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6159 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6160 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6161 &Some(ref script) => {
6162 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6163 if script.len() == 0 {
6166 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6169 Some(script.clone())
6172 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6179 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6180 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6181 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6182 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6186 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6187 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6192 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6193 Ok(script) => script,
6194 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6197 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6198 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6200 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6203 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6207 context: ChannelContext {
6210 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6211 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6213 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6218 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6220 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6221 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6222 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6223 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6226 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6229 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6232 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6233 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6234 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6236 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6237 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6238 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6239 pending_update_fee: None,
6240 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6241 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6242 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6243 update_time_counter: 1,
6245 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6247 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6248 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6249 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6250 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6251 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6252 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6254 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6255 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6256 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6257 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6259 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6260 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6261 closing_fee_limits: None,
6262 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6264 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6265 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6266 short_channel_id: None,
6267 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6269 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6270 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6271 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6272 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6273 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6274 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6275 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6276 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6277 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6278 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6279 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6280 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6283 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6285 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6286 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6287 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6288 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6289 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6290 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6291 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6293 funding_outpoint: None,
6294 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6296 funding_transaction: None,
6298 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6299 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6300 counterparty_node_id,
6302 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6304 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6306 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6307 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6309 announcement_sigs: None,
6311 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6312 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6313 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6314 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6316 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6317 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6319 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6320 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6322 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6323 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6325 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6326 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6331 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6333 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6339 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6340 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6342 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6343 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6344 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6345 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6347 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6348 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6350 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6351 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6354 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6357 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6358 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6359 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6361 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6362 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6363 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6364 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6366 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6367 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6368 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6369 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6370 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6371 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6372 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6373 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6374 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6375 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6376 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6377 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6378 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6379 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6380 first_per_commitment_point,
6381 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6382 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6383 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6385 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6387 next_local_nonce: None,
6391 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6392 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6394 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6396 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6397 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6400 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6401 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6403 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6404 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6406 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6407 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6408 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6409 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6410 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6411 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6412 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6413 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6414 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6417 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6418 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6420 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6421 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6422 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6423 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6425 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6426 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6428 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6429 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6432 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6433 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6434 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6436 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6439 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6440 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6442 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6443 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6444 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6446 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6448 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6449 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6450 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6451 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6454 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6455 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6456 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6457 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6458 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6460 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6462 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6463 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6464 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6467 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6468 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6469 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6473 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6474 initial_commitment_tx,
6477 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6478 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6481 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6482 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6485 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6487 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6488 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6489 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6490 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6491 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6492 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6493 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6494 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6495 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6496 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6497 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6499 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6501 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6503 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6504 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6505 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6506 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6508 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6510 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6511 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6512 let mut channel = Channel {
6513 context: self.context,
6515 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6516 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6517 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6519 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6523 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6524 }, channel_monitor))
6528 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6529 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6531 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6537 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6538 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6539 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6540 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6541 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6543 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6544 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6545 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6546 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6552 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6553 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6554 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6555 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6556 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6557 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6562 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6563 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6564 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6565 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6567 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6568 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6569 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6570 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6575 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6576 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6577 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6578 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6579 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6580 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6585 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6586 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6587 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6590 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6592 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6593 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6594 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6595 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6596 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6598 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6599 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6600 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6601 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6603 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6604 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6605 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6607 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6609 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6610 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6611 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6612 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6613 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6614 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6616 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6617 // deserialized from that format.
6618 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6619 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6620 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6622 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6624 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6625 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6626 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6628 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6629 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6630 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6631 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6634 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6635 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6636 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6639 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6640 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6641 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6642 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6644 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6645 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6647 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6649 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6651 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6653 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6656 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6658 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6663 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6664 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6666 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6667 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6668 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6669 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6670 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6671 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6672 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6674 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6676 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6678 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6681 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6682 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6683 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6686 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6688 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6689 preimages.push(preimage);
6691 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6692 reason.write(writer)?;
6694 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6696 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6697 preimages.push(preimage);
6699 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6700 reason.write(writer)?;
6703 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6704 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6705 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6707 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6708 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6709 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6713 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6714 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6715 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6717 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6718 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6722 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6723 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6724 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6725 source.write(writer)?;
6726 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6728 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6729 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6730 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6732 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6733 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6735 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6737 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6738 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6740 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6742 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6743 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6748 match self.context.resend_order {
6749 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6750 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6753 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6754 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6755 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6757 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6758 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6759 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6760 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6763 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6764 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6765 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6766 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6767 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6770 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6771 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6772 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6773 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6775 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6776 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6777 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6779 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6781 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6782 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6783 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6784 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6786 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6787 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6788 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6789 // consider the stale state on reload.
6792 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6793 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6794 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6796 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6797 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6798 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6800 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6801 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6803 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6804 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6805 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6807 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6808 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6810 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6813 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6814 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6815 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6817 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6820 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6821 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6823 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6824 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6825 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6827 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6829 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6831 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6833 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6834 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6835 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6836 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6837 htlc.write(writer)?;
6840 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6841 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6842 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6844 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6845 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6847 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6848 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6849 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6850 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6851 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6852 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6853 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6855 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6856 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6857 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6858 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6859 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6861 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6862 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6864 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6865 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6866 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6867 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6869 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6871 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6872 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6873 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6874 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6875 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6876 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6877 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6879 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6880 (2, chan_type, option),
6881 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6882 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6883 (5, self.context.config, required),
6884 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6885 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6886 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6887 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6888 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6889 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6890 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6891 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6892 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6893 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6894 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6895 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6896 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6897 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6898 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6899 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6900 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6901 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6908 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6909 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6911 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6912 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6914 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6915 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6916 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6918 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6919 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6920 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6921 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6923 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6925 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6926 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6927 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6928 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6929 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6931 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6932 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6935 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6939 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6941 let mut keys_data = None;
6943 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6944 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6945 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6946 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6947 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6948 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6949 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6950 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6951 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6952 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6956 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6957 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6958 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6961 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6963 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6964 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6965 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6967 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6970 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6971 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6972 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6973 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6974 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6975 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6976 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6977 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6978 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6979 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6980 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6981 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6986 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6987 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6988 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6989 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6990 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6991 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6992 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6993 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6994 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6995 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6996 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6997 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6999 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7000 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7003 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7004 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7007 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7010 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7012 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7016 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7017 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7018 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7019 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7020 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7021 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7022 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7023 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7024 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7025 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7026 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7028 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7029 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7030 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7032 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7033 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7034 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7036 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7040 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7041 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7042 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7043 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7046 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7048 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7051 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7052 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7053 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7056 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7057 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7058 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7059 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7062 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7064 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7066 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7068 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7069 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7072 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7073 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7074 // consider the stale state on reload.
7075 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7078 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7079 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7080 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7082 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7085 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7086 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7087 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7089 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7090 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7091 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7092 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7094 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7095 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7097 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7098 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7100 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7102 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7104 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7106 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7107 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7109 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7110 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7113 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7115 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7116 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7117 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7118 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7120 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7123 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7124 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7126 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7128 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7129 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7131 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7132 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7136 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7137 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7138 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7140 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7141 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7142 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7146 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7147 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7148 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7150 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7156 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7157 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7158 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7159 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7160 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7161 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7162 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7163 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7164 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7165 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7167 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7168 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7169 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7170 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7171 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7172 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7173 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7175 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7176 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7177 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7178 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7180 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7182 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7183 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7185 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7186 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7187 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7188 (2, channel_type, option),
7189 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7190 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7191 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7192 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7193 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7194 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7195 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7196 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7197 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7198 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7199 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7200 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7201 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7202 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7203 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7204 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7205 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7206 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7207 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7208 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7209 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7212 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7213 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7214 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7215 // required channel parameters.
7216 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7217 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7218 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7220 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7222 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7223 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7224 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7225 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7228 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7229 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7230 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7232 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7233 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7235 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7236 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7241 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7242 if iter.next().is_some() {
7243 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7247 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7248 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7249 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7250 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7251 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7254 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7255 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7256 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7258 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7259 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7261 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7262 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7263 // separate u64 values.
7264 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7266 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7268 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7269 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7270 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7271 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7273 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7274 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7276 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7277 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7278 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7279 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7280 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7283 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7284 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7288 context: ChannelContext {
7291 config: config.unwrap(),
7295 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7296 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7297 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7300 temporary_channel_id,
7302 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7304 channel_value_satoshis,
7306 latest_monitor_update_id,
7309 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7312 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7313 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7316 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7317 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7318 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7319 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7323 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7324 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7325 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7326 monitor_pending_forwards,
7327 monitor_pending_failures,
7328 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7331 holding_cell_update_fee,
7332 next_holder_htlc_id,
7333 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7334 update_time_counter,
7337 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7338 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7339 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7340 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7342 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7343 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7344 closing_fee_limits: None,
7345 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7347 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7348 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7350 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7352 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7353 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7354 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7355 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7356 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7357 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7358 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7359 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7360 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7363 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7365 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7366 funding_transaction,
7368 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7369 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7370 counterparty_node_id,
7372 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7376 channel_update_status,
7377 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7381 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7382 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7383 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7384 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7386 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7387 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7389 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7390 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7391 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7393 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7394 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7396 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7397 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7399 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7402 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7411 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7412 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7413 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7414 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7415 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7417 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7418 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7419 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7420 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7421 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7422 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7423 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7424 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7425 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7426 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7427 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7428 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7429 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7430 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7431 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7432 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7433 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7434 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7435 use crate::util::test_utils;
7436 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7437 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7438 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7439 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7440 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7441 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7442 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7443 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7444 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7445 use crate::prelude::*;
7447 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7450 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7451 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7457 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7458 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7459 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7460 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7464 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7465 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7466 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7467 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7468 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7469 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(
7470 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7471 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7475 signer: InMemorySigner,
7478 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7479 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7482 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7483 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7485 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7486 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7489 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7493 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7495 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7496 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7497 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7498 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7499 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7502 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7503 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7504 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7505 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7509 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7510 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7511 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7515 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7516 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7517 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7518 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7520 let seed = [42; 32];
7521 let network = Network::Testnet;
7522 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7523 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7524 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7527 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7528 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7529 let config = UserConfig::default();
7530 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7531 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7532 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7534 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7535 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7539 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7540 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7542 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7543 let original_fee = 253;
7544 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7545 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7546 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7547 let seed = [42; 32];
7548 let network = Network::Testnet;
7549 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7551 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7552 let config = UserConfig::default();
7553 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7555 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7556 // same as the old fee.
7557 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7558 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7559 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7563 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7564 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7565 // dust limits are used.
7566 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7567 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7568 let seed = [42; 32];
7569 let network = Network::Testnet;
7570 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7571 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7572 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7574 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7575 // they have different dust limits.
7577 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7578 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7579 let config = UserConfig::default();
7580 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7582 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7583 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7584 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7585 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7586 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7588 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7589 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7590 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7591 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7592 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7594 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7595 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7596 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7597 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7599 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7600 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7601 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7603 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7604 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7606 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7607 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7608 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7610 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7611 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7612 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7613 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7616 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7618 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7619 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7620 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7621 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7622 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7623 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7624 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7625 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7626 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7628 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7631 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7632 // the dust limit check.
7633 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7634 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7635 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7636 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7638 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7639 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7640 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7641 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7642 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7643 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7644 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7648 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7649 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7650 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7651 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7652 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7653 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7654 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7655 let seed = [42; 32];
7656 let network = Network::Testnet;
7657 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7659 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7660 let config = UserConfig::default();
7661 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7663 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7664 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7666 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7667 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7668 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7669 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7670 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7671 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7673 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7674 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7675 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7676 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7677 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7679 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7681 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7682 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7683 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7684 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7685 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7687 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7688 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7689 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7690 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7691 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7695 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7696 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7697 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7698 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7699 let seed = [42; 32];
7700 let network = Network::Testnet;
7701 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7702 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7703 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7705 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7707 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7708 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7709 let config = UserConfig::default();
7710 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7712 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7713 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7714 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7715 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7717 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7718 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7719 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7721 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7722 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7723 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7724 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7726 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7727 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7728 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7730 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7731 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7733 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7734 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7735 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7736 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7737 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7738 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7739 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7741 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7743 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7744 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7745 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7746 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7747 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7751 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7752 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7753 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7754 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7755 let seed = [42; 32];
7756 let network = Network::Testnet;
7757 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7758 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7759 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7761 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7762 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7763 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7764 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7765 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7766 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7767 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7768 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7770 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7771 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7772 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7773 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7774 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7775 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7777 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7778 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7779 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7780 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7782 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7784 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7785 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7786 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7787 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7788 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7789 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7791 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7792 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7793 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7794 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7796 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7797 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7798 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7799 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7800 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7802 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7803 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7805 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7806 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7807 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7809 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7810 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7811 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7812 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7813 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7815 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7816 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7818 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7819 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7820 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7824 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7826 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7827 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7828 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7830 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7831 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7832 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7833 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7835 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7836 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7837 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7839 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7841 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7842 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7845 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7846 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7847 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7848 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7849 let seed = [42; 32];
7850 let network = Network::Testnet;
7851 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7852 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7853 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7856 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7857 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7858 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7860 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7861 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7863 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7864 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7865 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7867 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7868 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7870 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7872 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7873 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7875 // Channel Negotiations failed
7876 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7877 assert!(result.is_err());
7882 fn channel_update() {
7883 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7884 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7885 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7886 let seed = [42; 32];
7887 let network = Network::Testnet;
7888 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7889 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7890 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7892 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7893 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7894 let config = UserConfig::default();
7895 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7897 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7898 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7899 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7900 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7901 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7903 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7904 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7905 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7906 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7907 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7909 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7910 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7911 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7912 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7914 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7915 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7916 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7918 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7919 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7921 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7922 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7923 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7925 short_channel_id: 0,
7928 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7929 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7930 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7932 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7933 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7935 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7937 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7939 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7940 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7941 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7942 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7944 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7945 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7946 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7948 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7952 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7954 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7955 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7956 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7957 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7958 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7959 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7960 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7961 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7962 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7963 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7964 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7965 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7966 use crate::sync::Arc;
7968 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7969 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7970 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7971 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7973 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7975 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7976 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7977 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7978 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7979 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7981 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7982 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7988 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7989 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7990 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7992 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7993 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7994 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7995 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7996 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7997 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7999 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8001 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8002 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8003 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8004 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8005 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8006 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8008 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8009 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8010 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8011 selected_contest_delay: 144
8013 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8014 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8016 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8017 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8019 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8020 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8022 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8023 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8025 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8026 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8027 // build_commitment_transaction.
8028 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8029 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8030 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8031 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8032 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8034 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8035 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8036 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8037 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8041 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8042 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8043 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8044 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8048 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8049 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8050 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8052 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8053 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8055 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8056 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8058 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8060 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8061 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8062 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8063 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8064 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8065 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8066 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8068 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8069 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8070 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8071 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8073 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8074 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8075 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8077 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8079 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8080 commitment_tx.clone(),
8081 counterparty_signature,
8082 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8083 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8084 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8086 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8087 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8089 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8090 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8091 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8093 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8094 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8097 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8098 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8100 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8101 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8102 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8103 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8104 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8105 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8106 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8107 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8109 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8112 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8113 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8114 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8118 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8121 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8122 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8123 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8125 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8126 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8127 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8128 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8129 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8130 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8131 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8132 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8134 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8138 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8139 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8140 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8141 "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", {});
8143 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8144 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8146 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8147 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8148 "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", {});
8150 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8151 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8152 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8153 "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", {});
8155 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8156 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8158 amount_msat: 1000000,
8160 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8161 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8163 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8166 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8167 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8169 amount_msat: 2000000,
8171 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8172 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8174 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8177 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8178 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8180 amount_msat: 2000000,
8182 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8183 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8184 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8185 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8187 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8190 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8191 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8193 amount_msat: 3000000,
8195 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8196 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8197 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8198 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8200 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8203 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8204 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8206 amount_msat: 4000000,
8208 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8209 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8211 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8215 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8216 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8217 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8219 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8220 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8221 "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", {
8224 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8225 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8226 "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" },
8229 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8230 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8231 "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" },
8234 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8235 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8236 "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" },
8239 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8240 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8241 "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" },
8244 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8245 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8246 "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" }
8249 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8250 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8251 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8253 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8254 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8255 "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", {
8258 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8259 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8260 "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" },
8263 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8264 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8265 "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" },
8268 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8269 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8270 "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" },
8273 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8274 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8275 "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" },
8278 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8279 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8280 "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" }
8283 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8284 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8285 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8287 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8288 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8289 "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", {
8292 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8293 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8294 "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" },
8297 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8298 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8299 "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" },
8302 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8303 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8304 "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" },
8307 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8308 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8309 "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" }
8312 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8313 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8314 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8315 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8317 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8318 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8319 "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", {
8322 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8323 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8324 "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" },
8327 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8328 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8329 "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" },
8332 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8333 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8334 "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" },
8337 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8338 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8339 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8342 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8343 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8344 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8345 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8347 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8348 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8349 "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", {
8352 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8353 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8354 "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" },
8357 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8358 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8359 "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" },
8362 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8363 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8364 "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" },
8367 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8368 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8369 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8372 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8373 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8374 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8376 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8377 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8378 "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", {
8381 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8382 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8383 "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" },
8386 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8387 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8388 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8391 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8392 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8393 "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" }
8396 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8397 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8398 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8400 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8401 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8402 "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", {
8405 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8406 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8407 "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" },
8410 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8411 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8412 "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" },
8415 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8416 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8417 "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" }
8420 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8421 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8422 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8424 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8425 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8426 "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", {
8429 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8430 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8431 "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" },
8434 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8435 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8436 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8439 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8440 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8441 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8442 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8443 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8444 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8446 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8447 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8448 "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", {
8451 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8452 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8453 "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" },
8456 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8457 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8458 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8461 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8462 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8463 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8464 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8465 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8467 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8468 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8469 "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", {
8472 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8473 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8474 "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" },
8477 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8478 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8479 "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" }
8482 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8483 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8484 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8486 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8487 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8488 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8491 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8492 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8493 "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" }
8496 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8497 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8498 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8499 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8500 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8502 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8503 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8504 "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", {
8507 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8508 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8509 "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" }
8512 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8513 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8514 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8515 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8516 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8518 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8519 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8520 "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", {
8523 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8524 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8525 "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" }
8528 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8529 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8530 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8531 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8533 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8534 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8535 "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", {});
8537 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8538 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8539 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8540 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8541 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8543 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8544 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8545 "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", {});
8547 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8548 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8549 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8550 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8551 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8553 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8554 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8555 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8557 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8558 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8559 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8561 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8562 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8563 "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", {});
8565 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8566 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8567 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8568 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8569 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8571 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8572 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8573 "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", {});
8575 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8576 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8577 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8578 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8579 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8581 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8582 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8583 "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", {});
8585 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8586 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8587 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8588 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8589 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8590 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8592 amount_msat: 2000000,
8594 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8595 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8597 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8600 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8601 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8602 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8604 amount_msat: 5000001,
8606 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8607 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8608 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8609 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8611 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8614 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8615 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8617 amount_msat: 5000000,
8619 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8620 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8621 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8622 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8624 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8628 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8629 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8630 "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", {
8633 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8634 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8635 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce501473044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8637 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8638 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8639 "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" },
8641 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8642 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8643 "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" }
8646 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8647 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8648 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8649 "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", {
8652 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8653 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8654 "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" },
8656 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8657 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8658 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
8660 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8661 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8662 "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" }
8667 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8668 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8670 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8671 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8672 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8673 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8675 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8676 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8677 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8679 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8680 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8682 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8683 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8685 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8686 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8687 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8691 fn test_key_derivation() {
8692 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8693 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8695 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8696 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8698 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8699 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8701 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8702 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8704 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8705 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8707 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8708 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8710 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8711 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8713 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8714 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8718 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8719 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8720 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8721 let seed = [42; 32];
8722 let network = Network::Testnet;
8723 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8724 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8726 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8727 let config = UserConfig::default();
8728 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8729 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8731 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8732 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8734 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8735 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8736 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8737 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8738 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8739 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8740 assert!(res.is_ok());
8744 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8745 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8746 // resulting `channel_type`.
8747 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8748 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8749 let network = Network::Testnet;
8750 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8751 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8753 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8754 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8756 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8757 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8759 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8760 // need to signal it.
8761 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8762 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8763 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8766 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8768 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8769 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8770 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8772 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8773 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8774 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8777 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8778 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8779 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8780 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8781 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8784 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8785 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8789 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8790 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8791 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8792 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8793 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8794 let network = Network::Testnet;
8795 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8796 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8798 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8799 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8801 let config = UserConfig::default();
8803 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8804 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8805 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8806 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8807 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8809 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8810 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8811 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8814 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8815 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8816 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8818 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8819 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8820 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8821 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8822 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8823 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8825 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8829 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8830 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8832 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8833 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8834 let network = Network::Testnet;
8835 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8836 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8838 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8839 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8841 let config = UserConfig::default();
8843 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8844 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8845 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8846 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8847 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8848 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8849 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8850 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8852 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8853 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8854 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8855 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8856 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8857 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8860 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8861 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8863 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8864 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8865 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8866 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8868 assert!(res.is_err());
8870 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8871 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8872 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8874 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8875 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8876 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8879 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8881 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8882 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8883 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8884 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8887 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8888 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8890 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8891 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8893 assert!(res.is_err());