1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
591 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
592 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
593 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
595 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
599 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
600 (0, update, required),
601 (2, blocked, required),
604 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
605 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
606 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
608 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
609 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
610 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
611 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
613 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
617 channel_id: [u8; 32],
618 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
621 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
622 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
624 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
625 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
626 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
628 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
629 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
631 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
633 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
634 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
636 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
638 holder_signer: Signer,
639 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
640 destination_script: Script,
642 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
643 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
644 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
646 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
647 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
648 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
649 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
650 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
651 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
653 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
654 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
655 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
656 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
657 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
658 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
660 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
662 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
663 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
664 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
666 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
667 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
668 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
669 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
670 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
671 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
672 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
674 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
676 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
677 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
678 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
679 // HTLCs with similar state.
680 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
681 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
682 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
683 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
684 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
685 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
686 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
687 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
688 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
691 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
692 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
693 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
695 update_time_counter: u32,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
699 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
700 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
701 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
702 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
704 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
705 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
707 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
708 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
709 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
710 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
712 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
713 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
715 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
717 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
719 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
720 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
721 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
722 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
723 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
724 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
726 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
727 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
728 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
729 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
730 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
732 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
733 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
734 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
735 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
736 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
737 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
738 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
739 channel_creation_height: u32,
741 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
744 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
749 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
754 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
756 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
758 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
759 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
762 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
764 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
766 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
767 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
769 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
771 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
772 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
773 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
775 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
777 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
778 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
780 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
781 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
782 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
784 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
786 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
788 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
789 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
790 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
791 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
793 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
794 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
795 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
797 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
798 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
799 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
801 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
802 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
803 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
804 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
805 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
806 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
808 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
810 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
811 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
812 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
813 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
814 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
816 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
817 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
819 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
820 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
821 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
822 /// unblock the state machine.
824 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
825 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
826 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
828 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
829 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
830 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
833 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
834 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
835 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
836 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
837 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
838 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
839 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
841 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
842 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
844 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
845 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
846 // the channel's funding UTXO.
848 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
849 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
850 // associated channel mapping.
852 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
853 // to store all of them.
854 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
856 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
857 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
858 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
859 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
860 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
863 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
865 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
866 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
868 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
869 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
870 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
872 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
873 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
874 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
875 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
876 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
879 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
880 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
881 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
884 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
885 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
886 self.update_time_counter
889 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
890 self.latest_monitor_update_id
893 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
894 self.config.announced_channel
897 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
898 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
901 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
902 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
903 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
904 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
907 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
908 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
909 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
912 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
913 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
914 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
915 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
916 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
919 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
920 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
921 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
922 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
923 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
928 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
932 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
934 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
935 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
936 self.temporary_channel_id
939 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
943 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
944 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
945 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
949 /// Gets the channel's type
950 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
954 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
955 /// is_usable() returns true).
956 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
957 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
958 self.short_channel_id
961 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
962 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
963 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
966 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
967 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
968 self.outbound_scid_alias
971 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
972 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
973 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
974 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
975 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
978 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
979 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
980 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
981 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
984 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
985 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
986 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
989 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
990 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
991 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
992 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
996 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
999 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1000 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1003 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1004 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1007 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1008 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1009 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1012 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1013 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1016 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1017 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1018 self.counterparty_node_id
1021 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1022 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1023 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1026 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1027 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1028 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1031 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1032 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1034 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1035 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1036 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1037 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1039 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1043 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1044 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1045 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1049 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1050 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1053 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1054 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1055 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1057 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1058 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1063 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1064 self.channel_value_satoshis
1067 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1068 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1071 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1072 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1075 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1076 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1079 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1080 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1081 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1084 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1085 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1086 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1089 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1090 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1091 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1094 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1095 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1096 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1099 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1100 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1101 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1104 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1105 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1106 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1109 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1110 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1111 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1112 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1113 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1116 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1118 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1119 self.prev_config = None;
1123 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1124 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1128 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1129 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1130 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1131 let did_channel_update =
1132 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1133 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1134 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1135 if did_channel_update {
1136 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1137 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1138 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1139 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1141 self.config.options = *config;
1145 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1146 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1147 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1150 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1151 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1152 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1153 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1154 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1156 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1157 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1158 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1159 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1160 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1161 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1162 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1164 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1165 where L::Target: Logger
1167 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1168 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1169 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1171 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1172 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1173 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1174 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1176 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1177 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1178 if match update_state {
1179 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1180 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1181 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1182 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1183 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1185 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1189 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1190 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1191 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1192 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1194 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1195 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1196 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1198 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1199 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1200 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1201 transaction_output_index: None
1206 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1207 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1208 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1209 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1210 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1213 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1215 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1216 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1217 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1219 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1220 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1223 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1224 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1227 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1229 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1230 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1231 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1233 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1234 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1240 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1241 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1242 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1243 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1244 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1245 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1246 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1250 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1251 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1253 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1255 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1256 if generated_by_local {
1257 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1258 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1267 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1269 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1270 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1271 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1272 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1273 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1274 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1275 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1278 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1279 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1280 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1281 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1285 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1286 preimages.push(preimage);
1290 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1291 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1293 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1295 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1296 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1298 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1299 if !generated_by_local {
1300 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1308 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1309 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1310 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1311 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1312 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1313 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1314 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1315 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1317 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1320 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1321 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1322 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1324 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1326 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1327 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1328 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1329 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1332 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1333 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1334 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1335 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1337 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1340 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1341 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1342 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1343 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1345 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1348 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1349 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1354 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1355 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1360 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1362 let channel_parameters =
1363 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1364 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1365 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1368 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1373 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1376 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1377 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1378 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1379 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1381 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1382 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1383 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1391 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1392 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1398 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1399 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1400 /// our counterparty!)
1401 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1402 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1403 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1404 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1405 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1406 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1407 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1409 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1413 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1414 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1415 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1416 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1417 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1418 //may see payments to it!
1419 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1420 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1421 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1423 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1426 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1427 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1428 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1429 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1430 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1433 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1434 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1437 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1441 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1442 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1443 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1444 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1445 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1446 // which are near the dust limit.
1447 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1448 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1449 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1450 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1451 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1453 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1454 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1456 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1459 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1460 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1461 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1464 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1465 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1467 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1468 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1469 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1470 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1471 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1472 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1473 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1476 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1479 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1480 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1481 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1483 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1484 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1485 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1486 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1487 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1488 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1490 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1491 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1497 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1498 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1500 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1501 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1502 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1503 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1504 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1505 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1506 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1509 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1512 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1513 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1514 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1516 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1517 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1518 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1519 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1520 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1521 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1523 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1524 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1529 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1530 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1531 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1532 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1533 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1534 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1536 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1537 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1539 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1546 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1547 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1548 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1549 /// corner case properly.
1550 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1551 let context = &self;
1552 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1553 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1554 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1556 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1557 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1558 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1559 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1562 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1564 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1565 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1567 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1569 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1571 if context.is_outbound() {
1572 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1573 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1575 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1576 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1578 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1579 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1580 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1581 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1584 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1585 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1586 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1587 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1589 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1590 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1591 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1592 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1593 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1594 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1595 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1596 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1597 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1598 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1600 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1603 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1604 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1605 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1606 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1607 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1610 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1611 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1613 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1614 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1615 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1617 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1618 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1619 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1620 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1624 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1626 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1627 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1628 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1629 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1630 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1631 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1633 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1634 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1636 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1637 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1638 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1640 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1641 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1642 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1643 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1644 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1647 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1648 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1649 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1650 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1651 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1652 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1655 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1656 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1657 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1659 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1663 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1664 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1666 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1667 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1671 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1672 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1673 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1674 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1676 outbound_capacity_msat,
1677 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1678 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1683 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1684 let context = &self;
1685 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1688 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1689 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1691 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1692 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1694 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1695 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1697 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1698 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1699 let context = &self;
1700 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1702 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1705 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1706 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1708 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1709 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1711 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1712 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1714 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1715 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1719 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1720 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1726 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1727 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1728 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1731 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1732 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1733 included_htlcs += 1;
1736 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1737 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1741 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1742 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1743 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1744 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1745 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1746 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1751 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1753 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1754 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1759 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1760 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1764 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1765 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1766 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1769 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1770 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1772 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1773 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1774 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1776 total_pending_htlcs,
1777 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1778 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1779 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1781 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1782 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1783 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1785 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1787 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1792 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1793 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1795 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1796 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1798 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1799 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1801 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1802 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1803 let context = &self;
1804 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1806 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1809 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1810 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1812 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1813 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1815 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1816 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1819 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1823 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1824 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1830 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1831 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1832 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1833 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1834 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1835 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1838 included_htlcs += 1;
1841 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1842 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1845 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1846 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1848 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1849 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1850 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1855 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1856 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1860 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1861 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1863 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1864 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1866 total_pending_htlcs,
1867 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1868 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1869 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1871 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1872 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1873 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1875 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1877 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1882 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1883 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1884 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1885 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1891 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1892 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1893 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1894 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1895 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1896 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1897 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1898 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1899 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1900 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1901 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1903 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1904 // return them to fail the payment.
1905 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1906 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1907 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1909 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1910 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1915 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1916 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1917 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1918 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1919 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1920 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1921 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1922 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1923 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1924 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1925 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1926 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1927 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1932 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1933 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1934 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1938 // Internal utility functions for channels
1940 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1941 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1942 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1944 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1946 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1947 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1948 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1950 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1953 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1955 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1958 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1959 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1960 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1962 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1964 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1965 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1966 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1967 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1968 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1971 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1972 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1973 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1974 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1975 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1976 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1977 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1980 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1981 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1983 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1984 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1987 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1988 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1989 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1990 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1991 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1992 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1995 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1996 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1997 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
2000 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2001 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2002 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2003 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2006 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2007 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2009 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2010 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2011 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2015 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2016 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2017 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2018 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2020 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2021 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2022 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2023 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2024 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2025 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2026 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2029 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2030 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2031 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2032 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2033 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2034 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2035 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2036 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2038 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2039 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2049 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2050 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2051 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2052 // outside of those situations will fail.
2053 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2057 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2062 1 + // script length (0)
2066 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2067 2 + // witness marker and flag
2068 1 + // witness element count
2069 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2070 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2071 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2072 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2073 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2074 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2076 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2077 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2078 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2084 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2085 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2086 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2087 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2089 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2090 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2091 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2093 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2094 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2095 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2096 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2097 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2098 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2101 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2102 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2105 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2106 value_to_holder = 0;
2109 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2110 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2111 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2112 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2114 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2115 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2118 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2119 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2122 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2125 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2126 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2128 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2130 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2131 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2132 where L::Target: Logger {
2133 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2134 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2135 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2136 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2137 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2138 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2139 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2140 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2144 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2145 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2146 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2147 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2149 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2150 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2152 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2154 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2156 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2157 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2158 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2160 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2161 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2162 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2163 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2164 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2166 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2167 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2168 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2170 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2171 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2173 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2176 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2177 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2181 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2185 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2186 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2187 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2188 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2189 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2190 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2193 // Now update local state:
2195 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2196 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2197 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2198 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2199 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2200 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2201 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2205 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2206 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2207 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2208 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2209 // do not not get into this branch.
2210 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2211 match pending_update {
2212 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2213 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2214 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2215 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2216 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2217 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2218 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2221 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2222 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2223 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2224 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2225 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2227 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2233 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2234 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2235 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2238 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2239 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2242 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2245 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2246 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2248 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2249 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2251 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2252 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2255 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2258 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2259 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2260 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2261 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2266 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2267 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2268 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2269 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2270 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2271 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2272 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2273 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2274 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2275 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2276 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2277 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2278 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2279 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2280 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2282 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(0)
2283 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2284 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2285 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2286 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2289 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2290 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2291 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2292 update, blocked: true,
2297 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2298 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2300 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2304 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2305 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2306 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2307 /// before we fail backwards.
2309 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2310 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2311 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2312 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2313 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2314 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2315 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2318 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2319 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2320 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2321 /// before we fail backwards.
2323 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2324 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2325 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2326 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2327 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2328 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2329 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2331 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2333 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2334 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2335 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2337 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2338 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2339 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2341 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2342 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2343 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2345 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2350 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2357 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2358 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2359 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2360 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2361 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2365 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2366 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2367 force_holding_cell = true;
2370 // Now update local state:
2371 if force_holding_cell {
2372 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2373 match pending_update {
2374 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2375 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2376 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2377 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2381 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2382 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2383 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2384 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2390 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2391 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2392 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2398 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2400 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2401 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2404 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2405 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2406 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2411 // Message handlers:
2413 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2414 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2415 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2416 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2417 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2419 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2422 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2425 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2426 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2428 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2429 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2430 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2431 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2434 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2436 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2437 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2438 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2439 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2441 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2442 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2444 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2445 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2447 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2448 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2449 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2450 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2451 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2456 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2457 initial_commitment_tx,
2460 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2461 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2464 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2465 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2468 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2469 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2470 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2471 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2472 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2473 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2474 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2475 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2476 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2477 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2478 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2479 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2481 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2483 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2485 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2486 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2487 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2488 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2490 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2492 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2493 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2497 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2498 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2500 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2501 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2502 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2503 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2505 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2508 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2509 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2510 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2513 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2514 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2515 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2516 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2517 // when routing outbound payments.
2518 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2522 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2524 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2525 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2526 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2527 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2528 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2529 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2530 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2531 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2532 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2534 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2535 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2536 let expected_point =
2537 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2538 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2540 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2541 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2542 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2543 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2544 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2545 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2547 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2548 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2549 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2550 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2551 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2553 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2558 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2561 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2562 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2564 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2566 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2569 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2570 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2571 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2572 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2573 if local_sent_shutdown {
2574 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2576 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2577 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2578 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2581 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2582 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2584 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2585 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2587 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2588 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2590 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2591 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2594 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2595 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2596 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2597 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2599 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2600 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2602 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2603 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2604 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2605 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2606 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2607 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2608 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2609 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2610 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2611 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2612 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2614 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2615 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2616 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2617 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2618 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2619 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2623 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2626 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2627 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2628 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2630 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2631 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2632 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2633 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2634 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2635 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2636 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2640 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2641 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2642 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2643 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2644 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2645 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2646 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2650 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2651 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2652 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2653 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2654 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2655 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2658 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2659 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2660 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2661 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2662 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2664 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2668 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2669 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2672 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2673 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2674 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2675 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2676 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2677 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2678 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2679 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2680 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2681 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2682 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2683 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2684 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2685 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2686 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2687 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2690 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2691 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2692 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2693 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2697 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2698 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2700 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2701 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2704 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2705 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2706 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2710 // Now update local state:
2711 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2712 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2713 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2714 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2715 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2716 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2717 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2722 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2724 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2725 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2726 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2727 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2728 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2729 None => fail_reason.into(),
2730 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2731 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2732 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2733 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2735 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2739 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2740 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2741 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2742 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2744 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2745 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2750 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2753 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2754 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2757 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2761 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2764 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2765 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2768 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2772 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2776 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2777 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2780 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2784 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2788 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2789 where L::Target: Logger
2791 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2792 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2794 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2795 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2797 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2801 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2803 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2805 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2806 let commitment_txid = {
2807 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2808 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2809 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2811 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2812 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2813 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2814 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2815 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2816 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2820 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2822 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2823 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2824 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2825 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2828 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2829 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2830 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2834 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2836 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2837 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2838 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2839 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2840 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2841 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2842 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2843 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2844 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2845 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2846 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2852 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2856 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2857 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2858 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2859 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2860 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2861 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2862 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2863 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2864 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2865 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2866 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2867 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2868 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2871 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2872 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2873 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2874 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2875 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2876 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
2877 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2879 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2880 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2881 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2882 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2883 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2884 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2885 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2886 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2888 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2889 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2892 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2894 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2895 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2896 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2899 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2902 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2903 commitment_stats.tx,
2905 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2906 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2907 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2910 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2911 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2913 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2914 let mut need_commitment = false;
2915 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2916 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2917 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2918 need_commitment = true;
2922 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2923 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2924 Some(forward_info.clone())
2926 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2927 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2928 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2929 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2930 need_commitment = true;
2933 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2934 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2935 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2936 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2937 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2938 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2939 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2940 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2941 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2942 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2943 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2944 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2945 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2946 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2948 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2950 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2951 need_commitment = true;
2955 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2956 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2957 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2958 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2959 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2960 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2962 nondust_htlc_sources,
2966 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2967 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2968 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2969 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2971 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2972 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2973 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2974 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2975 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2976 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2977 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2978 // includes the right HTLCs.
2979 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2980 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2981 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2982 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2983 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2984 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2986 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2987 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2988 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
2991 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2992 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2993 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2994 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2995 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2996 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2997 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2998 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2999 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3003 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3004 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3005 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3006 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3009 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3010 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3011 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3012 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3013 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3014 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3015 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3016 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3019 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3020 /// for our counterparty.
3021 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3022 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3023 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3024 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3025 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3027 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3028 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3029 updates: Vec::new(),
3032 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3033 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3034 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3035 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3036 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3037 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3038 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3039 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3040 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3041 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3042 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3043 // to rebalance channels.
3044 match &htlc_update {
3045 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3046 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3047 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3049 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3050 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
3052 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3055 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3056 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3057 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3058 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3059 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3060 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3061 // into the holding cell without ever being
3062 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3063 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3064 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3067 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3073 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3074 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3075 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3076 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3077 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3078 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3079 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3080 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3081 (msg, monitor_update)
3082 } else { unreachable!() };
3083 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3084 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3086 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3087 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3088 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3089 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3090 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3091 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3092 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3093 // for a full revocation before failing.
3094 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3097 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3099 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3106 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3107 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3109 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3110 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3115 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3116 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3117 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3118 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3119 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3121 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3122 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3123 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3125 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3126 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3132 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3133 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3134 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3135 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3136 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3137 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3138 where L::Target: Logger,
3140 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3143 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3146 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3150 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3152 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3153 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3158 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3159 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3160 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3161 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3162 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3163 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3164 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3165 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3166 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3169 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3171 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3172 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3175 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3176 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3178 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3180 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3181 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3182 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3183 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3184 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3185 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3186 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3187 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3191 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3192 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3193 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3194 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3195 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3196 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3197 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3198 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3199 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3201 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3202 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3205 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3206 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3207 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3208 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3209 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3210 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3211 let mut require_commitment = false;
3212 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3215 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3216 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3217 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3219 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3220 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3221 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3222 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3223 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3224 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3229 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3230 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3231 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3232 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3233 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3235 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3236 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3237 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3242 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3243 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3245 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3249 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3250 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3252 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3253 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3254 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3255 require_commitment = true;
3256 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3257 match forward_info {
3258 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3259 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3260 require_commitment = true;
3262 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3263 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3264 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3266 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3267 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3268 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3272 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3273 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3274 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3275 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3281 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3282 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3283 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3284 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3286 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3287 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3288 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3289 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3290 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3291 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3292 require_commitment = true;
3296 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3298 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3299 match update_state {
3300 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3301 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3302 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3303 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3304 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3306 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3307 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3308 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3309 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3310 require_commitment = true;
3311 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3312 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3317 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3318 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3319 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3320 if require_commitment {
3321 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3322 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3323 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3324 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3325 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3326 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3327 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3328 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3329 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3331 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3332 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3333 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3334 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3335 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3338 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3339 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3340 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3341 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3342 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3343 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3345 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3346 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3348 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3349 if require_commitment {
3350 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3352 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3353 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3354 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3355 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3357 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3358 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3359 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3360 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3362 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3363 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3364 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3370 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3371 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3372 /// commitment update.
3373 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3374 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3375 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3378 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3379 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3380 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3381 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3383 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3384 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3385 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3386 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3387 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3389 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3390 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3392 if !self.context.is_live() {
3393 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3396 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3397 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3398 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3399 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3400 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3401 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3402 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3403 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3404 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3405 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3409 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3410 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3411 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3412 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3413 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3416 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3417 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3421 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3422 force_holding_cell = true;
3425 if force_holding_cell {
3426 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3430 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3431 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3433 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3434 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3439 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3440 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3442 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3444 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3445 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3446 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3447 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3451 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3452 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3453 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3457 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3458 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3461 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3462 // will be retransmitted.
3463 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3464 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3465 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3467 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3468 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3470 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3471 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3472 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3473 // this HTLC accordingly
3474 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3477 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3478 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3479 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3480 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3483 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3484 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3485 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3486 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3487 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3488 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3493 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3495 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3496 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3497 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3498 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3502 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3503 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3504 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3505 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3506 // the update upon reconnection.
3507 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3511 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3513 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3514 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3517 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3518 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3519 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3520 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3521 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3522 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3523 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3525 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3526 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3527 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3528 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3529 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3530 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3531 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3533 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3534 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3535 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3536 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3537 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3538 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3539 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3542 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3543 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3544 /// to the remote side.
3545 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3546 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3547 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3548 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3551 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3553 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3554 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3555 for upd in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter() {
3556 debug_assert!(upd.blocked);
3559 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3560 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3561 // first received the funding_signed.
3562 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3563 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3564 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3566 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3567 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3568 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3569 funding_broadcastable = None;
3572 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3573 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3574 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3575 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3576 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3577 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3578 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3579 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3580 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3581 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3582 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3583 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3584 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3585 next_per_commitment_point,
3586 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3590 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3592 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3593 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3594 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3595 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3596 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3597 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3599 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3600 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3601 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3602 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3603 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3604 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3608 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3609 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3611 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3612 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3613 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3616 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3617 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3618 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3619 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3620 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3621 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3622 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3623 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3624 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3628 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3629 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3631 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3632 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3634 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3635 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3637 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3638 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3640 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3641 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3642 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3643 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3644 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3645 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3646 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3647 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3648 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3649 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3650 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3651 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3652 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3654 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3656 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3662 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3663 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3664 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3665 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3666 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3667 per_commitment_secret,
3668 next_per_commitment_point,
3670 next_local_nonce: None,
3674 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3675 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3676 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3677 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3678 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3680 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3681 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3682 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3683 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3684 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3685 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3686 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3687 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3688 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3689 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3694 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3695 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3697 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3698 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3699 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3700 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3701 reason: err_packet.clone()
3704 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3705 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3706 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3707 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3708 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3709 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3712 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3713 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3714 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3715 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3716 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3723 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3724 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3725 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3726 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3730 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3731 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3732 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3733 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3734 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3735 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3739 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3740 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3742 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3743 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3744 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3745 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3746 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3747 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3748 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3749 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3752 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3754 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3755 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3756 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3757 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3758 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3761 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3762 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3766 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3767 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3768 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3769 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3770 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3773 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3774 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3775 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3776 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3777 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3780 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3781 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3782 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3783 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3784 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3785 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3786 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3787 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3791 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3792 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3793 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3794 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3796 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3800 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3801 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3802 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3803 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3805 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3806 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3807 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3808 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3809 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3813 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3815 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3816 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3817 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3818 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3819 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3820 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3822 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3823 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3824 channel_ready: None,
3825 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3826 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3827 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3831 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3832 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3833 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3834 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3835 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3836 next_per_commitment_point,
3837 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3839 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3840 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3841 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3845 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3846 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3847 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3849 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3850 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3851 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3854 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3860 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3861 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3862 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3863 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3864 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3865 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3866 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3868 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3870 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3871 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3872 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3873 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3874 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3875 next_per_commitment_point,
3876 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3880 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3881 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3882 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3884 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3887 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3888 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3889 raa: required_revoke,
3890 commitment_update: None,
3891 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3893 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3894 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3895 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3897 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3900 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3901 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3902 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3903 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3904 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3905 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3908 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3909 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3910 raa: required_revoke,
3911 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3912 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3916 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3920 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3921 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3922 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3923 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3925 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3927 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3929 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3930 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3931 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3932 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3933 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3934 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3936 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3937 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3938 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3939 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3940 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3942 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3943 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3944 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3945 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3948 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3949 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3950 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3951 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3952 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3953 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3954 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3955 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3956 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3957 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3958 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3959 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3960 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3961 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3962 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3964 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3967 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3968 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3971 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3972 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3973 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3974 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3975 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3976 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3977 self.context.channel_state &
3978 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3979 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3980 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3981 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3984 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3985 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3986 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3987 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3988 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3989 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
3990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3992 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
3998 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3999 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4000 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4001 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4003 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4004 return Ok((None, None));
4007 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4008 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4009 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4011 return Ok((None, None));
4014 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4016 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4017 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4018 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4019 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4021 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4022 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4023 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4025 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4026 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4027 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4028 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4030 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4031 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4032 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4037 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4038 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4040 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4041 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4044 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4045 /// within our expected timeframe.
4047 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4048 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4049 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4052 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4055 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4056 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4059 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4060 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4061 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4062 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4064 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4067 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4068 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4069 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4070 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4073 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4074 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4078 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4080 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4081 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4084 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4085 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4086 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4089 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4092 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4093 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4094 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4095 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4097 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4100 assert!(send_shutdown);
4101 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4102 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4103 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4105 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4108 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4113 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4115 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4116 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4118 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4119 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4120 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4121 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4122 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4123 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4126 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4127 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4129 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4130 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4131 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4132 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4136 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4137 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4138 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4139 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4140 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4141 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4143 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4144 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4151 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4152 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4154 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4157 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4158 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4160 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4162 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4163 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4164 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4165 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4166 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4167 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4168 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4169 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4170 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4172 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4173 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4176 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4180 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4181 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4182 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4183 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4185 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4188 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4191 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4192 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4194 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4198 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4202 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4203 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4204 return Ok((None, None));
4207 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4208 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4209 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4212 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4214 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4217 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4218 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4219 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4220 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4221 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4225 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4226 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4231 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4232 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4233 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4234 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4235 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4236 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4237 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4241 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4243 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4244 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4245 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4246 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4248 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4251 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4252 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4253 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4255 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4256 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4257 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4258 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4262 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4263 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4264 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4265 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4267 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4268 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4269 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4275 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4276 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4279 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4280 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4282 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4286 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4287 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4288 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4289 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4290 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4292 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4294 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4296 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4297 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4300 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4301 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4302 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4303 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4304 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4305 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4306 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4307 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4309 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4312 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4313 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4314 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4315 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4317 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4321 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4322 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4323 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4324 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4326 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4332 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4333 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4334 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4335 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4336 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4337 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4338 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4340 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4341 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4344 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4346 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4347 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4353 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4354 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4355 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4356 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4357 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4358 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4359 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4361 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4362 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4369 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4370 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4373 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4374 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4377 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4378 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4382 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4383 &self.context.holder_signer
4387 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4389 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4390 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4391 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4392 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4393 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4394 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4396 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4398 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4406 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4407 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4411 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4412 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4413 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4414 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4417 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4418 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4419 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4422 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4423 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4424 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4425 for upd in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter() {
4426 debug_assert!(upd.blocked);
4428 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4429 Some((self.context.pending_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4430 !self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4433 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4434 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4435 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4436 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4437 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4438 if !release_monitor {
4439 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4440 update, blocked: true,
4448 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4449 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len()
4452 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4453 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4454 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4456 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4457 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4458 if self.context.channel_state &
4459 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4460 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4461 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4462 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4463 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4466 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4467 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4468 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4469 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4470 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4471 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4473 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4474 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4475 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4477 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4478 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4479 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4480 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4481 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4482 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4488 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4489 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4490 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4493 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4494 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4495 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4498 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4499 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4500 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4503 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4504 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4505 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4506 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4507 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4508 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4513 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4514 self.context.channel_update_status
4517 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4518 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4519 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4522 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4524 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4525 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4526 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4530 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4531 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4532 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4535 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4539 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4540 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4541 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4543 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4544 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4545 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4547 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4548 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4551 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4552 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4553 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4554 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4555 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4556 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4557 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4558 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4559 self.context.channel_state);
4561 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4565 if need_commitment_update {
4566 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4567 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4568 let next_per_commitment_point =
4569 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4570 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4571 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4572 next_per_commitment_point,
4573 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4577 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4583 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4584 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4585 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4586 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4587 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4588 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4589 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4591 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4594 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4595 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4596 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4597 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4598 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4599 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4600 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4601 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4602 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4603 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4604 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4605 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4606 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4607 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4608 // channel and move on.
4609 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4610 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4612 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4613 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4614 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4616 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4617 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4618 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4619 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4620 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4621 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4622 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4626 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4627 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4628 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4629 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4630 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4634 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4635 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4636 // may have already happened for this block).
4637 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4638 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4639 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4640 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4643 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4644 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4645 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4646 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4654 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4655 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4656 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4657 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4659 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4660 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4663 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4665 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4666 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4667 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4668 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4670 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4673 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4676 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4677 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4678 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4679 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4681 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4684 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4685 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4686 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4688 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4689 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4691 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4692 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4693 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4701 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4703 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4704 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4705 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4707 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4708 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4711 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4712 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4713 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4714 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4715 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4716 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4717 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4718 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4719 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4722 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4723 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4724 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4725 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4727 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4728 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4729 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4731 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4732 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4733 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4734 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4736 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4737 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4738 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4739 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4740 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4741 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4742 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4745 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4746 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4748 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4751 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4752 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4753 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4754 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4755 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4756 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4757 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4758 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4759 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4760 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4761 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4762 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4763 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4764 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4765 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4766 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4767 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4773 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4778 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4779 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4781 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4782 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4783 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4784 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4786 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4789 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4790 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4791 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4792 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4793 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4794 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4796 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4797 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4800 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4801 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4802 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4803 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4805 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4806 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4808 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4809 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4810 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4811 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4812 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4813 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4819 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4820 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4821 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4822 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4824 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4827 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4831 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4835 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4836 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4840 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4844 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4845 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4848 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4852 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4854 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4859 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4861 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4866 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4868 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4869 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4870 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4871 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4872 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4876 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4878 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4879 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4880 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4881 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4882 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4883 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4884 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4886 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4887 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4888 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4889 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4890 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4891 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4892 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4893 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4894 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4895 contents: announcement,
4898 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4902 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4903 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4904 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4905 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4906 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4907 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4908 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4909 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4911 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4913 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4914 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4915 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4916 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4918 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4919 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4920 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4921 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4924 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4925 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4926 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4927 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4930 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4933 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4934 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4935 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4936 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4937 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4938 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4941 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4943 Err(_) => return None,
4945 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4946 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4951 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4952 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4953 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4954 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4955 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4956 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4957 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4958 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4959 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4960 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4961 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4962 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4963 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4964 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4965 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4966 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4969 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4972 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4973 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4974 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4975 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4976 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4977 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4978 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4979 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4980 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4982 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4983 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4984 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4985 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4986 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4987 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4988 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4989 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4990 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4992 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4993 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4994 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4995 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
4996 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
4997 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
4998 next_funding_txid: None,
5003 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5005 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5006 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5007 /// commitment update.
5009 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5010 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(
5011 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5012 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5013 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5015 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5016 skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
5017 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5019 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5020 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5025 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5026 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5028 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5030 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5031 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5033 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5034 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5035 /// regenerate them.
5037 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5038 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5040 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5041 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(
5042 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5043 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5044 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5045 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5046 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5047 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5049 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5050 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5051 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5054 if amount_msat == 0 {
5055 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5058 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5059 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5060 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5061 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5064 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5065 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5066 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5069 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5070 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5071 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5072 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5073 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5074 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5075 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5076 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5079 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5080 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5081 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5082 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5083 else { "to peer" });
5085 if need_holding_cell {
5086 force_holding_cell = true;
5089 // Now update local state:
5090 if force_holding_cell {
5091 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5096 onion_routing_packet,
5102 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5103 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5105 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5107 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5112 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5113 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5114 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5118 onion_routing_packet,
5121 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5126 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5127 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5128 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5129 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5131 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5132 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5133 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5135 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5136 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5140 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5141 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5142 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5143 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5144 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5145 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5146 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5149 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5150 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5151 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5152 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5153 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5154 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5157 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5159 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5160 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5161 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5163 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5164 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5167 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5168 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5169 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5170 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5171 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5172 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5173 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5174 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5177 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5181 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5182 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5183 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5184 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5186 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5188 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5189 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5190 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5191 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5192 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5193 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5194 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5195 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5196 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5197 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
5198 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5204 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5207 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5208 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5209 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5210 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5211 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5212 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5214 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5215 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5216 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5217 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5220 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5221 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5225 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5226 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5228 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5230 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5231 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5232 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5233 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5235 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5236 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5237 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5238 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5239 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5240 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5244 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5245 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5249 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5250 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5253 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5254 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5256 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5257 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5258 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(
5259 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5260 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5261 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5262 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5263 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger);
5264 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5267 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5268 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5269 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5275 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5276 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5279 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5280 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5281 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5282 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5288 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5289 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5291 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5292 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5293 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5294 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5295 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5296 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5297 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5298 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5299 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5302 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5303 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5304 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5306 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5307 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5310 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5311 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5313 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5314 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5315 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5318 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5319 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5320 let mut chan_closed = false;
5321 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5325 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5327 None if !chan_closed => {
5328 // use override shutdown script if provided
5329 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5330 Some(script) => script,
5332 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5333 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5334 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5335 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5339 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5340 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5342 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5348 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5349 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5350 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5351 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5353 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5355 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5357 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5358 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5359 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5360 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5361 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5362 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5365 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5366 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5368 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5369 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5370 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5373 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5374 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5375 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5376 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5377 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5379 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5380 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5387 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5388 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5390 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5393 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5394 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5395 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5397 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5398 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5402 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5406 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5407 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5408 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5411 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5412 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5413 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5414 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5415 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5416 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5417 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5418 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5419 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5421 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5422 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5423 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5424 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5426 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5427 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5429 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5430 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5432 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5433 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5434 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5436 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5437 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5439 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5440 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5441 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5442 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5443 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5446 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5447 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5449 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5451 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5452 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
5453 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5454 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5457 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5458 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5460 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5461 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5462 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5463 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5467 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5468 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5469 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5473 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5474 Ok(script) => script,
5475 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5478 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5481 context: ChannelContext {
5484 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5485 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5486 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5487 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5492 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5494 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5495 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5496 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5497 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5499 channel_value_satoshis,
5501 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5504 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5507 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5508 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5511 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5512 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5513 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5514 pending_update_fee: None,
5515 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5516 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5517 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5518 update_time_counter: 1,
5520 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5522 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5523 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5524 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5525 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5526 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5527 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5529 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5530 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5531 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5532 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5534 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5535 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5536 closing_fee_limits: None,
5537 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5539 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5541 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5542 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5543 short_channel_id: None,
5544 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5546 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5547 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5548 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5549 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5550 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5551 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5552 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5553 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5554 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5555 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5556 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5557 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5559 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5561 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5562 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5563 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5564 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5565 counterparty_parameters: None,
5566 funding_outpoint: None,
5567 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
5568 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
5570 funding_transaction: None,
5572 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5573 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5574 counterparty_node_id,
5576 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5578 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5580 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5581 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5583 announcement_sigs: None,
5585 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5586 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5587 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5588 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5590 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5591 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5593 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5594 outbound_scid_alias,
5596 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5597 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5599 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5600 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5605 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5610 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5611 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5612 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5613 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5614 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5615 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5618 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5619 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5620 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5621 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5622 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5623 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5624 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5625 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5626 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5627 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5628 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5630 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5631 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5633 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5634 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5635 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5636 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5639 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5640 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5642 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5645 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5646 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5647 return Err((self, e));
5651 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5653 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5655 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5656 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5657 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5659 let channel = Channel {
5660 context: self.context,
5663 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5664 temporary_channel_id,
5665 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5666 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5669 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5671 next_local_nonce: None,
5675 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5676 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5677 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5678 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5679 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5680 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5681 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5682 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5683 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5684 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5687 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5688 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5689 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5691 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
5692 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5693 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5694 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5701 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5702 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5703 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5704 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5705 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5706 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5707 // We've exhausted our options
5710 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5711 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5714 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5715 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5716 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5717 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5719 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5720 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5721 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
5722 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
5723 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5724 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5726 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5728 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5731 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5732 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5733 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5735 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5736 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5739 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5740 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5743 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5744 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5748 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5749 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5750 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5751 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5752 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5753 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5754 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5755 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5756 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5757 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5758 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5759 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5760 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5761 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5762 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5763 first_per_commitment_point,
5764 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5765 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5766 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5767 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5769 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5774 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5775 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5777 // Check sanity of message fields:
5778 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5781 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5784 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5785 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5787 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5788 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5790 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5793 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5794 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5795 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5797 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5798 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5799 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5801 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5802 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5803 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5805 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5806 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5808 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5809 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5812 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5813 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5816 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5819 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5820 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5822 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5823 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5825 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5826 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5828 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5829 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5831 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5835 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5836 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5839 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5840 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5842 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5843 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5846 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
5849 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5850 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5851 &Some(ref script) => {
5852 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5853 if script.len() == 0 {
5856 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5859 Some(script.clone())
5862 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5869 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5870 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5871 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5872 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5873 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5875 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5876 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5878 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5881 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5882 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5883 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5884 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5885 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5886 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5889 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5890 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5891 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5894 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5895 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5897 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5898 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5904 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5905 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5906 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5909 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5910 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5911 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5912 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5913 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5914 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5915 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5916 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5917 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5918 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5919 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5920 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5923 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5925 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5926 // support this channel type.
5927 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5928 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5932 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5933 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5934 // `static_remote_key`.
5935 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5938 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5939 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5942 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5945 channel_type.clone()
5947 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5948 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5953 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5955 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5956 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5957 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5958 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5959 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5960 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5961 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5962 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5963 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5966 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5967 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
5970 // Check sanity of message fields:
5971 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
5972 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5974 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
5977 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5978 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5980 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5981 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
5982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5984 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5985 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5987 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5990 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
5992 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5993 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
5994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
5996 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5999 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6003 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6004 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6007 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6010 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6013 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6016 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6019 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6022 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6026 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6028 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6029 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6030 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6034 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6035 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6036 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6037 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6040 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6043 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6044 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6045 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6047 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6051 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6052 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6053 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6054 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
6055 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6059 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6060 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6061 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6062 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6066 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6067 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6068 &Some(ref script) => {
6069 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6070 if script.len() == 0 {
6073 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6076 Some(script.clone())
6079 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6081 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6086 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6087 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6088 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6089 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6093 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6094 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6099 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6100 Ok(script) => script,
6101 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6104 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6105 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6108 context: ChannelContext {
6111 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6112 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6114 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6119 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6121 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6122 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6123 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6124 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6127 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6130 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6133 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6134 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6135 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6137 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6138 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6139 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6140 pending_update_fee: None,
6141 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6142 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6143 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6144 update_time_counter: 1,
6146 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6148 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6149 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6150 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6151 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6152 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6153 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6155 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6156 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6157 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6158 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6160 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6161 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6162 closing_fee_limits: None,
6163 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6165 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6167 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6168 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6169 short_channel_id: None,
6170 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6172 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6173 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6174 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6175 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6176 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6177 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6178 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6179 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6180 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6181 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6182 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6183 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6184 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6186 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6188 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6189 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6190 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6191 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6192 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6193 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6194 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6196 funding_outpoint: None,
6197 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
6198 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6200 funding_transaction: None,
6202 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6203 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6204 counterparty_node_id,
6206 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6208 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6210 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6211 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6213 announcement_sigs: None,
6215 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6216 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6217 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6218 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6220 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6221 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6223 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6224 outbound_scid_alias,
6226 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6227 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6229 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6230 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6235 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6242 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6243 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6246 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6247 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6248 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6249 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6252 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6253 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6255 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6256 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6257 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6258 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6260 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6261 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6263 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6264 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6266 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6267 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6270 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6271 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6273 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6276 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6277 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6278 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6280 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6281 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6282 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6283 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6285 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6286 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6287 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6288 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6289 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6290 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6291 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6292 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6293 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6294 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6295 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6296 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6297 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6298 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6299 first_per_commitment_point,
6300 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6301 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6302 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6304 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6306 next_local_nonce: None,
6310 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6311 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6313 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6315 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6316 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6319 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6320 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6322 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6323 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6325 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6326 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6327 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6328 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6329 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6330 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6331 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6332 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6333 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6336 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6337 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6339 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6340 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6341 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6342 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6344 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6345 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6347 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6348 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6351 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6352 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6353 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6355 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6358 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6359 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6361 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6362 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6363 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6365 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6367 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6368 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6370 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6371 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6372 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6373 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6376 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6377 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6378 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6379 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6380 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6382 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6384 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6385 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6386 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6389 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6390 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6391 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6395 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6396 initial_commitment_tx,
6399 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6400 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6403 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6404 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6407 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6409 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6410 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6411 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6412 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6413 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6414 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6415 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6416 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6417 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6418 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6419 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6421 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6423 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6425 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6426 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6427 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6428 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6430 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6432 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6433 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6434 let mut channel = Channel {
6435 context: self.context,
6437 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6438 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6439 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6441 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6445 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6446 }, channel_monitor))
6450 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6451 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6453 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6459 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6460 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6461 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6462 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6463 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6465 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6466 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6467 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6468 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6474 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6475 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6476 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6477 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6478 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6479 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6484 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6485 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6486 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6487 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6489 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6490 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6491 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6492 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6497 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6498 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6499 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6500 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6501 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6502 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6507 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6508 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6509 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6512 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6514 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6515 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6516 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6517 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6518 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6520 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6521 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6522 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6523 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6525 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6526 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6527 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6529 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6531 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6532 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6533 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6534 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6535 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6536 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6538 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6539 // deserialized from that format.
6540 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6541 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6542 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6544 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6546 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6547 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6548 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6550 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6551 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6552 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6553 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6556 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6557 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6558 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6561 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6562 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6563 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6564 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6566 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6567 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6569 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6571 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6573 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6575 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6578 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6580 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6585 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6586 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6588 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6589 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6590 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6591 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6592 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6593 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6594 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6596 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6598 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6600 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6603 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6604 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6605 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6608 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6610 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6611 preimages.push(preimage);
6613 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6614 reason.write(writer)?;
6616 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6618 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6619 preimages.push(preimage);
6621 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6622 reason.write(writer)?;
6625 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6626 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6627 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6629 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6630 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6631 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6635 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6636 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6637 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6639 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6640 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6644 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6645 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6646 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6647 source.write(writer)?;
6648 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6650 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6651 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6652 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6654 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6655 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6657 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6659 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6660 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6662 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6664 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6665 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6670 match self.context.resend_order {
6671 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6672 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6675 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6676 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6677 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6679 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6680 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6681 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6682 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6685 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6686 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6687 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6688 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6689 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6692 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6693 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6694 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6695 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6697 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6698 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6699 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6701 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6703 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6704 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6705 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6706 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6708 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6709 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6710 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6711 // consider the stale state on reload.
6714 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6715 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6716 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6718 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6719 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6720 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6722 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6723 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6725 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6726 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6727 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6729 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6730 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6732 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6735 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6736 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6737 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6739 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6742 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6743 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6745 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6746 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6747 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6749 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6751 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6753 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6755 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6756 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6757 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6758 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6759 htlc.write(writer)?;
6762 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6763 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6764 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6766 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6767 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6769 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6770 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6771 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6772 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6773 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6774 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6775 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6777 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6778 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6779 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6780 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6781 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6783 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6784 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6786 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6787 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6788 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6789 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6791 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6793 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6794 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6795 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6796 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6797 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6798 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6799 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6801 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6802 (2, chan_type, option),
6803 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6804 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6805 (5, self.context.config, required),
6806 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6807 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6808 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6809 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6810 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6811 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6812 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6813 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6814 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6815 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6816 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6817 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6818 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6819 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6820 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6821 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6822 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6823 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6830 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6831 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6833 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6834 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6836 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6837 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6838 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6840 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6841 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6842 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6843 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6845 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6847 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6848 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6849 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6850 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6851 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6853 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6854 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6858 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6859 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6861 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6863 let mut keys_data = None;
6865 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6866 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6867 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6868 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6869 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6870 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6871 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6872 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6873 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6874 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6878 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6879 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6880 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6883 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6889 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6891 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6892 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6893 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6894 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6895 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6896 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6897 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6898 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6899 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6900 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6901 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6902 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6903 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6908 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6910 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6911 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6912 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6913 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6914 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6915 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6916 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6917 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6918 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6919 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6921 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6922 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6925 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6926 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6929 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6930 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6932 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6934 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6938 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6939 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6940 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6941 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6942 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6943 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6944 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6945 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6946 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6947 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6948 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6950 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6951 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6952 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6954 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6955 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6956 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6958 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6962 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6963 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6964 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6965 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6968 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6974 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6975 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6978 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6979 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6980 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6981 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6984 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6986 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6988 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6991 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6994 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6995 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6996 // consider the stale state on reload.
6997 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7000 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7001 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7002 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7004 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7007 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7012 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7014 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7016 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7017 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7019 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7020 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7028 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7029 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7031 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7032 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7037 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7038 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7039 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7040 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7042 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7045 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7048 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7051 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7053 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7054 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7056 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7058 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7059 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7060 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7062 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7063 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7064 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7068 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7069 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7070 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7072 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7078 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7079 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7080 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7081 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7082 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7083 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7084 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7085 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7086 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7087 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7089 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7090 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7091 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7092 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7093 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7094 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7095 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7097 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7098 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7099 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7100 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7102 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7104 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7105 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7107 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7108 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7109 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7110 (2, channel_type, option),
7111 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7112 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7113 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7114 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7115 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7116 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7117 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7118 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7119 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7120 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7121 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7122 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7123 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7124 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7125 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7126 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7127 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7128 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7129 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7130 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7131 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7134 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7135 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7136 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7137 // required channel parameters.
7138 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7139 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7140 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7142 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7144 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7145 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7146 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7147 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7150 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7151 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7152 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7154 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7155 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7157 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7158 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7163 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7164 if iter.next().is_some() {
7165 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7169 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7170 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7171 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7172 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7173 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7176 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7177 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7179 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7180 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7181 // separate u64 values.
7182 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7184 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7186 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7187 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7188 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7189 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7191 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7192 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7194 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7195 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7196 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7197 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7198 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7201 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7202 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7206 context: ChannelContext {
7209 config: config.unwrap(),
7213 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7214 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7215 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7218 temporary_channel_id,
7220 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7222 channel_value_satoshis,
7224 latest_monitor_update_id,
7227 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7230 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7231 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7234 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7235 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7236 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7237 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7241 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7242 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7243 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7244 monitor_pending_forwards,
7245 monitor_pending_failures,
7246 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7249 holding_cell_update_fee,
7250 next_holder_htlc_id,
7251 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7252 update_time_counter,
7255 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7256 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7257 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7258 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7260 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7261 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7262 closing_fee_limits: None,
7263 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7265 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7267 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7268 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7270 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7272 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7273 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7274 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7275 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7276 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7277 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7278 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7279 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7280 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7283 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7285 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7286 funding_transaction,
7288 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7289 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7290 counterparty_node_id,
7292 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7296 channel_update_status,
7297 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7301 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7302 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7303 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7304 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7306 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7307 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7309 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7310 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7311 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7313 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7314 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7316 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7317 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7319 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7322 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7331 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7332 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7333 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7334 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7335 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7337 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7338 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7340 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7341 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7342 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7343 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7344 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7345 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7346 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7347 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7348 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7349 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7350 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7351 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7352 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7353 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7354 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7355 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7356 use crate::util::test_utils;
7357 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7358 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7359 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7360 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7361 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7362 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7363 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7364 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7365 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7366 use crate::prelude::*;
7368 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7371 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7372 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7378 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7379 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7380 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7381 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7385 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7386 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7387 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7388 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7389 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7390 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7391 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7395 signer: InMemorySigner,
7398 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7399 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7402 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7403 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7405 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7406 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7409 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7413 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7415 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7416 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7417 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7418 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7419 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7422 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7423 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7424 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7425 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7429 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7430 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7431 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7435 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7436 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7437 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7438 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7440 let seed = [42; 32];
7441 let network = Network::Testnet;
7442 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7443 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7444 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7447 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7448 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7449 let config = UserConfig::default();
7450 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7451 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7452 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7454 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7455 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7459 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7460 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7462 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7463 let original_fee = 253;
7464 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7465 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7466 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7467 let seed = [42; 32];
7468 let network = Network::Testnet;
7469 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7471 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7472 let config = UserConfig::default();
7473 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7475 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7476 // same as the old fee.
7477 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7478 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7479 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7483 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7484 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7485 // dust limits are used.
7486 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7487 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7488 let seed = [42; 32];
7489 let network = Network::Testnet;
7490 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7491 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7492 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7494 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7495 // they have different dust limits.
7497 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7498 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7499 let config = UserConfig::default();
7500 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7502 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7503 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7504 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7505 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7506 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7508 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7509 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7510 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7511 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7512 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7514 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7515 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7516 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7517 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7519 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7520 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7521 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7523 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7524 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7526 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7527 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7528 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7530 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7531 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7532 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7533 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7536 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7538 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7539 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7540 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7541 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7542 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7543 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7544 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7545 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7546 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7548 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7551 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7552 // the dust limit check.
7553 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7554 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7555 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7556 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7558 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7559 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7560 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7561 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7562 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7563 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7564 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7568 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7569 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7570 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7571 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7572 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7573 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7575 let seed = [42; 32];
7576 let network = Network::Testnet;
7577 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7579 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7580 let config = UserConfig::default();
7581 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7583 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7584 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7586 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7587 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7588 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7589 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7590 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7591 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7593 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7594 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7595 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7596 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7597 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7599 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7601 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7602 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7603 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7604 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7605 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7607 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7608 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7609 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7610 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7611 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7615 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7616 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7617 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7618 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7619 let seed = [42; 32];
7620 let network = Network::Testnet;
7621 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7622 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7623 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7625 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7627 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7628 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7629 let config = UserConfig::default();
7630 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7632 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7633 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7634 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7635 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7637 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7638 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7639 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7641 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7642 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7643 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7644 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7646 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7647 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7648 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7650 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7651 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7653 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7654 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7655 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7656 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7657 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7658 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7659 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7661 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7663 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7664 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7665 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7666 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7667 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7671 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7672 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7673 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7674 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7675 let seed = [42; 32];
7676 let network = Network::Testnet;
7677 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7678 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7679 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7681 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7682 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7683 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7684 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7685 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7686 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7687 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7688 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7690 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7691 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7692 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7693 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7694 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7695 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7697 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7698 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7699 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7700 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7702 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7704 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7705 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7706 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7707 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7708 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7709 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7711 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7712 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7713 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7714 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7716 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7717 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7718 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7719 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7720 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7722 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7723 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7725 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7726 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7727 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7729 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7730 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7731 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7732 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7733 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7735 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7736 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7738 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7739 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7740 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7744 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7746 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7747 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7748 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7750 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7751 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7752 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7753 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7755 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7756 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7757 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7759 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7761 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7762 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7765 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7766 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7767 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7768 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7769 let seed = [42; 32];
7770 let network = Network::Testnet;
7771 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7772 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7773 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7776 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7777 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7778 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7780 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7781 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7783 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7784 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7785 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7787 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7788 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7790 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7792 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7793 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7795 // Channel Negotiations failed
7796 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7797 assert!(result.is_err());
7802 fn channel_update() {
7803 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7804 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7805 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7806 let seed = [42; 32];
7807 let network = Network::Testnet;
7808 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7809 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7810 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7812 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7813 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7814 let config = UserConfig::default();
7815 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7817 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7818 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7819 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7820 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7821 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7823 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7824 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7825 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7826 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7827 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7829 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7830 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7831 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7832 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7834 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7835 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7836 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7838 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7839 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7841 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7842 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7843 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7845 short_channel_id: 0,
7848 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7849 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7850 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7852 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7853 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7855 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7857 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7859 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7860 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7861 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7862 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7864 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7865 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7866 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7868 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7872 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7874 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7875 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7876 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7877 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7878 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7879 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7880 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7881 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7882 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7883 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7884 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7885 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7886 use crate::sync::Arc;
7888 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7889 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7890 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7891 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7893 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7895 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7896 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7897 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7898 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7899 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7901 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7902 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7908 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7909 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7910 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7912 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7913 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7914 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7915 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7916 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7917 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7919 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7921 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7922 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7923 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7924 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7925 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7926 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7928 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7929 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7930 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7931 selected_contest_delay: 144
7933 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7934 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7936 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7937 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7939 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7940 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7942 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7943 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7945 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7946 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7947 // build_commitment_transaction.
7948 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7949 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7950 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7951 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7952 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7954 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7955 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7956 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7957 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7961 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7962 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7963 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7964 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7968 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7969 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7970 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7972 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7973 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7975 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7976 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7978 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7980 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7981 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7982 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7983 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7984 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7985 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7986 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7988 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7989 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7990 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7991 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7993 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7994 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7995 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7997 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7999 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8000 commitment_tx.clone(),
8001 counterparty_signature,
8002 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8003 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8004 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8006 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8007 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8009 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8010 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8011 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8013 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8014 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8017 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8018 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8020 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8021 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8022 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8023 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8024 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8025 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8026 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8027 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8029 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8032 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8033 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8034 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8038 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8041 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8042 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
8043 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8045 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8046 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8047 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8048 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8049 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8050 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8051 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8052 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8054 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8058 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8059 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8060 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8061 "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", {});
8063 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8064 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8066 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8067 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8068 "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", {});
8070 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8071 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8072 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8073 "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", {});
8075 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8076 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8078 amount_msat: 1000000,
8080 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8081 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8083 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8086 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8087 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8089 amount_msat: 2000000,
8091 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8092 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8094 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8097 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8098 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8100 amount_msat: 2000000,
8102 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8103 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8104 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8105 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8107 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8110 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8111 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8113 amount_msat: 3000000,
8115 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8116 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8117 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8118 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8120 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8123 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8124 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8126 amount_msat: 4000000,
8128 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8129 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8131 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8135 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8136 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8137 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8139 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8140 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8141 "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", {
8144 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8145 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8146 "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" },
8149 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8150 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8151 "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" },
8154 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8155 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8156 "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" },
8159 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8160 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8161 "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" },
8164 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8165 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8166 "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" }
8169 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8170 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8171 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8173 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8174 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8175 "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", {
8178 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8179 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8180 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8183 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8184 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8185 "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" },
8188 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8189 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8190 "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" },
8193 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8194 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8195 "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" },
8198 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8199 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8200 "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" }
8203 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8204 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8205 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8207 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8208 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8209 "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", {
8212 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8213 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8214 "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" },
8217 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8218 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8219 "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" },
8222 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8223 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8224 "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" },
8227 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8228 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8229 "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" }
8232 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8233 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8234 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8235 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8237 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8238 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8239 "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", {
8242 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8243 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8244 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
8247 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8248 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8249 "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" },
8252 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8253 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8254 "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" },
8257 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8258 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8259 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8262 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8263 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8264 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8265 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8267 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8268 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8269 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8272 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8273 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8274 "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" },
8277 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8278 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8279 "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" },
8282 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8283 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8284 "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" },
8287 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8288 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8289 "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" }
8292 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8293 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8294 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8296 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8297 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8298 "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", {
8301 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8302 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8303 "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" },
8306 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8307 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8308 "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" },
8311 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8312 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8313 "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" }
8316 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8317 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8318 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8320 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8321 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8322 "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", {
8325 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8326 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8327 "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" },
8330 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8331 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8332 "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" },
8335 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8336 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8337 "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" }
8340 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8341 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8342 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8344 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8345 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8346 "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", {
8349 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8350 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8351 "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" },
8354 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8355 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8356 "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" }
8359 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8360 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8361 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8362 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8364 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8365 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8366 "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", {
8369 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8370 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8371 "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" },
8374 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8375 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8376 "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" }
8379 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8380 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8381 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8382 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8384 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8385 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8386 "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", {
8389 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8390 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8391 "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" },
8394 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8395 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8396 "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" }
8399 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8400 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8401 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8403 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8404 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8405 "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", {
8408 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8409 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8410 "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" }
8413 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8414 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8415 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8416 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8418 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8419 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8420 "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", {
8423 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8424 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8425 "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" }
8428 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8429 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8430 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8431 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8433 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8434 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8435 "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", {
8438 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8439 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8440 "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" }
8443 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8444 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8445 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8446 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8448 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8449 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8450 "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", {});
8452 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8453 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8454 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8455 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8457 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8458 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8459 "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", {});
8461 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8462 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8463 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8464 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8466 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8467 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8468 "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", {});
8470 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8471 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8472 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8474 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8475 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8476 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8478 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8479 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8480 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8481 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8483 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8484 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8485 "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", {});
8487 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8488 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8489 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8490 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8492 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8493 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8494 "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", {});
8496 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8497 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8498 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8499 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8500 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8501 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8503 amount_msat: 2000000,
8505 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8506 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8508 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8511 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8512 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8513 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8515 amount_msat: 5000001,
8517 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8518 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8519 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8520 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8522 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8525 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8526 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8528 amount_msat: 5000000,
8530 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8531 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8532 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8533 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8535 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8539 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8540 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8541 "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", {
8544 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8545 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8546 "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" },
8548 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8549 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8550 "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" },
8552 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8553 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8554 "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" }
8557 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8558 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8559 "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", {
8562 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8563 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8564 "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" },
8566 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8567 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8568 "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" },
8570 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8571 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8572 "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" }
8577 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8578 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8580 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8581 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8582 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8583 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8585 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8586 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8587 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8589 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8590 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8592 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8593 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8595 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8596 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8597 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8601 fn test_key_derivation() {
8602 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8603 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8605 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8606 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8608 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8609 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8611 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8612 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8614 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8615 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8617 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8618 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8620 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8621 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8623 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8624 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8628 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8629 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8630 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8631 let seed = [42; 32];
8632 let network = Network::Testnet;
8633 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8634 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8636 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8637 let config = UserConfig::default();
8638 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8639 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8641 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8642 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8644 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8645 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8646 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8647 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8648 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8649 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8650 assert!(res.is_ok());
8655 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8656 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8657 // resulting `channel_type`.
8658 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8659 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8660 let network = Network::Testnet;
8661 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8662 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8664 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8665 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8667 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8668 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8670 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8671 // need to signal it.
8672 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8673 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8674 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8677 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8679 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8680 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8681 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8683 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8684 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8685 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8688 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8689 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8690 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8691 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8692 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8695 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8696 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8701 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8702 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8703 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8704 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8705 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8706 let network = Network::Testnet;
8707 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8708 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8710 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8711 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8713 let config = UserConfig::default();
8715 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8716 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8717 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8718 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8719 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8721 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8722 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8723 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8726 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8727 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8728 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8730 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8731 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8732 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8733 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8734 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8735 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8737 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8742 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8743 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8745 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8746 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8747 let network = Network::Testnet;
8748 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8749 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8751 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8752 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8754 let config = UserConfig::default();
8756 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8757 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8758 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8759 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8760 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8761 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8762 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8763 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8765 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8766 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8767 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8768 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8769 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8770 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8773 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8774 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8776 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8777 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8778 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8779 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8781 assert!(res.is_err());
8783 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8784 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8785 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8787 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8788 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8789 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8792 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8794 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8795 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8796 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8797 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8800 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8801 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8803 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8804 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8806 assert!(res.is_err());