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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channel.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
20
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
24
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs;
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
30 use ln::chan_utils;
31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
34 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
35 use util::transaction_utils;
36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
37 use util::logger::Logger;
38 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
40
41 use std;
42 use std::default::Default;
43 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
44 use std::ops::Deref;
45 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
46 use std::sync::Mutex;
47 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
48 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
49
50 #[cfg(test)]
51 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
52         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
53         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
54         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
55         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
56         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
57         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
58         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
59         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
60 }
61
62 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
63         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
64         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
65         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
66 }
67
68 enum InboundHTLCState {
69         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
70         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
71         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
72         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
73         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
74         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
75         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
76         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
77         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
78         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
79         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
80         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
81         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
82         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
83         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
84         ///
85         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
86         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
87         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
88         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
89         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
90         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
91         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
92         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
93         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
94         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
95         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
96         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
97         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
98         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
99         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
100         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
101         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
102         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
103         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
104         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
105         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
106         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
107         Committed,
108         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
109         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
110         /// we'll drop it.
111         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
112         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
113         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
114         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
115         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
116         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
117         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
118         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
119 }
120
121 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
122         htlc_id: u64,
123         amount_msat: u64,
124         cltv_expiry: u32,
125         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
126         state: InboundHTLCState,
127 }
128
129 enum OutboundHTLCState {
130         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
131         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
132         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
133         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
134         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
135         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
136         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
137         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
138         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
139         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
140         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
141         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
142         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
143         Committed,
144         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
145         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
146         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
147         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
148         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
149         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
150         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
151         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
152         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
153         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
154         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
155         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
156         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
157         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
158         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
159 }
160
161 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
162         htlc_id: u64,
163         amount_msat: u64,
164         cltv_expiry: u32,
165         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166         state: OutboundHTLCState,
167         source: HTLCSource,
168 }
169
170 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
171 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
172         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
173                 // always outbound
174                 amount_msat: u64,
175                 cltv_expiry: u32,
176                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
177                 source: HTLCSource,
178                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
179         },
180         ClaimHTLC {
181                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
182                 htlc_id: u64,
183         },
184         FailHTLC {
185                 htlc_id: u64,
186                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
187         },
188 }
189
190 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
191 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
192 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
193 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
194 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
195 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
196 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
197 enum ChannelState {
198         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
199         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
200         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
201         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
202         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
203         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
204         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
205         FundingCreated = 4,
206         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
207         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
208         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
209         FundingSent = 8,
210         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
211         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
212         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
213         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
214         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
215         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
216         ChannelFunded = 64,
217         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
218         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
219         /// dance.
220         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
221         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
222         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
223         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
224         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
225         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
226         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
227         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
228         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
229         /// later.
230         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
231         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
232         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
233         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
234         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
235         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
236         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
237         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
238         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
239         /// us their shutdown.
240         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
241         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
242         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
243         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
244 }
245 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
246 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
247
248 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
249
250 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
251 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
252 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
253 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
254 #[derive(PartialEq)]
255 enum UpdateStatus {
256         /// Status has been gossiped.
257         Fresh,
258         /// Status has been changed.
259         DisabledMarked,
260         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
261         DisabledStaged,
262 }
263
264 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
265 enum HTLCInitiator {
266         LocalOffered,
267         RemoteOffered,
268 }
269
270 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
271 struct HTLCCandidate {
272         amount_msat: u64,
273         origin: HTLCInitiator,
274 }
275
276 impl HTLCCandidate {
277         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
278                 Self {
279                         amount_msat,
280                         origin,
281                 }
282         }
283 }
284
285 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
286 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
287 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
288 // inbound channel.
289 //
290 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
291 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
292 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
293         config: ChannelConfig,
294
295         user_id: u64,
296
297         channel_id: [u8; 32],
298         channel_state: u32,
299         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
300         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
301
302         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
303
304         holder_signer: Signer,
305         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
306         destination_script: Script,
307
308         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
309         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
310         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
311
312         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
313         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
314         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
315         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
316         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
317         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
318
319         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
320         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
321         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
322         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
323         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
324         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
325         /// send it first.
326         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
327
328         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
329         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
330         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
331         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
332         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
333
334         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
335         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
336         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
337         //
338         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
339         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
340         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
341         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
342         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
343         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
344         // commitment_signed.
345         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
346         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
347         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
348         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
349         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
350         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
351         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
352         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
353         update_time_counter: u32,
354         feerate_per_kw: u32,
355
356         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
357         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
358         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
359         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
361         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
362
363         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
364
365         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
366         /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
367         /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
368         /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
369         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
370         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
371         /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
372         /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
373         pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
374         funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
375
376         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
377         #[cfg(test)]
378         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
379         #[cfg(not(test))]
380         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
381         #[cfg(test)]
382         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
383         #[cfg(not(test))]
384         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
385         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
386         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
387         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
388         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
389         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
390         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
391         #[cfg(test)]
392         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
393         #[cfg(not(test))]
394         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
395         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
396         minimum_depth: u32,
397
398         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
399
400         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
401
402         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
403         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
404
405         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
406
407         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
408
409         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
410
411         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
412         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
413         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
414         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
415         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
416         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
417         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
418         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
419 }
420
421 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
422 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
423         fee: u64,
424         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
425         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
426         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
427         feerate: u32,
428 }
429
430 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
431 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
432 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
433 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
434 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
435 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
436 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
437
438 #[cfg(not(test))]
439 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
440 #[cfg(test)]
441 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
442 #[cfg(not(test))]
443 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
444 #[cfg(test)]
445 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
446
447 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
448 /// it's 2^24.
449 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
450
451 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
452 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
453 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
454 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
455         Ignore(String),
456         Close(String),
457         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
458 }
459
460 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
461         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
462                 match self {
463                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
464                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
465                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
466                 }
467         }
468 }
469
470 macro_rules! secp_check {
471         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
472                 match $res {
473                         Ok(thing) => thing,
474                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
475                 }
476         };
477 }
478
479 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
480         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
481         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
482                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
483         }
484
485         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
486         /// required by us.
487         ///
488         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
489         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
490                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
491                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
492         }
493
494         fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
495                 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
496         }
497
498         // Constructors:
499         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
500         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
501               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
502         {
503                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
504                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
505                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
506
507                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
508                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
509                 }
510                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
511                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
512                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
513                 }
514                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
515                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
516                 }
517                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
518                 if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
519                         return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
520                 }
521
522                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
523
524                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
525                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
526
527                 Ok(Channel {
528                         user_id,
529                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
530
531                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
532                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
533                         secp_ctx,
534                         channel_value_satoshis,
535
536                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
537
538                         holder_signer,
539                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
540                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
541
542                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
543                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
544                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
545
546                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
547                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
548                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
549                         pending_update_fee: None,
550                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
551                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
552                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
553                         update_time_counter: 1,
554
555                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
556
557                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
558                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
559                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
560                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
561                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
562
563                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
564                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
565                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
566                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
567
568                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
569
570                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
571                         short_channel_id: None,
572                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
573                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
574
575                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
576                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
577                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
578                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
579                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
580                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
581                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
582                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
583                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
584
585                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
586                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
587                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
588                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
589                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
590                                 funding_outpoint: None
591                         },
592                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
593
594                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
595                         counterparty_node_id,
596
597                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
598
599                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
600
601                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
602
603                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
604                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
605                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
606                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
607                 })
608         }
609
610         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
611                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
612         {
613                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
614                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
615                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
616                 }
617                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
618                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
619                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
620                 }
621                 Ok(())
622         }
623
624         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
625         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
626         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
627                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
628           F::Target: FeeEstimator
629         {
630                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
631                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
632                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
633                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
634                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
635                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
636                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
637                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
638                 };
639                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
640
641                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
642                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
643                 }
644
645                 // Check sanity of message fields:
646                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
647                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
648                 }
649                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
650                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
651                 }
652                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
653                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
654                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
655                 }
656                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
657                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
658                 }
659                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
660                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
661                 }
662                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
663                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
664                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
665                 }
666                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
667
668                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
669                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
670                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
671                 }
672                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
673                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
674                 }
675                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
676                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
677                 }
678
679                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
680                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
681                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
682                 }
683                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
684                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
685                 }
686                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
687                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
688                 }
689                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
690                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
691                 }
692                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
693                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
694                 }
695                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
696                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
697                 }
698                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
699                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
700                 }
701
702                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
703
704                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
705                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
706                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
707                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
708                         }
709                 }
710                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
711                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
712
713                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
714
715                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
716                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
717                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
718                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
719                 }
720                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
721                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
722                 }
723                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
724                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
725                 }
726
727                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
728                 // for full fee payment
729                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
730                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
731                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
732                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
733                 }
734
735                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
736                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
737                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
738                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
739                 }
740
741                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
742                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
743                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
744                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
745                                         if script.len() == 0 {
746                                                 None
747                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
748                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
749                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
750                                         } else {
751                                                 Some(script.clone())
752                                         }
753                                 },
754                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
755                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
756                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
757                                 }
758                         }
759                 } else { None };
760
761                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
762                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
763
764                 let chan = Channel {
765                         user_id,
766                         config: local_config,
767
768                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
769                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
770                         secp_ctx,
771
772                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
773
774                         holder_signer,
775                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
776                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
777
778                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
779                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
780                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
781
782                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
783                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
784                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
785                         pending_update_fee: None,
786                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
787                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
788                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
789                         update_time_counter: 1,
790
791                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
792
793                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
794                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
795                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
796                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
797                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
798
799                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
800                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
801                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
802                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
803
804                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
805
806                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
807                         short_channel_id: None,
808                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
809                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
810
811                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
812                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
813                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
814                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
815                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
816                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
817                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
818                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
819                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
820                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
821
822                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
823                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
824                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
825                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
826                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
827                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
828                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
829                                 }),
830                                 funding_outpoint: None
831                         },
832                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
833
834                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
835                         counterparty_node_id,
836
837                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
838
839                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
840
841                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
842
843                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
844                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
845                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
846                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
847                 };
848
849                 Ok(chan)
850         }
851
852         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
853         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
854         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
855         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
856         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
857         /// an HTLC to a).
858         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
859         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
860         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
861         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
862         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
863         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
864         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
865         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
866         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
867         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
868         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
869         #[inline]
870         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
871                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
872                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
873                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
874
875                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
876                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
877                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
878                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
879
880                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
881
882                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
883                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
884                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
885                                         offered: $offered,
886                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
887                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
888                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
889                                         transaction_output_index: None
890                                 }
891                         }
892                 }
893
894                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
895                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
896                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
897                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
898                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
899                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
900                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
901                                         } else {
902                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
903                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
904                                         }
905                                 } else {
906                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
907                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
908                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
909                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
910                                         } else {
911                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
912                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
913                                         }
914                                 }
915                         }
916                 }
917
918                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
919                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
920                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
921                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
922                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
923                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
924                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
925                         };
926
927                         if include {
928                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
929                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
930                         } else {
931                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
932                                 match &htlc.state {
933                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
934                                                 if generated_by_local {
935                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
936                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
937                                                         }
938                                                 }
939                                         },
940                                         _ => {},
941                                 }
942                         }
943                 }
944
945                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
946                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
947                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
948                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
949                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
950                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
951                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
952                         };
953
954                         if include {
955                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
956                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
957                         } else {
958                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
959                                 match htlc.state {
960                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
961                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
962                                         },
963                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
964                                                 if !generated_by_local {
965                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
966                                                 }
967                                         },
968                                         _ => {},
969                                 }
970                         }
971                 }
972
973                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
974                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
975                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
976                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
977                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
978                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
979                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
980                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
981
982                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
983                 {
984                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
985                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
986                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
987                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
988                         } else {
989                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
990                         };
991                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
992                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
993                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
994                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
995                 }
996
997                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
998                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
999                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1000                 } else {
1001                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1002                 };
1003
1004                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1005                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1006
1007                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1008                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1009                 } else {
1010                         value_to_a = 0;
1011                 }
1012
1013                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1014                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1015                 } else {
1016                         value_to_b = 0;
1017                 }
1018
1019                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1020
1021                 let channel_parameters =
1022                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1023                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1024                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1025                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1026                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1027                                                                              keys.clone(),
1028                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1029                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1030                                                                              &channel_parameters
1031                 );
1032                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1033                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1034                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1035                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1036
1037                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1038         }
1039
1040         #[inline]
1041         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1042                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1043                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1044         }
1045
1046         #[inline]
1047         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1048                 let mut ret =
1049                 (4 +                                           // version
1050                  1 +                                           // input count
1051                  36 +                                          // prevout
1052                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1053                  4 +                                           // sequence
1054                  1 +                                           // output count
1055                  4                                             // lock time
1056                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1057                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1058                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1059                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1060                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1061                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1062                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1063                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1064                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1065                 }
1066                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1067                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1068                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1069                 }
1070                 ret
1071         }
1072
1073         #[inline]
1074         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1075                 let txins = {
1076                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1077                         ins.push(TxIn {
1078                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1079                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1080                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1081                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1082                         });
1083                         ins
1084                 };
1085
1086                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1087                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1088                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1089
1090                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1091                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1092                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1093
1094                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1095                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1096                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1097                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1098                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1099                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1100                 }
1101
1102                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1103                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1104                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1105                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1106                         }, ()));
1107                 }
1108
1109                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1110                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1111                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1112                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1113                         }, ()));
1114                 }
1115
1116                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1117
1118                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1119                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1120                         outputs.push(out.0);
1121                 }
1122
1123                 (Transaction {
1124                         version: 2,
1125                         lock_time: 0,
1126                         input: txins,
1127                         output: outputs,
1128                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1129         }
1130
1131         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1132                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1133         }
1134
1135         #[inline]
1136         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1137         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1138         /// our counterparty!)
1139         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1140         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1141         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1142                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1143                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1144                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1145                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1146
1147                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1148         }
1149
1150         #[inline]
1151         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1152         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1153         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1154         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1155                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1156                 //may see payments to it!
1157                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1158                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1159                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1160
1161                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1162         }
1163
1164         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1165         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1166         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1167         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1168                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1169         }
1170
1171         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1172         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1173         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1174         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1175                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1176         }
1177
1178         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1179         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1180         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1181         ///
1182         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1183         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1184         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1185                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1186                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1187                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1188                 // either.
1189                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1190                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1191                 }
1192                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1193
1194                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1195
1196                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1197                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1198                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1199
1200                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1201                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1202                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1203                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1204                                 match htlc.state {
1205                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1206                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1207                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1208                                                 } else {
1209                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1210                                                 }
1211                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1212                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1213                                         },
1214                                         _ => {
1215                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1216                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1217                                         }
1218                                 }
1219                                 pending_idx = idx;
1220                                 break;
1221                         }
1222                 }
1223                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1224                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1225                 }
1226
1227                 // Now update local state:
1228                 //
1229                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1230                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1231                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1232                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1233                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1234                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1235                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1236                         }],
1237                 };
1238
1239                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1240                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1241                                 match pending_update {
1242                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1243                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1244                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1245                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1246                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1247                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1248                                                 }
1249                                         },
1250                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1251                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1252                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1253                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1254                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1255                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1256                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1257                                                 }
1258                                         },
1259                                         _ => {}
1260                                 }
1261                         }
1262                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1263                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1264                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1265                         });
1266                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1267                 }
1268
1269                 {
1270                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1271                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1272                         } else {
1273                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1274                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1275                         }
1276                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1277                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1278                 }
1279
1280                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1281                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1282                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1283                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1284                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1285         }
1286
1287         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1288                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1289                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1290                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1291                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1292                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1293                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1294                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1295                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1296                         },
1297                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1298                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1299                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1300                         },
1301                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1302                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1303                 }
1304         }
1305
1306         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1307         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1308         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1309         ///
1310         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1311         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1312         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1313                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1314                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1315                 }
1316                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1317
1318                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1319                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1320                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1321
1322                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1323                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1324                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1325                                 match htlc.state {
1326                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1327                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1328                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1329                                                 return Ok(None);
1330                                         },
1331                                         _ => {
1332                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1333                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1334                                         }
1335                                 }
1336                                 pending_idx = idx;
1337                         }
1338                 }
1339                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1340                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1341                 }
1342
1343                 // Now update local state:
1344                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1345                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1346                                 match pending_update {
1347                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1348                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1349                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1350                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1351                                                 }
1352                                         },
1353                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1354                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1355                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1356                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1357                                                 }
1358                                         },
1359                                         _ => {}
1360                                 }
1361                         }
1362                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1363                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1364                                 err_packet,
1365                         });
1366                         return Ok(None);
1367                 }
1368
1369                 {
1370                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1371                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1372                 }
1373
1374                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1375                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1376                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1377                         reason: err_packet
1378                 }))
1379         }
1380
1381         // Message handlers:
1382
1383         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1384                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1385                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1386                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1387                 }
1388                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1389                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1390                 }
1391                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1392                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1393                 }
1394                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1395                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1396                 }
1397                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1398                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1399                 }
1400                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1401                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1402                 }
1403                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1404                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1405                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1406                 }
1407                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1408                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1409                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1410                 }
1411                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1412                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1413                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1414                 }
1415                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1416                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1417                 }
1418                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1419                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1420                 }
1421
1422                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1423                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1424                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1425                 }
1426                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1427                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1428                 }
1429                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1430                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1431                 }
1432                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1433                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1434                 }
1435                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1436                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1437                 }
1438                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1439                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1440                 }
1441                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1442                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1443                 }
1444
1445                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1446                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1447                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1448                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1449                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1450                                                 None
1451                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1452                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1453                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1454                                         } else {
1455                                                 Some(script.clone())
1456                                         }
1457                                 },
1458                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1459                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1460                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1461                                 }
1462                         }
1463                 } else { None };
1464
1465                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1466                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1467                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1468                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1469                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1470                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1471
1472                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1473                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1474                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1475                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1476                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1477                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1478                 };
1479
1480                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1481                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1482                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1483                 });
1484
1485                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1486                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1487
1488                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1489
1490                 Ok(())
1491         }
1492
1493         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1494                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1495
1496                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1497                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1498                 {
1499                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1500                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1501                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1502                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1503                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1504                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1505                 }
1506
1507                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1508                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1509
1510                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1511                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1512                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1513
1514                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1515                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1516
1517                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1518                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1519         }
1520
1521         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1522                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1523         }
1524
1525         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1526                 if self.is_outbound() {
1527                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1528                 }
1529                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1530                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1531                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1532                         // channel.
1533                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1534                 }
1535                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1536                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1537                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1538                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1539                 }
1540
1541                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1542                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1543                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1544                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1545                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1546
1547                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1548                         Ok(res) => res,
1549                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1550                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1551                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1552                         },
1553                         Err(e) => {
1554                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1555                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1556                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1557                         }
1558                 };
1559
1560                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1561                         initial_commitment_tx,
1562                         msg.signature,
1563                         Vec::new(),
1564                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1565                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1566                 );
1567
1568                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1569
1570                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1571                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1572                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1573                 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1574                                                               &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1575                                                               &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1576                                                               &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1577                                                               funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1578                                                               obscure_factor,
1579                                                               holder_commitment_tx);
1580
1581                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1582
1583                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1584                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1585                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1586                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1587
1588                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1589                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1590                         signature
1591                 }, channel_monitor))
1592         }
1593
1594         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1595         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1596         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1597                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1598                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1599                 }
1600                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1601                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1602                 }
1603                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1604                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1605                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1606                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1607                 }
1608
1609                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1610
1611                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1612                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1613                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1614                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1615
1616                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1617
1618                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1619                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1620                 {
1621                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1622                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1623                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1624                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1625                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1626                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1627                         }
1628                 }
1629
1630                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1631                         initial_commitment_tx,
1632                         msg.signature,
1633                         Vec::new(),
1634                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1635                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1636                 );
1637
1638
1639                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1640                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1641                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1642                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1643                 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1644                                                               &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1645                                                               &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1646                                                               &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1647                                                               funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1648                                                               obscure_factor,
1649                                                               holder_commitment_tx);
1650
1651                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1652
1653                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1654                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1655                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1656                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1657
1658                 Ok(channel_monitor)
1659         }
1660
1661         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1662                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1663                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1664                 }
1665
1666                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1667
1668                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1669                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1670                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1671                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1672                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1673                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1674                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1675                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1676                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1677                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1678                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1679                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1680                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1681                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1682                         }
1683                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1684                         return Ok(());
1685                 } else {
1686                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1687                 }
1688
1689                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1690                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1691                 Ok(())
1692         }
1693
1694         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1695         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1696                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1697                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1698                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1699                 }
1700                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1701         }
1702
1703         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1704         /// holding cell.
1705         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1706                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1707                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1708                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1709                 }
1710
1711                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1712                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1713                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1714                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1715                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1716                         }
1717                 }
1718
1719                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1720         }
1721
1722         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1723         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1724         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1725         /// corner case properly.
1726         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1727                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1728                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1729                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1730         }
1731
1732         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1733         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1734         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1735                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1736                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1737                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1738         }
1739
1740         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1741         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1742         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1743         // are excluded.
1744         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1745                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1746
1747                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1748                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1749
1750                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1751                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1752                 match htlc.origin {
1753                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1754                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1755                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1756                                 }
1757                         },
1758                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1759                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1760                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1761                                 }
1762                         }
1763                 }
1764
1765                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1766                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1767                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1768                                 continue
1769                         }
1770                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1771                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1772                         included_htlcs += 1;
1773                 }
1774
1775                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1776                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1777                                 continue
1778                         }
1779                         match htlc.state {
1780                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1781                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1782                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1783                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1784                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1785                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1786                                 _ => {},
1787                         }
1788                 }
1789
1790                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1791                         match htlc {
1792                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1793                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1794                                                 continue
1795                                         }
1796                                         included_htlcs += 1
1797                                 },
1798                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1799                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1800                         }
1801                 }
1802
1803                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1804                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1805                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1806                 {
1807                         let mut fee = res;
1808                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1809                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1810                         }
1811                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1812                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1813                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1814                                 fee,
1815                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1816                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1817                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1818                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1819                                 },
1820                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1821                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1822                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1823                                 },
1824                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1825                         };
1826                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1827                 }
1828                 res
1829         }
1830
1831         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1832         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1833         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1834         // excluded.
1835         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1836                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1837
1838                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1839                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1840
1841                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1842                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1843                 match htlc.origin {
1844                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1845                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1846                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1847                                 }
1848                         },
1849                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1850                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1851                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1852                                 }
1853                         }
1854                 }
1855
1856                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1857                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1858                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1859                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1860                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1861                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1862                                 continue
1863                         }
1864                         included_htlcs += 1;
1865                 }
1866
1867                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1868                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1869                                 continue
1870                         }
1871                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1872                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1873                         match htlc.state {
1874                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1875                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1876                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1877                                 _ => {},
1878                         }
1879                 }
1880
1881                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1882                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1883                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1884                 {
1885                         let mut fee = res;
1886                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1887                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1888                         }
1889                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1890                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1891                                 fee,
1892                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1893                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1894                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1895                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1896                                 },
1897                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1898                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1899                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1900                                 },
1901                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1902                         };
1903                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1904                 }
1905                 res
1906         }
1907
1908         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1909         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1910                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1911                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1912                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1913                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1914                 }
1915                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1916                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1917                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1918                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1919                 }
1920                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1921                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1922                 }
1923                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1924                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1925                 }
1926                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1927                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1928                 }
1929                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1930                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1931                 }
1932
1933                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1934                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1935                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1936                 }
1937                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1938                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1939                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1940                 }
1941                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1942                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1943                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1944                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1945                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1946                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1947                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1948                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1949                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1950                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1951                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1952                 // transaction).
1953                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1954                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1955                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1956                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1957                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1958                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1959                         }
1960                 }
1961
1962                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1963                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1964                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1965                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1966                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1967                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1968                 }
1969
1970                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1971                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1972                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1973                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1974                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1975                 };
1976                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1977                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1978                 };
1979
1980                 let chan_reserve_msat =
1981                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1982                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1983                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1984                 }
1985
1986                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1987                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
1988                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
1989                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
1990                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
1991                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
1992                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
1993                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
1994                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
1995                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1996                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
1997                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1998                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
1999                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2000                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2001                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2002                         }
2003                 } else {
2004                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2005                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2006                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2007                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2008                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2009                         }
2010                 }
2011                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2012                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2013                 }
2014                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2015                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2016                 }
2017
2018                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2019                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2020                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2021                         }
2022                 }
2023
2024                 // Now update local state:
2025                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2026                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2027                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2028                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2029                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2030                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2031                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2032                 });
2033                 Ok(())
2034         }
2035
2036         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2037         #[inline]
2038         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2039                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2040                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2041                                 match check_preimage {
2042                                         None => {},
2043                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2044                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2045                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2046                                                 }
2047                                 };
2048                                 match htlc.state {
2049                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2050                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2051                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2052                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2053                                         },
2054                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2055                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2056                                 }
2057                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2058                         }
2059                 }
2060                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2061         }
2062
2063         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2064                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2065                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2066                 }
2067                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2068                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2069                 }
2070
2071                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2072                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2073         }
2074
2075         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2076                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2077                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2078                 }
2079                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2080                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2081                 }
2082
2083                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2084                 Ok(())
2085         }
2086
2087         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2088                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2089                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2090                 }
2091                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2092                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2093                 }
2094
2095                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2096                 Ok(())
2097         }
2098
2099         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2100         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2101                                 L::Target: Logger
2102         {
2103                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2104                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2105                 }
2106                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2107                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2108                 }
2109                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2110                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2111                 }
2112
2113                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2114
2115                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2116
2117                 let mut update_fee = false;
2118                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2119                         update_fee = true;
2120                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2121                 } else {
2122                         self.feerate_per_kw
2123                 };
2124
2125                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2126                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2127                         let commitment_txid = {
2128                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2129                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2130                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2131
2132                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2133                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2134                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2135                                 }
2136                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2137                         };
2138                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2139                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2140                 };
2141
2142                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2143                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2144                 if update_fee {
2145                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2146                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2147                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2148                         }
2149                 }
2150                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2151                 {
2152                         if self.is_outbound() {
2153                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2154                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2155                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2156                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2157                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2158                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2159                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2160                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2161                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2162                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2163                                                 }
2164                                 }
2165                         }
2166                 }
2167
2168                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2169                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2170                 }
2171
2172                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2173                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2174                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2175                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2176                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2177                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2178                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2179                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2180                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2181                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2182                                 }
2183                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2184                         } else {
2185                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2186                         }
2187                 }
2188
2189                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2190                         commitment_tx,
2191                         msg.signature,
2192                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2193                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2194                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2195                 );
2196
2197                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2198                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2199
2200                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2201                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2202                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2203                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2204                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2205                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2206                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2207                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2208                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2209                                         need_commitment = true;
2210                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2211                                 }
2212                         }
2213                 }
2214
2215                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2216                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2217                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2218                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2219                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2220                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2221                         }]
2222                 };
2223
2224                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2225                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2226                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2227                         } else { None };
2228                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2229                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2230                                 need_commitment = true;
2231                         }
2232                 }
2233                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2234                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2235                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2236                         } else { None } {
2237                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2238                                 need_commitment = true;
2239                         }
2240                 }
2241
2242                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2243                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2244                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2245                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2246
2247                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2248                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2249                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2250                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2251                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2252                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2253                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2254                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2255                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2256                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2257                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2258                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2259                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2260                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2261                         }
2262                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2263                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2264                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2265                 }
2266
2267                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2268                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2269                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2270                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2271                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2272                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2273                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2274                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2275                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2276                         (Some(msg), None)
2277                 } else if !need_commitment {
2278                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2279                 } else { (None, None) };
2280
2281                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2282                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2283                         per_commitment_secret,
2284                         next_per_commitment_point,
2285                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2286         }
2287
2288         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2289         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2290         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2291                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2292                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2293                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2294
2295                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2296                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2297                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2298                         };
2299
2300                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2301                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2302                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2303                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2304                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2305                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2306                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2307                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2308                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2309                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2310                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2311                                 // to rebalance channels.
2312                                 match &htlc_update {
2313                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2314                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2315                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2316                                                         Err(e) => {
2317                                                                 match e {
2318                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2319                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2320                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2321                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2322                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2323                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2324                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2325                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2326                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2327                                                                         },
2328                                                                         _ => {
2329                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2330                                                                         },
2331                                                                 }
2332                                                         }
2333                                                 }
2334                                         },
2335                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2336                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2337                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2338                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2339                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2340                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2341                                                                 }
2342                                                         },
2343                                                         Err(e) => {
2344                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2345                                                                 else {
2346                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2347                                                                 }
2348                                                         }
2349                                                 }
2350                                         },
2351                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2352                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2353                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2354                                                         Err(e) => {
2355                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2356                                                                 else {
2357                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2358                                                                 }
2359                                                         }
2360                                                 }
2361                                         },
2362                                 }
2363                         }
2364                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2365                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2366                         }
2367                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2368                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2369                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2370                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2371                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2372                                 })
2373                         } else {
2374                                 None
2375                         };
2376
2377                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2378                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2379                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2380                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2381                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2382
2383                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2384                                 update_add_htlcs,
2385                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2386                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2387                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2388                                 update_fee,
2389                                 commitment_signed,
2390                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2391                 } else {
2392                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2393                 }
2394         }
2395
2396         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2397         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2398         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2399         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2400         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2401         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2402                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2403                                         L::Target: Logger,
2404         {
2405                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2406                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2407                 }
2408                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2409                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2410                 }
2411                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2412                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2413                 }
2414
2415                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2416                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2417                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2418                         }
2419                 }
2420
2421                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2422                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2423                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2424                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2425                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2426                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2427                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2428                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2429                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2430                 }
2431
2432                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2433                 {
2434                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2435                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2436                 }
2437
2438                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2439                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2440                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2441                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2442                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2443                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2444                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2445                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2446                         }],
2447                 };
2448
2449                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2450                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2451                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2452                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2453                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2454                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2455                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2456                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2457
2458                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2459                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2460                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2461                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2462                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2463                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2464                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2465
2466                 {
2467                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2468                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2469                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2470
2471                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2472                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2473                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2474                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2475                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2476                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2477                                         }
2478                                         false
2479                                 } else { true }
2480                         });
2481                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2482                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2483                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2484                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2485                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2486                                         } else {
2487                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2488                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2489                                         }
2490                                         false
2491                                 } else { true }
2492                         });
2493                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2494                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2495                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2496                                         true
2497                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2498                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2499                                         true
2500                                 } else { false };
2501                                 if swap {
2502                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2503                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2504
2505                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2506                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2507                                                 require_commitment = true;
2508                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2509                                                 match forward_info {
2510                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2511                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2512                                                                 match fail_msg {
2513                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2514                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2515                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2516                                                                         },
2517                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2518                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2519                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2520                                                                         },
2521                                                                 }
2522                                                         },
2523                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2524                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2525                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2526                                                         }
2527                                                 }
2528                                         }
2529                                 }
2530                         }
2531                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2532                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2533                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2534                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2535                                 }
2536                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2537                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2538                                 } else { None } {
2539                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2540                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2541                                         require_commitment = true;
2542                                 }
2543                         }
2544                 }
2545                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2546
2547                 if self.is_outbound() {
2548                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2549                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2550                         }
2551                 } else {
2552                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2553                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2554                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2555                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2556                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2557                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2558                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2559                                         require_commitment = true;
2560                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2561                                 }
2562                         }
2563                 }
2564
2565                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2566                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2567                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2568                         if require_commitment {
2569                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2570                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2571                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2572                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2573                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2574                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2575                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2576                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2577                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2578                         }
2579                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2580                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2581                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2582                 }
2583
2584                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2585                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2586                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2587                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2588                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2589                                 }
2590                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2591                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2592                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2593                                 }
2594
2595                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2596                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2597                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2598                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2599
2600                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2601                         },
2602                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2603                                 if require_commitment {
2604                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2605
2606                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2607                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2608                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2609                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2610
2611                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2612                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2613                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2614                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2615                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2616                                                 update_fee: None,
2617                                                 commitment_signed
2618                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2619                                 } else {
2620                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2621                                 }
2622                         }
2623                 }
2624
2625         }
2626
2627         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2628         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2629         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2630         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2631                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2632                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2633                 }
2634                 if !self.is_usable() {
2635                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2636                 }
2637                 if !self.is_live() {
2638                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2639                 }
2640
2641                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2642                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2643                         return None;
2644                 }
2645
2646                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2647                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2648
2649                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2650                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2651                         feerate_per_kw,
2652                 })
2653         }
2654
2655         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2656                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2657                         Some(update_fee) => {
2658                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2659                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2660                         },
2661                         None => Ok(None)
2662                 }
2663         }
2664
2665         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2666         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2667         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2668         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2669         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2670         /// completed.
2671         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2672                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2673
2674                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2675                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2676                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2677                         return outbound_drops;
2678                 }
2679                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2680                 // will be retransmitted.
2681                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2682
2683                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2684                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2685                         match htlc.state {
2686                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2687                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2688                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2689                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2690                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2691                                         false
2692                                 },
2693                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2694                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2695                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2696                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2697                                         true
2698                                 },
2699                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2700                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2701                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2702                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2703                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2704                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2705                                         true
2706                                 },
2707                         }
2708                 });
2709                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2710
2711                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2712                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2713                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2714                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2715                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2716                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2717                         }
2718                 }
2719
2720                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2721                         match htlc_update {
2722                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2723                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2724                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2725                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2726                                 // logic.
2727                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2728                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2729                                         false
2730                                 },
2731                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2732                         }
2733                 });
2734                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2735                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2736                 outbound_drops
2737         }
2738
2739         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2740         /// updates are partially paused.
2741         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2742         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2743         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2744         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2745         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2746                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2747                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2748                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2749                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2750                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2751                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2752                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2753                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2754         }
2755
2756         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2757         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2758         /// to the remote side.
2759         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2760                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2761                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2762
2763                 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2764
2765                 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2766                 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2767                 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2768                 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2769                 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2770                 // monitor was persisted.
2771                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2772                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2773                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2774                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2775                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2776                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2777                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2778                         })
2779                 } else { None };
2780
2781                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2782                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2783                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2784                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2785
2786                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2787                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2788                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2789                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2790                 }
2791
2792                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2793                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2794                 } else { None };
2795                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2796                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2797                 } else { None };
2798
2799                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2800                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2801                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2802                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2803                         if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2804                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2805                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2806                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2807                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2808         }
2809
2810         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2811                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2812         {
2813                 if self.is_outbound() {
2814                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2815                 }
2816                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2817                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2818                 }
2819                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2820                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2821                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2822                 Ok(())
2823         }
2824
2825         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2826                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2827                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2828                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2829                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2830                         per_commitment_secret,
2831                         next_per_commitment_point,
2832                 }
2833         }
2834
2835         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2836                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2837                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2838                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2839                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2840
2841                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2842                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2843                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2844                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2845                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2846                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2847                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2848                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2849                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2850                                 });
2851                         }
2852                 }
2853
2854                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2855                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2856                                 match reason {
2857                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2858                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2859                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2860                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2861                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2862                                                 });
2863                                         },
2864                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2865                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2866                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2867                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2868                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2869                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2870                                                 });
2871                                         },
2872                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2873                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2874                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2875                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2876                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2877                                                 });
2878                                         },
2879                                 }
2880                         }
2881                 }
2882
2883                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2884                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2885                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2886                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2887                         update_fee: None,
2888                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2889                 }
2890         }
2891
2892         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2893         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2894         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2895                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2896                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2897                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2898                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2899                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2900                 }
2901
2902                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2903                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2904                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2905                 }
2906
2907                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2908                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2909                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2910                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2911                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2912                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2913                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2914                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2915                                         }
2916                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2917                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2918                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2919                                                 ));
2920                                         }
2921                                 },
2922                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2923                         }
2924                 }
2925
2926                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2927                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2928                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2929
2930                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2931                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2932                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2933                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2934                         })
2935                 } else { None };
2936
2937                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2938                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2939                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2940                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2941                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2942                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2943                                 }
2944                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2945                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2946                         }
2947
2948                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2949                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2950                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2951                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2952                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2953                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2954                 }
2955
2956                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2957                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2958                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2959                         None
2960                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2961                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2962                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2963                                 None
2964                         } else {
2965                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2966                         }
2967                 } else {
2968                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2969                 };
2970
2971                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2972                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2973                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2974                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2975                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2976
2977                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2978                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2979                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2980                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2981                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2982                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2983                         })
2984                 } else { None };
2985
2986                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2987                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2988                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2989                         } else {
2990                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2991                         }
2992
2993                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2994                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2995                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2996                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2997                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2998                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
2999                                         }
3000                                 }
3001
3002                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3003                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3004                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3005                                 // now!
3006                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3007                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3008                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3009                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3010                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3011                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3012                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3013                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3014                                         },
3015                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3016                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3017                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3018                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3019                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3020                                         },
3021                                 }
3022                         } else {
3023                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3024                         }
3025                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3026                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3027                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3028                         } else {
3029                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3030                         }
3031
3032                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3033                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3034                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3035                         }
3036
3037                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3038                 } else {
3039                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3040                 }
3041         }
3042
3043         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3044                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3045         {
3046                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3047                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3048                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3049                         return None;
3050                 }
3051
3052                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3053                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3054                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3055                 }
3056                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3057                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3058
3059                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3060                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3061                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3062                         .ok();
3063                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3064                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3065
3066                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3067                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3068                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3069                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3070                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3071                 })
3072         }
3073
3074         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3075                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3076         {
3077                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3078                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3079                 }
3080                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3081                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3082                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3083                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3084                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3085                 }
3086                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3087                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3088                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3089                         }
3090                 }
3091                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3092
3093                 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3094                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3095                 }
3096
3097                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3098                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3099                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3100                         }
3101                 } else {
3102                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3103                 }
3104
3105                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3106
3107                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3108                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3109
3110                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3111                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3112                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3113                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3114                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3115                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3116                         match htlc_update {
3117                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3118                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3119                                         false
3120                                 },
3121                                 _ => true
3122                         }
3123                 });
3124                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3125                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3126                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3127
3128                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3129                         None
3130                 } else {
3131                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3132                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3133                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3134                         })
3135                 };
3136
3137                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3138                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3139
3140                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3141         }
3142
3143         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3144                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3145                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3146                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3147
3148                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3149
3150                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3151                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3152                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3153                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3154                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3155                 } else {
3156                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3157                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3158                 }
3159                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3160                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3161
3162                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3163         }
3164
3165         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3166                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3167         {
3168                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3169                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3170                 }
3171                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3172                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3173                 }
3174                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3175                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3176                 }
3177                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3178                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3179                 }
3180
3181                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3182                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3183                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3184                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3185                 }
3186                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3187
3188                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3189                         Ok(_) => {},
3190                         Err(_e) => {
3191                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3192                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3193                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3194                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3195                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3196                         },
3197                 };
3198
3199                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3200                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3201                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3202                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3203                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3204                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3205                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3206                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3207                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3208                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3209                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3210                         }
3211                 }
3212
3213                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3214                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3215                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3216                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3217                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3218                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3219                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3220                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3221                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3222                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3223                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3224                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3225                                         signature: sig,
3226                                 }), None))
3227                         }
3228                 }
3229
3230                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3231                 if self.is_outbound() {
3232                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3233                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3234                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3235                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3236                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3237                                         }
3238                                 }
3239                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3240                         }
3241                 } else {
3242                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3243                 }
3244                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3245                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3246                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3247                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3248                                 }
3249                         }
3250                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3251                 }
3252
3253                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3254                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3255                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3256                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3257                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3258                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3259
3260                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3261                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3262
3263                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3264                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3265                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3266                         signature: sig,
3267                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3268         }
3269
3270         // Public utilities:
3271
3272         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3273                 self.channel_id
3274         }
3275
3276         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3277         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3278         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3279                 self.user_id
3280         }
3281
3282         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3283         /// is_usable() returns true).
3284         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3285         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3286                 self.short_channel_id
3287         }
3288
3289         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3290         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3291         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3292                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3293         }
3294
3295         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3296                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3297         }
3298
3299         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3300                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3301         }
3302
3303         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3304                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3305         }
3306
3307         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3308                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3309         }
3310
3311         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3312         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3313                 self.counterparty_node_id
3314         }
3315
3316         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3317         #[cfg(test)]
3318         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3319                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3320         }
3321
3322         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3323         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3324                 return cmp::min(
3325                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3326                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3327                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3328                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 9 / 10,
3329
3330                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3331                 );
3332         }
3333
3334         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3335         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3336                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3337         }
3338
3339         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3340                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3341         }
3342
3343         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3344                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3345         }
3346
3347         #[cfg(test)]
3348         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3349                 self.feerate_per_kw
3350         }
3351
3352         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3353                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3354         }
3355
3356         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3357                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3358         }
3359
3360         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3361                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3362         }
3363
3364         #[cfg(test)]
3365         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3366                 &self.holder_signer
3367         }
3368
3369         #[cfg(test)]
3370         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3371                 ChannelValueStat {
3372                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3373                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3374                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3375                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3376                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3377                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3378                                 let mut res = 0;
3379                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3380                                         match h {
3381                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3382                                                         res += amount_msat;
3383                                                 }
3384                                                 _ => {}
3385                                         }
3386                                 }
3387                                 res
3388                         },
3389                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3390                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3391                 }
3392         }
3393
3394         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3395         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3396                 self.update_time_counter
3397         }
3398
3399         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3400                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3401         }
3402
3403         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3404                 self.config.announced_channel
3405         }
3406
3407         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3408                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3409         }
3410
3411         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3412         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3413         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3414                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3415         {
3416                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3417                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3418
3419                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3420                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3421
3422                 if self.is_outbound() {
3423                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3424                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3425                 }
3426
3427                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3428                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3429
3430                 res as u32
3431         }
3432
3433         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3434         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3435                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3436         }
3437
3438         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3439         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3440         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3441                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3442                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3443         }
3444
3445         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3446         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3447         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3448         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3449                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3450         }
3451
3452         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3453         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3454         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3455                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3456         }
3457
3458         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3459         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3460                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3461         }
3462
3463         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3464         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3465         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3466         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3467                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3468                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3469                         true
3470                 } else { false }
3471         }
3472
3473         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3474                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3475         }
3476
3477         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3478                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3479         }
3480
3481         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3482                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3483         }
3484
3485         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3486                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3487         }
3488
3489         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3490                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3491         }
3492
3493         /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3494         /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3495         /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3496         /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3497         /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3498         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3499         ///
3500         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3501         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3502         /// post-shutdown.
3503         /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3504         ///
3505         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3506         /// back.
3507         pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3508                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3509                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3510                         match htlc_update {
3511                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3512                                         if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3513                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3514                                                 false
3515                                         } else { true }
3516                                 },
3517                                 _ => true
3518                         }
3519                 });
3520                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3521                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3522                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3523                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3524                         }
3525                 }
3526                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3527                         for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3528                                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3529                                 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3530                                         let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3531                                         if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3532                                                         tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3533                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3534                                                         // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3535                                                         // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3536                                                         // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3537                                                         // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3538                                                         // channel and move on.
3539                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3540                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3541                                                 }
3542                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3543                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3544                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3545                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3546                                                         data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3547                                                 });
3548                                         } else {
3549                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3550                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
3551                                                                 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3552                                                                         // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3553                                                                         // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3554                                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3555                                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3556                                                                 }
3557                                                         }
3558                                                 }
3559                                                 if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
3560                                                         panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
3561                                                 }
3562                                                 assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
3563                                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3564                                                 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)         << (5*8)) |
3565                                                                              ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3566                                                                              ((txo_idx as u64)        << (0*8)));
3567                                         }
3568                                 }
3569                         }
3570                 }
3571                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3572                         self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3573                         self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3574                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3575                                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3576                                         let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3577                                                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3578                                                 true
3579                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3580                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3581                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3582                                                 true
3583                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3584                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3585                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3586                                                 false
3587                                         } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3588                                                 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3589                                         } else {
3590                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3591                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3592                                                 false
3593                                         };
3594                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
3595
3596                                         //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3597                                         //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3598                                         //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3599                                         //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3600                                         if need_commitment_update {
3601                                                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3602                                                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3603                                                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3604                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3605                                                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3606                                                         }), timed_out_htlcs));
3607                                                 } else {
3608                                                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3609                                                         return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3610                                                 }
3611                                         }
3612                                 }
3613                         }
3614                 }
3615                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3616         }
3617
3618         /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3619         /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3620         /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3621         pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3622                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3623                         self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3624                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3625                                 return true;
3626                         }
3627                 }
3628                 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3629                 if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3630                         self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3631                 }
3632                 false
3633         }
3634
3635         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3636         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3637
3638         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3639                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3640                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3641                 }
3642                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3643                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3644                 }
3645
3646                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3647                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3648                 }
3649
3650                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3651                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3652
3653                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3654                         chain_hash,
3655                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3656                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3657                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3658                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3659                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3660                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3661                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3662                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3663                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3664                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3665                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3666                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3667                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3668                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3669                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3670                         first_per_commitment_point,
3671                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3672                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3673                 }
3674         }
3675
3676         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3677                 if self.is_outbound() {
3678                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3679                 }
3680                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3681                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3682                 }
3683                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3684                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3685                 }
3686
3687                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3688                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3689
3690                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3691                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3692                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3693                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3694                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3695                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3696                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3697                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3698                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3699                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3700                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3701                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3702                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3703                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3704                         first_per_commitment_point,
3705                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3706                 }
3707         }
3708
3709         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3710         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3711                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3712                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3713                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3714                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3715         }
3716
3717         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3718         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3719         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3720         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3721         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3722         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3723         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3724         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3725                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3726                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3727                 }
3728                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3729                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3730                 }
3731                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3732                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3733                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3734                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3735                 }
3736
3737                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3738                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3739
3740                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3741                         Ok(res) => res,
3742                         Err(e) => {
3743                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3744                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3745                                 return Err(e);
3746                         }
3747                 };
3748
3749                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3750
3751                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3752
3753                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3754                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3755
3756                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3757                         temporary_channel_id,
3758                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3759                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3760                         signature
3761                 })
3762         }
3763
3764         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3765         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3766         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3767         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3768         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3769         /// closing).
3770         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3771         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3772         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3773                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3774                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3775                 }
3776                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3777                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3778                 }
3779                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3780                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3781                 }
3782
3783                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3784
3785                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3786                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3787                         chain_hash,
3788                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3789                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3790                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3791                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3792                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3793                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3794                 };
3795
3796                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3797                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3798
3799                 Ok((msg, sig))
3800         }
3801
3802         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3803         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3804         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3805                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3806                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3807                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3808                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3809                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3810                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3811                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3812                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3813                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3814                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3815                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3816                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3817                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3818                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3819                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3820                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3821                         })
3822                 } else {
3823                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3824                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3825                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3826                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3827                         })
3828                 };
3829                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3830                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3831                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3832                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3833                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3834                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3835                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3836                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3837
3838                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3839                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3840                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3841                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3842                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3843                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3844                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3845                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3846                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3847                         // overflow here.
3848                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3849                         data_loss_protect,
3850                 }
3851         }
3852
3853
3854         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3855
3856         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3857         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3858         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3859         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3860         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3861         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3862         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3863         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3864                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3865                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3866                 }
3867                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3868                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3869                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3870                 }
3871
3872                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3873                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3874                 }
3875
3876                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3877                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3878                 }
3879
3880                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3881                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3882                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3883                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3884                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3885                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3886                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3887                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3888                 }
3889
3890                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3891                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3892                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3893                 }
3894                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3895                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3896                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3897                 }
3898
3899                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3900                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3901                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3902                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3903                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3904                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3905                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3906                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3907                         }
3908                 }
3909
3910                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3911                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3912                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3913                 }
3914
3915                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3916                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3917                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3918                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3919                 } else { 0 };
3920                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3921                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3922                 }
3923
3924                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3925                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3926                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3927                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3928                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3929                 }
3930
3931                 // Now update local state:
3932                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3933                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3934                                 amount_msat,
3935                                 payment_hash,
3936                                 cltv_expiry,
3937                                 source,
3938                                 onion_routing_packet,
3939                         });
3940                         return Ok(None);
3941                 }
3942
3943                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3944                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3945                         amount_msat,
3946                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3947                         cltv_expiry,
3948                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3949                         source,
3950                 });
3951
3952                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3953                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3954                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3955                         amount_msat,
3956                         payment_hash,
3957                         cltv_expiry,
3958                         onion_routing_packet,
3959                 };
3960                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3961
3962                 Ok(Some(res))
3963         }
3964
3965         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3966         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3967         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3968         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3969         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3970                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3971                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3972                 }
3973                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3974                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3975                 }
3976                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3977                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3978                 }
3979                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3980                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3981                 }
3982                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3983                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3984                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3985                                 have_updates = true;
3986                         }
3987                         if have_updates { break; }
3988                 }
3989                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3990                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3991                                 have_updates = true;
3992                         }
3993                         if have_updates { break; }
3994                 }
3995                 if !have_updates {
3996                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3997                 }
3998                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
3999         }
4000         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4001         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4002                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4003                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4004                 // is acceptable.
4005                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4006                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4007                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4008                         } else { None };
4009                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4010                                 htlc.state = state;
4011                         }
4012                 }
4013                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4014                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4015                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4016                         } else { None } {
4017                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4018                         }
4019                 }
4020                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4021
4022                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4023                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4024                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4025                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4026                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4027                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4028                         },
4029                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4030                 };
4031
4032                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4033                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4034                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4035                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4036                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4037                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4038                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4039                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4040                         }]
4041                 };
4042                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4043                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4044         }
4045
4046         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4047         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4048         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4049                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4050                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4051                         if self.is_outbound() {
4052                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4053                         }
4054                 }
4055
4056                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4057                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4058                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4059                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4060
4061                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4062                 {
4063                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4064                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4065                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4066                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4067                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4068                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4069                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4070                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4071                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4072                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4073                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4074                                                 }
4075                                 }
4076                         }
4077                 }
4078
4079                 {
4080                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4081                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4082                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4083                         }
4084
4085                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4086                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4087                         signature = res.0;
4088                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4089
4090                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4091                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4092                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4093                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4094                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4095
4096                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4097                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4098                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4099                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4100                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4101                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4102                         }
4103                 }
4104
4105                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4106                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4107                         signature,
4108                         htlc_signatures,
4109                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4110         }
4111
4112         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4113         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4114         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4115         /// more info.
4116         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4117                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4118                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4119                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4120                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4121                         },
4122                         None => Ok(None)
4123                 }
4124         }
4125
4126         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4127         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4128         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4129                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4130                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4131                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4132                         }
4133                 }
4134                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4135                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4136                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4137                         }
4138                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4139                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4140                         }
4141                 }
4142                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4143                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4144                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4145                 }
4146
4147                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4148
4149                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4150                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4151                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4152                 } else {
4153                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4154                 }
4155                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4156
4157                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4158                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4159                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4160                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4161                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4162                         match htlc_update {
4163                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4164                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4165                                         false
4166                                 },
4167                                 _ => true
4168                         }
4169                 });
4170
4171                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4172                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4173                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4174                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4175         }
4176
4177         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4178         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4179         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4180         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4181         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4182         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4183                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4184
4185                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4186                 // return them to fail the payment.
4187                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4188                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4189                         match htlc_update {
4190                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4191                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4192                                 },
4193                                 _ => {}
4194                         }
4195                 }
4196                 let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4197                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4198                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4199                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4200                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4201                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4202                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4203                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4204                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4205                                 Some(funding_txo.clone())
4206                         } else { None }
4207                 } else { None };
4208
4209                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4210                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4211                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4212                 (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4213                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4214                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4215                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4216         }
4217 }
4218
4219 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4220         // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4221
4222         // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4223         // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4224         // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4225         let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4226         if is_script_too_long {
4227                 return true;
4228         }
4229
4230         if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4231                 return false;
4232         }
4233
4234         return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4235 }
4236
4237 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4238 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4239
4240 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4241         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4242                 match self {
4243                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4244                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4245                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4246                         },
4247                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4248                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4249                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4250                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4251                         },
4252                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4253                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4254                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4255                         },
4256                 }
4257                 Ok(())
4258         }
4259 }
4260
4261 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4262         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4263                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4264                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4265                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4266                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4267                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4268                 })
4269         }
4270 }
4271
4272 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4273         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4274                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4275                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4276
4277                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4278                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4279
4280                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4281                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4282
4283                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4284                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4285                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4286
4287                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4288
4289                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4290                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4291                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4292                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4293                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4294                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4295
4296                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4297                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4298
4299                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4300                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4301                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4302
4303                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4304                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4305                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4306                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4307                         }
4308                 }
4309                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4310                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4311                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4312                                 continue; // Drop
4313                         }
4314                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4315                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4316                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4317                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4318                         match &htlc.state {
4319                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4320                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4321                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4322                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4323                                 },
4324                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4325                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4326                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4327                                 },
4328                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4329                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4330                                 },
4331                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4332                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4333                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4334                                 },
4335                         }
4336                 }
4337
4338                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4339                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4340                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4341                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4342                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4343                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4344                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4345                         match &htlc.state {
4346                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4347                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4348                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4349                                 },
4350                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4351                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4352                                 },
4353                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4354                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4355                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4356                                 },
4357                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4358                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4359                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4360                                 },
4361                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4362                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4363                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4364                                 },
4365                         }
4366                 }
4367
4368                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4369                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4370                         match update {
4371                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4372                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4373                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4374                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4375                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4376                                         source.write(writer)?;
4377                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4378                                 },
4379                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4380                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4381                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4382                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4383                                 },
4384                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4385                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4386                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4387                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4388                                 }
4389                         }
4390                 }
4391
4392                 match self.resend_order {
4393                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4394                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4395                 }
4396
4397                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4398                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4399                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4400
4401                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4402                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4403                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4404                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4405                 }
4406
4407                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4408                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4409                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4410                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4411                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4412                 }
4413
4414                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4415                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4416
4417                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4418                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4419                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4420                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4421
4422                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4423                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4424                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4425                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4426                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4427                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4428                         },
4429                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4430                 }
4431
4432                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4433                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4434
4435                 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4436                 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4437
4438                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4439                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4440                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4441                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4442                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4443                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4444                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4445                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4446
4447                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4448                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4449
4450                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4451                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4452
4453                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4454
4455                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4456                 Ok(())
4457         }
4458 }
4459
4460 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4461 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4462                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4463         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4464                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4465                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4466                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4467                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4468                 }
4469
4470                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4471                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4472
4473                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4474                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4475                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4476
4477                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4478
4479                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4480                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4481                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4482                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4483                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4484                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4485                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4486                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4487                 }
4488                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4489
4490                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4491                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4492
4493                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4494                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4495                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4496
4497                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4498                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4499                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4500                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4501                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4502                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4503                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4504                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4505                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4506                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4507                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4508                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4509                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4510                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4511                                 },
4512                         });
4513                 }
4514
4515                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4516                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4517                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4518                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4519                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4520                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4521                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4522                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4523                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4524                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4525                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4526                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4527                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4528                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4529                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4530                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4531                                 },
4532                         });
4533                 }
4534
4535                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4536                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4537                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4538                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4539                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4540                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4541                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4542                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4543                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4544                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4545                                 },
4546                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4547                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4548                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4549                                 },
4550                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4551                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4552                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4553                                 },
4554                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4555                         });
4556                 }
4557
4558                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4559                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4560                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4561                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4562                 };
4563
4564                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4565                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4566                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4567
4568                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4569                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4570                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4571                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4572                 }
4573
4574                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4575                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4576                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4577                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4578                 }
4579
4580                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4581                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4582
4583                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4584                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4585                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4586                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4587
4588                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4589                         0 => None,
4590                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4591                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4592                 };
4593
4594                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4595                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4596
4597                 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4598                 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4599
4600                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4601                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4602                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4603                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4605                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4606                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4607                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4608
4609                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4610                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4611
4612                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4613                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4614
4615                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4616                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4617
4618                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4619                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4620
4621                 Ok(Channel {
4622                         user_id,
4623
4624                         config,
4625                         channel_id,
4626                         channel_state,
4627                         secp_ctx,
4628                         channel_value_satoshis,
4629
4630                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4631
4632                         holder_signer,
4633                         shutdown_pubkey,
4634                         destination_script,
4635
4636                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4637                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4638                         value_to_self_msat,
4639
4640                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4641                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4642                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4643
4644                         resend_order,
4645
4646                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4647                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4648                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4649                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4650                         monitor_pending_failures,
4651
4652                         pending_update_fee,
4653                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4654                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4655                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4656                         update_time_counter,
4657                         feerate_per_kw,
4658
4659                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4660                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4661                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4662                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4663
4664                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4665
4666                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4667                         short_channel_id,
4668                         last_block_connected,
4669                         funding_tx_confirmations,
4670
4671                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4672                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4673                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4674                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4675                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4676                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4677                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4678                         minimum_depth,
4679
4680                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4681                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4682
4683                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4684                         counterparty_node_id,
4685
4686                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4687
4688                         commitment_secrets,
4689
4690                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4691
4692                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4693                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4694                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4695                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4696                 })
4697         }
4698 }
4699
4700 #[cfg(test)]
4701 mod tests {
4702         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4703         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4704         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4705         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4706         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4707         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4708         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4709         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4710         use hex;
4711         use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4712         use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4713         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4714         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4715         use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
4716         use ln::chan_utils;
4717         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4718         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4719         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
4720         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4721         use util::config::UserConfig;
4722         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4723         use util::test_utils;
4724         use util::logger::Logger;
4725         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4726         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4727         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4728         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4729         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4730         use std::sync::Arc;
4731
4732         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4733                 fee_est: u32
4734         }
4735         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4736                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4737                         self.fee_est
4738                 }
4739         }
4740
4741         #[test]
4742         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4743                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4744                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4745         }
4746
4747         struct Keys {
4748                 signer: InMemorySigner,
4749         }
4750         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4751                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4752
4753                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4754                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4755                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4756                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4757                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4758                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4759                 }
4760
4761                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4762                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4763                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4764                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4765                 }
4766
4767                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4768                         self.signer.clone()
4769                 }
4770                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4771                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4772         }
4773
4774         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4775                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4776         }
4777
4778         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4779         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4780         #[test]
4781         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4782                 let original_fee = 253;
4783                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4784                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4785                 let seed = [42; 32];
4786                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4787                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4788
4789                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4790                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4791                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4792
4793                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4794                 // same as the old fee.
4795                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4796                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4797                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4798         }
4799
4800         #[test]
4801         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4802                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4803                 // dust limits are used.
4804                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4805                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4806                 let seed = [42; 32];
4807                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4808                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4809
4810                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4811                 // they have different dust limits.
4812
4813                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4814                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4815                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4816                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4817
4818                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4819                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4820                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4821                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
4822                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4823                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4824
4825                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4826                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4827                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4828                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4829
4830                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4831                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4832                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4833                         htlc_id: 0,
4834                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4835                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4836                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4837                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4838                 });
4839
4840                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4841                         htlc_id: 1,
4842                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4843                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4844                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4845                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4846                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4847                                 path: Vec::new(),
4848                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4849                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4850                         }
4851                 });
4852
4853                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4854                 // the dust limit check.
4855                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4856                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4857                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4858                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4859
4860                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4861                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4862                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4863                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4864                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4865                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4866                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
4867         }
4868
4869         #[test]
4870         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
4871                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
4872                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
4873                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
4874                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
4875                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
4876                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4877                 let seed = [42; 32];
4878                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4879                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4880
4881                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4882                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4883                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4884
4885                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4886                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
4887
4888                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
4889                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4890                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4891                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4892                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4893                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4894
4895                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4896                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4897                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4898                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4899                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4900
4901                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4902
4903                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4904                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4905                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4906                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4907                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4908
4909                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4910                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4911                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4912                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4913                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4914         }
4915
4916         #[test]
4917         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4918                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4919                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4920                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4921                 let seed = [42; 32];
4922                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4923                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4924
4925                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4926
4927                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4928                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4929                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4930                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4931
4932                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4933                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4934                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4935                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4936
4937                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4938                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4939                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4940
4941                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4942                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4943                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4944                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4945                 }]};
4946                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4947                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4948                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4949
4950                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4951                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4952
4953                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4954                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4955                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4956                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4957                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4958                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4959                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4960                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4961                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4962                         },
4963                         _ => panic!()
4964                 }
4965
4966                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4967                 // is sane.
4968                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4969                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4970                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4971                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4972                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4973                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4974                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4975                         },
4976                         _ => panic!()
4977                 }
4978         }
4979
4980         #[test]
4981         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4982                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4983                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4984                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4985                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4986
4987                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
4988                         &secp_ctx,
4989                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4990                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4991                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4992                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4993                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4994
4995                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4996                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4997                         10_000_000,
4998                         [0; 32]
4999                 );
5000
5001                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5002                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5003                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5004
5005                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5006                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5007                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5008                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5009                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5010
5011                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5012
5013                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5014                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5015                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5016                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5017                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5018                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5019                 };
5020                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5021                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5022                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5023                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5024                         });
5025                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5026                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5027
5028                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5029                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5030
5031                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5032                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5033
5034                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5035                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5036
5037                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5038                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5039                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5040                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5041                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5042                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5043                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5044                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5045
5046                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5047                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5048                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5049                         } ) => { {
5050                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5051                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5052
5053                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5054                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5055                                                 .collect();
5056                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5057                                 };
5058                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5059                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5060                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5061                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5062                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5063                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5064
5065                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5066                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5067                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5068                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5069                                 $({
5070                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5071                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5072                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5073                                 })*
5074                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5075
5076                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5077                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5078                                         counterparty_signature,
5079                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5080                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5081                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5082                                 );
5083                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5084                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5085
5086                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5087                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5088                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5089
5090                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5091                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5092
5093                                 $({
5094                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5095
5096                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5097                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5098                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5099                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5100                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5101
5102                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5103                                         if !htlc.offered {
5104                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5105                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5106                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5107                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5108                                                         }
5109                                                 }
5110
5111                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5112                                         }
5113
5114                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5115                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5116
5117                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5118                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5119                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5120                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5121                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5122                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5123                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5124                                 })*
5125                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5126                         } }
5127                 }
5128
5129                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5130                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5131
5132                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5133                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5134                                                  "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", {});
5135
5136                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5137                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5138                                 htlc_id: 0,
5139                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5140                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5141                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5142                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5143                         };
5144                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5145                         out
5146                 });
5147                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5148                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5149                                 htlc_id: 1,
5150                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5151                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5152                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5153                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5154                         };
5155                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5156                         out
5157                 });
5158                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5159                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5160                                 htlc_id: 2,
5161                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5162                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5163                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5164                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5165                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5166                         };
5167                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5168                         out
5169                 });
5170                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5171                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5172                                 htlc_id: 3,
5173                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5174                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5175                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5176                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5177                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5178                         };
5179                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5180                         out
5181                 });
5182                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5183                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5184                                 htlc_id: 4,
5185                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5186                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5187                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5188                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5189                         };
5190                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5191                         out
5192                 });
5193
5194                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5195                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5196                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5197
5198                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5199                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5200                                  "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", {
5201
5202                                   { 0,
5203                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5204                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5205                                   "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" },
5206
5207                                   { 1,
5208                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5209                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5210                                   "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" },
5211
5212                                   { 2,
5213                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5214                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5215                                   "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" },
5216
5217                                   { 3,
5218                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5219                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5220                                   "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" },
5221
5222                                   { 4,
5223                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5224                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5225                                   "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" }
5226                 } );
5227
5228                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5229                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5230                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5231
5232                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5233                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5234                                  "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", {
5235
5236                                   { 0,
5237                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5238                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5239                                   "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" },
5240
5241                                   { 1,
5242                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5243                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5244                                   "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" },
5245
5246                                   { 2,
5247                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5248                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5249                                   "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" },
5250
5251                                   { 3,
5252                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5253                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5254                                   "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5255
5256                                   { 4,
5257                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5258                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5259                                   "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" }
5260                 } );
5261
5262                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5263                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5264                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5265
5266                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5267                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5268                                  "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", {
5269
5270                                   { 0,
5271                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5272                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5273                                   "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" },
5274
5275                                   { 1,
5276                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5277                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5278                                   "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" },
5279
5280                                   { 2,
5281                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5282                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5283                                   "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" },
5284
5285                                   { 3,
5286                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5287                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5288                                   "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" }
5289                 } );
5290
5291                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5292                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5293                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5294
5295                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5296                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5297                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5298
5299                                   { 0,
5300                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5301                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5302                                   "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" },
5303
5304                                   { 1,
5305                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5306                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5307                                   "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" },
5308
5309                                   { 2,
5310                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5311                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5312                                   "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" },
5313
5314                                   { 3,
5315                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5316                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5317                                   "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" }
5318                 } );
5319
5320                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5321                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5322                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5323
5324                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5325                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5326                                  "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", {
5327
5328                                   { 0,
5329                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5330                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5331                                   "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" },
5332
5333                                   { 1,
5334                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5335                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5336                                   "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" },
5337
5338                                   { 2,
5339                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5340                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5341                                   "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" }
5342                 } );
5343
5344                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5345                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5346                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5347
5348                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5349                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5350                                  "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", {
5351
5352                                   { 0,
5353                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5354                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5355                                   "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" },
5356
5357                                   { 1,
5358                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5359                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5360                                   "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" },
5361
5362                                   { 2,
5363                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5364                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5365                                   "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" }
5366                 } );
5367
5368                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5369                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5370                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5371
5372                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5373                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5374                                  "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", {
5375
5376                                   { 0,
5377                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5378                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5379                                   "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5380
5381                                   { 1,
5382                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5383                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5384                                   "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" }
5385                 } );
5386
5387                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5388                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5389                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5390
5391                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5392                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5393                                  "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", {
5394
5395                                   { 0,
5396                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5397                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5398                                   "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5399
5400                                   { 1,
5401                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5402                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5403                                   "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" }
5404                 } );
5405
5406                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5407                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5408                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5409
5410                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5411                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5412                                  "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", {
5413
5414                                   { 0,
5415                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5416                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5417                                   "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" }
5418                 } );
5419
5420                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5421                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5422                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5423
5424                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5425                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5426                                  "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", {
5427
5428                                   { 0,
5429                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5430                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5431                                   "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" }
5432                 } );
5433
5434                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5435                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5436                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5437
5438                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5439                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5440                                  "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", {});
5441
5442                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5443                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5444                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5445
5446                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5447                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5448                                  "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", {});
5449
5450                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5451                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5452                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5453
5454                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5455                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5456                                  "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", {});
5457
5458                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5459                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5460                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5461
5462                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5463                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5464                                  "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", {});
5465
5466                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5467                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5468                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5469                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5470                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5471                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5472                                 htlc_id: 1,
5473                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5474                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5475                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5476                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5477                         };
5478                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5479                         out
5480                 });
5481                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5482                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5483                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5484                                 htlc_id: 6,
5485                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5486                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5487                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5488                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5489                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5490                         };
5491                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5492                         out
5493                 });
5494                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5495                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5496                                 htlc_id: 5,
5497                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5498                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5499                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5500                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5501                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5502                         };
5503                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5504                         out
5505                 });
5506
5507                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5508                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5509                                  "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", {
5510
5511                                   { 0,
5512                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5513                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5514                                   "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" },
5515                                   { 1,
5516                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5517                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5518                                   "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" },
5519                                   { 2,
5520                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5521                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5522                                   "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" }
5523                 } );
5524         }
5525
5526         #[test]
5527         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5528                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5529
5530                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5531                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5532                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5533                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5534
5535                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5536                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5537                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5538
5539                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5540                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5541
5542                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5543                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5544
5545                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5546                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5547                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5548         }
5549
5550         #[test]
5551         fn test_key_derivation() {
5552                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5553                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5554
5555                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5556                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5557
5558                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5559                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5560
5561                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5562                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5563
5564                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5565                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5566
5567                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5568                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5569
5570                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5571                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5572
5573                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5574                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5575         }
5576 }