1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
34 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
35 use util::transaction_utils;
36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
37 use util::logger::Logger;
38 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
42 use std::default::Default;
43 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
45 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
47 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
48 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
51 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
52 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
53 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
54 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
55 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
56 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
57 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
58 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
59 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
62 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
63 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
64 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
65 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
68 enum InboundHTLCState {
69 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
70 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
71 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
72 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
73 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
74 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
75 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
76 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
77 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
78 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
79 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
80 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
81 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
82 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
83 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
85 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
86 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
87 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
88 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
89 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
90 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
91 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
92 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
93 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
94 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
95 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
96 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
97 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
98 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
99 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
100 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
102 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
103 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
104 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
105 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
106 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
108 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
109 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
111 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
112 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
113 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
114 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
115 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
116 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
117 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
118 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
121 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
126 state: InboundHTLCState,
129 enum OutboundHTLCState {
130 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
131 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
132 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
133 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
134 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
135 /// money back (though we won't), and,
136 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
137 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
138 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
139 /// we'll never get out of sync).
140 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
141 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
142 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
144 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
145 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
146 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
147 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
148 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
149 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
150 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
151 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
152 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
153 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
154 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
155 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
156 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
157 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
158 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
161 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: OutboundHTLCState,
170 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
171 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
172 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
176 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
178 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
181 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
186 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
190 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
191 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
192 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
193 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
194 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
195 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
196 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
198 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
199 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
200 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
201 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
202 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
203 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
204 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
206 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
207 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
208 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
210 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
211 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
212 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
213 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
214 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
215 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
217 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
218 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
220 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
221 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
222 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
223 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
224 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
225 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
226 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
227 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
228 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
230 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
231 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
232 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
233 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
234 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
235 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
236 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
237 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
238 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
239 /// us their shutdown.
240 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
241 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
242 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
243 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
245 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
246 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
248 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
250 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
251 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
252 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
253 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
256 /// Status has been gossiped.
258 /// Status has been changed.
260 /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
264 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
270 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
271 struct HTLCCandidate {
273 origin: HTLCInitiator,
277 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
285 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
286 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
287 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
290 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
291 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
292 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
293 config: ChannelConfig,
297 channel_id: [u8; 32],
299 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
300 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
302 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
304 holder_signer: Signer,
305 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
306 destination_script: Script,
308 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
309 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
310 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
312 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
313 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
314 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
315 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
316 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
317 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
319 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
320 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
321 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
322 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
323 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
324 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
326 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
328 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
329 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
330 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
331 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
332 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
334 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
335 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
336 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
338 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
339 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
340 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
341 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
342 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
343 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
344 // commitment_signed.
345 pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
346 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
347 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
348 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
349 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
350 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
351 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
352 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
353 update_time_counter: u32,
356 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
357 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
358 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
361 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
363 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
365 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
366 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
367 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
368 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
369 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
370 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
371 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
372 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
373 pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
374 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
376 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
378 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
380 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
382 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
384 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
385 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
386 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
387 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
388 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
389 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
390 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
392 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
394 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
395 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
398 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
400 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
402 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
403 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
405 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
407 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
409 network_sync: UpdateStatus,
411 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
412 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
413 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
414 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
415 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
416 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
417 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
418 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
421 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
422 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
424 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
425 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
426 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
430 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
431 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
432 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
433 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
434 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
435 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
436 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
439 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
441 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
443 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
445 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
447 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
449 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
451 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
452 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
453 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
454 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
457 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
460 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
461 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
463 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
464 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
465 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
470 macro_rules! secp_check {
471 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
474 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
479 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
480 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
481 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
482 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
485 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
488 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
489 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
490 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
491 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
494 fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
495 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
499 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
500 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
501 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
503 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
504 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
505 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
507 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
508 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
510 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
511 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
512 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
514 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
515 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
517 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
518 if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
519 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
522 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
524 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
525 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
529 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
531 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
532 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
534 channel_value_satoshis,
536 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
539 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
540 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
544 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
546 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
547 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
548 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
549 pending_update_fee: None,
550 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
551 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
552 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
553 update_time_counter: 1,
555 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
557 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
558 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
559 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
560 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
561 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
563 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
564 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
565 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
566 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
568 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
570 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
571 short_channel_id: None,
572 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
573 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
575 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
576 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
577 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
578 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
579 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
580 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
581 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
582 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
583 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
585 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
586 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
587 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
588 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
589 counterparty_parameters: None,
590 funding_outpoint: None
592 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
594 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
595 counterparty_node_id,
597 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
599 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
601 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
603 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
604 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
605 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
606 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
610 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
611 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
613 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
614 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
615 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
617 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
618 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
619 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
624 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
625 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
626 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
627 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
628 F::Target: FeeEstimator
630 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
631 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
632 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
633 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
634 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
635 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
636 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
637 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
639 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
641 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
642 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
645 // Check sanity of message fields:
646 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
647 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
649 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
650 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
652 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
653 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
654 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
656 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
657 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
659 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
660 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
662 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
663 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
666 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
668 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
669 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
670 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
672 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
675 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
676 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
679 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
680 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
681 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
683 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
684 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
686 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
687 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
689 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
690 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
692 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
693 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
695 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
696 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
698 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
699 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
702 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
704 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
705 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
706 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
710 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
711 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
713 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
715 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
716 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
717 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
718 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
720 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
721 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
723 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
724 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
727 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
728 // for full fee payment
729 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
730 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
731 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
732 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
735 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
736 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
737 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
741 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
742 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
743 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
744 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
745 if script.len() == 0 {
747 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
748 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
749 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
754 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
755 &OptionalField::Absent => {
756 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
761 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
762 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
766 config: local_config,
768 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
769 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
772 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
775 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
776 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
778 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
779 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
780 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
782 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
783 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
784 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
785 pending_update_fee: None,
786 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
787 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
788 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
789 update_time_counter: 1,
791 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
793 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
794 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
795 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
796 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
797 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
800 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
801 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
802 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
804 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
806 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
807 short_channel_id: None,
808 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
809 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
811 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
812 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
813 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
814 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
815 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
816 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
817 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
818 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
819 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
820 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
822 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
823 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
824 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
825 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
826 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
827 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
828 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
830 funding_outpoint: None
832 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
834 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
835 counterparty_node_id,
837 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
839 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
841 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
843 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
844 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
845 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
846 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
852 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
853 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
854 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
855 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
856 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
858 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
859 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
860 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
861 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
862 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
863 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
864 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
865 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
866 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
867 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
868 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
870 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
871 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
872 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
873 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
875 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
876 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
877 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
878 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
880 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
882 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
883 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
884 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
886 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
887 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
888 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
889 transaction_output_index: None
894 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
895 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
896 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
897 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
898 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
899 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
900 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
902 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
903 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
906 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
907 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
908 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
909 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
911 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
912 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
918 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
919 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
920 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
921 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
922 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
923 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
924 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
928 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
929 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
931 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
933 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
934 if generated_by_local {
935 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
936 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
945 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
946 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
947 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
948 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
949 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
950 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
951 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
955 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
956 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
958 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
960 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
961 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
963 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
964 if !generated_by_local {
965 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
973 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
974 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
975 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
976 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
977 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
978 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
979 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
980 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
982 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
984 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
985 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
986 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
987 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
989 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
991 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
992 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
993 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
994 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
997 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
998 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
999 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1001 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1004 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1005 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1007 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1008 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1013 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1014 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1019 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1021 let channel_parameters =
1022 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1023 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1024 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1029 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1032 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1033 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1034 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1035 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1037 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1041 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1042 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1043 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1047 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1052 1 + // script length (0)
1056 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1057 2 + // witness marker and flag
1058 1 + // witness element count
1059 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1060 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1061 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1062 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1063 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1064 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1066 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1067 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1068 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1074 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1076 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1078 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1079 script_sig: Script::new(),
1080 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1081 witness: Vec::new(),
1086 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1087 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1088 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1090 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1091 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1092 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1094 if value_to_self < 0 {
1095 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1096 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1097 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1098 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1099 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1102 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1103 txouts.push((TxOut {
1104 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1105 value: value_to_remote as u64
1109 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1110 txouts.push((TxOut {
1111 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1112 value: value_to_self as u64
1116 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1118 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1119 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1120 outputs.push(out.0);
1128 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1131 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1132 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1136 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1137 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1138 /// our counterparty!)
1139 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1140 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1141 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1142 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1143 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1144 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1145 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1147 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1151 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1152 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1153 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1154 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1155 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1156 //may see payments to it!
1157 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1158 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1159 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1161 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1164 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1165 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1166 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1167 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1168 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1171 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1172 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1173 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1174 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1175 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1178 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1179 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1180 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1182 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1183 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1184 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1185 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1186 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1187 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1189 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1190 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1192 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1194 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1196 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1197 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1198 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1200 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1201 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1202 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1203 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1205 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1206 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1207 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1209 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1211 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1212 return Ok((None, None));
1215 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1216 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1223 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1227 // Now update local state:
1229 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1230 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1231 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1232 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1233 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1234 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1235 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1239 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1240 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1241 match pending_update {
1242 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1243 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1244 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1245 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1246 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1247 return Ok((None, None));
1250 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1251 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1252 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1253 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1254 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1255 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1256 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1262 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1263 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1264 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1266 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1270 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1271 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1273 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1274 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1276 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1277 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1280 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1281 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1282 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1283 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1284 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1287 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1288 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1289 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1290 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1291 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1292 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1293 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1294 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1295 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1297 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1298 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1299 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1301 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1302 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1306 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1307 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1308 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1310 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1311 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1312 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1313 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1314 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1316 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1318 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1319 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1320 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1322 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1323 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1324 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1326 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1327 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1328 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1332 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1333 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1339 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1340 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1343 // Now update local state:
1344 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1345 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1346 match pending_update {
1347 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1348 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1349 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1350 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1353 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1354 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1355 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1356 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1362 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1363 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1370 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1371 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1374 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1375 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1376 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1381 // Message handlers:
1383 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1384 // Check sanity of message fields:
1385 if !self.is_outbound() {
1386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1388 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1391 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1392 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1394 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1395 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1397 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1398 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1400 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1401 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1403 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1404 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1405 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1407 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1408 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1409 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1411 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1412 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1413 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1415 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1418 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1419 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1422 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1423 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1424 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1426 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1427 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1429 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1430 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1432 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1433 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1435 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1436 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1438 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1439 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1441 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1442 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1445 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1446 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1447 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1448 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1449 if script.len() == 0 {
1451 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1452 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1453 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1455 Some(script.clone())
1458 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1459 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1460 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1465 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1466 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1467 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1468 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1469 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1470 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1472 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1473 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1474 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1475 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1476 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1477 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1480 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1481 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1482 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1485 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1486 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1488 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1493 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1494 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1496 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1497 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1499 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1500 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1501 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1502 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1503 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1504 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1507 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1508 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1510 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1511 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1512 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1514 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1515 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1517 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1518 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1521 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1522 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1525 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1526 if self.is_outbound() {
1527 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1529 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1530 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1531 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1533 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1535 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1536 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1537 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1538 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1541 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1542 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1543 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1544 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1545 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1547 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1549 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1550 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1551 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1554 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1555 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1556 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1560 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1561 initial_commitment_tx,
1564 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1565 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1568 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1570 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1571 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1572 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1573 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1574 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1575 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1576 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1577 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1579 holder_commitment_tx);
1581 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1583 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1584 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1585 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1586 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1588 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1589 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1591 }, channel_monitor))
1594 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1595 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1596 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1597 if !self.is_outbound() {
1598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1600 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1603 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1604 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1605 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1606 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1609 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1611 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1612 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1613 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1614 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1616 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1618 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1619 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1621 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1622 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1623 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1624 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1625 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1626 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1630 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1631 initial_commitment_tx,
1634 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1635 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1639 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1640 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1641 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1642 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1643 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1644 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1645 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1646 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1647 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1649 holder_commitment_tx);
1651 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1653 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1654 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1655 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1656 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1661 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1662 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1663 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1666 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1668 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1669 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1670 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1671 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1672 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1673 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1674 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1675 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1676 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1677 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1678 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1679 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1680 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1681 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1683 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1686 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1689 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1690 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1694 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1695 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1696 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1697 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1698 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1700 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1703 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1705 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1706 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1707 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1708 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1711 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1712 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1713 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1714 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1715 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1719 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1722 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1723 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1724 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1725 /// corner case properly.
1726 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1727 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1728 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1729 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1732 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1733 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1734 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1735 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1736 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1737 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1740 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1741 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1742 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1744 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1745 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1747 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1748 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1750 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1751 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1753 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1754 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1758 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1759 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1765 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1766 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1767 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1770 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1771 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1772 included_htlcs += 1;
1775 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1776 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1780 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1781 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1782 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1783 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1784 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1785 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1790 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1792 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1793 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1798 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1799 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1803 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1804 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1805 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1808 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1809 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1811 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1812 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1813 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1815 total_pending_htlcs,
1816 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1817 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1818 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1820 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1821 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1822 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1824 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1826 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1831 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1832 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1833 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1835 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1836 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1838 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1839 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1841 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1842 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1844 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1845 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1849 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1850 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1856 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1857 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1858 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1859 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1860 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1861 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1864 included_htlcs += 1;
1867 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1868 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1871 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1872 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1874 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1875 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1876 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1881 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1882 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1883 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1886 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1887 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1889 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1890 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1892 total_pending_htlcs,
1893 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1894 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1895 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1897 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1898 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1899 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1901 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1903 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1908 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1909 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1910 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1911 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1912 if local_sent_shutdown {
1913 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1915 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1916 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1917 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1918 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1920 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1921 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1923 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1926 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1929 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1930 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1933 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1934 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1935 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1937 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1938 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1939 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1941 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1942 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1943 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1944 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1945 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1946 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1947 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1948 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1949 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1950 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1951 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1953 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1954 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1955 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1956 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1957 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1958 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1962 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1963 self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1964 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1965 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1966 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1970 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1971 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1972 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1973 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1974 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1976 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1980 let chan_reserve_msat =
1981 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1982 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1983 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1986 if !self.is_outbound() {
1987 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
1988 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
1989 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
1990 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
1991 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
1992 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
1993 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
1994 // sensitive to fee spikes.
1995 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1996 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
1997 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1998 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
1999 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2000 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2001 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2004 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2005 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2006 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2007 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2008 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2011 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2012 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2014 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2015 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2018 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2019 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2020 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2024 // Now update local state:
2025 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2026 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2027 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2028 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2029 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2030 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2031 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2036 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2038 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2039 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2040 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2041 match check_preimage {
2043 Some(payment_hash) =>
2044 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2049 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2050 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2051 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2052 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2054 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2055 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2057 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2060 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2063 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2064 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2067 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2071 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2072 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2075 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2076 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2079 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2083 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2087 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2088 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2091 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2095 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2099 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2100 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2103 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2104 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2106 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2107 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2109 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2110 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2113 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2115 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2117 let mut update_fee = false;
2118 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2120 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2125 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2126 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2127 let commitment_txid = {
2128 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2129 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2130 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2132 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2133 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2134 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2138 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2139 (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2142 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2143 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2145 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2146 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2147 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2150 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2152 if self.is_outbound() {
2153 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2154 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2155 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2156 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2157 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2158 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2159 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2160 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2161 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2162 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2168 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2169 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2172 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2173 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2174 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2175 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2176 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2177 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2178 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2179 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2180 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2181 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2183 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2185 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2189 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2192 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2193 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2194 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2197 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2198 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2200 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2201 let mut need_commitment = false;
2202 if !self.is_outbound() {
2203 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2204 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2205 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2206 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2207 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2208 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2209 need_commitment = true;
2210 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2215 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2216 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2217 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2218 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2219 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2220 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2224 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2225 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2226 Some(forward_info.clone())
2228 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2229 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2230 need_commitment = true;
2233 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2234 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2235 Some(fail_reason.take())
2237 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2238 need_commitment = true;
2242 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2243 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2244 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2245 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2247 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2248 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2249 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2250 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2251 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2252 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2253 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2254 // includes the right HTLCs.
2255 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2256 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2257 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2258 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2259 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2260 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2262 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2263 // re-send the message on restoration)
2264 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2267 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2268 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2269 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2270 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2271 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2272 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2273 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2274 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2275 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2277 } else if !need_commitment {
2278 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2279 } else { (None, None) };
2281 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2282 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2283 per_commitment_secret,
2284 next_per_commitment_point,
2285 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2288 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2289 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2290 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2291 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2292 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2293 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2295 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2296 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2297 updates: Vec::new(),
2300 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2301 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2302 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2303 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2304 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2305 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2306 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2307 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2308 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2309 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2310 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2311 // to rebalance channels.
2312 match &htlc_update {
2313 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2314 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2315 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2318 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2319 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2320 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2321 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2322 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2323 // into the holding cell without ever being
2324 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2325 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2326 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2329 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2335 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2336 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2337 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2338 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2339 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2340 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2344 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2346 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2351 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2352 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2353 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2355 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2357 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2364 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2365 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2367 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2368 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2369 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2370 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2371 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2377 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2378 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2379 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2380 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2381 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2383 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2385 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2387 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2390 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2392 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2396 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2397 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2398 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2399 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2400 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2401 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2402 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2405 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2406 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2408 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2409 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2411 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2415 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2416 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2421 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2422 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2423 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2424 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2425 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2426 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2427 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2428 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2429 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2432 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2434 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2435 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2438 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2439 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2440 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2441 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2442 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2443 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2444 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2445 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2449 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2450 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2451 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2452 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2453 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2454 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2455 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2456 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2458 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2459 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2460 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2461 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2462 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2463 let mut require_commitment = false;
2464 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2467 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2468 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2469 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2471 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2472 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2473 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2474 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2475 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2476 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2481 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2482 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2483 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2484 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2485 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2487 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2488 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2493 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2494 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2495 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2497 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2498 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2502 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2503 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2505 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2506 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2507 require_commitment = true;
2508 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2509 match forward_info {
2510 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2511 require_commitment = true;
2513 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2514 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2515 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2517 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2518 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2519 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2523 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2524 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2525 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2531 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2532 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2533 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2534 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2536 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2537 Some(fail_reason.take())
2539 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2540 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2541 require_commitment = true;
2545 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2547 if self.is_outbound() {
2548 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2549 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2552 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2553 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2554 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2555 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2556 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2557 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2558 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2559 require_commitment = true;
2560 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2565 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2566 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2567 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2568 if require_commitment {
2569 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2570 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2571 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2572 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2573 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2574 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2575 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2576 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2577 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2579 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2580 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2581 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2584 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2585 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2586 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2587 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2588 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2590 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2591 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2592 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2595 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2596 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2597 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2598 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2600 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2602 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2603 if require_commitment {
2604 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2606 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2607 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2608 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2609 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2611 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2612 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2613 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2615 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2618 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2620 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2627 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2628 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2629 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2630 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2631 if !self.is_outbound() {
2632 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2634 if !self.is_usable() {
2635 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2637 if !self.is_live() {
2638 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2641 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2642 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2646 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2647 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2649 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2650 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2655 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2656 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2657 Some(update_fee) => {
2658 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2659 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2665 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2666 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2667 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2668 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2669 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2671 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2672 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2674 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2675 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2676 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2677 return outbound_drops;
2679 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2680 // will be retransmitted.
2681 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2683 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2684 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2686 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2687 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2688 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2689 // this HTLC accordingly
2690 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2693 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2694 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2695 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2696 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2699 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2700 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2701 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2702 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2703 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2704 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2709 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2711 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2712 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2713 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2714 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2715 // the update upon reconnection.
2716 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2720 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2722 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2723 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2724 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2725 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2727 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2728 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2731 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2734 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2735 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2739 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2740 /// updates are partially paused.
2741 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2742 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2743 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2744 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2745 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2746 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2747 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2748 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2749 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2750 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2751 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2752 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2753 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2756 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2757 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2758 /// to the remote side.
2759 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2760 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2761 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2763 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2765 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2766 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2767 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2768 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2769 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2770 // monitor was persisted.
2771 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2772 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2773 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2774 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2775 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2776 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2777 next_per_commitment_point,
2781 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2782 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2783 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2784 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2786 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2787 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2788 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2789 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2792 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2793 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2795 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2796 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2799 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2800 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2801 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2802 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2803 if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2804 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2805 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2806 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2807 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2810 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2811 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2813 if self.is_outbound() {
2814 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2816 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2817 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2819 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2820 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2821 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2825 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2826 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2827 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2828 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2829 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2830 per_commitment_secret,
2831 next_per_commitment_point,
2835 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2836 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2837 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2838 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2839 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2841 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2842 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2843 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2844 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2845 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2846 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2847 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2848 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2849 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2854 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2855 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2857 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2858 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2859 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2860 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2861 reason: err_packet.clone()
2864 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2865 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2866 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2867 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2868 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2869 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2872 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2873 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2874 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2875 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2876 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2883 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2884 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2885 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2886 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2888 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2892 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2893 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2894 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2895 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2896 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2897 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2898 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2902 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2903 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2907 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2908 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2909 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2910 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2911 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2912 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2913 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2914 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2916 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2917 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2918 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2922 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2926 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2927 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2928 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2930 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2931 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2932 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2933 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2937 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2938 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2939 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2940 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2941 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2944 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2945 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2948 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2949 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2950 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2951 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2952 next_per_commitment_point,
2953 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2956 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2957 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2958 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2960 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2961 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2962 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2965 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2971 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2972 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2973 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2974 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2975 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2977 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2978 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2979 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2980 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2981 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2982 next_per_commitment_point,
2986 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2987 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2988 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2990 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2993 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2994 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2995 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2996 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2997 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2998 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
3002 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3003 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3004 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3006 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3007 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3008 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3009 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3010 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3011 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3012 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3013 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3015 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3016 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3017 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3018 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3019 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3023 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3025 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3026 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3027 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3029 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3032 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3033 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3034 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3037 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3043 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3044 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3046 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3047 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3048 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3052 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3053 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3054 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3056 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3057 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3059 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3060 let sig = self.holder_signer
3061 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3063 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3064 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3066 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3067 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3068 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3069 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3070 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3074 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3075 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3077 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3080 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3081 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3082 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3083 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3086 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3087 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3091 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3093 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3097 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3098 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3102 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3105 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3107 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3108 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3110 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3111 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3112 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3113 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3114 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3115 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3117 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3118 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3124 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3125 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3126 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3128 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3131 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3132 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3133 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3137 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3138 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3140 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3143 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3144 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3145 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3146 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3148 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3150 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3151 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3152 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3153 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3154 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3156 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3157 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3159 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3160 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3162 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3165 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3166 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3168 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3171 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3172 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3174 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3177 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3181 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3182 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3183 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3186 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3188 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3191 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3192 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3193 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3194 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3195 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3199 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3200 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3201 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3202 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3203 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3204 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3205 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3206 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3207 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3208 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3209 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3213 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3214 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3215 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3216 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3217 let sig = self.holder_signer
3218 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3219 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3220 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3221 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3222 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3223 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3224 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3230 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3231 if self.is_outbound() {
3232 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3233 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3234 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3235 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3239 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3242 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3244 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3245 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3246 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3250 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3253 let sig = self.holder_signer
3254 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3255 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3256 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3257 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3258 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3260 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3261 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3263 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3264 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3265 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3267 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3270 // Public utilities:
3272 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3276 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3277 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3278 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3282 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3283 /// is_usable() returns true).
3284 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3285 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3286 self.short_channel_id
3289 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3290 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3291 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3292 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3295 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3296 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3299 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3300 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3303 fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3304 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3307 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3308 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3311 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3312 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3313 self.counterparty_node_id
3316 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3318 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3319 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3322 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3323 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3325 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3326 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3327 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3328 self.channel_value_satoshis * 9 / 10,
3330 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3334 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3335 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3336 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3339 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3340 self.channel_value_satoshis
3343 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3344 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3348 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3352 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3353 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3356 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3357 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3360 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3361 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3365 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3370 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3372 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3373 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3374 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3375 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3376 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3377 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3379 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3381 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3389 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3390 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3394 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3395 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3396 self.update_time_counter
3399 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3400 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3403 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3404 self.config.announced_channel
3407 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3408 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3411 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3412 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3413 pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3414 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3416 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3417 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3419 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3420 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3422 if self.is_outbound() {
3423 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3424 res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3427 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3428 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3433 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3434 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3435 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3438 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3439 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3440 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3441 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3442 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3445 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3446 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3447 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3448 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3449 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3452 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3453 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3454 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3455 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3458 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3459 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3460 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3463 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3464 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3465 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3466 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3467 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3468 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3473 pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3474 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3477 pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3478 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3481 pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3482 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3485 pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3486 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3489 pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3490 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3493 /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3494 /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3495 /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3496 /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3497 /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3498 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3500 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3501 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3503 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3505 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3507 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3508 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3509 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3511 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3512 if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3513 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3520 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3521 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3522 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3523 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3526 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3527 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3528 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3529 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3530 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3531 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3532 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3533 if self.is_outbound() {
3534 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3535 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3536 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3537 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3538 // channel and move on.
3539 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3540 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3542 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3543 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3544 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3545 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3546 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3549 if self.is_outbound() {
3550 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3551 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3552 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3553 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3554 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3555 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3559 if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
3560 panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
3562 assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
3563 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3564 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
3565 ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3566 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
3571 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3572 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3573 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3574 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3575 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3576 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3577 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3579 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3580 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3581 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3583 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3584 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3585 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3587 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3588 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3590 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3591 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3594 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
3596 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3597 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3598 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3599 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3600 if need_commitment_update {
3601 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3602 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3603 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3604 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3605 next_per_commitment_point,
3606 }), timed_out_htlcs));
3608 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3609 return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3615 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3618 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3619 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3620 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3621 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3622 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3623 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3624 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3628 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3629 if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3630 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3635 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3636 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3638 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3639 if !self.is_outbound() {
3640 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3642 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3643 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3646 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3647 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3650 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3651 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3655 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3656 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3657 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3658 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3659 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3660 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3661 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3662 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3663 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3664 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3665 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3666 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3667 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3668 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3669 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3670 first_per_commitment_point,
3671 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3672 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3676 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3677 if self.is_outbound() {
3678 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3680 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3681 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3683 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3684 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3687 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3688 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3690 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3691 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3692 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3693 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3694 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3695 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3696 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3697 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3698 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3699 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3700 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3701 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3702 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3703 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3704 first_per_commitment_point,
3705 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3709 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3710 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3711 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3712 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3713 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3714 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3717 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3718 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3719 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3720 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3721 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3722 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3723 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3724 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3725 if !self.is_outbound() {
3726 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3728 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3729 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3731 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3732 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3733 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3734 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3737 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3738 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3740 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3743 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3744 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3749 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3751 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3753 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3754 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3756 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3757 temporary_channel_id,
3758 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3759 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3764 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3765 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3766 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3767 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3768 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3770 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3771 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3772 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3773 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3774 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3776 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3777 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3779 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3780 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3783 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3785 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3786 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3788 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3789 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3790 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3791 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3792 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3793 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3796 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3797 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3802 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3803 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3804 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3805 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3806 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3807 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3808 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3809 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3810 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3811 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3812 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3813 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3814 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3815 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3816 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3817 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3818 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3819 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3820 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3823 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3824 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3825 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3826 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3829 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3830 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3831 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3832 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3833 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3834 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3835 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3836 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3838 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3839 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3840 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3841 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3842 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3843 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3844 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3845 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3846 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3848 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3854 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3856 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3857 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3858 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3859 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3860 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3861 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3862 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3863 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3864 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3865 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3867 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3868 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3869 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3872 if amount_msat == 0 {
3873 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3876 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3877 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3880 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3881 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3882 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3883 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3884 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3885 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3886 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3887 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3890 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3891 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3892 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3894 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3895 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3896 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3899 if !self.is_outbound() {
3900 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3901 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3902 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3903 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3904 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3905 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3906 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3910 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3911 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3912 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3915 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3916 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3917 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3918 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3920 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3921 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3924 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3925 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3926 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3927 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3928 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3931 // Now update local state:
3932 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3933 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3938 onion_routing_packet,
3943 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3944 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3946 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3948 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3952 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3953 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3954 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3958 onion_routing_packet,
3960 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3965 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3966 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3967 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3968 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3969 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3970 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3971 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3973 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3974 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3976 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3977 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3979 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3980 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3982 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3983 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3984 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3985 have_updates = true;
3987 if have_updates { break; }
3989 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3990 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3991 have_updates = true;
3993 if have_updates { break; }
3996 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3998 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4000 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4001 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4002 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4003 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4005 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4006 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4007 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4009 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4013 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4014 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4015 Some(fail_reason.take())
4017 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4020 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4022 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4023 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4024 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4025 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4026 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4027 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4029 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4032 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4033 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4034 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4035 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4036 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4037 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4038 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4039 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4042 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4043 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4046 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4047 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4048 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4049 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4050 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4051 if self.is_outbound() {
4052 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4056 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4057 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4058 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4059 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4061 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4063 if !self.is_outbound() {
4064 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4065 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4066 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4067 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4068 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4069 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4070 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4071 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4072 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4073 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4080 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4081 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4085 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4086 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4088 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4090 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4091 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4092 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4093 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4094 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4096 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4097 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4098 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4099 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4100 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4101 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4105 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4106 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4109 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4112 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4113 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4114 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4116 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4117 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4118 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4119 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4120 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4126 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4127 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4128 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4129 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4130 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4131 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4134 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4135 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4136 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4138 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4139 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4142 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4143 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4144 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4147 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4149 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4150 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4151 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4153 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4155 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4157 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4158 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4159 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4160 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4161 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4163 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4164 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4171 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4172 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4173 scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4174 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4177 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4178 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4179 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4180 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4181 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4182 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4183 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4185 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4186 // return them to fail the payment.
4187 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4188 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4190 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4191 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4196 let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4197 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4198 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4199 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4200 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4201 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4202 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4203 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4204 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4205 Some(funding_txo.clone())
4209 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4210 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4211 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4212 (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4213 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4214 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4215 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4219 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4220 // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4222 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4223 // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4224 // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4225 let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4226 if is_script_too_long {
4230 if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4234 return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4237 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4238 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4240 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4241 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4243 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4245 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4247 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4249 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4250 err_code.write(writer)?;
4252 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4254 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4261 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4262 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4263 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4264 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4265 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4266 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4267 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4272 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4274 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4275 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4277 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4278 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4280 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4281 self.config.write(writer)?;
4283 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4284 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4285 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4287 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4289 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4290 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4291 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4292 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4293 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4294 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4296 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4297 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4299 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4300 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4301 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4303 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4304 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4305 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4306 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4309 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4310 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4311 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4314 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4315 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4316 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4317 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4319 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4320 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4322 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4324 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4326 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4328 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4331 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4333 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4338 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4339 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4340 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4341 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4342 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4343 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4344 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4346 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4348 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4350 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4353 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4355 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4357 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4359 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4361 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4363 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4368 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4369 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4371 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4373 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4374 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4375 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4376 source.write(writer)?;
4377 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4379 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4381 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4382 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4384 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4386 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4387 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4392 match self.resend_order {
4393 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4394 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4397 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4398 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4399 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4401 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4402 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4403 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4404 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4407 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4408 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4409 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4410 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4411 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4414 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4415 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4417 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4418 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4419 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4420 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4422 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4423 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4425 feerate.write(writer)?;
4429 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4432 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4433 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4435 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4436 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4438 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4439 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4440 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4441 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4442 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4443 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4444 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4445 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4447 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4448 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4450 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4451 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4453 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4455 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4460 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4461 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4462 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4463 fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4464 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4465 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4466 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4467 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4470 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4471 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4473 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4474 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4475 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4477 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4479 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4480 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4481 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4482 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4483 let mut data = [0; 1024];
4484 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4485 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4486 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4488 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4490 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4491 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4493 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4494 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4495 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4497 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4498 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4499 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4500 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4501 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4502 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4503 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4504 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4505 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4506 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4507 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4508 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4509 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4510 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4515 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4516 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4517 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4518 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4519 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4520 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4521 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4522 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4523 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4524 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4525 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4526 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4527 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4528 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4529 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4530 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4535 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4536 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4537 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4538 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4539 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4540 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4541 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4542 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4543 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4544 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4546 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4547 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4548 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4550 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4551 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4552 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4554 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4558 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4559 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4560 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4561 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4564 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4565 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4566 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4568 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4569 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4570 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4571 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4574 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4575 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4576 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4577 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4580 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4581 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4583 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4584 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4585 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4586 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4588 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4590 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4591 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4594 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4595 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4597 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4598 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4600 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4601 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4602 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4603 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4605 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4606 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4607 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4609 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4610 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4612 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4613 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4615 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4616 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4618 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4619 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4628 channel_value_satoshis,
4630 latest_monitor_update_id,
4636 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4637 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4640 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4641 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4642 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4646 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4647 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4648 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4649 monitor_pending_forwards,
4650 monitor_pending_failures,
4653 holding_cell_update_fee,
4654 next_holder_htlc_id,
4655 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4656 update_time_counter,
4659 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4660 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4661 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4662 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4664 last_sent_closing_fee,
4666 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4668 last_block_connected,
4669 funding_tx_confirmations,
4671 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4672 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4673 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4674 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4675 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4676 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4677 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4680 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4681 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4683 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4684 counterparty_node_id,
4686 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4690 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4692 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4693 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4694 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4695 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4702 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4703 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4704 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4705 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4706 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4707 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4708 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4709 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4711 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4712 use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4713 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4714 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4715 use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
4717 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4718 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4719 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
4720 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4721 use util::config::UserConfig;
4722 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4723 use util::test_utils;
4724 use util::logger::Logger;
4725 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4726 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4727 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4728 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4729 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4732 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4735 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4736 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4742 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4743 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4744 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4748 signer: InMemorySigner,
4750 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4751 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4753 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4754 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4755 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4756 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4757 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4758 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4761 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4762 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4763 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4764 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4767 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4770 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4771 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4774 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4775 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4778 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4779 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4781 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4782 let original_fee = 253;
4783 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4784 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4785 let seed = [42; 32];
4786 let network = Network::Testnet;
4787 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4789 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4790 let config = UserConfig::default();
4791 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4793 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4794 // same as the old fee.
4795 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4796 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4797 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4801 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4802 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4803 // dust limits are used.
4804 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4805 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4806 let seed = [42; 32];
4807 let network = Network::Testnet;
4808 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4810 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4811 // they have different dust limits.
4813 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4814 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4815 let config = UserConfig::default();
4816 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4818 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4819 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4820 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4821 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
4822 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4823 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4825 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4826 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4827 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4828 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4830 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4831 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4832 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4834 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4835 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4836 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4837 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4840 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4842 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4843 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4844 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4845 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4846 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4848 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4849 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4853 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4854 // the dust limit check.
4855 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4856 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4857 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4858 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4860 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4861 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4862 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4863 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4864 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4865 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4866 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
4870 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
4871 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
4872 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
4873 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
4874 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
4875 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
4876 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4877 let seed = [42; 32];
4878 let network = Network::Testnet;
4879 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4881 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4882 let config = UserConfig::default();
4883 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4885 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4886 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
4888 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
4889 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4890 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4891 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4892 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4893 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4895 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4896 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4897 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4898 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4899 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4901 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4903 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4904 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4905 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4906 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4907 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4909 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4910 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4911 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4912 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4913 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4917 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4918 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4919 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4920 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4921 let seed = [42; 32];
4922 let network = Network::Testnet;
4923 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4925 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4927 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4928 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4929 let config = UserConfig::default();
4930 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4932 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4933 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4934 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4935 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4937 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4938 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4939 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4941 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4942 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4943 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4944 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4946 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4947 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4948 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4950 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4951 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4953 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4954 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4955 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4956 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4957 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4958 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4959 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4960 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4961 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4966 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4968 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4969 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4970 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4971 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4972 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4973 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4974 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4981 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4982 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4983 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4984 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4985 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4987 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
4989 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4990 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4991 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4992 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4993 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4995 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4996 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5001 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5002 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5003 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5005 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5006 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5007 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5008 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5009 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5011 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5013 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5014 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5015 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5016 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5017 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5018 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5020 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5021 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5022 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5023 selected_contest_delay: 144
5025 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5026 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5028 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5029 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5031 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5032 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5034 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5035 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5037 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5038 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5039 // build_commitment_transaction.
5040 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5041 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5042 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5043 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5044 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5046 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5047 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5048 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5050 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5051 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5053 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5054 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5058 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5059 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5060 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5061 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5062 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5063 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5065 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5066 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5067 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5068 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5070 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5071 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5072 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5074 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5076 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5077 commitment_tx.clone(),
5078 counterparty_signature,
5079 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5080 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5081 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5083 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5084 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5086 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5087 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5088 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5090 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5091 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5094 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5096 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5097 let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5098 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5099 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5100 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5102 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5105 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5106 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5107 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5111 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5114 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5115 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5117 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5118 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5119 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5120 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5121 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5122 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5123 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5125 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5129 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5130 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5132 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5133 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5134 "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", {});
5136 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5137 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5139 amount_msat: 1000000,
5141 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5142 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5144 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5147 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5148 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5150 amount_msat: 2000000,
5152 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5153 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5155 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5158 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5159 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5161 amount_msat: 2000000,
5163 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5164 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5165 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5167 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5170 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5171 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5173 amount_msat: 3000000,
5175 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5176 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5177 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5179 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5182 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5183 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5185 amount_msat: 4000000,
5187 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5188 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5190 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5194 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5195 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5196 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5198 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5199 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5200 "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", {
5203 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5204 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5205 "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" },
5208 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5209 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5210 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
5213 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5214 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5215 "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" },
5218 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5219 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5220 "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" },
5223 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5224 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5225 "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" }
5228 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5229 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5230 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5232 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5233 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5234 "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", {
5237 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5238 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5239 "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" },
5242 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5243 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5244 "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" },
5247 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5248 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5249 "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" },
5252 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5253 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5254 "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" },
5257 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5258 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5259 "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" }
5262 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5263 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5264 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5266 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5267 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5268 "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", {
5271 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5272 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5273 "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" },
5276 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5277 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5278 "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" },
5281 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5282 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5283 "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" },
5286 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5287 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5288 "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" }
5291 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5292 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5293 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5295 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5296 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5297 "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", {
5300 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5301 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5302 "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" },
5305 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5306 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5307 "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" },
5310 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5311 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5312 "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" },
5315 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5316 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5317 "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" }
5320 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5321 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5322 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5324 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5325 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5326 "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", {
5329 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5330 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5331 "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" },
5334 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5335 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5336 "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" },
5339 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5340 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5341 "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" }
5344 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5345 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5346 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5348 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5349 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5350 "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", {
5353 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5354 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5355 "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" },
5358 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5359 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5360 "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" },
5363 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5364 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5365 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5368 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5369 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5370 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5372 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5373 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5374 "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", {
5377 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5378 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5379 "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" },
5382 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5383 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5384 "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" }
5387 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5388 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5389 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5391 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5392 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5393 "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", {
5396 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5397 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5398 "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" },
5401 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5402 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5403 "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" }
5406 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5407 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5408 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5410 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5411 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5412 "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", {
5415 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5416 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5417 "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" }
5420 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5421 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5422 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5424 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5425 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5426 "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", {
5429 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5430 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5431 "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" }
5434 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5435 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5436 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5438 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5439 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5440 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5442 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5443 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5444 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5446 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5447 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5448 "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", {});
5450 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5451 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5452 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5454 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5455 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5456 "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", {});
5458 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5459 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5460 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5462 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5463 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5464 "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", {});
5466 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5467 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5468 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5469 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5470 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5471 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5473 amount_msat: 2000000,
5475 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5476 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5478 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5481 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5482 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5483 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5485 amount_msat: 5000000,
5487 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5488 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5489 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5491 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5494 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5495 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5497 amount_msat: 5000000,
5499 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5500 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5501 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5503 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5507 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5508 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5509 "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", {
5512 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5513 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5514 "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" },
5516 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5517 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5518 "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" },
5520 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5521 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5522 "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" }
5527 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5528 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5530 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5531 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5532 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5533 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5535 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5536 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5537 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5539 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5540 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5542 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5543 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5545 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5546 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5547 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5551 fn test_key_derivation() {
5552 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5553 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5555 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5556 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5558 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5559 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5561 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5562 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5564 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5565 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5567 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5568 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5570 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5571 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5573 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5574 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());