1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
41 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
42 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
43 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
44 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use crate::prelude::*;
48 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
50 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use crate::sync::Mutex;
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 pub struct AvailableBalances {
67 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
68 pub balance_msat: u64,
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
79 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
81 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
82 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
83 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
84 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
85 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
86 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
88 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
92 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
93 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
94 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
95 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
98 enum InboundHTLCState {
99 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
100 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
101 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
103 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
104 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
105 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
106 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
107 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
108 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
109 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
110 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
111 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
112 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
113 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
115 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
116 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
119 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
120 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
123 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
124 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
125 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
126 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
127 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
128 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
130 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
131 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
132 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
133 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
134 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
135 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
137 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
139 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
140 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
142 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
143 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
144 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
145 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
146 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
147 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
148 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
149 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
152 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
156 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 state: InboundHTLCState,
160 enum OutboundHTLCState {
161 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
162 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
163 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
164 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
165 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
166 /// money back (though we won't), and,
167 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
168 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
169 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
170 /// we'll never get out of sync).
171 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
172 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
173 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
175 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
176 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
177 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
178 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
179 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
180 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
181 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
182 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
183 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
188 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
189 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
194 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
195 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
198 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
201 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
202 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
207 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
216 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
226 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
227 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
236 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
241 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
245 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
246 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
247 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
248 /// move on to ChannelReady.
249 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
250 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
251 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
253 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
254 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
255 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
256 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
257 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
258 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
259 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
261 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
262 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
263 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
265 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
266 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
267 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
268 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
269 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
270 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
272 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
273 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
275 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
277 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
278 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
279 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
280 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
281 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
282 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
283 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
285 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
286 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
287 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
288 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
289 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
290 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
292 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
293 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
294 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
295 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
296 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
298 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
299 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
301 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
303 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
304 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
305 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
306 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
307 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
310 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
312 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
314 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
316 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
320 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
322 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
323 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
324 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
326 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
327 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
329 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
330 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
331 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
332 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
333 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
335 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
336 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
340 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
346 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
349 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
350 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 holding_cell_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
356 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
357 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
358 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
359 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
360 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
361 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
362 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
363 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
368 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
369 struct HTLCCandidate {
371 origin: HTLCInitiator,
375 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
383 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
385 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
387 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
388 htlc_value_msat: u64,
389 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
394 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
395 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
396 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
397 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
398 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
400 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
401 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
402 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
403 htlc_value_msat: u64,
404 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
405 /// in the holding cell).
406 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
408 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
409 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
413 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
415 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
416 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
421 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
424 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
425 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
426 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
427 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
428 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
429 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
430 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
431 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
432 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
433 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
434 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
437 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
438 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
439 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
440 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
441 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
442 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
443 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
444 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
447 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
448 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
449 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
450 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
451 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
452 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
453 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
454 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
455 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
456 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
457 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
458 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
459 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
460 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
461 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
463 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
464 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
465 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
466 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
468 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
469 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
470 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
471 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
473 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
474 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
475 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
476 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
477 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
479 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
480 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
481 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
482 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
484 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
485 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
486 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
488 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
489 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
490 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
491 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
492 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
494 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
495 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
496 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
499 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
500 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
501 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
502 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
504 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
505 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
506 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
507 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
509 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
513 channel_id: [u8; 32],
516 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
517 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
519 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
520 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
521 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
524 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
525 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
526 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
528 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
529 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
531 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
533 holder_signer: Signer,
534 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
535 destination_script: Script,
537 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
538 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
539 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
541 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
548 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
549 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
550 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
551 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
552 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
553 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
555 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
557 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
558 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
559 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
560 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
561 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
562 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
564 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
566 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
567 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
568 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
569 // HTLCs with similar state.
570 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
571 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
572 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
573 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
574 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
575 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
576 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
577 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
578 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
581 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
582 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
583 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
585 update_time_counter: u32,
587 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
588 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
589 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
591 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
592 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
594 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
595 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
597 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
598 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
599 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
600 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
602 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
603 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
605 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
607 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
609 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
610 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
611 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
612 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
613 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
614 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
616 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
617 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
618 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
619 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
620 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
622 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
623 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
624 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
625 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
626 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
627 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
628 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
629 channel_creation_height: u32,
631 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
634 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
636 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
639 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
644 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
646 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
648 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
649 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
652 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
659 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
665 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
667 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
668 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
670 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
674 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
676 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
678 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
679 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
680 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
681 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
683 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
684 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
685 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
687 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
688 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
689 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
691 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
692 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
693 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
694 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
696 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
698 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
700 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
701 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
702 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
703 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
704 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
706 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
707 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
710 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
711 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
712 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
713 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
714 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
715 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
716 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
718 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
719 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
721 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
722 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
723 // the channel's funding UTXO.
725 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
726 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
727 // associated channel mapping.
729 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
730 // to store all of them.
731 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
733 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
734 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
735 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
736 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
737 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
739 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
740 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
743 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
744 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
748 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
750 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
751 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
752 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
756 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
758 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
761 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
765 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
769 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
771 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
772 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
773 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
774 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
775 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
777 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
778 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
780 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
782 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
783 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
785 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
786 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
787 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
788 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
789 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
790 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
792 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
793 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
795 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
796 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
797 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
798 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
799 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
801 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
802 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
804 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
805 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
807 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
808 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
809 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
810 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
816 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
817 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
819 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
821 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
826 macro_rules! secp_check {
827 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
830 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
835 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
836 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
837 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
838 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
840 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
842 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
843 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
844 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
846 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
849 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
851 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
854 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
855 /// required by us according to the configured or default
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
858 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
860 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
861 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
862 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
863 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
864 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
867 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
868 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
869 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
870 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
871 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
872 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
873 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
876 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
877 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
880 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
881 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
882 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
883 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
884 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
885 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
886 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
887 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
888 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
889 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
892 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
893 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
894 // `only_static_remotekey`.
896 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
897 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
898 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
899 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
906 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
907 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
908 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
909 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
910 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
911 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
912 // We've exhausted our options
915 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
916 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
919 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
920 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
921 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
922 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
924 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
925 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
926 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
927 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
928 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
929 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
931 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
933 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
937 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
938 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
939 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
940 outbound_scid_alias: u64
941 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
942 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
943 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
944 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
946 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
947 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
948 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
949 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
951 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
952 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
954 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
955 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
957 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
958 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
959 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
961 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
964 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
965 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
966 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
967 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
968 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
971 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
972 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
974 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
976 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
977 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
978 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
982 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
983 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
985 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
986 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
989 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
990 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
991 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
998 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
999 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1000 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1001 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1006 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1008 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1009 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1010 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1012 channel_value_satoshis,
1014 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1017 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1018 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1020 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1021 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1024 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1025 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1026 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1027 pending_update_fee: None,
1028 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1029 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1030 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1031 update_time_counter: 1,
1033 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1035 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1036 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1037 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1038 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1039 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1040 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1042 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1043 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1044 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1045 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1047 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1048 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1049 closing_fee_limits: None,
1050 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1052 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1054 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1055 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1056 short_channel_id: None,
1057 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1059 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1060 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1061 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1062 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1063 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1064 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1065 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1066 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1067 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1068 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1069 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1071 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1073 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1074 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1075 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1076 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1077 counterparty_parameters: None,
1078 funding_outpoint: None,
1079 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1080 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1082 funding_transaction: None,
1084 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1085 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1086 counterparty_node_id,
1088 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1090 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1092 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1093 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1095 announcement_sigs: None,
1097 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1098 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1099 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1100 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1102 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1104 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1105 outbound_scid_alias,
1107 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1109 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1110 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1117 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1118 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1119 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1121 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1122 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1123 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1124 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1125 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1126 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1127 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1130 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1131 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1132 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1133 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1134 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1135 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1136 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1137 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1139 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1140 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1149 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1150 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1151 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1152 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1153 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1154 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1155 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1156 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1157 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1158 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1162 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1164 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1165 // support this channel type.
1166 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1167 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1171 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1172 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1173 // `static_remote_key`.
1174 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1177 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1178 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1181 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1184 channel_type.clone()
1186 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1187 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1192 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1194 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1195 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1196 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1197 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1198 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1199 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1200 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1201 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1202 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1205 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1209 // Check sanity of message fields:
1210 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1213 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1216 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1219 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1220 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1226 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1229 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1231 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1232 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1235 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1238 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1242 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1243 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1246 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1249 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1252 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1258 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1261 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1265 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1267 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1268 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1273 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1274 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1275 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1276 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1279 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1282 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1283 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1284 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1286 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1290 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1291 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1292 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1293 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1294 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1298 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1299 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1300 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1301 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1305 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1306 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1307 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1308 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1309 if script.len() == 0 {
1312 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1315 Some(script.clone())
1318 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1319 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1325 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1326 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1329 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1330 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1335 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1336 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1338 let chan = Channel {
1341 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1342 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1344 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1349 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1351 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1352 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1353 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1356 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1359 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1360 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1362 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1363 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1366 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1367 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1369 pending_update_fee: None,
1370 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1371 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1372 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1373 update_time_counter: 1,
1375 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1377 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1378 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1379 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1380 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1381 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1384 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1385 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1386 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1387 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1389 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1390 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1391 closing_fee_limits: None,
1392 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1394 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1396 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1397 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1398 short_channel_id: None,
1399 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1401 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1402 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1403 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1404 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1405 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1406 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1407 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1408 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1409 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1410 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1411 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1412 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1414 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1416 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1417 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1418 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1419 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1420 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1421 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1422 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1424 funding_outpoint: None,
1425 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1426 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1428 funding_transaction: None,
1430 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1431 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1432 counterparty_node_id,
1434 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1436 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1438 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1439 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1441 announcement_sigs: None,
1443 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1444 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1445 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1446 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1448 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1450 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1451 outbound_scid_alias,
1453 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1456 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1465 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1466 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1467 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1468 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1469 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1471 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1472 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1473 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1474 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1475 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1476 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1477 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1479 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1480 where L::Target: Logger
1482 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1483 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1484 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1486 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1487 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1488 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1489 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1491 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1492 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1493 if match update_state {
1494 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1495 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1496 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1497 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1498 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1500 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1504 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1505 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1506 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1507 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1509 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1510 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1511 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1513 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1514 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1515 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1516 transaction_output_index: None
1521 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1522 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1523 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1524 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1525 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1528 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1530 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1531 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1532 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1534 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1535 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1538 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1539 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1542 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1544 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1545 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1546 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1548 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1549 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1555 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1556 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1557 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1558 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1559 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1560 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1565 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1566 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1568 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1570 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1571 if generated_by_local {
1572 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1573 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1582 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1584 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1585 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1586 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1587 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1588 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1589 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1593 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1594 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1595 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1596 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1600 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1601 preimages.push(preimage);
1605 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1606 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1608 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1610 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1611 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1613 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1614 if !generated_by_local {
1615 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1623 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1624 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1625 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1626 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1627 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1628 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1629 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1630 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1632 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1634 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1635 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1636 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1637 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1639 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1641 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1642 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1643 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1644 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1647 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1648 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1649 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1650 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1652 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1655 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1656 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1657 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1658 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1660 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1663 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1664 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1669 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1670 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1675 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1677 let channel_parameters =
1678 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1679 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1680 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1683 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1688 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1691 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1692 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1693 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1694 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1696 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1697 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1698 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1706 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1707 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1713 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1714 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1715 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1716 // outside of those situations will fail.
1717 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1721 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1726 1 + // script length (0)
1730 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1731 2 + // witness marker and flag
1732 1 + // witness element count
1733 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1734 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1735 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1736 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1737 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1738 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1740 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1741 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1742 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1748 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1749 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1750 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1751 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1753 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1754 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1755 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1757 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1758 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1759 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1760 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1761 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1762 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1765 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1766 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1769 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1770 value_to_holder = 0;
1773 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1774 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1775 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1776 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1778 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1779 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1782 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1783 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1787 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1788 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1789 /// our counterparty!)
1790 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1791 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1792 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1793 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1794 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1795 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1796 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1798 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1802 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1803 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1804 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1805 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1806 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1807 //may see payments to it!
1808 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1809 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1810 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1812 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1815 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1816 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1817 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1818 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1819 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1822 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1825 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1826 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1828 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1830 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1831 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1832 where L::Target: Logger {
1833 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1834 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1835 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1836 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1837 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1838 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1839 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1840 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1844 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1845 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1846 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1847 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1849 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1850 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1852 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1854 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1856 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1857 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1858 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1860 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1861 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1862 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1863 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1864 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1866 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1867 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1868 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1870 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1871 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1873 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1876 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1877 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1881 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1885 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1886 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1887 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1888 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1889 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1890 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1893 // Now update local state:
1895 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1896 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1897 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1898 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1899 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1900 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1901 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1905 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1906 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1907 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1908 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1909 // do not not get into this branch.
1910 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1911 match pending_update {
1912 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1913 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1914 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1915 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1916 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1917 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1918 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1921 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1922 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1923 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1924 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1925 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1926 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1927 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1933 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1934 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1935 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1937 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1938 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1939 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1941 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1942 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1945 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1946 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1948 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1949 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1951 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1952 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1955 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1958 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1959 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1960 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1961 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1966 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1967 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1968 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1969 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1970 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1973 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1974 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1975 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1976 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1977 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1979 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1980 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1981 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1985 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1986 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1987 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1988 /// before we fail backwards.
1990 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1991 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1992 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1993 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
1994 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1995 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
1996 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
1999 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2000 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2001 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2002 /// before we fail backwards.
2004 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2005 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2006 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2007 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2008 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2009 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2010 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2012 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2014 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2015 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2016 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2018 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2019 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2020 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2022 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2023 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2024 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2026 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2031 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2032 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2038 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2039 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2040 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2041 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2042 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2046 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2047 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2048 force_holding_cell = true;
2051 // Now update local state:
2052 if force_holding_cell {
2053 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2054 match pending_update {
2055 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2056 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2057 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2058 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2062 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2063 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2064 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2065 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2071 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2072 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2073 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2079 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2081 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2082 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2085 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2086 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2087 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2092 // Message handlers:
2094 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2095 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2097 // Check sanity of message fields:
2098 if !self.is_outbound() {
2099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2101 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2104 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2107 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2108 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2110 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2113 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2115 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2117 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2118 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2121 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2122 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2125 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2128 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2132 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2133 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2136 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2139 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2142 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2143 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2145 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2146 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2148 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2149 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2151 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2155 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2156 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2159 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2160 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2162 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2163 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2166 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2169 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2170 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2171 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2172 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2173 if script.len() == 0 {
2176 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2179 Some(script.clone())
2182 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2183 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2189 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2190 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2191 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2192 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2193 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2195 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2196 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2198 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2201 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2202 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2203 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2204 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2205 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2206 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2209 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2210 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2211 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2214 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2215 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2217 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2218 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2223 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2224 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2226 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2227 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2229 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2230 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2231 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2232 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2233 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2234 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2235 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2236 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2237 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2240 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2241 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2243 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2244 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2245 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2246 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2248 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2249 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2251 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2252 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2255 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2256 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2259 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2260 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2261 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2263 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2266 if self.is_outbound() {
2267 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2269 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2270 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2271 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2275 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2278 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2279 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2280 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2281 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2284 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2285 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2286 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2287 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2288 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2290 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2292 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2293 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2297 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2298 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2299 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2303 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2304 initial_commitment_tx,
2307 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2308 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2311 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2312 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2314 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2316 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2317 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2318 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2319 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2320 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2321 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2322 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2323 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2324 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2325 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2326 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2328 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2330 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2332 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2333 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2334 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2335 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2337 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2339 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2340 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2342 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2345 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2346 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2347 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2348 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2349 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2351 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2354 if !self.is_outbound() {
2355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2357 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2360 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2361 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2362 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2363 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2366 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2368 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2369 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2370 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2371 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2373 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2374 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2376 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2377 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2379 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2380 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2381 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2382 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2383 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2388 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2389 initial_commitment_tx,
2392 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2393 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2396 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2397 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2400 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2401 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2402 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2403 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2404 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2405 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2406 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2407 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2408 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2409 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2410 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2411 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2413 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2415 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2417 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2418 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2419 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2420 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2422 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2424 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2427 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2428 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2430 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2431 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2432 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2433 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2435 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2438 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2439 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2440 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2443 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2444 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2445 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2446 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2447 // when routing outbound payments.
2448 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2452 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2454 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2455 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2456 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2457 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2458 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2459 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2460 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2461 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2462 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2464 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2465 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2466 let expected_point =
2467 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2468 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2470 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2472 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2473 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2474 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2475 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2476 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2478 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2486 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2487 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2489 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2491 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2494 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2495 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2496 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2497 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2503 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2504 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2505 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2506 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2507 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2508 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2509 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2510 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2511 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2514 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2517 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2518 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2519 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2521 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2522 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2523 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2524 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2525 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2526 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2528 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2529 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2535 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2536 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2537 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2538 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2539 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2540 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2541 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2542 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2543 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2546 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2549 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2550 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2551 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2553 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2554 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2555 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2556 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2557 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2558 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2560 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2561 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2565 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2566 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2567 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2568 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2569 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2570 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2571 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2573 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2574 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2576 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2583 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2584 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2585 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2586 /// corner case properly.
2587 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2588 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2589 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2591 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2592 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2593 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2594 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2597 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2599 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2600 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2601 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2604 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2605 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2606 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2607 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2609 outbound_capacity_msat,
2610 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2611 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2612 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2618 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2619 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2622 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2623 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2624 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2625 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2626 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2627 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2630 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2631 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2633 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2634 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2637 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2638 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2639 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2641 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2642 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2644 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2647 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2648 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2650 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2651 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2653 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2654 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2656 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2657 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2661 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2662 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2668 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2669 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2670 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2673 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2674 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2675 included_htlcs += 1;
2678 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2679 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2683 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2684 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2685 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2686 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2687 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2688 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2693 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2695 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2696 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2701 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2702 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2706 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2707 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2711 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2712 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2714 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2715 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2716 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2718 total_pending_htlcs,
2719 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2720 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2721 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2723 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2724 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2725 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2727 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2729 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2734 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2735 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2736 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2738 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2739 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2741 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2744 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2745 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2747 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2748 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2750 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2751 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2753 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2754 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2758 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2759 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2765 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2766 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2767 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2768 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2769 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2770 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2773 included_htlcs += 1;
2776 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2777 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2780 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2781 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2783 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2784 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2785 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2790 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2791 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2792 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2795 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2796 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2798 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2799 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2801 total_pending_htlcs,
2802 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2803 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2804 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2806 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2807 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2808 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2810 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2812 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2817 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2818 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2819 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2820 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2821 if local_sent_shutdown {
2822 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2824 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2825 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2826 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2829 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2830 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2832 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2835 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2836 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2838 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2842 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2843 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2844 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2845 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2847 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2850 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2851 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2852 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2853 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2854 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2855 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2856 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2857 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2858 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2859 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2860 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2862 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2863 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2864 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2865 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2866 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2867 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2871 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2874 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2875 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2876 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2878 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2879 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2880 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2881 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2882 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2883 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2884 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2888 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2889 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2890 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2891 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2892 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2893 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2894 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2898 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2899 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2900 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2901 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2902 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2903 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2906 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2907 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2908 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2909 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2910 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2912 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2916 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2920 if !self.is_outbound() {
2921 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2922 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2923 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2924 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2925 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2926 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2927 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2928 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2929 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2930 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2931 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2932 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2933 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2934 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2935 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2938 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2939 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2940 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2941 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2945 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2946 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2948 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2952 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2953 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2954 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2958 // Now update local state:
2959 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2960 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2961 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2962 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2963 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2964 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2965 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2970 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2972 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2973 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2974 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2975 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2976 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2977 None => fail_reason.into(),
2978 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2979 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2980 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2983 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2987 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2989 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2990 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2992 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2993 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2998 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3001 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3002 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3003 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3005 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3006 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3009 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3012 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3013 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3014 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3016 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3020 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3024 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3025 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3028 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3032 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3036 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
3037 where L::Target: Logger
3039 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3040 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
3042 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3043 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
3045 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3046 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
3049 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3051 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3053 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3054 let commitment_txid = {
3055 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3056 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3057 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3059 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3060 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3061 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3062 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3063 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3064 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3068 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3070 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3071 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3072 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3073 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3076 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3077 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3078 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3079 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3082 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3084 if self.is_outbound() {
3085 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3086 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3087 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3088 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3089 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3090 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3091 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3092 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3093 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3094 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3100 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3101 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3104 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3105 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3106 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3107 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3108 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3109 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3110 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3112 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3113 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3114 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3115 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3116 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3117 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3118 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3119 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3121 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3123 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3127 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3128 commitment_stats.tx,
3130 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3131 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3132 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3135 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3136 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3137 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3138 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3140 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3141 let mut need_commitment = false;
3142 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3143 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3144 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3145 need_commitment = true;
3149 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3150 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3151 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3152 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3153 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3154 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3158 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3159 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3160 Some(forward_info.clone())
3162 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3163 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3164 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3165 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3166 need_commitment = true;
3169 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3170 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3171 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3172 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3173 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3174 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3175 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3176 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3177 need_commitment = true;
3181 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3182 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3183 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3184 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3186 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3187 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3188 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3189 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3190 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3191 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3192 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3193 // includes the right HTLCs.
3194 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3195 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3196 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3197 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3198 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3199 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3201 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3202 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3203 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3206 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3207 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3208 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3209 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3210 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3211 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3212 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3213 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3214 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3218 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3219 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3221 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3222 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3223 per_commitment_secret,
3224 next_per_commitment_point,
3225 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3228 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3229 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3230 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3231 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3232 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3233 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3234 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3235 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3238 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3239 /// for our counterparty.
3240 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3241 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3242 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3243 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3244 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3246 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3247 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3248 updates: Vec::new(),
3251 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3252 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3253 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3254 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3255 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3256 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3257 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3258 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3259 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3260 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3261 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3262 // to rebalance channels.
3263 match &htlc_update {
3264 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3265 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3266 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3269 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3270 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3271 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3272 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3273 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3274 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3275 // into the holding cell without ever being
3276 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3277 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3278 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3281 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3287 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3288 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3289 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3290 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3291 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3292 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3293 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3294 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3295 (msg, monitor_update)
3296 } else { unreachable!() };
3297 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3298 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3300 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3301 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3302 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3303 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3304 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3305 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3306 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3307 // for a full revocation before failing.
3308 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3311 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3313 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3320 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3321 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3323 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3324 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3329 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3330 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3331 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3332 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3333 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3335 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3336 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3337 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3339 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3341 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3343 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3346 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3348 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3352 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3353 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3354 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3355 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3356 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3357 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3358 where L::Target: Logger,
3360 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3361 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3363 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3364 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3366 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3370 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3372 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3373 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3378 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3379 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3380 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3381 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3382 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3383 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3384 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3385 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3389 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3391 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3392 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3395 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3396 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3398 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3400 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3401 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3402 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3403 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3404 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3405 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3406 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3407 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3411 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3412 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3413 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3414 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3415 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3416 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3417 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3418 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3420 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3421 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3424 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3425 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3426 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3427 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3428 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3429 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3430 let mut require_commitment = false;
3431 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3434 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3435 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3436 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3438 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3439 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3440 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3441 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3442 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3443 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3448 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3449 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3450 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3451 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3452 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3454 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3455 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3456 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3461 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3462 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3464 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3468 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3469 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3471 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3472 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3473 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3474 require_commitment = true;
3475 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3476 match forward_info {
3477 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3478 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3479 require_commitment = true;
3481 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3482 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3483 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3485 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3486 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3487 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3491 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3492 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3493 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3494 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3500 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3501 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3502 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3503 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3505 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3506 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3507 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3508 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3509 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3510 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3511 require_commitment = true;
3515 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3517 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3518 match update_state {
3519 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3520 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3521 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3522 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3523 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3525 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3526 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3527 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3528 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3529 require_commitment = true;
3530 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3531 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3536 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3537 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3538 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3539 if require_commitment {
3540 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3541 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3542 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3543 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3544 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3545 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3546 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3547 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3548 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3550 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3551 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3552 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3553 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3554 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3555 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3556 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3558 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3562 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3563 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3564 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3565 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3566 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3568 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3569 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3570 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3573 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3574 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3575 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3576 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3579 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3580 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3581 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3582 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3584 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3587 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3588 if require_commitment {
3589 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3591 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3592 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3593 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3594 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3596 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3597 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3599 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3600 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3601 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3603 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3607 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3608 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3609 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3612 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3614 commitment_update: None,
3615 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3616 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3617 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3624 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3625 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3626 /// commitment update.
3627 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3628 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3629 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3632 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3633 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3634 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3635 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3637 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3638 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3639 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3640 if !self.is_outbound() {
3641 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3643 if !self.is_usable() {
3644 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3646 if !self.is_live() {
3647 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3650 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3651 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3652 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3653 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3654 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3655 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3656 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3657 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3658 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3659 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3663 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3664 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3665 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3666 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3667 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3670 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3671 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3675 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3676 force_holding_cell = true;
3679 if force_holding_cell {
3680 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3684 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3685 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3687 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3688 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3693 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3694 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3696 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3698 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3699 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3700 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3701 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3705 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3706 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3707 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3711 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3712 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3715 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3716 // will be retransmitted.
3717 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3718 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3719 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3721 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3722 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3724 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3725 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3726 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3727 // this HTLC accordingly
3728 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3731 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3732 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3733 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3734 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3737 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3738 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3739 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3740 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3741 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3742 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3747 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3749 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3750 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3751 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3752 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3756 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3757 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3758 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3759 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3760 // the update upon reconnection.
3761 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3765 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3766 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3769 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3770 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3771 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3772 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3773 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3774 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3776 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3777 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3778 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3779 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3780 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3781 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3783 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3784 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3785 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3786 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3787 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3788 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3789 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3792 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3793 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3794 /// to the remote side.
3795 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3796 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3797 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3798 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3801 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3803 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3804 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3806 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3807 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3808 // first received the funding_signed.
3809 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3810 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3811 self.funding_transaction.take()
3813 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3814 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3815 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3816 funding_broadcastable = None;
3819 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3820 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3821 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3822 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3823 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3824 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3825 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3826 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3827 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3828 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3829 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3830 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3831 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3832 next_per_commitment_point,
3833 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3837 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3839 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3840 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3841 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3842 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3843 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3844 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3846 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3847 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3848 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3849 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3850 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3851 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3855 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3856 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3858 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3859 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3862 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3863 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3864 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3865 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3866 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3867 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3868 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3869 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3870 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3874 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3875 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3877 if self.is_outbound() {
3878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3880 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3881 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3883 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3884 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3886 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3887 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3888 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3889 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3890 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3891 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3892 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3893 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3894 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3895 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3896 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3897 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3898 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3900 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3902 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3908 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3909 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3910 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3911 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3912 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3913 per_commitment_secret,
3914 next_per_commitment_point,
3918 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3919 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3920 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3921 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3922 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3924 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3925 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3926 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3927 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3928 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3929 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3930 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3931 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3932 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3937 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3938 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3940 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3941 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3942 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3943 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3944 reason: err_packet.clone()
3947 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3948 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3949 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3950 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3951 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3952 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3955 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3956 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3957 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3958 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3959 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3966 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3967 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3968 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3969 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3973 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3974 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3975 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3976 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3977 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3978 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3982 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3983 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3985 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3986 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3987 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3988 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3989 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3990 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3991 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3992 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3995 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3997 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3998 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3999 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4000 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4004 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4005 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4006 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4009 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4010 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4011 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4012 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4013 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4014 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4015 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4016 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4018 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4019 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4020 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4021 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4022 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4025 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4026 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4027 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4028 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4029 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4030 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4031 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4032 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4035 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4039 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4040 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4041 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4042 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4044 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4048 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4049 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4050 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4052 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4053 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4054 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4055 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4056 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4060 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4062 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4063 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4064 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4065 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4066 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4069 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4070 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4071 channel_ready: None,
4072 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4073 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4074 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4078 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4079 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4080 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4081 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4082 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4083 next_per_commitment_point,
4084 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4086 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4087 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4088 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4092 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4093 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4094 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4096 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4097 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4098 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4101 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4107 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4108 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4109 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4110 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4111 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4113 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4114 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4115 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4116 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4117 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4118 next_per_commitment_point,
4119 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4123 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4124 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4125 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4127 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4130 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4131 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4132 raa: required_revoke,
4133 commitment_update: None,
4134 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4136 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4137 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4138 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4140 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4143 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4144 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4145 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4146 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4147 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4148 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4151 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4152 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4153 raa: required_revoke,
4154 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4155 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4159 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4163 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4164 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4165 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4166 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4168 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4170 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4172 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4173 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4174 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4175 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4176 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4177 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4179 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4180 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4181 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4182 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4183 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4185 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4186 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4187 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4188 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4191 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4192 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4193 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4194 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4195 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4196 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4197 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4198 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4199 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4200 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4201 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4202 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4203 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4204 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4205 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4207 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4210 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4211 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4214 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4215 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4216 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4217 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4218 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4219 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4220 self.channel_state &
4221 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4222 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4223 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4224 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4227 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4228 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4229 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4230 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4231 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4232 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4235 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4241 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4242 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4243 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4244 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4246 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4247 return Ok((None, None));
4250 if !self.is_outbound() {
4251 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4252 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4254 return Ok((None, None));
4257 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4259 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4260 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4261 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4262 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4264 let sig = self.holder_signer
4265 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4266 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4268 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4269 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4270 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4271 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4273 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4274 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4275 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4280 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4281 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4282 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4283 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4285 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4288 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4289 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4290 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4291 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4292 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4294 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4295 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4299 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4301 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4305 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4306 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4310 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4313 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4314 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4315 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4316 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4318 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4321 assert!(send_shutdown);
4322 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4323 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4324 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4326 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4331 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4333 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4334 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4336 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4337 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4338 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4339 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4340 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4341 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4345 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4346 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4347 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4348 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4352 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4353 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4354 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4355 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4356 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4357 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4359 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4360 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4367 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4368 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4370 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4373 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4374 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4376 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4378 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4379 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4380 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4381 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4382 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4383 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4384 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4385 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4386 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4388 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4389 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4392 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4396 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4397 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4398 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4399 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4401 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4404 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4407 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4410 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4414 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4415 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4418 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4419 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4420 return Ok((None, None));
4423 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4424 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4425 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4426 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4428 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4430 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4433 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4434 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4435 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4436 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4437 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4441 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4442 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4447 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4448 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4449 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4450 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4451 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4452 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4453 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4457 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4459 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4460 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4461 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4462 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4464 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4467 let sig = self.holder_signer
4468 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4469 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4471 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4472 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4473 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4474 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4478 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4479 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4480 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4481 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4483 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4484 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4485 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4491 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4492 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4493 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4495 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4496 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4498 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4499 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4502 if !self.is_outbound() {
4503 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4504 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4505 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4506 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4508 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4510 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4512 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4513 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4516 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4517 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4518 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4519 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4520 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4521 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4522 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4523 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4525 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4528 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4529 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4530 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4531 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4537 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4538 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4539 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4540 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4542 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4548 // Public utilities:
4550 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4554 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4558 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4559 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4560 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4564 /// Gets the channel's type
4565 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4569 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4570 /// is_usable() returns true).
4571 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4572 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4573 self.short_channel_id
4576 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4577 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4578 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4581 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4582 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4583 self.outbound_scid_alias
4585 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4586 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4587 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4588 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4589 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4592 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4593 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4594 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4595 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4598 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4599 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4600 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4603 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4604 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4605 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4606 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4610 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4613 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4614 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4617 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4618 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4621 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4622 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4623 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4626 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4627 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4630 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4631 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4632 self.counterparty_node_id
4635 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4636 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4637 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4640 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4641 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4642 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4645 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4646 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4648 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4649 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4650 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4651 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4653 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4657 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4658 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4659 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4662 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4663 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4664 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4667 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4668 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4669 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4671 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4672 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4677 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4678 self.channel_value_satoshis
4681 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4682 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4685 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4686 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4689 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4690 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4693 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4694 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4695 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4698 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4699 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4700 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4703 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4704 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4705 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4708 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4709 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4710 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4711 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4712 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4715 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4717 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4718 self.prev_config = None;
4722 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4723 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4727 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4728 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4729 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4730 let did_channel_update =
4731 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4732 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4733 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4734 if did_channel_update {
4735 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4736 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4737 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4738 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4740 self.config.options = *config;
4744 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4745 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4746 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4747 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4748 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4749 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4750 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4752 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4753 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4756 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4758 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4759 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4765 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4766 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4767 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4768 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4769 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4770 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4771 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4773 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4774 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4781 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4785 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4786 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4787 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4788 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4789 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4790 // which are near the dust limit.
4791 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4792 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4793 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4794 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4795 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4797 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4798 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4800 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4803 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4804 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4807 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4808 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4811 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4812 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4816 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4821 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4823 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4824 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4825 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4826 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4827 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4828 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4830 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4832 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4840 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4841 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4845 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4846 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4847 self.update_time_counter
4850 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4851 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4854 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4855 self.config.announced_channel
4858 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4859 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4862 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4863 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4864 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4865 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4868 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4869 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4870 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4873 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4874 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4875 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4876 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4877 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4880 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4881 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4882 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4883 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4884 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4887 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4888 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4889 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4890 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4893 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4894 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4895 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4898 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4899 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4900 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4902 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4903 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4904 if self.channel_state &
4905 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4906 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4907 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4908 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4909 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4912 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4913 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4914 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4915 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4916 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4917 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4919 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4920 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4921 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4923 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4924 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4925 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4926 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4927 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4928 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4934 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4935 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4936 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4939 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4940 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4941 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4944 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4945 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4946 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4949 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4950 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4951 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4952 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4953 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4954 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4959 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4960 self.channel_update_status
4963 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4964 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4965 self.channel_update_status = status;
4968 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4970 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4971 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4972 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4976 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4977 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4978 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4981 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4985 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4986 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4987 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4989 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4990 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4991 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4993 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4994 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4997 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4998 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4999 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5000 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5001 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5002 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5003 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5004 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5005 self.channel_state);
5007 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5011 if need_commitment_update {
5012 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5013 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5014 let next_per_commitment_point =
5015 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5016 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5017 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5018 next_per_commitment_point,
5019 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5023 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5029 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5030 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5031 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5032 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5033 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5034 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5035 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5037 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5040 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5041 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5042 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5043 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5044 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5045 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5046 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5047 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5048 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5049 if self.is_outbound() {
5050 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5051 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5052 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5053 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5054 // channel and move on.
5055 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5056 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5058 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5059 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5060 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5062 if self.is_outbound() {
5063 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5064 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5065 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5066 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5067 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5068 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5072 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5073 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5074 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5075 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5076 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5080 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5081 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5082 // may have already happened for this block).
5083 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5084 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5085 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5086 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5089 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5090 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5091 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5092 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5100 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5101 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5102 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5103 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5105 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5106 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5109 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5111 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5112 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5113 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5114 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5116 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5119 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5122 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5123 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5124 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5125 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5127 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5130 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5131 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5132 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5134 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5135 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5137 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5138 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5139 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5147 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5149 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5150 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5151 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5153 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5154 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5157 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5158 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5159 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5160 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5161 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5162 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5163 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5164 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5165 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5168 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5169 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5170 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5171 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5173 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5174 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5175 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5177 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5178 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5179 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5180 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5182 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5183 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5184 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5185 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5186 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5187 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5188 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5191 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5192 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5194 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5197 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5198 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5199 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5200 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5201 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5202 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5203 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5204 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5205 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5206 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5207 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5208 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5209 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5210 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5211 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5212 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5213 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5219 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5224 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5225 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5227 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5228 if !self.is_outbound() {
5229 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5231 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5232 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5235 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5236 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5239 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5240 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5244 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5245 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5246 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5247 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5248 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5249 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5250 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5251 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5252 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5253 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5254 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5255 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5256 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5257 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5258 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5259 first_per_commitment_point,
5260 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5261 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5262 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5263 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5265 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5269 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5270 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5273 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5274 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5275 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5276 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5279 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5280 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5282 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5283 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5284 if self.is_outbound() {
5285 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5287 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5288 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5290 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5291 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5293 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5294 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5297 self.user_id = user_id;
5298 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5300 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5303 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5304 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5305 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5307 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5308 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5309 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5310 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5312 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5313 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5314 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5315 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5316 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5317 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5318 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5319 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5320 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5321 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5322 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5323 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5324 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5325 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5326 first_per_commitment_point,
5327 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5328 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5329 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5331 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5335 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5336 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5338 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5340 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5341 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5344 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5345 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5346 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5347 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5348 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5349 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5352 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5353 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5354 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5355 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5356 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5357 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5358 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5359 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5360 if !self.is_outbound() {
5361 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5363 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5364 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5366 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5367 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5368 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5369 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5372 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5373 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5375 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5378 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5379 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5384 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5386 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5388 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5389 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5390 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5392 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5393 temporary_channel_id,
5394 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5395 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5400 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5401 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5402 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5403 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5405 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5408 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5409 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5410 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5411 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5412 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5413 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5415 if !self.is_usable() {
5416 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5419 let node_id = node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5420 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?;
5421 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5423 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5424 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5426 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5427 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5428 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5429 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5430 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5431 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5437 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5438 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5439 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5440 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5442 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5445 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5449 if !self.is_usable() {
5453 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5454 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5458 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5462 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5463 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5466 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5470 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5472 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5477 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5479 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5484 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5486 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5487 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5488 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5489 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5490 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5494 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5496 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5497 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5498 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5499 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5500 let our_node_key = node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5501 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?;
5502 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5504 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5505 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5506 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5507 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5508 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5509 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5510 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5511 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5512 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5513 contents: announcement,
5516 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5520 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5521 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5522 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5523 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5524 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5525 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5526 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5527 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5529 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5531 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5532 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5533 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5534 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5536 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5537 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5538 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5539 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5542 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5543 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5544 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5545 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5548 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5551 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5552 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5553 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5554 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5555 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5556 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5559 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5561 Err(_) => return None,
5563 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5564 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5569 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5570 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5571 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5572 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5573 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5574 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5575 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5576 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5577 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5578 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5579 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5580 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5581 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5582 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5583 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5584 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5585 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5586 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5587 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5590 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5591 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5592 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5593 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5596 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5597 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5598 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5599 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5600 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5601 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5602 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5603 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5605 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5606 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5607 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5608 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5609 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5610 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5611 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5612 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5613 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5615 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5621 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5623 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5624 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5625 /// commitment update.
5627 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5628 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5629 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5630 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5632 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5633 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5635 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5636 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5641 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5642 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5644 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5646 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5647 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5649 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5650 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5651 /// regenerate them.
5653 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5654 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5656 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5657 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5658 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5659 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5660 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5661 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5663 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5664 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5665 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5668 if amount_msat == 0 {
5669 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5672 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5673 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5676 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5677 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5678 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5679 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5680 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5681 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5682 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5683 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5686 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5687 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5688 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5689 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5691 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5692 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5693 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5696 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5697 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5698 if !self.is_outbound() {
5699 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5700 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5701 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5702 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5703 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5704 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5708 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5711 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5712 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5713 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5715 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5716 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5717 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5718 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5719 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5720 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5724 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5725 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5726 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5727 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5728 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5729 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5733 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5734 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5735 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5738 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5739 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5740 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5741 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5743 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5744 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5747 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5748 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5749 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5750 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5751 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5754 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5755 force_holding_cell = true;
5758 // Now update local state:
5759 if force_holding_cell {
5760 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5765 onion_routing_packet,
5770 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5771 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5773 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5775 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5779 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5780 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5781 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5785 onion_routing_packet,
5787 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5792 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5793 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5794 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5795 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5796 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5798 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5799 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5800 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5802 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5803 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5807 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5808 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5809 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5810 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5811 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5812 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5813 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5816 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5817 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5818 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5819 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5820 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5821 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5824 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5826 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5827 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5828 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5829 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5830 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5831 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5833 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5836 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5837 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5840 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5841 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5842 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5843 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5844 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5845 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5846 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5847 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5850 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5851 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5854 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5855 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5856 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5857 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5858 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5859 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5860 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5862 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5864 if !self.is_outbound() {
5865 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5866 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5867 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5868 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5869 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5870 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5871 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5872 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5873 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5874 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5881 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5882 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5886 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5887 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5889 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5891 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5892 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5893 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5894 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5896 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5897 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5898 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5899 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5900 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5901 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5905 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5906 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5909 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5912 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5913 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5915 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5916 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5917 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5918 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5919 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5920 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5921 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5927 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5928 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5929 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5932 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5933 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5934 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5936 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5937 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5938 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5939 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5945 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5946 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5947 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5948 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5949 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5950 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5951 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5952 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5955 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5956 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5957 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5959 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5960 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5963 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5964 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5965 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5968 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5971 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5972 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5973 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5975 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5980 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5981 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5982 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5983 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5985 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5987 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5989 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5990 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5991 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5992 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5993 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5994 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5998 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5999 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6000 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6003 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6004 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6005 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6006 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6007 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6009 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6010 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6017 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6020 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6021 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6022 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6023 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6024 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6025 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6026 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6027 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6028 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6029 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6030 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6032 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6033 // return them to fail the payment.
6034 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6035 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6036 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6038 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6039 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6044 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6045 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6046 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6047 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6048 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6049 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6050 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6051 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6052 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6053 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6054 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6055 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6056 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6061 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6062 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6063 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6066 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6067 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6068 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6070 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6071 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6075 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6079 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6080 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6082 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6088 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6089 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6090 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6091 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6092 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6094 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6095 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6096 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6097 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6103 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6104 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6105 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6106 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6107 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6108 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6113 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6114 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6115 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6116 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6118 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6119 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6120 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6121 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6126 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6127 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6128 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6129 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6130 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6131 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6136 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6137 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6138 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6141 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6143 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6144 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6145 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6146 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6147 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6149 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6150 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6151 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6152 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6154 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6155 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6156 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6158 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6160 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6161 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6162 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6163 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6164 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6165 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6167 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6168 // deserialized from that format.
6169 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6170 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6171 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6173 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6175 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6176 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6177 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6179 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6180 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6181 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6182 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6185 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6186 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6187 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6190 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6191 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6192 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6193 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6195 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6196 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6198 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6200 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6202 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6204 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6207 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6209 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6214 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6216 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6217 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6218 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6219 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6220 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6221 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6222 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6224 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6226 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6228 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6231 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6232 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6233 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6236 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6238 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6239 preimages.push(preimage);
6241 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6242 reason.write(writer)?;
6244 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6246 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6247 preimages.push(preimage);
6249 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6250 reason.write(writer)?;
6255 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6256 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6258 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6260 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6261 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6262 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6263 source.write(writer)?;
6264 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6266 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6268 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6269 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6271 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6273 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6274 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6279 match self.resend_order {
6280 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6281 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6284 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6285 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6286 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6288 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6289 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6290 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6291 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6294 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6295 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6296 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6297 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6298 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6301 if self.is_outbound() {
6302 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6303 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6304 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6306 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6307 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6308 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6310 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6312 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6313 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6314 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6315 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6317 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6318 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6319 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6320 // consider the stale state on reload.
6323 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6324 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6325 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6327 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6328 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6329 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6331 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6332 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6334 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6335 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6336 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6338 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6339 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6341 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6344 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6345 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6346 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6348 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6351 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6352 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6354 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6355 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6356 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6358 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6360 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6362 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6364 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6365 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6366 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6367 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6368 htlc.write(writer)?;
6371 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6372 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6373 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6375 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6376 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6378 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6379 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6380 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6381 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6382 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6383 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6384 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6386 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6387 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6388 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6389 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6390 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6392 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6394 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6395 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6396 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6397 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6399 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6400 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6401 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6402 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6403 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6404 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6405 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6407 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6408 (2, chan_type, option),
6409 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6410 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6411 (5, self.config, required),
6412 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6413 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6414 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6415 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6416 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6417 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6418 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6419 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6420 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6421 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6422 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6423 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6430 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6431 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6433 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6434 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6436 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6437 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6438 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6440 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6441 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6442 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6443 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6445 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6447 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6448 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6450 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6451 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6453 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6454 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6458 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6459 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6463 let mut keys_data = None;
6465 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6466 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6467 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6468 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6469 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6470 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6471 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6472 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6473 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6474 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6478 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6479 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6480 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6483 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6485 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6487 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6491 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6492 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6493 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6494 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6495 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6496 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6497 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6498 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6499 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6500 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6501 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6502 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6507 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6508 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6509 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6510 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6511 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6512 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6513 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6514 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6515 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6516 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6517 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6518 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6520 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6521 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6524 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6525 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6528 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6531 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6536 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6537 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6538 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6539 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6540 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6541 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6542 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6543 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6544 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6545 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6547 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6548 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6549 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6551 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6552 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6553 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6555 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6559 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6560 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6561 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6562 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6565 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6566 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6567 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6569 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6570 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6571 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6572 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6575 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6576 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6577 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6578 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6581 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6583 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6585 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6586 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6587 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6588 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6590 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6591 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6592 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6593 // consider the stale state on reload.
6594 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6597 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6598 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6599 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6601 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6604 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6605 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6606 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6608 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6609 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6610 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6611 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6613 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6614 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6616 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6617 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6619 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6620 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6621 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6623 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6625 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6626 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6628 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6629 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6632 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6634 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6635 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6636 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6637 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6639 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6642 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6643 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6647 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6648 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6650 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6651 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6653 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6655 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6656 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6657 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6659 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6660 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6661 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6665 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6666 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6667 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6669 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6675 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6676 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6677 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6678 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6679 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6680 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6681 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6682 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6683 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6684 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6686 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6687 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6688 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6689 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6690 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6691 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6693 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6694 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6696 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6697 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6698 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6699 (2, channel_type, option),
6700 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6701 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6702 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6703 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6704 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6705 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6706 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6707 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6708 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6709 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6710 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6711 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6712 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6713 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6714 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6717 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6718 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6719 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6720 // required channel parameters.
6721 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6722 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6723 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6725 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6727 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6728 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6729 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6730 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6733 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6734 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6735 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6737 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6738 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6740 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6741 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6746 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6747 if iter.next().is_some() {
6748 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6752 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6753 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6754 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6755 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6756 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6759 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6760 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6762 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6763 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6764 // separate u64 values.
6765 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6770 config: config.unwrap(),
6774 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6775 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6776 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6780 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6782 channel_value_satoshis,
6784 latest_monitor_update_id,
6787 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6790 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6791 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6794 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6795 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6796 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6800 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6801 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6802 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6803 monitor_pending_forwards,
6804 monitor_pending_failures,
6805 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6808 holding_cell_update_fee,
6809 next_holder_htlc_id,
6810 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6811 update_time_counter,
6814 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6815 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6816 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6817 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6819 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6820 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6821 closing_fee_limits: None,
6822 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6824 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6826 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6827 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6829 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6831 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6832 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6833 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6834 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6835 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6836 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6837 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6838 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6839 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6842 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6844 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6845 funding_transaction,
6847 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6848 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6849 counterparty_node_id,
6851 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6855 channel_update_status,
6856 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6860 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6861 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6862 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6863 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6865 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6867 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6868 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6869 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6871 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6873 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6874 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6876 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6885 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6886 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6887 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6888 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6889 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6891 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6892 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6894 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6895 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6896 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6897 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6898 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6899 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6900 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6901 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6902 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6903 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6904 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6905 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6906 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6907 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6908 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6909 use crate::util::test_utils;
6910 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6911 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6912 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6913 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6914 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6915 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6916 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6917 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6918 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6919 use crate::prelude::*;
6921 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6924 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6925 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6931 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6932 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6933 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6934 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6938 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6939 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6940 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6941 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6942 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6943 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6944 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6948 signer: InMemorySigner,
6951 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6952 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6955 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6956 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6958 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6959 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6962 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6966 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6968 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6969 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6970 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6971 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6972 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6975 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6976 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6977 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6978 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6982 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6983 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6984 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6988 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6989 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6990 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6991 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6993 let seed = [42; 32];
6994 let network = Network::Testnet;
6995 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6996 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6997 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7000 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7001 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7002 let config = UserConfig::default();
7003 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7004 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7005 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7007 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7008 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7012 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7013 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7015 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7016 let original_fee = 253;
7017 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7018 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7019 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7020 let seed = [42; 32];
7021 let network = Network::Testnet;
7022 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7024 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7025 let config = UserConfig::default();
7026 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7028 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7029 // same as the old fee.
7030 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7031 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7032 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7036 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7037 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7038 // dust limits are used.
7039 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7040 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7041 let seed = [42; 32];
7042 let network = Network::Testnet;
7043 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7044 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7046 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7047 // they have different dust limits.
7049 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7050 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7051 let config = UserConfig::default();
7052 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7054 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7055 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7056 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7057 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7058 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7060 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7061 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7062 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7063 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7064 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7066 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7067 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7068 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7070 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7071 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7072 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7073 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7076 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7078 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7079 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7080 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7081 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7082 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7084 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7085 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7086 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7087 payment_secret: None,
7088 payment_params: None,
7092 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7093 // the dust limit check.
7094 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7095 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7096 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7097 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7099 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7100 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7101 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7102 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7103 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7104 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7105 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7109 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7110 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7111 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7112 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7113 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7114 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7115 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7116 let seed = [42; 32];
7117 let network = Network::Testnet;
7118 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7120 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7121 let config = UserConfig::default();
7122 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7124 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7125 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7127 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7128 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7129 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7130 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7131 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7132 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7134 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7135 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7136 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7137 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7138 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7140 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7142 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7143 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7144 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7145 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7146 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7148 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7149 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7150 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7151 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7152 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7156 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7157 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7158 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7159 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7160 let seed = [42; 32];
7161 let network = Network::Testnet;
7162 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7163 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7164 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7166 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7168 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7169 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7170 let config = UserConfig::default();
7171 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7173 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7174 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7175 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7176 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7178 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7179 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7180 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7182 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7183 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7184 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7185 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7187 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7188 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7189 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7191 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7192 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7194 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7195 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7196 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7197 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7198 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7199 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7200 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7201 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7202 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7207 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7209 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7210 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7211 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7212 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7213 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7214 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7215 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7222 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7223 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7224 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7225 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7226 let seed = [42; 32];
7227 let network = Network::Testnet;
7228 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7229 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7230 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7232 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7233 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7234 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7235 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7236 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7237 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7238 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7239 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7241 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7242 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7243 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7244 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7245 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7246 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7248 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7249 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7250 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7251 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7253 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7255 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7256 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7257 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7258 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7259 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7260 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7262 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7263 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7264 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7265 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7267 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7268 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7269 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7270 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7271 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7273 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7274 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7276 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7277 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7278 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7280 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7281 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7282 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7283 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7284 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7286 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7287 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7289 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7290 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7291 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7295 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7297 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7298 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7299 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7301 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7302 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7303 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7304 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7306 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7307 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7308 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7310 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7312 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7313 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7316 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7317 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7318 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7319 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7320 let seed = [42; 32];
7321 let network = Network::Testnet;
7322 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7323 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7324 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7327 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7328 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7329 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7331 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7332 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7334 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7335 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7336 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7338 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7339 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7341 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7343 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7344 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7346 // Channel Negotiations failed
7347 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7348 assert!(result.is_err());
7353 fn channel_update() {
7354 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7355 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7356 let seed = [42; 32];
7357 let network = Network::Testnet;
7358 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7359 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7361 // Create a channel.
7362 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7363 let config = UserConfig::default();
7364 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7365 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7366 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7367 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7369 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7370 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7371 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7373 short_channel_id: 0,
7376 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7377 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7378 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7380 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7381 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7383 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7385 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7387 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7388 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7389 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7390 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7392 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7393 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7394 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7396 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7400 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7402 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7403 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7404 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7405 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7406 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7407 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7408 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7409 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7410 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7411 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7412 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7413 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7414 use crate::sync::Arc;
7416 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7417 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7418 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7419 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7421 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7423 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7424 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7425 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7426 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7427 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7429 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7430 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7435 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7436 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7437 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7439 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7440 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7441 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7442 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7443 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7444 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7446 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7448 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7449 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7450 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7451 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7452 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7453 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7455 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7456 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7457 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7458 selected_contest_delay: 144
7460 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7461 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7463 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7464 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7466 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7467 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7469 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7470 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7472 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7473 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7474 // build_commitment_transaction.
7475 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7476 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7477 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7478 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7479 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7481 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7482 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7483 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7484 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7488 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7489 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7490 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7491 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7495 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7496 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7497 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7499 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7500 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7502 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7503 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7505 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7507 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7508 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7509 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7510 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7511 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7512 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7513 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7515 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7516 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7517 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7518 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7520 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7521 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7522 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7524 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7526 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7527 commitment_tx.clone(),
7528 counterparty_signature,
7529 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7530 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7531 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7533 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7534 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7536 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7537 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7538 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7540 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7541 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7544 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7545 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7547 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7548 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7549 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7550 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7551 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7552 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7553 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7554 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7556 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7559 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7560 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7561 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7565 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7568 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7569 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7570 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7572 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7573 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7574 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7575 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7576 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7577 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7578 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7579 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7581 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7585 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7586 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7588 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7589 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7590 "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", {});
7592 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7593 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7594 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7595 "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", {});
7597 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7598 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7600 amount_msat: 1000000,
7602 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7603 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7605 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7608 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7609 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7611 amount_msat: 2000000,
7613 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7614 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7616 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7619 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7620 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7622 amount_msat: 2000000,
7624 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7625 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7626 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7628 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7631 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7632 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7634 amount_msat: 3000000,
7636 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7637 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7638 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7640 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7643 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7644 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7646 amount_msat: 4000000,
7648 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7649 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7651 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7655 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7656 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7657 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7659 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7660 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7661 "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", {
7664 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7665 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7666 "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" },
7669 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7670 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7671 "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" },
7674 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7675 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7676 "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" },
7679 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7680 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7681 "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" },
7684 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7685 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7686 "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" }
7689 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7690 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7691 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7693 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7694 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7695 "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", {
7698 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7699 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7700 "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" },
7703 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7704 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7705 "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" },
7708 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7709 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7710 "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" },
7713 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7714 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7715 "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" },
7718 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7719 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7720 "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" }
7723 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7724 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7725 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7727 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7728 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7729 "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", {
7732 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7733 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7734 "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" },
7737 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7738 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7739 "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" },
7742 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7743 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7744 "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" },
7747 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7748 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7749 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7752 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7753 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7754 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7755 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7757 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7758 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7759 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7762 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7763 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7764 "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" },
7767 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7768 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7769 "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" },
7772 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7773 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7774 "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" },
7777 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7778 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7779 "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" }
7782 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7783 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7784 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7785 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7787 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7788 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7789 "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", {
7792 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7793 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7794 "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" },
7797 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7798 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7799 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7802 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7803 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7804 "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" },
7807 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7808 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7809 "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" }
7812 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7813 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7814 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7816 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7817 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7818 "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", {
7821 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7822 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7823 "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" },
7826 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7827 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7828 "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" },
7831 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7832 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7833 "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" }
7836 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7837 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7838 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7840 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7841 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7842 "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", {
7845 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7846 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7847 "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" },
7850 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7851 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7852 "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" },
7855 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7856 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7857 "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" }
7860 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7861 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7862 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7864 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7865 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7866 "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", {
7869 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7870 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7871 "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" },
7874 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7875 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7876 "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" }
7879 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7880 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7881 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7882 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7884 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7885 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7886 "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", {
7889 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7890 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7891 "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" },
7894 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7895 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7896 "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" }
7899 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7900 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7901 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7902 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7904 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7905 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7906 "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", {
7909 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7910 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7911 "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" },
7914 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7915 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7916 "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" }
7919 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7920 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7921 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7923 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7924 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7925 "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", {
7928 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7929 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7930 "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" }
7933 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7934 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7935 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7936 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7938 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7939 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7940 "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", {
7943 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7944 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7945 "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" }
7948 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7949 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7950 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7951 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7953 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7954 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7955 "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", {
7958 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7959 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7960 "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" }
7963 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7964 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7965 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7966 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7968 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7969 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7970 "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", {});
7972 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7973 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7974 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7975 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7977 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7978 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7979 "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", {});
7981 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7982 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7983 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7984 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7986 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7987 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7988 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7990 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7991 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7992 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7994 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7995 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7996 "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", {});
7998 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7999 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8000 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8001 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8003 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8004 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8005 "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", {});
8007 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8008 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8009 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8010 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8012 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8013 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8014 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8016 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8017 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8018 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8019 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8020 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8021 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8023 amount_msat: 2000000,
8025 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8026 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8028 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8031 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8032 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8033 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8035 amount_msat: 5000000,
8037 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8038 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8039 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8041 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8044 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8045 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8047 amount_msat: 5000000,
8049 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8050 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8051 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8053 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8057 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8058 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8059 "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", {
8062 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8063 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8064 "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" },
8066 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8067 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8068 "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" },
8070 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8071 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8072 "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" }
8075 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8076 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8077 "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", {
8080 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8081 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8082 "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" },
8084 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8085 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8086 "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" },
8088 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8089 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8090 "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" }
8095 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8096 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8098 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8099 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8100 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8101 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8103 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8104 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8105 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8107 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8108 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8110 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8111 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8113 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8114 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8115 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8119 fn test_key_derivation() {
8120 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8121 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8123 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8124 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8126 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8127 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8129 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8130 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8132 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8133 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8135 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8136 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8138 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8139 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8141 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8142 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8146 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8147 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8148 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8149 let seed = [42; 32];
8150 let network = Network::Testnet;
8151 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8152 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8154 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8155 let config = UserConfig::default();
8156 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8157 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8159 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8160 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8162 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8163 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8164 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8165 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8166 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8167 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8168 assert!(res.is_ok());
8173 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8174 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8175 // resulting `channel_type`.
8176 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8177 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8178 let network = Network::Testnet;
8179 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8180 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8182 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8183 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8185 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8186 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8188 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8189 // need to signal it.
8190 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8191 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8192 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8195 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8197 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8198 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8199 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8201 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8202 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8203 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8206 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8207 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8208 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8209 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8210 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8213 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8214 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8219 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8220 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8221 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8222 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8223 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8224 let network = Network::Testnet;
8225 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8226 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8228 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8229 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8231 let config = UserConfig::default();
8233 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8234 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8235 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8236 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8237 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8239 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8240 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8241 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8244 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8245 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8246 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8248 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8249 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8250 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8251 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8252 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8253 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8255 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8260 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8261 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8263 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8264 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8265 let network = Network::Testnet;
8266 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8267 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8269 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8270 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8272 let config = UserConfig::default();
8274 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8275 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8276 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8277 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8278 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8279 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8280 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8281 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8283 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8284 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8285 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8286 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8287 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8288 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8291 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8292 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8294 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8295 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8296 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8297 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8299 assert!(res.is_err());
8301 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8302 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8303 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8305 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8306 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8307 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8310 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8312 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8313 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8314 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8315 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8318 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8319 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8321 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8322 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8324 assert!(res.is_err());