1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
304 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
305 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
307 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
309 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
311 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
314 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
318 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
322 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
324 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
325 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
326 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
327 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
328 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
330 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
331 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
333 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
335 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
336 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
338 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
339 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
340 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
341 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
342 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
343 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
345 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
346 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
348 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
349 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
350 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
351 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
352 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
354 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
355 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
357 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
358 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
360 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
361 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
362 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
363 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
370 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
372 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
379 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
380 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
382 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
389 macro_rules! secp_check {
390 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
398 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
399 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
400 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
401 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
402 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
404 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
405 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
407 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
409 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
411 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
415 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
417 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
418 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
419 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
421 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
422 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
424 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
425 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
426 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
427 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
428 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
430 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
431 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
435 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
441 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
444 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
445 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 holding_cell_msat: u64,
448 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
451 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
452 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
453 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
454 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
455 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
456 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
457 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
458 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
463 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
464 struct HTLCCandidate {
466 origin: HTLCInitiator,
470 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
478 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
480 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
482 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
483 htlc_value_msat: u64,
484 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
489 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
490 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
491 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
492 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
493 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
495 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
496 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
500 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
501 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
505 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
506 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
507 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
508 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
509 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
510 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
511 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
512 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
513 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
514 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
515 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
518 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
519 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
520 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
521 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
522 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
523 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
524 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
525 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
528 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
531 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
532 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
533 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
534 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
535 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>
538 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
539 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
540 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
541 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
542 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
543 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
544 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
545 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
546 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
547 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
548 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
549 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
550 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
552 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
554 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
555 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
556 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
557 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
559 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
560 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
561 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
562 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
564 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
565 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
566 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
567 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
568 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
570 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
571 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
572 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
573 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
575 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
576 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
577 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
579 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
580 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
581 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
582 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
583 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
585 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
586 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
589 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
590 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
592 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
593 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
594 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
595 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
597 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
598 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
601 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
602 (0, update, required),
605 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
606 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
607 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
608 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
609 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
611 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
612 /// in a timely manner.
613 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
616 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
617 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
618 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
620 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
621 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
622 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
623 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
627 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
628 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
629 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
631 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
632 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
633 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
634 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
636 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
640 /// The current channel ID.
641 channel_id: ChannelId,
642 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
643 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
644 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
647 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
648 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
650 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
651 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
652 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
654 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
655 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
656 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
657 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
659 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
660 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
662 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
664 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
665 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
666 destination_script: Script,
668 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
669 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
670 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
672 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
673 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
674 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
675 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
676 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
677 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
679 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
680 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
681 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
682 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
683 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
684 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
686 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
688 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
689 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
690 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
692 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
693 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
694 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
695 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
696 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
697 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
698 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
700 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
702 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
703 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
704 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
705 // HTLCs with similar state.
706 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
707 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
708 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
709 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
710 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
711 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
712 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
713 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
714 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
717 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
718 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
719 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
721 update_time_counter: u32,
723 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
724 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
725 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
726 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
727 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
728 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
730 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
731 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
733 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
734 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
735 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
736 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
738 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
739 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
741 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
743 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
745 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
746 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
747 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
748 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
749 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
750 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
751 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
752 channel_creation_height: u32,
754 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
757 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
759 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
762 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
764 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
767 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
769 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
771 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
772 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
775 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
777 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
779 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
780 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
782 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
784 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
785 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
786 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
788 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
790 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
791 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
793 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
794 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
795 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
797 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
799 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
801 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
802 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
803 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
804 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
806 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
807 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
808 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
810 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
811 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
812 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
814 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
815 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
816 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
817 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
818 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
819 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
820 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
821 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
823 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
824 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
825 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
826 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
827 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
829 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
830 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
832 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
833 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
834 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
835 /// unblock the state machine.
837 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
838 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
839 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
841 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
842 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
843 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
845 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
846 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
847 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
848 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
849 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
850 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
851 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
852 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
854 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
855 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
857 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
858 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
859 // the channel's funding UTXO.
861 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
862 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
863 // associated channel mapping.
865 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
866 // to store all of them.
867 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
869 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
870 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
871 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
872 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
873 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
875 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
876 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
878 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
879 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
881 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
882 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
883 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
885 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
886 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
887 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
890 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
891 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
892 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
893 self.update_time_counter
896 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
897 self.latest_monitor_update_id
900 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
901 self.config.announced_channel
904 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
905 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
908 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
909 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
910 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
911 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
914 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
915 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
916 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
919 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
920 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
921 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
922 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
923 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
926 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
927 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
928 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
929 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
931 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
932 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
934 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
935 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
937 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
938 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
940 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
943 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
944 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
945 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
946 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
948 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
949 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
950 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
951 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
954 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
955 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
956 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
957 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
958 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
963 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
967 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
969 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
970 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
971 self.temporary_channel_id
974 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
978 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
979 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
980 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
984 /// Gets the channel's type
985 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
989 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
991 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
992 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
993 self.short_channel_id
996 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
997 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
998 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1001 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1002 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1003 self.outbound_scid_alias
1006 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1007 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1008 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1009 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1010 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1011 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1014 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1015 /// get_funding_created.
1016 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1017 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1020 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1021 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1022 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1025 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1026 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1027 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1028 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1032 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1035 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1036 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1039 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1040 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1043 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1044 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1045 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1048 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1049 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1052 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1053 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1054 self.counterparty_node_id
1057 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1058 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1059 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1062 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1063 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1064 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1067 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1068 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1070 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1071 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1072 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1073 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1075 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1079 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1080 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1081 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1084 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1085 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1086 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1089 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1090 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1091 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1093 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1094 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1099 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1100 self.channel_value_satoshis
1103 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1104 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1107 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1108 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1111 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1112 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1113 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1115 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1116 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1117 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1118 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1119 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1121 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1125 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1126 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1127 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1130 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1131 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1132 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1135 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1136 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1137 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1140 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1141 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1142 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1145 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1146 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1147 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1150 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1151 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1152 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1155 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1156 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1157 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1158 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1159 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1162 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1164 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1165 self.prev_config = None;
1169 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1170 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1174 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1175 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1176 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1177 let did_channel_update =
1178 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1179 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1180 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1181 if did_channel_update {
1182 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1183 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1184 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1185 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1187 self.config.options = *config;
1191 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1192 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1193 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1196 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1197 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1198 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1199 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1200 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1202 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1203 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1204 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1205 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1206 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1207 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1208 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1210 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1211 where L::Target: Logger
1213 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1214 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1215 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1217 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1218 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1219 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1220 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1222 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1223 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1224 if match update_state {
1225 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1226 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1227 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1228 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1229 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1231 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1235 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1236 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1237 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1239 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1241 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1242 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1243 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1245 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1246 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1247 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1248 transaction_output_index: None
1253 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1254 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1255 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1256 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1257 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1260 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1262 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1263 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1264 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1266 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1267 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1270 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1271 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1274 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1276 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1277 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1278 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1280 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1281 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1287 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1288 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1289 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1290 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1291 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1292 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1293 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1297 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1298 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1300 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1302 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1303 if generated_by_local {
1304 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1305 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1314 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1316 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1317 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1318 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1319 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1320 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1321 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1322 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1325 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1326 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1327 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1328 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1332 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1333 preimages.push(preimage);
1337 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1338 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1340 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1342 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1343 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1345 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1346 if !generated_by_local {
1347 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1355 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1356 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1357 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1358 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1359 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1360 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1361 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1362 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1364 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1366 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1367 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1368 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1369 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1371 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1373 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1374 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1375 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1376 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1379 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1380 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1381 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1382 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1384 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1387 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1388 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1389 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1390 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1392 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1395 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1396 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1401 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1402 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1407 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1409 let channel_parameters =
1410 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1411 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1412 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1419 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1422 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1423 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1424 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1425 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1427 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1428 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1429 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1437 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1438 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1444 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1445 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1446 /// our counterparty!)
1447 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1448 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1449 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1450 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1451 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1452 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1453 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1455 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1459 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1460 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1461 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1462 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1463 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1464 //may see payments to it!
1465 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1466 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1467 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1469 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1472 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1473 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1474 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1475 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1476 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1479 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1480 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1483 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1487 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1488 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1489 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1490 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1491 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1492 // which are near the dust limit.
1493 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1494 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1495 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1496 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1497 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1499 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1500 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1502 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1505 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1506 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1507 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1510 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1511 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1513 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1514 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1515 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1516 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1517 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1518 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1519 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1522 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1525 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1526 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1527 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1529 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1530 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1531 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1532 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1533 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1534 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1536 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1537 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1543 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1544 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1546 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1547 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1548 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1549 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1550 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1551 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1552 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1555 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1558 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1559 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1560 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1562 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1563 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1564 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1565 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1566 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1567 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1569 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1570 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1574 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1575 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1576 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1577 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1578 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1579 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1580 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1582 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1583 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1585 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1592 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1593 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1594 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1595 /// corner case properly.
1596 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1597 -> AvailableBalances
1598 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1600 let context = &self;
1601 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1602 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1603 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1605 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1606 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1608 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1610 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1612 if context.is_outbound() {
1613 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1614 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1616 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1617 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1619 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1620 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1621 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1622 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1625 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1626 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1627 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1628 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1630 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1631 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1632 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1633 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1634 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1635 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1636 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1637 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1638 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1639 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1641 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1644 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1645 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1646 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1647 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1648 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1651 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1652 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1654 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1655 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1656 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1658 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1659 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1660 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1661 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1665 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1667 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1668 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1669 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1670 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1671 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1672 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1673 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1675 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1676 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1678 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1679 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1680 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1682 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1683 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1684 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1685 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1686 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1689 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1690 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1691 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1692 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1693 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1694 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1697 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1698 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1699 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1701 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1705 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1706 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1708 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1709 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1713 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1714 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1715 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1716 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1718 outbound_capacity_msat,
1719 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1720 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1724 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1725 let context = &self;
1726 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1729 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1730 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1732 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1733 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1735 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1736 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1738 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1739 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1740 let context = &self;
1741 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1743 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1746 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1747 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1749 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1750 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1752 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1753 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1755 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1756 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1760 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1761 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1767 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1768 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1769 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1772 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1773 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1774 included_htlcs += 1;
1777 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1778 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1782 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1783 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1784 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1785 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1786 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1787 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1792 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1794 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1795 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1800 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1801 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1805 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1806 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1810 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1811 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1813 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1814 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1815 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1817 total_pending_htlcs,
1818 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1822 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1823 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1824 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1826 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1828 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1833 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1834 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1836 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1837 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1839 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1840 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1842 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1843 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1844 let context = &self;
1845 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1847 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1850 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1851 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1853 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1854 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1856 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1857 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1859 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1860 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1864 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1865 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1871 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1872 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1873 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1874 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1875 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1876 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1879 included_htlcs += 1;
1882 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1883 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1886 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1887 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1889 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1890 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1891 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1896 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1897 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1901 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1902 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1904 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1905 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1907 total_pending_htlcs,
1908 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1909 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1910 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1912 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1913 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1914 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1916 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1918 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1923 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1924 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1925 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1926 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1932 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1933 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1934 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1935 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1936 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1937 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1938 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1939 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1940 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1941 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1942 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1944 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1945 // return them to fail the payment.
1946 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1947 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1948 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1950 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1951 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1956 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1957 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1958 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1959 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1960 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1961 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1962 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1963 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1964 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1965 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1966 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1967 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1968 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1973 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1974 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1975 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1979 // Internal utility functions for channels
1981 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1982 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1983 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1985 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1987 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1988 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1989 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1991 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1994 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1996 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1999 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2000 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2001 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2003 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2005 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2006 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2007 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2008 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2009 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2012 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2013 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2014 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2015 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2016 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2017 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2018 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2021 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2022 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2024 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2025 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2028 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2029 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2030 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2031 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2032 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2033 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2036 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2037 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2038 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2041 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2042 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2043 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2044 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2047 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2048 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2050 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2051 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2052 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2056 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2057 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2058 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2060 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2061 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2062 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2063 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2065 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2066 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2067 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2068 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2069 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2070 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2071 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2072 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2073 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2074 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2079 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2080 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2081 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2082 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2083 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2084 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2086 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2088 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2089 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2090 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2091 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2092 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2093 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2094 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2095 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2097 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2098 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2108 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2109 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2110 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2111 // outside of those situations will fail.
2112 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2116 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2121 1 + // script length (0)
2125 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2126 2 + // witness marker and flag
2127 1 + // witness element count
2128 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2129 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2130 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2131 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2132 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2133 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2135 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2136 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2137 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2143 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2144 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2145 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2146 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2148 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2149 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2150 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2152 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2153 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2154 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2155 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2156 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2157 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2160 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2161 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2164 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2165 value_to_holder = 0;
2168 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2169 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2170 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2171 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2173 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2174 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2177 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2178 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2181 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2184 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2185 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2187 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2189 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2190 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2191 where L::Target: Logger {
2192 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2193 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2194 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2195 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2196 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2197 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2198 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2199 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2203 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2204 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2205 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2206 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2208 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2209 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2211 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2213 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2214 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2215 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2217 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2218 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2219 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2220 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2221 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2222 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2223 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2225 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2226 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2227 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2229 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2230 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2232 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2235 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2236 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2240 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2244 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2245 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2246 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2247 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2248 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2249 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2252 // Now update local state:
2254 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2255 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2256 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2257 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2258 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2259 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2260 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2264 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2265 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2266 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2267 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2268 // do not not get into this branch.
2269 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2270 match pending_update {
2271 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2272 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2273 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2274 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2275 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2276 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2277 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2280 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2281 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2282 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2283 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2284 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2285 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2286 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2292 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2293 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2294 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2296 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2298 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2300 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2301 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2304 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2305 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2307 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2308 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2310 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2311 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2314 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2317 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2318 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2319 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2320 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2325 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2326 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2327 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2328 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2329 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2330 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2331 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2332 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2333 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2334 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2335 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2336 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2337 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2338 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2339 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2341 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2342 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2343 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2344 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2345 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2348 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2349 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2350 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2356 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2357 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2359 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2363 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2364 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2365 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2366 /// before we fail backwards.
2368 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2369 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2370 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2371 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2372 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2373 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2374 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2377 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2378 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2379 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2380 /// before we fail backwards.
2382 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2383 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2384 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2385 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2386 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2387 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2388 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2390 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2392 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2393 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2394 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2396 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2397 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2398 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2400 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2401 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2402 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2404 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2409 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2410 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2416 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2417 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2418 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2419 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2420 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2424 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2425 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2426 force_holding_cell = true;
2429 // Now update local state:
2430 if force_holding_cell {
2431 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2432 match pending_update {
2433 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2434 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2435 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2436 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2440 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2441 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2442 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2443 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2449 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2450 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2451 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2457 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2459 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2460 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2463 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2464 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2465 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2470 // Message handlers:
2472 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2473 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2474 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2475 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2476 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2480 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2481 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2483 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2484 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2486 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2487 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2488 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2489 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2492 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2494 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2495 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2496 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2497 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2499 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2500 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2502 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2503 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2505 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2506 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2507 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2508 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2509 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2510 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2514 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2515 initial_commitment_tx,
2518 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2519 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2522 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2523 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2526 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2527 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2528 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2529 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2530 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2531 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2532 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2533 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2534 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2535 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2536 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2537 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2539 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2541 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2542 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2543 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2544 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2545 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2546 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2547 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2549 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2550 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2551 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2552 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2554 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2556 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2557 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2561 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2562 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2564 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2565 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2566 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2567 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2569 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2572 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2573 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2574 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2577 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2578 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2579 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2580 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2581 // when routing outbound payments.
2582 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2586 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2588 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2589 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2590 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2591 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2592 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2593 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2594 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2595 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2596 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2598 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2599 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2600 let expected_point =
2601 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2602 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2604 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2605 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2606 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2607 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2608 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2609 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2611 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2612 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2613 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2614 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2615 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2617 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2625 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2626 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2628 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2630 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2633 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2634 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2635 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2636 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2637 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2638 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2640 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2641 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2642 if local_sent_shutdown {
2643 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2645 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2646 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2647 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2650 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2653 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2656 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2657 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2659 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2660 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2663 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2664 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2665 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2666 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2668 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2669 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2671 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2672 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2673 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2674 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2675 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2676 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2677 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2678 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2679 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2680 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2681 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2683 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2684 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2685 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2686 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2687 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2688 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2692 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2693 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2696 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2697 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2698 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2700 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2701 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2702 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2703 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2704 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2705 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2706 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2710 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2711 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2712 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2713 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2714 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2715 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2716 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2720 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2721 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2722 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2723 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2724 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2728 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2729 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2730 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2731 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2732 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2734 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2738 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2742 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2743 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2744 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2745 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2746 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2747 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2748 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2749 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2750 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2751 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2752 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2753 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2754 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2755 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2756 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2757 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2760 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2761 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2762 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2763 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2764 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2767 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2770 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2774 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2775 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2776 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2780 // Now update local state:
2781 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2782 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2783 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2784 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2785 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2786 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2787 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2792 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2794 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2795 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2796 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2797 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2798 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2799 None => fail_reason.into(),
2800 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2801 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2802 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2803 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2805 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2809 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2810 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2811 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2812 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2814 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2820 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2823 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2824 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2825 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2827 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2831 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2834 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2835 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2836 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2838 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2842 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2846 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2847 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2850 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2854 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2858 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2859 where L::Target: Logger
2861 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2864 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2867 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2871 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2873 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2875 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2876 let commitment_txid = {
2877 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2878 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2879 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2881 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2882 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2883 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2884 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2885 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2886 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2890 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2892 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2893 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2894 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2895 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2898 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2899 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2900 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2904 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2906 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2907 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2908 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2909 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2910 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2911 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2912 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2913 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2914 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2915 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2916 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2922 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2923 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2926 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2927 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2928 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2929 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2930 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2931 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2932 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2933 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2934 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2935 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2936 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2937 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2938 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2941 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2942 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2943 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2944 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2945 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2946 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2947 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2949 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2950 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2951 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2952 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2953 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2954 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
2955 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2956 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2958 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2959 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2962 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2964 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2965 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2966 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2969 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2972 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2973 commitment_stats.tx,
2975 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2976 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2977 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2980 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2981 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2983 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2984 let mut need_commitment = false;
2985 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2986 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2987 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2988 need_commitment = true;
2992 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2993 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2994 Some(forward_info.clone())
2996 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2997 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2998 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2999 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3000 need_commitment = true;
3003 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3004 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3005 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3006 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3007 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3008 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3009 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3010 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3011 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3012 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3013 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3014 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3015 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3016 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3018 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3020 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3021 need_commitment = true;
3025 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3026 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3027 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3028 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3029 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3030 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3032 nondust_htlc_sources,
3036 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3037 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3038 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3039 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3041 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3042 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3043 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3044 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3045 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3046 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3047 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3048 // includes the right HTLCs.
3049 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3050 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3051 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3052 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3053 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3054 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3056 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3057 &self.context.channel_id);
3058 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3061 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3062 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3063 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3064 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3065 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3066 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3067 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3068 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3069 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3073 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3074 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3075 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3076 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3079 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3080 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3081 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3082 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3083 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3084 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3085 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3087 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3088 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3089 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3090 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3093 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3094 /// for our counterparty.
3095 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3096 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3097 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3098 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3100 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3101 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3102 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3103 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3105 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3106 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3107 updates: Vec::new(),
3110 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3111 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3112 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3113 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3114 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3115 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3116 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3117 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3118 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3119 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3120 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3121 // to rebalance channels.
3122 match &htlc_update {
3123 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3124 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3125 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3127 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3128 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3130 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3133 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3134 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3135 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3136 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3137 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3138 // into the holding cell without ever being
3139 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3140 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3141 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3144 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3150 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3151 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3152 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3153 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3154 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3155 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3156 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3157 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3158 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3159 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3160 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3161 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3163 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3164 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3165 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3166 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3167 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3168 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3169 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3170 // for a full revocation before failing.
3171 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3172 update_fail_count += 1;
3175 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3177 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3184 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3185 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3187 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3188 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3193 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3194 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3195 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3196 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3197 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3199 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3200 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3201 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3203 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3204 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3210 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3211 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3212 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3213 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3214 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3215 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3216 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3217 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3218 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3220 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3223 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3226 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3230 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3232 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3233 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3238 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3239 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3240 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3241 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3242 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3243 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3244 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3245 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3249 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3251 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3252 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3255 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3256 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3257 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3258 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3260 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3264 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3265 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3266 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3267 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3268 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3269 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3270 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3271 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3275 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3276 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3277 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3278 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3279 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3280 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3281 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3282 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3283 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3285 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3286 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3289 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3290 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3291 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3292 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3293 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3294 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3295 let mut require_commitment = false;
3296 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3299 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3300 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3301 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3303 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3304 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3305 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3306 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3307 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3308 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3313 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3314 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3315 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3316 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3317 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3319 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3320 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3321 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3326 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3327 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3329 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3333 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3334 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3336 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3337 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3338 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3339 require_commitment = true;
3340 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3341 match forward_info {
3342 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3343 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3344 require_commitment = true;
3346 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3347 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3348 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3350 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3351 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3352 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3356 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3357 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3358 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3359 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3365 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3366 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3367 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3368 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3370 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3371 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3372 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3373 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3374 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3375 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3376 require_commitment = true;
3380 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3382 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3383 match update_state {
3384 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3385 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3386 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3387 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3388 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3390 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3391 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3392 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3393 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3394 require_commitment = true;
3395 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3396 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3401 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3402 let release_state_str =
3403 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3404 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3405 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3406 if !release_monitor {
3407 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3408 update: monitor_update,
3410 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3412 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3417 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3418 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3419 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3420 if require_commitment {
3421 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3422 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3423 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3424 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3425 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3426 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3427 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3428 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3429 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3431 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3432 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3433 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3434 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3435 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3438 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3439 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3440 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3441 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3442 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3443 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3445 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3446 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3448 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3449 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3451 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3452 if require_commitment {
3453 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3455 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3456 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3457 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3458 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3460 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3461 &self.context.channel_id(),
3462 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3465 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3466 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3468 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3469 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3471 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3472 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3478 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3479 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3480 /// commitment update.
3481 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3482 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3483 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3485 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3486 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3489 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3490 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3491 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3492 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3494 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3495 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3496 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3497 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3498 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3499 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3500 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3502 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3503 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3505 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3506 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3508 if !self.context.is_live() {
3509 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3512 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3513 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3514 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3515 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3516 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3517 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3518 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3519 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3520 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3521 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3525 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3526 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3527 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3528 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3529 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3530 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3533 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3534 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3538 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3539 force_holding_cell = true;
3542 if force_holding_cell {
3543 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3547 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3548 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3550 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3551 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3556 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3557 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3559 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3561 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3562 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3563 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3564 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3568 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3569 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3570 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3574 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3575 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3578 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3579 // will be retransmitted.
3580 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3581 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3582 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3584 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3585 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3587 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3588 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3589 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3590 // this HTLC accordingly
3591 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3594 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3595 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3596 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3597 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3600 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3601 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3602 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3603 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3604 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3605 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3610 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3612 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3613 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3614 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3615 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3619 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3620 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3621 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3622 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3623 // the update upon reconnection.
3624 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3628 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3630 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3631 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3634 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3635 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3636 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3637 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3638 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3639 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3640 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3642 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3643 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3644 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3645 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3646 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3647 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3648 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3650 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3651 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3652 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3653 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3654 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3655 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3656 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3659 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3660 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3661 /// to the remote side.
3662 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3663 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3664 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3665 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3668 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3670 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3671 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3673 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3674 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3675 // first received the funding_signed.
3676 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3677 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3678 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3680 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3681 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3682 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3683 funding_broadcastable = None;
3686 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3687 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3688 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3689 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3690 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3691 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3692 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3693 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3694 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3695 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3696 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3697 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3698 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3699 next_per_commitment_point,
3700 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3704 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3706 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3707 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3708 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3709 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3710 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3711 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3713 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3714 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3715 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3716 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3717 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3718 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3722 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3723 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3725 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3726 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3727 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3730 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3731 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3732 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3733 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3734 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3735 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3736 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3737 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3738 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3742 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3743 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3745 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3746 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3748 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3751 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3752 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3754 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3755 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3756 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3757 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3758 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3759 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3760 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3761 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3762 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3763 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3764 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3765 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3766 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3767 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3769 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3770 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3771 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3777 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3778 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3779 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3780 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3781 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3782 per_commitment_secret,
3783 next_per_commitment_point,
3785 next_local_nonce: None,
3789 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3790 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3791 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3792 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3793 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3795 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3796 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3797 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3798 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3799 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3800 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3801 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3802 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3803 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3804 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3809 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3810 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3812 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3813 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3814 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3815 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3816 reason: err_packet.clone()
3819 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3820 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3821 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3822 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3823 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3824 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3827 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3828 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3829 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3830 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3831 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3838 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3839 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3840 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3841 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3845 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3846 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3847 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3848 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3849 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3850 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3854 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3855 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3856 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3857 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3858 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3859 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3860 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3865 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3866 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3868 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3869 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3870 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3871 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3872 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3873 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3874 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3875 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3878 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3880 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3881 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3882 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3883 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3887 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3888 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3889 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3892 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3893 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3894 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3895 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3896 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3897 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3899 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3900 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3901 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3902 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3903 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3906 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3907 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3908 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3909 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3910 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3911 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3912 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3913 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3917 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3918 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3919 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3920 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3922 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3926 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3927 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3928 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3929 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3931 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
3933 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3935 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3936 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3937 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3938 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3939 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3942 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3943 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3944 channel_ready: None,
3945 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3946 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3947 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3951 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3952 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3953 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3954 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3955 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3956 next_per_commitment_point,
3957 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3959 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3960 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3961 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3965 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3966 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3967 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3969 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3970 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3971 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3974 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3980 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3981 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3982 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3983 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3984 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3985 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3986 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3988 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3990 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3991 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3992 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3993 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3994 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3995 next_per_commitment_point,
3996 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4000 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4001 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4002 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4004 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4007 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4008 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4009 raa: required_revoke,
4010 commitment_update: None,
4011 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4013 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4014 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4015 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4017 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4020 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4021 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4022 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4023 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4024 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4025 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4028 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4029 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4030 raa: required_revoke,
4031 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4032 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4036 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4040 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4041 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4042 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4043 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4045 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4047 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4049 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4050 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4051 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4052 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4053 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4054 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4056 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4057 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4058 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4059 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4060 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4062 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4063 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4064 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4065 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4068 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4069 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4070 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4071 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4072 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4073 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4074 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4075 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4076 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4077 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4078 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4079 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4080 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4081 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4082 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4084 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4087 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4088 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4091 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4092 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4093 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4094 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4095 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4096 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4099 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4100 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4101 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4102 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4103 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4104 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4105 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4107 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4113 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4114 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4115 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4116 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4118 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4119 return Ok((None, None));
4122 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4123 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4124 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4126 return Ok((None, None));
4129 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4131 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4132 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4133 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4134 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4136 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4137 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4139 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4140 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4142 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4143 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4144 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4145 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4147 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4148 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4149 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4156 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4157 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4159 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4160 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4163 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4164 /// within our expected timeframe.
4166 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4167 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4168 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4171 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4174 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4175 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4179 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4180 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4182 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4185 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4186 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4187 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4188 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4191 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4192 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4196 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4198 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4199 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4202 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4203 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4204 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4207 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4210 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4211 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4212 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4213 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4215 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4218 assert!(send_shutdown);
4219 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4220 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4221 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4223 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4226 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4231 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4233 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4234 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4236 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4237 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4238 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4239 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4240 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4241 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4244 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4245 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4247 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4248 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4249 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4250 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4254 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4255 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4256 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4257 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4258 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4259 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4261 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4262 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4269 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4270 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4272 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4275 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4276 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4278 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4280 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4281 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4282 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4283 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4284 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4285 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4286 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4287 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4288 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4290 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4291 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4294 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4298 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4299 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4300 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4301 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4303 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4306 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4309 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4312 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4313 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4316 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4317 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4320 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4321 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4322 return Ok((None, None));
4325 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4326 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4327 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4330 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4332 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4335 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4336 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4337 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4338 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4339 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4343 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4344 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4349 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4350 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4351 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4352 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4353 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4354 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4355 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4359 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4361 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4362 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4363 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4364 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4366 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4369 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4370 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4372 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4373 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4375 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4376 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4377 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4378 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4382 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4383 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4384 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4385 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4387 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4388 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4389 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4397 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4398 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4399 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4401 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4404 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4408 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4409 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4410 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4411 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4412 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4414 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4415 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4416 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4418 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4419 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4422 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4423 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4424 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4425 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4426 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4427 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4428 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4429 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4431 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4434 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4435 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4436 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4437 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4439 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4443 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4444 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4445 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4446 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4448 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4454 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4455 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4456 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4457 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4458 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4459 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4460 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4462 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4463 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4466 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4468 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4469 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4475 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4476 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4477 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4478 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4479 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4480 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4481 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4483 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4484 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4491 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4492 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4495 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4496 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4499 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4500 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4504 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4505 &self.context.holder_signer
4509 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4511 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4512 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4513 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4514 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4515 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4516 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4518 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4520 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4528 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4529 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4533 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4534 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4535 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4536 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4539 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4540 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4541 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4542 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4545 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4546 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4547 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4548 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4549 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4550 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4553 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4554 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4555 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4556 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4557 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4558 if !release_monitor {
4559 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4568 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4569 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4572 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4573 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4574 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4576 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4577 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4578 if self.context.channel_state &
4579 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4580 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4581 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4582 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4583 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4586 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4587 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4588 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4589 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4590 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4591 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4593 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4594 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4595 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4597 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4598 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4599 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4600 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4601 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4602 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4608 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4609 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4610 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4613 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4614 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4615 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4618 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4619 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4620 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4623 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4624 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4625 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4626 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4627 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4628 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4633 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4634 self.context.channel_update_status
4637 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4638 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4639 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4642 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4644 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4645 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4646 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4650 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4651 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4652 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4655 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4659 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4660 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4661 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4663 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4664 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4665 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4667 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4668 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4671 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4672 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4673 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4674 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4675 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4676 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4677 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4678 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4679 self.context.channel_state);
4681 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4685 if need_commitment_update {
4686 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4687 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4688 let next_per_commitment_point =
4689 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4690 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4691 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4692 next_per_commitment_point,
4693 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4697 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4703 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4704 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4705 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4706 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4707 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4708 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4709 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4711 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4714 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4715 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4716 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4717 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4718 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4719 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4720 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4721 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4722 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4723 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4724 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4725 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4726 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4727 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4728 // channel and move on.
4729 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4730 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4732 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4733 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4734 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4736 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4737 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4738 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4739 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4740 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4741 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4742 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4746 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4747 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4748 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4749 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4750 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4754 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4755 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4756 // may have already happened for this block).
4757 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4758 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4759 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4760 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4763 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4764 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4765 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4766 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4774 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4775 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4776 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4777 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4779 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4780 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4783 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4785 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4786 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4787 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4788 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4790 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4793 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4796 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4797 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4798 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4799 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4801 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4804 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4805 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4806 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4808 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4809 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4811 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4812 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4813 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4821 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4823 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4824 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4825 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4827 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4828 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4831 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4832 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4833 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4834 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4835 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4836 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4837 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4838 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4839 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4842 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4843 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4844 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4845 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4847 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4848 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4849 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4851 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4852 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4853 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4854 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4856 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4857 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4858 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4859 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4860 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4861 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4862 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4865 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4866 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4868 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4871 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4872 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4873 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4874 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4875 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4876 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4877 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4878 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4879 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4880 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4881 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4882 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4883 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4884 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4885 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4886 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4887 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4893 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4898 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4899 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4901 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4902 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4903 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4904 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4906 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4909 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4911 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4912 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4913 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4914 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4915 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4916 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4918 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4919 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4922 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4923 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4924 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4925 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4926 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4927 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4929 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4930 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4933 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4934 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4935 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4936 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4937 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4943 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4944 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4945 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4946 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4948 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4951 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4955 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4959 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4960 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4964 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4968 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4969 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4972 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4976 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4978 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4983 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4984 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4985 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4987 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4992 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4994 None => return None,
4997 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4999 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5000 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5002 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5003 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5009 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5011 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5012 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5013 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5014 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5015 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5016 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5017 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5019 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5020 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5021 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5022 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5023 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5024 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5025 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5026 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5027 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5028 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5029 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5030 contents: announcement,
5035 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5039 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5040 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5041 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5042 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5043 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5044 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5045 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5046 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5048 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5050 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5052 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5053 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5055 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5057 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5058 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5061 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5062 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5063 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5064 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5067 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5070 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5071 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5072 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5073 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5074 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5075 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5078 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5080 Err(_) => return None,
5082 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5083 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5088 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5089 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5090 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5091 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5092 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5093 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5094 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5095 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5096 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5097 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5098 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5099 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5100 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5101 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5102 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5103 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5106 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5109 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5110 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5111 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5112 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5113 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5114 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5115 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5116 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5117 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5119 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5120 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5121 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5122 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5123 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5124 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5125 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5126 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5127 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5129 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5130 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5131 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5132 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5133 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5134 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5135 next_funding_txid: None,
5140 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5142 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5143 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5144 /// commitment update.
5146 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5147 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5148 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5149 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5150 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5151 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5152 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5155 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5156 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5157 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5159 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5160 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5165 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5166 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5168 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5170 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5171 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5173 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5174 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5175 /// regenerate them.
5177 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5178 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5180 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5181 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5182 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5183 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5184 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5185 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5186 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5188 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5189 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5191 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5192 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5193 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5196 if amount_msat == 0 {
5197 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5200 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5201 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5202 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5203 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5206 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5207 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5208 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5211 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5212 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5213 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5214 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5215 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5216 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5217 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5218 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5221 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5222 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5223 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5224 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5225 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5226 else { "to peer" });
5228 if need_holding_cell {
5229 force_holding_cell = true;
5232 // Now update local state:
5233 if force_holding_cell {
5234 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5239 onion_routing_packet,
5245 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5246 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5248 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5250 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5255 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5256 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5257 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5261 onion_routing_packet,
5264 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5269 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5270 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5271 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5272 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5274 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5275 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5276 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5278 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5279 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5283 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5284 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5285 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5286 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5287 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5288 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5289 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5292 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5293 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5294 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5295 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5296 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5297 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5300 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5302 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5303 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5304 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5305 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5306 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5308 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5309 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5312 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5313 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5314 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5315 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5316 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5317 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5318 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5319 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5320 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5321 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5322 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5325 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5329 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5330 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5331 where L::Target: Logger
5333 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5334 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5335 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5337 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5339 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5340 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5341 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5342 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5343 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5344 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5345 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5346 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5347 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5348 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5349 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5355 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5358 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5359 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5360 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5361 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5362 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5363 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5365 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5366 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5367 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5369 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5370 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5371 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5374 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5375 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5379 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5380 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5382 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5384 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5385 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5386 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5387 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5389 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5390 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5391 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5392 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5393 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5394 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5398 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5399 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5403 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5404 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5409 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5410 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5412 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5413 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5414 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5415 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5416 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5417 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5418 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5419 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5421 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5422 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5423 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5426 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5427 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5428 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5434 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5435 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5438 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5439 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5440 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5441 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5447 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5448 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5450 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5451 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5452 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5453 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5454 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5456 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5457 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5458 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5461 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5462 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5463 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5465 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5466 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5469 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5470 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5472 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5473 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5474 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5477 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5478 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5479 let mut chan_closed = false;
5480 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5484 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5486 None if !chan_closed => {
5487 // use override shutdown script if provided
5488 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5489 Some(script) => script,
5491 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5492 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5493 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5494 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5498 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5499 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5501 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5507 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5508 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5509 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5510 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5512 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5514 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5516 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5517 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5518 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5519 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5520 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5521 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5524 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5525 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5527 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5528 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5529 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5532 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5533 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5534 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5535 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5536 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5538 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5539 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5546 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5547 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5549 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5552 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5553 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5554 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5556 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5557 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5561 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5565 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5566 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5567 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5568 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5571 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5572 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5573 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5574 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5575 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5576 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5577 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5578 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5580 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5581 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5582 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5583 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5585 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5586 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5588 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5589 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5591 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5592 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5595 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5596 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5598 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5599 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5600 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5601 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5602 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5605 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5606 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5608 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5609 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5611 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5613 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5615 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5616 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5617 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5618 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5621 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5622 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5624 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5625 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5626 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5627 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5631 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5632 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5633 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5637 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5638 Ok(script) => script,
5639 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5642 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5645 context: ChannelContext {
5648 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5649 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5650 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5651 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5656 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5658 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5659 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5660 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5661 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5663 channel_value_satoshis,
5665 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5667 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5668 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5671 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5672 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5675 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5676 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5677 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5678 pending_update_fee: None,
5679 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5680 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5681 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5682 update_time_counter: 1,
5684 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5686 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5687 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5688 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5689 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5690 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5691 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5693 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5694 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5695 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5696 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5698 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5699 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5700 closing_fee_limits: None,
5701 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5703 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5704 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5705 short_channel_id: None,
5706 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5708 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5709 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5710 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5711 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5712 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5713 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5714 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5715 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5716 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5717 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5718 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5719 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5721 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5723 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5724 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5725 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5726 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5727 counterparty_parameters: None,
5728 funding_outpoint: None,
5729 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5731 funding_transaction: None,
5733 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5734 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5735 counterparty_node_id,
5737 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5739 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5741 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5742 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5744 announcement_sigs: None,
5746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5747 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5748 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5749 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5751 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5752 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5754 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5755 outbound_scid_alias,
5757 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5758 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5760 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5761 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5766 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5768 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5772 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5773 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5774 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5775 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5776 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5777 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5778 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5779 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5780 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5785 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5786 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5787 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5788 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5789 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5790 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5791 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5792 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5793 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5794 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5795 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5797 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5798 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5800 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5801 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5802 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5803 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5806 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5807 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5809 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5812 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5813 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5814 return Err((self, e));
5818 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5820 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5822 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5823 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5824 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5826 let channel = Channel {
5827 context: self.context,
5830 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5831 temporary_channel_id,
5832 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5833 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5836 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5838 next_local_nonce: None,
5842 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5843 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5844 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5845 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5846 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5847 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5848 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5849 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5850 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5851 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5854 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5855 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5856 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5857 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5858 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5859 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5865 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5866 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5867 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5868 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5869 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5870 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5872 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5874 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5875 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5876 // We've exhausted our options
5879 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5880 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5883 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5884 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5885 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5886 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5888 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5889 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5890 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5891 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5892 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5893 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5895 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5897 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5898 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5901 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5902 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5903 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5905 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5906 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5909 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5910 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5913 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5914 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5918 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5919 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5920 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5921 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5922 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5923 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5924 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5925 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5926 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5927 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5928 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5929 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5930 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5931 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5932 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5933 first_per_commitment_point,
5934 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5935 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5936 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5937 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5939 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5944 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5945 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5947 // Check sanity of message fields:
5948 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5951 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5954 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5955 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5957 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5960 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5961 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5963 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5964 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5965 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5967 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5968 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5971 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5972 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5973 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5975 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5976 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5978 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5979 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5982 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5983 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5984 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5986 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5987 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5989 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5992 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5993 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5995 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5998 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6001 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6005 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6006 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6009 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6010 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6012 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6013 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6014 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6016 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6017 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6020 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6021 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6022 &Some(ref script) => {
6023 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6024 if script.len() == 0 {
6027 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6030 Some(script.clone())
6033 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6040 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6041 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6042 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6043 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6044 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6046 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6047 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6049 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6052 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6053 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6054 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6055 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6056 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6057 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6060 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6061 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6062 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6065 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6066 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6068 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6069 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6075 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6076 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6077 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6078 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6081 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6082 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6083 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6084 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6085 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6086 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6087 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6088 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6089 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6090 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6091 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6094 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6096 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6097 // support this channel type.
6098 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6099 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6103 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6104 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6105 // `static_remote_key`.
6106 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6107 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6109 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6110 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6111 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6113 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6116 channel_type.clone()
6118 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6119 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6125 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6126 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6127 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6128 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6129 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6130 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6131 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6132 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6133 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6136 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6140 // Check sanity of message fields:
6141 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6144 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6147 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6150 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6151 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6154 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6157 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6160 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6162 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6163 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6164 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6166 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6169 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6170 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6173 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6174 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6177 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6178 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6180 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6183 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6186 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6189 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6192 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6196 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6198 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6199 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6204 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6205 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6206 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6207 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6210 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6213 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6214 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6215 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6217 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6221 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6222 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6223 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6224 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6225 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6229 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6230 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6231 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6232 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6236 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6237 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6238 &Some(ref script) => {
6239 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6240 if script.len() == 0 {
6243 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6246 Some(script.clone())
6249 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6256 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6257 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6258 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6259 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6263 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6264 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6265 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6269 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6270 Ok(script) => script,
6271 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6274 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6275 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6277 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6280 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6284 context: ChannelContext {
6287 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6288 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6290 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6295 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6297 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6298 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6299 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6300 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6303 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6305 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6306 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6309 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6310 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6311 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6313 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6314 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6315 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6316 pending_update_fee: None,
6317 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6318 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6319 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6320 update_time_counter: 1,
6322 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6324 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6325 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6326 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6327 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6328 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6329 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6332 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6333 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6334 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6336 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6337 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6338 closing_fee_limits: None,
6339 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6341 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6342 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6343 short_channel_id: None,
6344 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6346 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6347 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6348 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6349 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6350 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6351 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6352 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6353 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6354 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6355 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6356 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6357 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6360 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6362 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6363 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6364 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6365 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6366 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6367 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6368 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6370 funding_outpoint: None,
6371 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6373 funding_transaction: None,
6375 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6376 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6377 counterparty_node_id,
6379 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6381 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6383 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6384 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6386 announcement_sigs: None,
6388 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6389 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6391 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6393 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6394 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6396 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6397 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6399 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6400 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6402 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6403 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6408 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6410 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6416 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6417 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6419 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6420 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6421 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6422 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6424 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6425 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6427 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6428 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6431 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6434 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6435 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6436 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6438 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6439 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6440 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6441 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6443 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6444 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6445 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6446 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6447 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6448 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6449 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6450 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6451 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6452 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6453 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6454 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6455 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6456 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6457 first_per_commitment_point,
6458 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6459 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6460 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6462 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6464 next_local_nonce: None,
6468 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6469 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6471 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6473 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6474 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6477 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6478 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6480 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6481 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6483 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6484 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6485 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6486 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6487 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6488 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6489 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6490 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6491 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6494 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6495 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6497 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6498 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6499 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6500 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6502 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6503 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6504 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6505 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6506 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6508 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6509 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6514 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6515 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6516 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6520 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6521 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6523 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6524 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6525 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6527 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6529 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6530 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6531 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6532 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6535 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6536 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6537 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6538 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6539 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6541 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6543 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6544 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6545 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6548 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6549 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6550 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6554 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6555 initial_commitment_tx,
6558 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6559 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6562 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6563 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6566 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6568 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6569 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6570 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6571 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6572 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6573 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6574 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6575 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6576 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6577 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6578 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6580 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6582 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6583 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6584 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6585 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6586 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6587 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6589 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6590 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6591 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6592 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6594 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6596 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6597 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6598 let mut channel = Channel {
6599 context: self.context,
6601 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6602 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6603 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6605 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6609 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6610 }, channel_monitor))
6614 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6615 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6617 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6623 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6624 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6625 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6626 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6627 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6629 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6630 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6631 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6632 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6638 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6639 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6640 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6641 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6642 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6643 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6648 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6649 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6650 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6651 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6653 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6654 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6655 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6656 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6661 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6662 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6663 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6664 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6665 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6666 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6671 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6672 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6673 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6676 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6678 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6679 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6680 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6681 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6682 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6684 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6685 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6686 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6687 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6689 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6690 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6691 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6693 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6695 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6696 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6697 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6698 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6699 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6700 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6701 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6703 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6704 // deserialized from that format.
6705 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6706 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6707 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6709 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6711 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6712 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6713 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6715 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6716 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6717 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6718 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6721 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6722 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6723 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6726 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6727 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6728 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6729 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6731 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6732 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6734 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6736 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6738 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6740 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6743 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6745 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6750 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6751 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6753 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6754 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6755 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6756 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6757 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6758 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6759 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6761 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6763 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6765 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6768 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6769 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6770 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6773 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6775 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6776 preimages.push(preimage);
6778 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6779 reason.write(writer)?;
6781 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6783 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6784 preimages.push(preimage);
6786 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6787 reason.write(writer)?;
6790 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6791 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6792 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6794 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6795 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6796 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6800 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6801 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6802 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6804 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6805 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6809 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6810 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6811 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6812 source.write(writer)?;
6813 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6815 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6816 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6817 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6819 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6820 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6822 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6824 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6825 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6827 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6829 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6830 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6835 match self.context.resend_order {
6836 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6837 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6840 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6841 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6842 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6844 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6845 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6846 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6847 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6850 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6851 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6852 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6853 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6854 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6857 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6858 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6859 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6860 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6862 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6863 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6864 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6866 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6868 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6869 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6870 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6871 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6873 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6874 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6875 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6876 // consider the stale state on reload.
6879 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6880 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6881 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6883 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6884 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6885 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6887 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6888 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6890 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6891 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6892 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6894 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6895 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6897 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6900 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6901 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6902 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6904 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6907 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6908 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6910 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6911 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6912 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6914 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6916 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6918 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6920 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6921 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6922 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6923 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6924 htlc.write(writer)?;
6927 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6928 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6929 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6931 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6932 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6934 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6935 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6936 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6937 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6938 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6939 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6940 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6942 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6943 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6944 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6945 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6946 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6948 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6949 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6951 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6952 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6953 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6954 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6956 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6958 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6959 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6960 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6961 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6962 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6963 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6964 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6966 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6967 (2, chan_type, option),
6968 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6969 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6970 (5, self.context.config, required),
6971 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6972 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6973 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6974 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6975 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6976 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6977 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6978 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6979 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6980 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6981 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6982 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6983 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6984 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6985 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6986 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6987 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6988 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6995 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6996 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
6998 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6999 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7001 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7002 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7003 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7005 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7006 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7007 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7008 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7012 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7013 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7014 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7018 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7019 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7028 let mut keys_data = None;
7030 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7031 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7032 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7033 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7034 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7035 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7036 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7037 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7038 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7039 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7043 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7044 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7045 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7048 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7051 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7052 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7054 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7056 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7057 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7058 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7059 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7060 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7061 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7062 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7063 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7064 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7065 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7066 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7067 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7068 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7073 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7074 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7075 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7076 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7077 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7078 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7079 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7080 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7081 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7082 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7083 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7084 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7086 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7087 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7090 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7091 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7094 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7095 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7097 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7099 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7103 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7104 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7105 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7106 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7107 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7108 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7109 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7110 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7111 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7112 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7113 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7115 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7116 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7117 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7119 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7120 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7121 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7123 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7127 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7128 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7129 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7130 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7133 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7135 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7137 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7139 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7140 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7143 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7144 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7145 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7146 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7149 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7153 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7154 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7155 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7156 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7158 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7159 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7160 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7161 // consider the stale state on reload.
7162 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7165 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7166 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7167 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7169 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7172 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7173 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7174 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7176 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7177 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7178 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7181 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7182 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7184 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7185 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7187 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7188 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7189 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7191 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7193 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7194 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7196 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7197 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7200 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7202 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7203 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7204 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7205 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7207 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7210 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7211 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7213 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7215 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7216 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7218 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7219 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7221 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7223 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7224 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7225 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7227 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7228 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7229 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7233 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7234 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7235 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7237 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7243 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7244 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7245 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7246 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7247 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7248 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7249 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7250 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7251 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7252 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7254 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7255 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7256 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7257 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7258 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7259 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7260 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7262 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7263 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7264 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7265 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7267 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7269 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7270 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7272 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7273 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7274 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7275 (2, channel_type, option),
7276 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7277 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7278 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7279 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7280 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7281 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7282 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7283 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7284 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7285 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7286 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7287 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7288 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7289 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7290 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7291 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7292 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7293 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7294 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7295 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7296 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7299 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7300 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7301 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7302 // required channel parameters.
7303 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7304 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7305 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7307 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7309 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7310 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7311 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7312 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7315 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7316 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7317 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7319 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7320 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7322 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7323 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7328 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7329 if iter.next().is_some() {
7330 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7334 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7335 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7336 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7337 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7338 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7341 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7342 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7343 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7345 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7346 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7348 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7349 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7350 // separate u64 values.
7351 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7353 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7355 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7356 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7357 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7358 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7360 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7361 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7363 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7364 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7365 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7366 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7367 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7370 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7371 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7375 context: ChannelContext {
7378 config: config.unwrap(),
7382 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7383 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7384 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7387 temporary_channel_id,
7389 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7391 channel_value_satoshis,
7393 latest_monitor_update_id,
7395 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7396 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7399 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7400 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7403 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7404 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7405 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7406 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7410 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7411 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7412 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7413 monitor_pending_forwards,
7414 monitor_pending_failures,
7415 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7418 holding_cell_update_fee,
7419 next_holder_htlc_id,
7420 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7421 update_time_counter,
7424 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7425 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7426 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7427 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7429 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7430 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7431 closing_fee_limits: None,
7432 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7434 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7435 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7437 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7439 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7440 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7441 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7442 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7443 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7444 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7445 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7446 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7447 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7450 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7452 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7453 funding_transaction,
7455 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7456 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7457 counterparty_node_id,
7459 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7463 channel_update_status,
7464 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7468 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7469 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7470 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7471 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7473 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7474 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7476 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7477 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7478 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7480 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7481 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7483 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7484 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7486 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7489 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7498 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7499 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7500 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7501 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7502 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7504 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7505 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7506 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7507 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7508 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7509 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7510 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7511 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7512 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7513 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7514 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7515 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7516 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7517 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7518 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7519 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7520 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7521 use crate::util::test_utils;
7522 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7523 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7524 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7525 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7526 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7527 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7528 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7529 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7530 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7531 use crate::prelude::*;
7533 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7536 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7537 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7543 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7544 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7545 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7546 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7550 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7551 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7552 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7553 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7554 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7555 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7556 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7557 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7561 signer: InMemorySigner,
7564 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7565 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7568 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7569 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7571 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7572 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7575 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7579 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7581 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7582 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7583 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7584 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7585 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7588 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7589 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7590 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7591 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7595 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7596 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7597 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7601 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7602 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7603 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7604 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7606 let seed = [42; 32];
7607 let network = Network::Testnet;
7608 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7609 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7610 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7613 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7614 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7615 let config = UserConfig::default();
7616 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7617 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7618 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7620 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7621 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7625 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7626 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7628 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7629 let original_fee = 253;
7630 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7631 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7632 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7633 let seed = [42; 32];
7634 let network = Network::Testnet;
7635 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7637 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7638 let config = UserConfig::default();
7639 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7641 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7642 // same as the old fee.
7643 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7644 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7645 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7649 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7650 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7651 // dust limits are used.
7652 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7653 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7654 let seed = [42; 32];
7655 let network = Network::Testnet;
7656 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7657 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7658 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7660 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7661 // they have different dust limits.
7663 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7664 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7665 let config = UserConfig::default();
7666 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7668 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7669 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7670 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7671 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7672 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7674 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7675 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7676 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7677 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7678 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7680 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7681 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7682 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7683 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7685 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7686 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7687 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7689 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7690 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7692 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7693 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7694 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7696 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7697 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7698 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7699 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7702 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7704 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7705 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7706 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7707 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7708 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7709 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7710 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7711 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7712 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7714 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7717 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7718 // the dust limit check.
7719 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7720 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7721 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7722 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7724 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7725 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7726 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7727 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7728 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7729 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7730 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7734 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7735 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7736 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7737 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7738 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7739 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7740 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7741 let seed = [42; 32];
7742 let network = Network::Testnet;
7743 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7745 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7746 let config = UserConfig::default();
7747 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7749 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7750 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7752 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7753 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7754 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7755 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7756 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7757 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7759 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7760 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7761 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7762 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7763 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7765 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7767 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7768 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7769 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7770 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7771 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7773 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7774 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7775 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7776 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7777 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7781 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7782 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7783 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7784 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7785 let seed = [42; 32];
7786 let network = Network::Testnet;
7787 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7788 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7789 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7791 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7793 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7794 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7795 let config = UserConfig::default();
7796 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7798 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7799 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7800 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7801 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7803 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7804 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7805 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7807 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7808 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7809 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7810 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7812 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7813 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7814 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7816 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7817 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7819 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7820 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7821 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7822 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7823 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7824 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7825 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7827 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7829 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7830 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7831 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7832 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7833 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7837 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7838 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7839 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7840 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7841 let seed = [42; 32];
7842 let network = Network::Testnet;
7843 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7844 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7845 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7847 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7848 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7849 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7850 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7851 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7852 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7853 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7854 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7856 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7857 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7858 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7859 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7860 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7861 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7863 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7864 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7865 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7866 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7868 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7870 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7871 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7872 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7873 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7874 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7875 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7877 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7878 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7879 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7880 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7882 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7883 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7884 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7885 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7886 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7888 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7889 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7891 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7892 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7893 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7895 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7896 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7897 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7898 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7899 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7901 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7902 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7904 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7905 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7906 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7910 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7912 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7913 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7914 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7916 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7917 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7918 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7919 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7921 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7922 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7923 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7925 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7927 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7928 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7931 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7932 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7933 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7934 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7935 let seed = [42; 32];
7936 let network = Network::Testnet;
7937 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7938 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7939 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7942 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7943 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7944 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7946 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7947 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7949 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7950 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7951 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7953 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7954 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7956 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7958 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7959 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7961 // Channel Negotiations failed
7962 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7963 assert!(result.is_err());
7968 fn channel_update() {
7969 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7970 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7971 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7972 let seed = [42; 32];
7973 let network = Network::Testnet;
7974 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7975 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7976 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7978 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7979 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7980 let config = UserConfig::default();
7981 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7983 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7984 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7985 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7986 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7987 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7989 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7990 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7991 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7992 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7993 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7995 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7996 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7997 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7998 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8000 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8001 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8002 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8004 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8005 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8007 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8008 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8009 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8011 short_channel_id: 0,
8014 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8015 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8016 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8018 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8019 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8021 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8023 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
8025 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8026 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8027 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8028 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8030 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8031 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8032 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8034 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8038 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8040 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8041 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8042 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8043 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8044 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8045 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8046 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8047 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8048 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8049 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8050 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8051 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8052 use crate::sync::Arc;
8054 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8055 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8056 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8057 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8059 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8061 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8062 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8063 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8064 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8065 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8067 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8068 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8074 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8075 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8076 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8078 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8079 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8080 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8081 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8082 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8083 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8085 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8087 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8088 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8089 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8090 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8091 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8092 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8094 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8095 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8096 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8097 selected_contest_delay: 144
8099 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8100 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8102 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8103 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8105 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8106 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8108 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8109 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8111 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8112 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8113 // build_commitment_transaction.
8114 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8115 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8116 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8117 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8118 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8120 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8121 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8122 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8123 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8127 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8128 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8129 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8130 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8134 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8135 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8136 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8138 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8139 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8141 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8142 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8144 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8146 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8147 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8148 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8149 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8150 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8151 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8152 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8154 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8155 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8156 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8157 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8159 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8160 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8161 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8163 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8165 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8166 commitment_tx.clone(),
8167 counterparty_signature,
8168 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8169 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8170 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8172 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8173 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8175 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8176 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8177 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8179 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8180 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8183 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8184 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8186 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8187 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8188 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8189 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8190 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8191 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8192 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8193 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8195 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8198 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8199 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8200 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8204 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8207 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8208 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8209 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8211 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8212 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8213 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8214 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8215 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8216 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8217 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8218 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8220 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8224 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8225 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8226 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8227 "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", {});
8229 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8230 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8232 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8233 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8234 "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", {});
8236 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8237 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8238 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8239 "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", {});
8241 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8242 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8244 amount_msat: 1000000,
8246 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8247 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8249 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8252 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8253 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8255 amount_msat: 2000000,
8257 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8258 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8260 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8263 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8264 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8266 amount_msat: 2000000,
8268 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8269 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8270 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8271 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8273 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8276 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8277 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8279 amount_msat: 3000000,
8281 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8282 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8283 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8284 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8286 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8289 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8290 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8292 amount_msat: 4000000,
8294 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8295 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8297 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8301 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8302 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8303 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8305 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8306 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8307 "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", {
8310 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8311 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8312 "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" },
8315 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8316 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8317 "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" },
8320 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8321 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8322 "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" },
8325 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8326 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8327 "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" },
8330 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8331 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8332 "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" }
8335 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8336 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8337 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8339 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8340 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8341 "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", {
8344 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8345 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8346 "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" },
8349 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8350 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8351 "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" },
8354 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8355 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8356 "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" },
8359 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8360 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8361 "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" },
8364 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8365 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8366 "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" }
8369 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8370 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8371 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8373 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8374 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8375 "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", {
8378 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8379 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8380 "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" },
8383 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8384 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8385 "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" },
8388 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8389 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8390 "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" },
8393 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8394 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8395 "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" }
8398 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8399 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8400 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8401 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8403 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8404 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8405 "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", {
8408 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8409 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8410 "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" },
8413 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8414 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8415 "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" },
8418 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8419 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8420 "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" },
8423 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8424 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8425 "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" }
8428 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8429 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8430 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8431 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8433 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8434 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8435 "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", {
8438 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8439 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8440 "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" },
8443 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8444 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8445 "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" },
8448 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8449 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8450 "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" },
8453 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8454 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8455 "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" }
8458 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8459 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8460 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8462 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8463 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8464 "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", {
8467 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8468 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8469 "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" },
8472 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8473 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8474 "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" },
8477 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8478 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8479 "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" }
8482 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8483 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8484 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8486 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8487 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8488 "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", {
8491 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8492 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8493 "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" },
8496 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8497 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8498 "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" },
8501 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8502 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8503 "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" }
8506 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8507 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8508 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8510 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8511 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8512 "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", {
8515 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8516 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8517 "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" },
8520 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8521 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8522 "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" }
8525 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8526 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8527 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8528 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8529 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8530 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8532 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8533 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8534 "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", {
8537 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8538 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8539 "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" },
8542 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8543 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8544 "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" }
8547 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8548 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8549 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8550 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8551 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8553 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8554 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8555 "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", {
8558 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8559 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8560 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8563 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8564 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8565 "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" }
8568 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8569 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8570 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8572 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8573 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8574 "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", {
8577 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8578 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8579 "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" }
8582 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8583 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8584 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8585 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8586 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8588 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8589 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8590 "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", {
8593 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8594 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8595 "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" }
8598 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8599 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8600 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8601 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8602 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8604 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8605 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8606 "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", {
8609 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8610 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8611 "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" }
8614 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8615 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8616 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8617 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8619 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8620 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8621 "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", {});
8623 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8624 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8625 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8626 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8627 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8629 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8630 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8631 "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", {});
8633 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8634 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8635 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8636 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8637 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8639 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8640 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8641 "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", {});
8643 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8644 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8645 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8647 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8648 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8649 "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", {});
8651 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8652 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8653 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8654 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8655 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8657 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8658 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8659 "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", {});
8661 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8662 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8663 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8664 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8665 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8667 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8668 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8669 "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", {});
8671 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8672 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8673 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8674 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8675 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8676 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8678 amount_msat: 2000000,
8680 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8681 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8683 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8686 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8687 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8688 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8690 amount_msat: 5000001,
8692 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8693 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8694 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8695 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8697 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8700 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8701 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8703 amount_msat: 5000000,
8705 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8706 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8707 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8708 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8710 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8714 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8715 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8716 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8719 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8720 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8721 "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" },
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8725 "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" },
8727 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8728 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8729 "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" }
8732 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8733 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8735 "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", {
8738 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8739 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8740 "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" },
8742 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8743 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8744 "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" },
8746 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8747 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8748 "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" }
8753 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8754 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8756 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8757 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8758 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8759 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8761 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8762 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8763 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8765 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8766 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8768 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8769 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8771 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8772 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8773 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8777 fn test_key_derivation() {
8778 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8779 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8781 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8782 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8784 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8785 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8787 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8788 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8790 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8791 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8793 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8794 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8796 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8797 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8799 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8800 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8804 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8805 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8806 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8807 let seed = [42; 32];
8808 let network = Network::Testnet;
8809 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8810 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8812 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8813 let config = UserConfig::default();
8814 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8815 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8817 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8818 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8820 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8821 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8822 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8823 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8824 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8825 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8826 assert!(res.is_ok());
8830 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8831 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8832 // resulting `channel_type`.
8833 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8834 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8835 let network = Network::Testnet;
8836 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8837 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8839 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8840 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8842 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8843 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8845 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8846 // need to signal it.
8847 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8848 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8849 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8852 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8854 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8855 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8856 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8858 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8859 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8860 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8863 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8864 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8865 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8866 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8867 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8870 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8871 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8875 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8876 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8877 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8878 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8879 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8880 let network = Network::Testnet;
8881 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8882 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8884 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8885 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8887 let config = UserConfig::default();
8889 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8890 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8891 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8892 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8893 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8895 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8896 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8897 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8900 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8901 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8902 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8904 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8905 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8906 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8907 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8908 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8909 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8911 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8915 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8916 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8918 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8919 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8920 let network = Network::Testnet;
8921 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8922 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8924 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8925 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8927 let config = UserConfig::default();
8929 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8930 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8931 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8932 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8933 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8934 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8935 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8936 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8938 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8939 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8940 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8941 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8942 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8943 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8946 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8947 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8949 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8950 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8951 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8952 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8954 assert!(res.is_err());
8956 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8957 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8958 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8960 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8961 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8962 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8965 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8967 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8968 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8969 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8970 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8973 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8974 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8976 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8977 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8979 assert!(res.is_err());