1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
13 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
24 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
28 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
34 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
35 use util::transaction_utils;
36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
37 use util::logger::Logger;
38 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
40 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
42 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
44 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
46 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
47 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
50 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
51 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
52 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
53 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
54 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
55 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
56 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
57 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
58 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
61 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
62 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
63 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
64 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
67 enum InboundHTLCState {
68 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
69 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
70 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
71 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
72 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
73 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
74 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
75 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
76 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
77 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
78 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
79 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
80 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
81 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
82 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
84 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
85 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
86 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
87 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
88 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
89 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
90 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
91 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
92 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
93 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
94 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
95 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
96 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
97 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
99 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
100 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
102 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
103 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
104 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
105 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
106 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
108 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
109 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
111 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
112 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
113 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
114 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
115 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
116 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
117 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
118 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
121 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
126 state: InboundHTLCState,
129 enum OutboundHTLCState {
130 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
131 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
132 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
133 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
134 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
135 /// money back (though we won't), and,
136 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
137 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
138 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
139 /// we'll never get out of sync).
140 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
141 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
142 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
144 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
145 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
146 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
147 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
148 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
149 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
150 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
151 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
152 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
153 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
154 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
155 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
156 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
157 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
158 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
161 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: OutboundHTLCState,
170 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
171 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
172 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
176 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
178 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
181 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
186 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
190 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
191 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
192 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
193 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
194 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
195 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
196 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
198 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
199 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
200 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
201 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
202 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
203 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
204 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
206 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
207 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
208 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
210 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
211 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
212 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
213 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
214 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
215 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
217 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
218 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
220 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
221 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
222 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
223 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
224 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
225 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
226 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
227 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
228 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
230 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
231 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
232 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
233 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
234 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
235 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
236 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
237 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
238 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
239 /// us their shutdown.
240 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
241 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
242 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
243 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
245 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
246 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
248 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
250 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
251 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
252 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
253 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
254 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
255 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
256 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
257 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
259 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
261 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
263 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
267 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
273 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
274 struct HTLCCandidate {
276 origin: HTLCInitiator,
280 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
288 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
290 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
291 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
292 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
293 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
294 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
295 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
296 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
297 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
298 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
301 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
302 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
303 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
306 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
307 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
308 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
309 config: ChannelConfig,
313 channel_id: [u8; 32],
315 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
316 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
318 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
320 holder_signer: Signer,
321 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
322 destination_script: Script,
324 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
325 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
326 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
328 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
329 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
330 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
331 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
332 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
333 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
335 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
336 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
337 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
338 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
339 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
340 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
342 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
344 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
345 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
346 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
347 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
348 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
350 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
351 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
352 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
354 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
355 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
356 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
357 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
358 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
359 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
360 // commitment_signed.
361 pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
362 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
363 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
364 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
365 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
366 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
367 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
368 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
369 update_time_counter: u32,
372 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
373 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
374 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
375 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
376 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
377 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
379 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
381 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
382 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
383 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
384 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
386 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
388 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
390 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
392 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
394 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
395 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
396 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
397 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
398 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
399 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
400 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
402 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
404 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
405 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
408 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
410 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
411 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
413 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
414 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
415 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
417 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
419 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
421 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
423 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
424 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
425 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
426 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
427 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
428 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
429 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
430 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
434 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
436 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
437 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
438 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
442 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
443 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
446 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
448 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
450 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
452 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
454 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
456 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
458 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
459 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
460 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
461 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
462 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
463 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
464 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
465 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
466 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
468 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
469 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
470 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
471 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
472 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
474 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
475 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
476 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
477 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
480 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
483 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
484 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
486 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
487 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
488 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
493 macro_rules! secp_check {
494 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
497 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
502 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
503 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
504 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
505 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
508 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
511 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
512 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
513 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
514 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
518 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
519 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
520 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
522 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
523 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
524 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
526 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
527 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
529 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
530 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
531 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
533 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
534 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
536 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
537 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
538 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
541 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
543 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
544 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
548 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
550 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
551 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
553 channel_value_satoshis,
555 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
558 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
559 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
561 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
562 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
563 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
565 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
566 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
567 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
568 pending_update_fee: None,
569 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
570 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
571 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
572 update_time_counter: 1,
574 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
576 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
577 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
578 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
579 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
580 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
582 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
583 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
584 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
585 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
587 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
589 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
590 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
591 short_channel_id: None,
593 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
594 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
595 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
596 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
597 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
598 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
599 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
600 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
601 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
603 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
605 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
606 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
607 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
608 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
609 counterparty_parameters: None,
610 funding_outpoint: None
612 funding_transaction: None,
614 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
615 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
616 counterparty_node_id,
618 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
620 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
622 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
624 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
625 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
626 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
627 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
631 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
632 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
634 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
635 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
636 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
638 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
639 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
640 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
645 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
646 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
647 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
648 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
649 F::Target: FeeEstimator
651 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
652 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
653 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
654 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
655 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
656 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
657 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
658 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
660 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
662 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
666 // Check sanity of message fields:
667 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
670 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
671 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
673 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
674 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
677 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
680 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
681 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
683 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
684 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
685 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
687 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
689 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
690 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
693 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
696 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
700 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
701 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
702 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
704 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
705 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
707 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
708 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
710 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
711 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
713 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
714 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
716 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
717 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
719 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
720 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
723 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
725 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
726 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
727 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
731 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
732 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
734 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
736 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
737 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
738 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
740 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
741 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
743 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
744 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
747 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
748 // for full fee payment
749 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
750 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
751 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
752 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
755 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
756 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
757 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
758 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
761 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
762 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
763 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
764 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
765 if script.len() == 0 {
767 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
768 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
769 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
774 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
775 &OptionalField::Absent => {
776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
781 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
782 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
786 config: local_config,
788 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
789 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
792 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
795 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
796 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
798 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
799 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
800 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
802 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
803 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
804 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
805 pending_update_fee: None,
806 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
807 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
808 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
809 update_time_counter: 1,
811 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
813 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
814 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
815 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
816 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
817 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
819 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
820 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
821 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
822 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
824 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
826 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
827 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
828 short_channel_id: None,
830 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
831 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
832 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
833 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
834 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
835 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
836 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
837 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
838 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
839 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
841 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
843 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
844 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
845 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
846 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
847 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
848 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
849 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
851 funding_outpoint: None
853 funding_transaction: None,
855 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
856 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
857 counterparty_node_id,
859 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
861 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
863 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
865 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
866 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
867 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
868 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
874 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
875 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
876 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
877 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
878 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
880 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
881 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
882 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
883 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
884 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
885 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
886 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
887 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
888 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
889 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
890 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
892 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
893 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
894 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
895 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
897 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
898 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
899 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
900 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
902 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
904 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
905 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
906 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
908 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
909 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
910 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
911 transaction_output_index: None
916 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
917 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
918 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
919 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
920 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
921 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
922 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
924 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
925 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
928 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
929 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
930 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
931 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
933 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
934 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
940 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
941 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
942 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
943 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
944 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
945 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
946 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
950 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
951 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
953 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
955 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
956 if generated_by_local {
957 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
958 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
967 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
968 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
969 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
970 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
971 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
972 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
973 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
977 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
978 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
980 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
982 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
983 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
985 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
986 if !generated_by_local {
987 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
995 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
996 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
997 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
998 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
999 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1000 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1001 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1002 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1004 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1006 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1007 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1008 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1009 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1011 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1013 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1014 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1015 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1016 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1019 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1020 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1021 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1023 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1026 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1027 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1029 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1030 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1035 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1036 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1041 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1043 let channel_parameters =
1044 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1045 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1046 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1051 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1054 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1055 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1056 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1057 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1059 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1063 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1064 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1065 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1069 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1074 1 + // script length (0)
1078 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1079 2 + // witness marker and flag
1080 1 + // witness element count
1081 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1082 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1083 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1084 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1085 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1086 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1088 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1089 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1090 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1096 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1098 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1100 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1101 script_sig: Script::new(),
1102 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1103 witness: Vec::new(),
1108 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1109 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1110 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1112 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1113 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1114 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1116 if value_to_self < 0 {
1117 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1118 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1119 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1120 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1121 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1124 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1125 txouts.push((TxOut {
1126 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1127 value: value_to_remote as u64
1131 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1132 txouts.push((TxOut {
1133 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1134 value: value_to_self as u64
1138 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1140 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1141 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1142 outputs.push(out.0);
1150 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1153 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1154 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1158 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1159 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1160 /// our counterparty!)
1161 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1162 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1163 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1164 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1165 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1166 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1167 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1169 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1173 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1174 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1175 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1176 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1177 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1178 //may see payments to it!
1179 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1180 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1181 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1183 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1186 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1187 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1188 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1189 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1190 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1193 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1194 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1195 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1196 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1197 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1200 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1201 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1202 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1204 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1205 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1206 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1207 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1208 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1209 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1211 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1212 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1214 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1216 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1218 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1219 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1220 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1222 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1223 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1224 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1225 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1227 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1228 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1229 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1231 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1233 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1234 return Ok((None, None));
1237 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1238 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1245 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1249 // Now update local state:
1251 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1252 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1253 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1254 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1255 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1256 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1257 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1261 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1262 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1263 match pending_update {
1264 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1265 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1266 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1267 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1268 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1269 return Ok((None, None));
1272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1273 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1274 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1275 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1276 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1277 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1278 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1284 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1285 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1286 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1288 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1292 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1293 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1295 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1296 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1298 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1299 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1302 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1303 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1304 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1305 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1306 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1309 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1310 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1311 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1312 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1313 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1314 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1315 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1316 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1317 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1319 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1320 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1321 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1323 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1324 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1328 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1329 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1330 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1332 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1333 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1334 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1335 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1336 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1338 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1340 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1341 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1342 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1344 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1345 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1346 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1348 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1349 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1350 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1354 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1355 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1361 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1362 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1365 // Now update local state:
1366 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1367 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1368 match pending_update {
1369 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1370 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1371 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1372 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1375 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1376 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1377 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1378 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1384 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell", htlc_id_arg);
1385 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1386 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1392 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message", htlc_id_arg);
1394 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1395 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1398 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1399 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1400 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1405 // Message handlers:
1407 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1408 // Check sanity of message fields:
1409 if !self.is_outbound() {
1410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1412 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1415 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1416 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1418 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1419 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1421 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1422 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1424 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1425 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1427 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1428 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1429 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1431 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1432 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1433 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1435 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1436 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1439 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1442 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1446 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1447 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1448 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1450 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1451 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1453 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1454 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1456 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1457 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1459 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1460 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1462 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1463 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1465 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1466 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1469 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1470 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1471 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1472 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1473 if script.len() == 0 {
1475 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1476 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1477 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1479 Some(script.clone())
1482 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1483 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1484 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1489 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1490 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1491 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1492 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1493 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1494 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1496 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1497 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1498 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1499 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1500 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1501 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1504 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1505 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1506 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1509 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1510 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1512 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1517 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1518 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1520 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1521 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1523 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1524 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1525 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1526 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1527 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1528 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1531 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1532 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1534 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1535 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1536 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1538 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1539 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1541 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1542 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1545 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1546 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1549 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1550 if self.is_outbound() {
1551 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1553 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1554 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1555 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1557 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1559 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1560 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1561 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1562 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1565 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1566 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1567 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1568 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1569 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1571 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1573 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1574 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1575 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1578 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1579 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1580 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1584 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1585 initial_commitment_tx,
1588 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1589 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1592 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1594 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1595 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1596 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1597 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1598 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1599 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1600 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1601 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1603 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1605 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1607 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1608 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1609 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1610 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1612 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1613 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1615 }, channel_monitor))
1618 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1619 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1620 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1621 if !self.is_outbound() {
1622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1624 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1625 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1627 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1628 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1629 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1630 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1633 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1635 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1636 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1637 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1638 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1640 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1642 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1643 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1645 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1646 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1647 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1648 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1649 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1654 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1655 initial_commitment_tx,
1658 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1659 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1663 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1664 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1665 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1666 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1667 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1668 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1669 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1670 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1671 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1673 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1675 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1677 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1678 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1679 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1680 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1682 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1685 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1686 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1690 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1692 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1693 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1694 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1695 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1696 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1697 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1698 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1699 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1700 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1701 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1702 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1703 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1704 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1705 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1707 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1710 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1713 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1714 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1718 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1719 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1720 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1721 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1722 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1724 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1727 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1729 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1730 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1731 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1732 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1735 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1736 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1737 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1738 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1739 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1743 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1746 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1747 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1748 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1749 /// corner case properly.
1750 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1751 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1752 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1753 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1756 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1757 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1758 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1759 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1760 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1761 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1764 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1765 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1766 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1768 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1769 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1771 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1772 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1774 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1775 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1777 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1778 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1782 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1783 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1789 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1790 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1791 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1794 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1795 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1796 included_htlcs += 1;
1799 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1800 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1804 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1805 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1806 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1807 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1808 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1809 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1814 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1816 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1817 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1822 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1823 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1827 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1828 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1829 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1832 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1833 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1835 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1836 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1837 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1839 total_pending_htlcs,
1840 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1841 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1842 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1844 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1845 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1846 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1848 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1850 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1855 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1856 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1857 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1859 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1860 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1862 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1863 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1865 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1866 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1868 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1869 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1873 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1874 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1880 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1881 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1882 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1883 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1884 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1885 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1888 included_htlcs += 1;
1891 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1892 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1895 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1896 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1898 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1899 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1900 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1905 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1906 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1907 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1910 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1911 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1913 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1914 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1916 total_pending_htlcs,
1917 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1918 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1919 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1921 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1922 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1923 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1925 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1927 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1932 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1933 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1934 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1935 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1936 if local_sent_shutdown {
1937 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1939 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1940 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1941 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1944 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1947 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1950 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1951 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1953 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1957 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1958 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1961 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1962 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1965 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1966 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1967 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1968 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1969 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1970 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1971 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1972 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1973 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1974 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1975 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1977 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1978 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1979 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1980 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1981 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1982 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1986 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1987 self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1988 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1989 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1990 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1994 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1995 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1996 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1997 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1998 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2000 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2004 let chan_reserve_msat =
2005 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2006 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2010 if !self.is_outbound() {
2011 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2012 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2013 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2014 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2015 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2016 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2017 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2018 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2019 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2020 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2021 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2022 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2023 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2024 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2025 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2028 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2029 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2030 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2031 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2032 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2035 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2038 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2042 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2043 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2044 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2048 // Now update local state:
2049 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2050 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2051 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2052 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2053 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2054 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2055 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2060 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2062 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2063 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2064 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2065 match check_preimage {
2067 Some(payment_hash) =>
2068 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2073 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2075 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2076 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2078 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2079 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2081 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2084 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2087 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2088 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2091 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2095 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2096 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2099 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2100 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2101 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2103 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2107 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2111 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2112 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2115 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2119 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2123 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2124 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2127 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2128 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2130 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2131 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2133 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2134 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2137 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2139 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2141 let mut update_fee = false;
2142 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2144 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2149 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2150 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2151 let commitment_txid = {
2152 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2153 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2154 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2156 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2157 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2158 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2162 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2163 (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2166 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2167 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2169 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2170 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2171 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2174 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2176 if self.is_outbound() {
2177 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2178 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2179 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2180 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2181 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2182 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2183 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2184 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2185 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2186 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2192 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2193 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2196 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2197 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2198 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2199 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2200 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2201 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2202 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2203 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2204 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2205 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2207 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2209 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2213 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2216 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2217 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2218 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2221 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2222 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2224 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2225 let mut need_commitment = false;
2226 if !self.is_outbound() {
2227 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2228 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2229 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2230 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2231 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2232 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2233 need_commitment = true;
2234 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2239 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2240 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2241 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2242 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2243 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2244 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2248 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2249 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2250 Some(forward_info.clone())
2252 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2253 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2254 need_commitment = true;
2257 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2258 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2259 Some(fail_reason.take())
2261 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2262 need_commitment = true;
2266 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2267 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2268 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2269 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2271 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2272 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2273 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2274 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2275 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2276 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2277 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2278 // includes the right HTLCs.
2279 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2280 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2281 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2282 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2283 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2284 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2286 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2287 // re-send the message on restoration)
2288 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2291 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2292 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2293 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2294 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2295 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2296 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2297 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2298 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2299 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2301 } else if !need_commitment {
2302 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2303 } else { (None, None) };
2305 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2306 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2307 per_commitment_secret,
2308 next_per_commitment_point,
2309 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2312 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2313 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2314 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2315 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2316 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2317 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2318 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2319 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2322 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2323 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2324 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2325 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2326 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2327 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2329 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2330 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2331 updates: Vec::new(),
2334 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2335 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2336 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2337 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2338 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2339 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2340 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2341 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2342 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2343 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2344 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2345 // to rebalance channels.
2346 match &htlc_update {
2347 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2348 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2349 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2352 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2353 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2354 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2355 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2356 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2357 // into the holding cell without ever being
2358 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2359 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2360 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2363 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2369 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2370 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2371 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2372 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2373 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2374 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2378 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2380 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2385 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2386 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2387 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2389 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2391 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2398 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2399 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2401 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2402 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2403 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2404 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2405 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2411 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2412 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2413 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2414 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2415 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2417 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2419 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2421 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2424 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2426 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2430 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2431 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2432 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2433 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2434 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2435 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2436 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2439 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2442 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2445 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2446 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2449 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2450 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2455 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2456 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2457 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2458 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2459 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2460 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2461 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2462 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2463 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2466 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2468 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2469 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2472 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2473 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2474 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2475 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2476 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2477 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2478 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2479 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2483 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2484 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2485 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2486 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2487 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2488 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2489 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2490 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2492 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2493 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2494 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2495 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2496 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2497 let mut require_commitment = false;
2498 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2501 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2502 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2503 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2505 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2506 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2507 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2508 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2509 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2510 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2515 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2516 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2517 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2518 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2519 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2521 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2522 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2527 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2528 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2529 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2531 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2532 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2536 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2537 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2539 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2540 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2541 require_commitment = true;
2542 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2543 match forward_info {
2544 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2545 require_commitment = true;
2547 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2548 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2549 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2551 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2552 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2553 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2557 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2558 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2559 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2565 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2566 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2567 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2568 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2570 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2571 Some(fail_reason.take())
2573 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2574 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2575 require_commitment = true;
2579 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2581 if self.is_outbound() {
2582 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2583 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2586 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2587 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2588 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2589 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2590 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2591 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2592 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2593 require_commitment = true;
2594 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2599 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2600 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2601 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2602 if require_commitment {
2603 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2604 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2605 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2606 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2607 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2608 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2609 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2610 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2611 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2613 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2614 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2615 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2618 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2619 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2620 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2621 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2622 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2624 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2625 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2626 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2629 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2630 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2631 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2632 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2634 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2636 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2637 if require_commitment {
2638 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2640 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2641 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2642 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2643 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2645 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2646 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2647 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2649 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2652 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2654 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2661 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2662 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2663 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2664 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2665 if !self.is_outbound() {
2666 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2668 if !self.is_usable() {
2669 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2671 if !self.is_live() {
2672 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2675 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2676 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2680 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2681 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2683 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2684 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2689 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2690 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2691 Some(update_fee) => {
2692 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2693 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2699 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2700 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2702 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2704 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2705 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2706 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2707 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2710 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2711 // will be retransmitted.
2712 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2714 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2715 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2717 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2718 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2719 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2720 // this HTLC accordingly
2721 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2724 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2725 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2726 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2727 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2730 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2731 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2732 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2733 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2734 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2735 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2740 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2742 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2743 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2744 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2745 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2746 // the update upon reconnection.
2747 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2751 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2752 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2755 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2756 /// updates are partially paused.
2757 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2758 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2759 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2760 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2761 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2762 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2763 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2764 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2765 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2766 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2767 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2768 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2769 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2772 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2773 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2774 /// to the remote side.
2775 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2776 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2777 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2779 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
2780 self.funding_transaction.take()
2783 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
2784 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
2785 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
2786 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
2787 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
2788 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2789 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
2790 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2791 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2792 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2793 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2794 next_per_commitment_point,
2798 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2799 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2800 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2801 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2803 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2804 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2805 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2806 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2809 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2810 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2812 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2813 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2816 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2817 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2818 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2819 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2820 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
2821 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2822 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2823 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2824 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
2827 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2828 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2830 if self.is_outbound() {
2831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2833 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2836 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2837 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2838 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2842 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2843 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2844 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2845 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2846 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2847 per_commitment_secret,
2848 next_per_commitment_point,
2852 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2853 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2854 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2855 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2856 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2858 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2859 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2860 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2861 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2862 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2863 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2864 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2865 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2866 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2871 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2872 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2874 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2875 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2876 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2877 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2878 reason: err_packet.clone()
2881 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2882 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2883 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2884 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2885 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2886 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2889 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2890 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2891 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2892 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2893 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2900 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2901 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2902 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2903 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2905 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2909 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2910 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2911 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2912 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2913 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2914 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2915 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2919 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2920 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2921 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2924 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2925 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2926 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2927 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2928 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2929 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2930 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2933 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2934 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2935 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2939 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2943 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2944 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2945 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2947 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2948 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2949 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2950 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2954 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2955 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2956 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2957 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2958 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2961 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2962 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
2965 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2966 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2967 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2968 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2969 next_per_commitment_point,
2970 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
2973 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2974 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2975 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2977 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2978 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2979 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2982 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2985 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2988 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2989 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2990 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2991 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2992 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2994 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2995 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2996 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2997 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2998 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2999 next_per_commitment_point,
3003 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3004 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3005 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3007 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3010 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3011 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3012 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3013 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3015 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3016 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3017 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3018 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3019 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3021 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3022 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3026 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3028 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3029 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3030 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3032 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3035 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3036 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3037 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3040 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3046 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3047 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3049 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3050 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3051 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3055 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3056 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3057 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3059 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3060 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3062 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3063 let sig = self.holder_signer
3064 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3066 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3067 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3069 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3070 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3071 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3072 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3073 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3077 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3078 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3080 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3081 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3083 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3084 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3085 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3086 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3087 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3089 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3090 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3091 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3094 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3096 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3097 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3100 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3101 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3105 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3108 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3110 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3111 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3113 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3114 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3115 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3116 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3117 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3118 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3120 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3121 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3127 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3128 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3129 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3131 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3134 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3135 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3136 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3140 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3141 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3143 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3146 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3147 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3148 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3149 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3151 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3153 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3154 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3155 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3156 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3157 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3159 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3160 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3162 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3163 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3165 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3168 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3169 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3171 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3172 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3174 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3177 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3180 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3181 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3184 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3185 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3186 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3189 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3191 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3194 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3195 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3196 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3197 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3198 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3202 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3203 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3204 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3205 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3206 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3207 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3208 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3209 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3210 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3211 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3212 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3216 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3217 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3218 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3219 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3220 let sig = self.holder_signer
3221 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3222 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3223 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3224 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3225 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3226 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3227 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3233 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3234 if self.is_outbound() {
3235 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3236 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3237 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3238 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3242 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3245 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3247 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3248 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3249 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3253 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3256 let sig = self.holder_signer
3257 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3258 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3259 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3260 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3261 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3263 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3264 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3266 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3267 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3268 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3270 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3273 // Public utilities:
3275 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3279 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3280 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3281 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3285 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3286 /// is_usable() returns true).
3287 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3288 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3289 self.short_channel_id
3292 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3293 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3294 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3295 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3298 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3299 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3302 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3303 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3306 fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3307 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3310 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3311 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3314 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3315 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3316 self.counterparty_node_id
3319 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3321 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3322 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3325 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3326 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3328 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3329 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3330 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3331 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3333 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3337 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3338 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3339 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3342 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3343 self.channel_value_satoshis
3346 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3347 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3350 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3351 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3355 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3359 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3360 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3363 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3364 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3367 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3368 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3372 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3377 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3379 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3380 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3381 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3382 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3383 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3384 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3386 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3388 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3396 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3397 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3401 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3402 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3403 self.update_time_counter
3406 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3407 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3410 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3411 self.config.announced_channel
3414 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3415 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3418 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3419 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3420 pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3421 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3423 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3424 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3426 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3427 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3429 if self.is_outbound() {
3430 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3431 res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3434 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3435 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3440 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3441 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3442 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3445 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3446 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3447 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3448 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3449 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3452 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3453 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3455 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3456 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3459 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3460 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3461 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3462 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3465 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3466 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3467 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3470 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3471 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3472 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3473 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3474 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3475 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3480 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3481 self.channel_update_status
3484 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3485 self.channel_update_status = status;
3488 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3489 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3493 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3494 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3495 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3498 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
3502 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3503 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3504 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3506 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3507 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3508 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3510 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3511 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3513 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3514 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3516 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3520 if need_commitment_update {
3521 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3522 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3523 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3524 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3525 next_per_commitment_point,
3528 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3534 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3535 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3536 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3537 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3538 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3539 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3540 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3541 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3542 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3543 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3544 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3545 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3546 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3547 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3548 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3549 if self.is_outbound() {
3550 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3551 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3552 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3553 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3554 // channel and move on.
3555 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3556 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3558 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3559 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3560 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3561 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3564 if self.is_outbound() {
3565 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3566 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3567 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3568 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3569 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3570 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3574 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3575 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3576 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3577 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3578 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3582 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3583 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3584 // may have already happened for this block).
3585 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3586 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3589 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3590 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3591 log_trace!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3592 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3593 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3594 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3603 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3604 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3605 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3606 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3608 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3609 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3612 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3614 pub fn best_block_updated(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3615 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3616 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3617 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3619 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3620 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3621 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3629 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3631 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3632 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3635 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3636 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3637 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3638 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3639 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3640 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3641 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3642 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3643 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3646 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3647 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3648 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3649 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3650 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
3651 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3652 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3653 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
3658 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3661 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3662 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3663 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3664 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&mut self) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3665 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3666 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3667 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3668 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3669 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3670 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3671 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3672 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3673 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time) {
3674 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3675 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3676 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3682 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3687 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3688 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3690 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3691 if !self.is_outbound() {
3692 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3694 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3695 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3698 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3699 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3702 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3703 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3707 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3708 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3709 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3710 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3711 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3712 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3713 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3714 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3715 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3716 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3717 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3718 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3719 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3720 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3721 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3722 first_per_commitment_point,
3723 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3724 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3728 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3729 if self.is_outbound() {
3730 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3732 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3733 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3735 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3736 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3739 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3740 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3742 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3743 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3744 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3745 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3746 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3747 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3748 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3749 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3750 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3751 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3752 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3753 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3754 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3755 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3756 first_per_commitment_point,
3757 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3761 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3762 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3763 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3764 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3765 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3766 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3769 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3770 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3771 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3772 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3773 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3774 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3775 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3776 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3777 if !self.is_outbound() {
3778 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3780 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3781 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3783 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3784 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3785 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3786 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3789 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3790 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3792 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3795 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3796 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3801 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3803 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3805 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3806 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3807 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
3809 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3810 temporary_channel_id,
3811 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3812 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3817 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3818 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3819 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3820 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3821 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3823 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3824 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3825 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3826 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3827 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3829 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3830 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3832 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3833 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3836 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3838 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3839 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3841 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3842 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3843 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3844 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3845 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3846 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3849 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3850 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3855 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3856 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3857 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3858 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3859 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3860 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3861 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3862 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3863 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3864 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3865 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3866 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3867 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3868 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3869 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3870 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3871 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3872 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3873 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3876 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3877 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3878 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3879 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3882 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3883 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3884 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3885 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3886 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3887 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3888 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3889 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3891 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3892 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3893 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3894 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3895 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3896 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3897 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3898 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3899 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3901 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3907 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3909 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3910 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3911 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3912 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3913 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3914 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3915 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3916 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3917 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3918 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3920 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3921 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3922 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3925 if amount_msat == 0 {
3926 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3929 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3930 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3933 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3934 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3935 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3936 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3937 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3938 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3939 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3940 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3943 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3944 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3945 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3947 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3948 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3949 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3952 if !self.is_outbound() {
3953 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3954 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3955 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3956 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3957 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3958 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3959 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3963 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3964 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3965 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3968 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3969 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3970 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3971 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3973 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3974 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3977 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3978 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3979 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3980 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3981 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3984 // Now update local state:
3985 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3986 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3991 onion_routing_packet,
3996 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3997 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3999 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4001 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4005 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4006 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4007 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4011 onion_routing_packet,
4013 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4018 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4019 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4020 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4021 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4022 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4023 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4024 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4026 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4027 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4029 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4030 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4032 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4033 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4035 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4036 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4037 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4038 have_updates = true;
4040 if have_updates { break; }
4042 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4043 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4044 have_updates = true;
4046 if have_updates { break; }
4049 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4051 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4053 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4054 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4055 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4056 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4058 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4059 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4060 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4062 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4066 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4067 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4068 Some(fail_reason.take())
4070 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4073 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4075 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4076 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4077 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4078 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4079 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4080 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4082 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4085 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4086 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4087 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4088 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4089 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4090 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4091 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4092 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4095 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4096 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4099 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4100 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4101 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4102 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4103 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4104 if self.is_outbound() {
4105 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4109 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4110 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4111 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4112 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4114 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4116 if !self.is_outbound() {
4117 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4118 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4119 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4120 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4121 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4122 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4123 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4124 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4125 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4126 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4133 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4134 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4138 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4139 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4141 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4143 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4144 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4145 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4146 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4147 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4149 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4150 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4151 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4152 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4153 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4154 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4158 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4159 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4162 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4165 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4166 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4167 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4169 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4170 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4171 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4172 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4173 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4179 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4180 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4181 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4184 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4185 let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
4186 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
4187 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4189 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4190 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4191 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4192 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4198 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4199 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4200 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4201 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4202 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4203 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4206 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4207 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4208 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4210 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4211 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4214 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4215 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4216 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4219 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4221 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4222 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4223 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4225 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4227 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4229 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4230 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4231 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4232 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4233 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4235 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4236 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4243 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4244 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4245 scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4246 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4249 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4250 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4251 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4252 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4253 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4254 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4255 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4256 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4257 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4258 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4259 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4261 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4262 // return them to fail the payment.
4263 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4264 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4266 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4267 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4272 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4273 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4274 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4275 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4276 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4277 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4278 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4279 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4280 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4281 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4282 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4283 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4284 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4289 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4290 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4291 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4295 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4296 // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4298 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4299 // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4300 // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4301 let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4302 if is_script_too_long {
4306 if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4310 return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4313 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4314 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4316 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4317 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4319 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4321 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4323 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4325 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4326 err_code.write(writer)?;
4328 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4330 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4337 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4338 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4339 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4340 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4341 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4342 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4343 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4348 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4349 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4350 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4351 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4352 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4354 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4355 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4356 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4357 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4363 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4364 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4365 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4366 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4367 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4368 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4373 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4374 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4375 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4378 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4379 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4381 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4382 self.config.write(writer)?;
4384 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4385 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4386 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4388 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4390 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4391 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4392 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4393 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4394 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4395 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4397 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4398 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4400 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4401 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4402 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4404 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4405 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4406 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4407 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4410 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4411 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4412 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4415 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4416 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4417 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4418 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4420 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4421 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4423 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4425 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4427 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4429 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4432 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4434 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4439 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4440 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4441 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4442 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4443 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4444 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4445 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4447 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4449 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4451 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4454 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4456 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4458 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4460 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4462 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4464 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4469 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4470 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4472 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4474 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4475 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4476 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4477 source.write(writer)?;
4478 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4480 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4482 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4483 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4485 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4487 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4488 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4493 match self.resend_order {
4494 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4495 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4498 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4499 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4500 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4502 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4503 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4504 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4505 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4508 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4509 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4510 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4511 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4512 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4515 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4516 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4518 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4519 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4520 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4521 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4523 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4524 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4526 feerate.write(writer)?;
4530 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4533 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4534 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4535 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4537 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4538 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4539 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4540 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4541 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4542 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4543 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4544 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4546 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4549 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4550 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4551 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4553 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4556 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4557 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4559 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4560 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4561 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4563 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4565 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4567 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4572 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4573 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4574 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4575 fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4576 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4577 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4578 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4579 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4582 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4583 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4585 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4586 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4587 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4589 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4591 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4592 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4593 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4594 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4595 let mut data = [0; 1024];
4596 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4597 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4598 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4600 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4602 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4603 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4605 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4606 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4607 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4609 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4610 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4611 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4612 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4613 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4614 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4615 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4616 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4617 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4618 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4619 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4620 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4621 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4622 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4627 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4628 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4629 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4630 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4631 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4632 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4633 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4634 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4635 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4636 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4637 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4638 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4639 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4640 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4641 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4642 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4647 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4648 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4649 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4650 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4651 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4652 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4653 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4654 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4655 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4656 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4658 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4659 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4660 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4662 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4663 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4664 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4666 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4670 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4671 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4672 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4673 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4676 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4677 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4678 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4680 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4681 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4682 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4683 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4686 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4687 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4688 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4689 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4692 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4693 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4695 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4696 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4697 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4698 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4700 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4702 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4703 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4706 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4707 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
4708 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4710 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4711 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4712 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4713 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4714 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4715 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4716 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4717 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4719 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4721 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4722 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4723 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
4724 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
4726 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4729 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4730 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
4732 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4734 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4735 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4737 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4738 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4740 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
4742 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4743 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4752 channel_value_satoshis,
4754 latest_monitor_update_id,
4760 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4761 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4764 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4765 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4766 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4770 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4771 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4772 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4773 monitor_pending_forwards,
4774 monitor_pending_failures,
4777 holding_cell_update_fee,
4778 next_holder_htlc_id,
4779 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4780 update_time_counter,
4783 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4784 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4785 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4786 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4788 last_sent_closing_fee,
4790 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4791 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
4794 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4795 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4796 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4797 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4798 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4799 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4800 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4803 counterparty_forwarding_info,
4805 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4806 funding_transaction,
4808 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4809 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4810 counterparty_node_id,
4812 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4816 channel_update_status,
4818 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4819 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4820 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4821 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4828 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4829 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4830 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4831 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4832 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4833 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4834 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4835 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4837 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4838 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
4839 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4840 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4841 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4842 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
4844 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4845 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4846 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
4847 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4848 use util::config::UserConfig;
4849 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4850 use util::test_utils;
4851 use util::logger::Logger;
4852 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4853 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
4854 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4855 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
4856 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4857 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4858 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4861 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4864 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4865 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4871 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4872 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4873 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4877 signer: InMemorySigner,
4879 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4880 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4882 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4883 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4884 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4885 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4886 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4887 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4890 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4891 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4892 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4893 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4896 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4899 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4900 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4901 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
4904 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4905 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4908 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4909 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4911 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4912 let original_fee = 253;
4913 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4914 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4915 let seed = [42; 32];
4916 let network = Network::Testnet;
4917 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4919 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4920 let config = UserConfig::default();
4921 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4923 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4924 // same as the old fee.
4925 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4926 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4927 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4931 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4932 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4933 // dust limits are used.
4934 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4935 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4936 let seed = [42; 32];
4937 let network = Network::Testnet;
4938 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4940 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4941 // they have different dust limits.
4943 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4944 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4945 let config = UserConfig::default();
4946 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4948 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4949 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4950 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4951 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4952 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4954 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4955 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4956 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4957 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4958 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
4960 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4961 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4962 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4964 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4965 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4966 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4967 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4970 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4972 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4973 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4974 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4975 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4976 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4978 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4979 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4983 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4984 // the dust limit check.
4985 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4986 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4987 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4988 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4990 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4991 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4992 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4993 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4994 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4995 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4996 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5000 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5001 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5002 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5003 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5004 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5005 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5006 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5007 let seed = [42; 32];
5008 let network = Network::Testnet;
5009 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5011 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5012 let config = UserConfig::default();
5013 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5015 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5016 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5018 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5019 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5020 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5021 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5022 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5023 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5025 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5026 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5027 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5028 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5029 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5031 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5033 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5034 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5035 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5036 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5037 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5039 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5040 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5041 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5042 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5043 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5047 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5048 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5049 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5050 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5051 let seed = [42; 32];
5052 let network = Network::Testnet;
5053 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5054 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5055 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5057 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5059 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5060 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5061 let config = UserConfig::default();
5062 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5064 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5065 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5066 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5067 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5069 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5070 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5071 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5073 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5074 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5075 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5076 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5078 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5079 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5080 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5082 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5083 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5085 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5086 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5087 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5088 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5089 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5090 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5091 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5092 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5093 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5098 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5100 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5101 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5102 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5103 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5104 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5105 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5106 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5113 fn channel_update() {
5114 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5115 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5116 let seed = [42; 32];
5117 let network = Network::Testnet;
5118 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5119 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5121 // Create a channel.
5122 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5123 let config = UserConfig::default();
5124 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5125 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5126 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5127 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5129 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5130 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5131 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5133 short_channel_id: 0,
5136 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5137 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5138 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5140 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5141 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5143 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5145 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5147 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5148 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5149 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5150 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5152 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5153 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5154 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5156 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5161 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5162 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5163 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5164 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5165 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5167 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5169 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5170 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5171 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5172 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5173 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5175 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5176 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5181 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5182 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5183 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5185 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5186 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5187 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5188 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5189 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5191 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5193 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5194 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5195 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5196 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5197 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5198 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5200 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5201 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5202 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5203 selected_contest_delay: 144
5205 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5206 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5208 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5209 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5211 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5212 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5214 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5215 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5217 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5218 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5219 // build_commitment_transaction.
5220 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5221 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5222 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5223 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5224 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5226 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5227 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5228 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5230 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5231 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5233 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5234 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5238 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5239 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5240 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5241 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5242 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5243 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5245 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5246 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5247 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5248 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5250 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5251 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5252 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5254 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5256 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5257 commitment_tx.clone(),
5258 counterparty_signature,
5259 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5260 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5261 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5263 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5264 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5266 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5267 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5268 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5270 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5271 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5274 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5276 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5277 let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5278 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5279 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5280 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5282 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5285 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5286 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5287 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5291 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5294 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5295 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5297 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5298 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5299 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5300 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5301 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5302 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5303 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5305 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5309 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5310 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5312 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5313 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5314 "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", {});
5316 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5317 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5319 amount_msat: 1000000,
5321 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5322 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5324 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5327 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5328 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5330 amount_msat: 2000000,
5332 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5333 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5335 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5338 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5339 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5341 amount_msat: 2000000,
5343 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5344 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5345 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5347 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5350 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5351 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5353 amount_msat: 3000000,
5355 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5356 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5357 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5359 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5362 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5363 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5365 amount_msat: 4000000,
5367 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5368 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5370 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5374 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5375 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5376 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5378 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5379 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5380 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5383 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5384 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5385 "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" },
5388 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5389 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5390 "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" },
5393 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5394 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5395 "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" },
5398 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5399 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5400 "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" },
5403 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5404 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5405 "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" }
5408 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5409 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5410 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5412 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5413 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5414 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5417 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5418 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5419 "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" },
5422 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5423 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5424 "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" },
5427 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5428 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5429 "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" },
5432 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5433 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5434 "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" },
5437 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5438 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5439 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5442 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5443 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5444 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5446 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5447 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5448 "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", {
5451 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5452 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5453 "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" },
5456 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5457 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5458 "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" },
5461 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5462 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5463 "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" },
5466 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5467 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5468 "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" }
5471 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5472 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5473 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5475 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5476 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5477 "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", {
5480 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5481 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5482 "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" },
5485 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5486 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5487 "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" },
5490 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5491 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5492 "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" },
5495 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5496 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5497 "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" }
5500 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5501 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5502 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5504 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5505 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5506 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5509 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5510 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5511 "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" },
5514 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5515 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5516 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5519 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5520 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5521 "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" }
5524 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5525 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5526 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5528 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5529 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5530 "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", {
5533 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5534 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5535 "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" },
5538 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5539 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5540 "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" },
5543 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5544 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5545 "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" }
5548 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5549 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5550 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5552 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5553 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5554 "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", {
5557 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5558 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5559 "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" },
5562 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5563 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5564 "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" }
5567 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5568 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5569 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5571 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5572 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5573 "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", {
5576 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5577 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5578 "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" },
5581 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5582 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5583 "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" }
5586 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5587 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5588 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5590 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5591 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5592 "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", {
5595 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5596 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5597 "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" }
5600 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5601 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5602 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5604 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5605 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5606 "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", {
5609 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5610 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5611 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5614 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5615 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5616 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5618 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5619 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5620 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5622 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5623 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5624 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5626 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5627 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5628 "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", {});
5630 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5631 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5632 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5634 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5635 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5636 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5638 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5639 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5640 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5642 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5643 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5644 "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", {});
5646 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5647 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5648 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5649 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5650 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5651 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5653 amount_msat: 2000000,
5655 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5656 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5658 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5661 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5662 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5663 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5665 amount_msat: 5000000,
5667 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5668 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5669 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5671 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5674 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5675 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5677 amount_msat: 5000000,
5679 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5680 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5681 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5683 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5687 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5688 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5689 "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", {
5692 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5693 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5694 "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" },
5696 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5697 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5698 "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" },
5700 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5701 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5702 "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" }
5707 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5708 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5710 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5711 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5712 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5713 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5715 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5716 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5717 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5719 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5720 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5722 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5723 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5725 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5726 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5727 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5731 fn test_key_derivation() {
5732 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5733 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5735 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5736 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5738 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5739 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5741 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5742 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5744 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5745 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5747 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5748 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5750 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5751 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5753 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5754 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());