1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
531 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
532 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
533 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
534 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
535 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
536 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
539 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
540 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
541 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
542 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
543 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
544 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
545 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
546 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
547 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
548 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
549 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
550 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
551 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
552 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
553 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
555 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
556 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
557 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
558 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
560 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
561 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
562 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
563 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
565 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
566 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
567 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
568 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
569 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
571 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
572 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
573 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
574 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
576 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
577 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
578 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
580 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
581 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
582 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
583 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
584 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
586 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
587 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
590 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
591 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
593 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
594 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
597 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
598 (0, update, required),
601 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
602 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
603 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
605 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
606 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
607 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
608 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
610 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
614 channel_id: [u8; 32],
615 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
618 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
619 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
621 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
622 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
623 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
626 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
627 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
628 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
631 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
633 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
635 holder_signer: Signer,
636 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
637 destination_script: Script,
639 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
640 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
641 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
643 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
644 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
645 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
646 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
647 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
648 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
650 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
651 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
652 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
653 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
654 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
655 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
657 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
659 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
660 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
661 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
663 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
664 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
665 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
666 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
667 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
668 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
669 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
671 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
673 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
674 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
675 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
676 // HTLCs with similar state.
677 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
678 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
679 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
680 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
681 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
682 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
683 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
684 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
685 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
688 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
689 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
690 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
692 update_time_counter: u32,
694 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
695 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
696 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
699 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
701 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
702 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
704 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
705 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
706 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
707 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
709 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
710 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
712 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
714 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
716 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
717 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
718 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
719 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
720 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
721 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
723 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
724 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
725 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
726 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
727 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
729 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
730 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
731 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
732 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
733 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
734 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
735 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
736 channel_creation_height: u32,
738 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
741 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
743 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
748 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
753 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
755 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
756 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
759 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
761 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
763 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
764 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
766 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
768 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
769 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
770 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
772 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
774 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
775 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
777 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
778 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
779 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
781 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
783 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
785 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
786 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
787 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
788 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
790 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
791 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
792 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
794 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
795 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
796 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
798 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
799 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
800 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
801 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
803 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
805 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
808 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
809 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
810 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
811 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
813 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
814 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
816 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
817 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
818 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
819 /// unblock the state machine.
821 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
822 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
823 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
825 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
826 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
827 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
829 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
830 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
831 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
832 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
833 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
834 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
835 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
836 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
838 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
839 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
841 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
842 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
843 // the channel's funding UTXO.
845 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
846 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
847 // associated channel mapping.
849 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
850 // to store all of them.
851 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
853 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
854 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
855 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
856 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
857 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
859 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
860 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
863 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
865 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
866 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
867 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
869 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
870 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
871 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
874 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
875 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
876 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
877 self.update_time_counter
880 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
881 self.latest_monitor_update_id
884 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
885 self.config.announced_channel
888 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
889 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
892 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
893 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
894 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
895 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
898 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
899 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
900 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
903 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
904 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
905 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
906 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
907 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
910 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
911 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
912 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
913 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
914 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
919 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
923 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
925 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
926 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
927 self.temporary_channel_id
930 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
934 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
935 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
936 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
940 /// Gets the channel's type
941 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
945 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
946 /// is_usable() returns true).
947 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
948 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
949 self.short_channel_id
952 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
953 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
954 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
957 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
958 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
959 self.outbound_scid_alias
962 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
963 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
964 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
965 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
966 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
969 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
970 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
971 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
972 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
975 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
976 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
977 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
980 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
981 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
982 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
983 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
987 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
990 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
991 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
994 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
995 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
998 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
999 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1000 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1003 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1004 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1007 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1008 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1009 self.counterparty_node_id
1012 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1013 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1014 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1017 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1018 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1019 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1022 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1023 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1025 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1026 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1027 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1028 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1030 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1034 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1035 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1036 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1039 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1040 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1041 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1044 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1045 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1046 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1048 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1049 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1054 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1055 self.channel_value_satoshis
1058 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1059 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1062 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1063 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1066 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1067 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1070 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1071 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1072 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1075 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1076 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1077 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1080 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1081 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1082 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1085 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1086 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1087 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1090 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1091 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1092 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1095 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1096 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1097 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1100 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1101 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1102 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1103 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1104 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1107 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1109 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1110 self.prev_config = None;
1114 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1115 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1119 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1120 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1121 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1122 let did_channel_update =
1123 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1124 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1125 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1126 if did_channel_update {
1127 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1128 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1129 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1130 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1132 self.config.options = *config;
1136 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1137 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1138 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1141 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1142 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1143 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1144 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1145 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1147 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1148 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1149 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1150 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1151 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1152 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1153 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1155 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1156 where L::Target: Logger
1158 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1159 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1160 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1162 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1163 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1164 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1165 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1167 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1168 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1169 if match update_state {
1170 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1171 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1172 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1173 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1174 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1176 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1180 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1181 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1182 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1183 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1185 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1186 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1187 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1189 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1190 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1191 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1192 transaction_output_index: None
1197 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1198 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1199 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1200 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1201 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1204 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1206 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1207 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1208 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1210 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1211 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1214 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1215 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1218 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1220 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1221 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1222 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1224 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1225 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1231 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1232 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1233 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1234 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1235 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1236 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1237 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1241 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1242 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1244 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1246 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1247 if generated_by_local {
1248 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1249 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1258 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1260 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1261 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1262 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1263 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1264 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1265 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1266 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1269 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1270 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1271 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1272 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1276 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1277 preimages.push(preimage);
1281 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1282 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1284 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1286 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1287 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1289 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1290 if !generated_by_local {
1291 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1299 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1300 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1301 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1302 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1303 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1304 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1305 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1306 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1308 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1310 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1311 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1312 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1313 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1315 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1317 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1318 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1319 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1320 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1323 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1324 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1325 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1326 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1328 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1331 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1332 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1333 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1334 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1336 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1339 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1340 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1345 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1346 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1351 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1353 let channel_parameters =
1354 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1355 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1356 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1363 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1366 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1367 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1368 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1369 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1371 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1372 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1373 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1381 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1382 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1388 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1389 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1390 /// our counterparty!)
1391 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1392 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1393 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1394 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1395 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1396 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1397 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1399 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1403 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1404 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1405 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1406 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1407 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1408 //may see payments to it!
1409 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1410 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1411 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1413 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1416 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1417 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1418 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1419 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1420 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1423 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1424 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1427 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1431 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1432 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1433 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1434 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1435 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1436 // which are near the dust limit.
1437 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1438 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1439 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1440 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1441 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1443 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1444 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1446 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1449 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1450 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1451 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1454 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1455 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1457 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1458 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1459 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1460 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1461 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1462 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1463 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1466 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1469 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1470 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1471 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1473 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1474 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1475 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1476 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1477 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1478 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1480 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1481 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1487 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1488 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1490 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1491 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1492 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1493 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1494 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1495 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1496 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1499 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1502 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1503 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1504 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1506 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1507 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1508 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1509 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1510 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1511 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1513 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1514 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1518 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1519 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1520 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1521 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1522 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1523 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1524 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1526 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1527 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1529 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1536 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1537 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1538 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1539 /// corner case properly.
1540 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1541 let context = &self;
1542 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1543 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1544 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1546 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1547 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1548 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1549 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1552 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1554 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1555 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1557 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1559 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1561 if context.is_outbound() {
1562 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1563 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1565 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1566 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1568 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1569 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1570 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1571 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1574 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1575 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1576 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1577 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1579 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1580 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1581 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1582 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1583 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1584 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1585 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1586 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1587 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1588 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1590 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1593 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1594 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1595 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1596 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1597 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1600 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1601 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1603 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1604 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1605 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1607 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1608 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1609 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1610 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1614 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1616 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1617 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1618 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1619 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1620 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1621 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1623 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1624 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1626 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1627 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1628 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1630 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1631 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1632 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1633 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1634 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1637 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1638 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1639 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1640 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1641 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1642 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1645 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1646 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1647 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1649 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1653 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1654 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1656 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1657 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1661 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1662 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1663 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1664 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1666 outbound_capacity_msat,
1667 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1668 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1673 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1674 let context = &self;
1675 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1678 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1679 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1681 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1682 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1684 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1685 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1687 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1688 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1689 let context = &self;
1690 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1692 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1695 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1696 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1698 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1699 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1701 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1702 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1704 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1705 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1709 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1710 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1716 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1717 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1718 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1721 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1722 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1723 included_htlcs += 1;
1726 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1727 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1731 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1732 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1733 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1734 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1735 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1736 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1741 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1743 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1744 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1749 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1750 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1754 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1755 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1756 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1759 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1760 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1762 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1763 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1764 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1766 total_pending_htlcs,
1767 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1768 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1769 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1771 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1772 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1773 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1775 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1777 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1782 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1783 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1785 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1786 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1788 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1789 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1791 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1792 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1793 let context = &self;
1794 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1796 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1799 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1800 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1802 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1803 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1805 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1806 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1808 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1809 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1813 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1814 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1820 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1821 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1822 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1823 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1824 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1825 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1828 included_htlcs += 1;
1831 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1832 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1835 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1836 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1838 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1839 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1840 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1845 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1846 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1847 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1850 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1851 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1853 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1854 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1856 total_pending_htlcs,
1857 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1858 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1859 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1861 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1862 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1863 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1865 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1867 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1872 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1873 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1874 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1875 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1881 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1882 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1883 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1884 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1885 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1886 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1887 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1888 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1889 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1890 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1891 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1893 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1894 // return them to fail the payment.
1895 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1896 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1897 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1899 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1900 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1905 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1906 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1907 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1908 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1909 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1910 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1911 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1912 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1913 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1914 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1915 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1916 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1917 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1922 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1923 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1924 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1928 // Internal utility functions for channels
1930 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1931 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1932 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1934 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1936 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1937 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1938 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1940 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1943 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1945 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1948 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1949 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1950 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1952 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1954 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1955 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1956 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1957 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1958 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1961 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1962 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1963 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1964 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1965 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1966 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1967 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1970 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1971 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1973 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1974 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1977 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1978 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1979 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1980 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1981 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1982 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1985 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1986 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1987 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1990 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1991 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1992 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
1993 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
1996 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1997 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1999 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2000 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2001 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2005 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2006 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2007 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2008 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2010 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2011 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2012 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2013 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2014 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2015 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2016 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2019 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2020 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2021 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2022 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2023 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2024 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2025 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2026 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2028 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2029 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2039 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2040 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2041 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2042 // outside of those situations will fail.
2043 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2047 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2052 1 + // script length (0)
2056 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2057 2 + // witness marker and flag
2058 1 + // witness element count
2059 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2060 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2061 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2062 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2063 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2064 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2066 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2067 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2068 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2074 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2075 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2076 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2077 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2079 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2080 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2081 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2083 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2084 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2085 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2086 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2087 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2088 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2091 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2092 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2095 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2096 value_to_holder = 0;
2099 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2100 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2101 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2102 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2104 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2105 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2108 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2109 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2112 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2115 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2116 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2118 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2120 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2121 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2122 where L::Target: Logger {
2123 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2124 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2125 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2126 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2127 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2128 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2129 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2130 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2134 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2135 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2136 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2137 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2139 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2140 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2142 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2144 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2146 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2147 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2148 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2150 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2151 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2152 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2153 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2154 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2156 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2157 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2158 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2160 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2161 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2163 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2166 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2167 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2171 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2175 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2176 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2177 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2178 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2179 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2180 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2183 // Now update local state:
2185 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2186 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2187 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2188 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2189 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2190 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2191 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2195 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2196 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2197 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2198 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2199 // do not not get into this branch.
2200 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2201 match pending_update {
2202 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2203 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2204 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2205 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2206 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2207 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2208 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2211 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2212 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2213 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2214 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2215 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2216 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2217 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2223 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2224 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2225 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2227 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2228 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2229 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2231 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2232 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2235 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2236 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2238 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2239 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2241 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2242 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2245 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2248 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2249 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2250 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2251 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2256 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2257 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2258 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2259 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2260 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2261 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2262 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2263 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2264 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2265 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2266 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2267 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2268 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2269 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2270 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2272 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2273 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2274 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2275 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2276 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2279 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2280 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2281 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2287 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2288 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2290 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2294 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2295 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2296 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2297 /// before we fail backwards.
2299 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2300 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2301 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2302 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2303 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2304 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2305 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2308 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2309 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2310 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2311 /// before we fail backwards.
2313 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2314 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2315 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2316 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2317 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2318 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2319 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2321 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2323 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2324 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2325 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2327 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2328 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2329 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2331 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2332 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2333 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2335 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2340 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2341 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2347 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2348 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2349 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2350 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2351 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2355 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2356 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2357 force_holding_cell = true;
2360 // Now update local state:
2361 if force_holding_cell {
2362 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2363 match pending_update {
2364 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2365 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2366 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2367 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2371 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2372 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2373 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2374 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2380 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2381 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2382 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2388 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2390 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2391 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2394 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2395 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2396 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2401 // Message handlers:
2403 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2404 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2405 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2406 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2407 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2409 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2412 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2415 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2418 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2419 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2420 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2421 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2424 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2426 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2427 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2428 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2429 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2431 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2432 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2434 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2435 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2437 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2438 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2439 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2440 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2441 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2446 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2447 initial_commitment_tx,
2450 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2451 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2454 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2455 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2458 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2459 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2460 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2461 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2462 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2463 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2464 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2465 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2466 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2467 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2468 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2469 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2471 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2473 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2475 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2476 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2477 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2478 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2480 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2482 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2483 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2487 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2488 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2490 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2491 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2492 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2493 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2495 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2498 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2499 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2500 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2503 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2504 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2505 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2506 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2507 // when routing outbound payments.
2508 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2512 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2514 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2515 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2516 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2517 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2518 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2519 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2520 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2521 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2522 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2524 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2525 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2526 let expected_point =
2527 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2528 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2530 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2531 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2532 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2533 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2534 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2535 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2537 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2538 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2539 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2540 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2541 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2543 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2548 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2551 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2552 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2554 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2556 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2559 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2560 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2561 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2562 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2563 if local_sent_shutdown {
2564 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2566 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2567 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2568 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2569 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2571 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2574 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2577 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2580 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2581 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2584 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2585 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2586 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2587 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2589 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2590 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2592 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2593 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2594 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2595 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2596 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2597 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2598 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2599 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2600 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2601 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2602 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2604 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2605 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2606 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2607 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2608 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2609 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2613 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2616 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2617 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2618 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2620 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2621 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2622 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2623 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2624 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2625 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2626 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2630 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2631 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2632 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2633 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2634 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2635 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2636 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2640 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2641 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2642 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2643 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2644 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2645 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2648 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2649 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2650 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2651 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2652 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2654 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2655 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2658 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2659 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2662 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2663 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2664 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2665 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2666 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2667 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2668 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2669 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2670 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2671 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2672 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2673 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2674 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2675 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2676 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2677 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2680 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2681 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2682 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2683 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2687 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2690 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2691 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2694 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2695 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2696 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2700 // Now update local state:
2701 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2702 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2703 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2704 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2705 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2706 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2707 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2712 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2714 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2715 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2716 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2717 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2718 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2719 None => fail_reason.into(),
2720 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2721 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2722 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2723 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2725 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2729 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2730 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2731 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2732 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2734 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2735 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2740 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2743 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2744 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2747 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2751 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2754 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2755 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2756 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2758 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2762 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2766 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2767 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2770 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2774 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2778 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2779 where L::Target: Logger
2781 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2784 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2787 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2788 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2791 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2793 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2795 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2796 let commitment_txid = {
2797 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2798 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2799 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2801 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2802 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2803 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2804 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2805 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2806 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2810 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2812 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2813 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2814 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2815 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2818 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2819 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2820 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2821 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2824 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2826 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2827 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2828 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2829 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2830 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2831 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2832 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2833 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2834 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2835 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2836 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2842 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2843 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2846 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2847 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2848 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2849 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2850 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2851 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2852 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2853 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2854 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2855 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2856 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2857 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2858 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2861 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2862 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2863 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2864 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2865 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2866 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2867 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2869 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2870 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2871 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2872 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2873 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2874 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2875 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2878 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2879 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2882 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2884 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2885 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2886 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2889 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2892 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2893 commitment_stats.tx,
2895 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2896 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2897 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2900 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2901 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2903 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2904 let mut need_commitment = false;
2905 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2906 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2907 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2908 need_commitment = true;
2912 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2913 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2914 Some(forward_info.clone())
2916 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2917 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2918 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2919 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2920 need_commitment = true;
2923 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2924 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2925 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2926 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2927 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2928 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2929 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2930 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2931 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2932 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2933 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2934 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2935 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2936 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2938 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2940 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2941 need_commitment = true;
2945 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2946 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2947 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2948 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2949 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2950 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2952 nondust_htlc_sources,
2956 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2957 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2958 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2959 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2961 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2962 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2963 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2964 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2965 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2966 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2967 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2968 // includes the right HTLCs.
2969 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2970 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2971 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2972 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2973 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2974 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2976 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2977 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2978 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
2981 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2982 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2983 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2984 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2985 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2986 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2987 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2988 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2989 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2993 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2994 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2995 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2996 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
2999 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3000 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3001 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3002 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3003 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3004 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3005 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3006 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3009 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3010 /// for our counterparty.
3011 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3012 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3013 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3014 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3015 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3017 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3018 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3019 updates: Vec::new(),
3022 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3023 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3024 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3025 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3026 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3027 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3028 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3029 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3030 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3031 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3032 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3033 // to rebalance channels.
3034 match &htlc_update {
3035 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3036 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3037 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3039 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3040 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
3042 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3045 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3046 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3047 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3048 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3049 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3050 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3051 // into the holding cell without ever being
3052 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3053 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3054 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3057 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3063 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3064 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3065 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3066 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3067 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3068 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3069 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3070 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3071 (msg, monitor_update)
3072 } else { unreachable!() };
3073 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3074 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3076 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3077 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3078 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3079 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3080 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3081 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3082 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3083 // for a full revocation before failing.
3084 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3087 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3089 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3096 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3097 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3099 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3100 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3105 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3106 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3107 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3108 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3109 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3111 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3112 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3113 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3115 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3116 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3122 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3123 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3124 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3125 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3126 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3127 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3128 where L::Target: Logger,
3130 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3133 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3136 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3140 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3142 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3143 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3148 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3149 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3150 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3151 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3152 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3153 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3154 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3155 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3159 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3161 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3162 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3165 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3166 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3168 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3170 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3171 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3172 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3173 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3174 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3175 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3176 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3177 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3181 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3182 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3183 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3184 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3185 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3186 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3187 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3188 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3189 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3191 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3192 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3195 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3196 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3197 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3198 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3199 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3200 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3201 let mut require_commitment = false;
3202 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3205 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3206 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3207 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3209 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3210 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3211 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3212 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3213 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3214 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3219 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3220 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3221 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3222 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3223 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3225 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3226 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3227 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3232 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3233 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3235 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3239 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3240 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3242 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3243 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3244 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3245 require_commitment = true;
3246 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3247 match forward_info {
3248 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3249 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3250 require_commitment = true;
3252 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3253 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3254 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3256 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3257 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3258 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3262 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3263 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3264 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3265 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3271 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3272 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3273 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3274 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3276 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3277 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3278 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3279 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3280 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3281 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3282 require_commitment = true;
3286 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3288 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3289 match update_state {
3290 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3291 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3292 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3293 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3294 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3296 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3297 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3298 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3299 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3300 require_commitment = true;
3301 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3302 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3307 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3308 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3309 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3310 if require_commitment {
3311 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3312 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3313 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3314 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3315 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3316 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3317 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3318 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3319 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3321 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3322 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3323 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3324 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3325 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3328 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3329 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3330 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3331 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3332 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3333 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3335 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3336 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3338 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3339 if require_commitment {
3340 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3342 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3343 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3344 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3345 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3347 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3348 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3349 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3350 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3352 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3353 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3354 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3360 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3361 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3362 /// commitment update.
3363 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3364 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3365 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3368 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3369 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3370 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3371 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3373 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3374 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3375 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3376 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3377 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3379 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3380 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3382 if !self.context.is_live() {
3383 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3386 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3387 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3388 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3389 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3390 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3391 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3392 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3393 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3394 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3395 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3399 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3400 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3401 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3402 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3403 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3406 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3407 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3411 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3412 force_holding_cell = true;
3415 if force_holding_cell {
3416 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3420 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3421 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3423 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3424 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3429 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3430 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3432 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3434 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3435 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3436 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3437 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3441 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3442 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3443 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3447 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3448 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3451 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3452 // will be retransmitted.
3453 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3454 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3455 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3457 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3458 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3460 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3461 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3462 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3463 // this HTLC accordingly
3464 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3467 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3468 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3469 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3470 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3473 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3474 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3475 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3476 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3477 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3478 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3483 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3485 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3486 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3487 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3488 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3492 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3493 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3494 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3495 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3496 // the update upon reconnection.
3497 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3501 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3503 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3504 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3507 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3508 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3509 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3510 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3511 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3512 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3513 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3515 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3516 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3517 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3518 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3519 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3520 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3521 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3523 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3524 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3525 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3526 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3527 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3528 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3529 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3532 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3533 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3534 /// to the remote side.
3535 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3536 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3537 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3538 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3541 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3543 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3544 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3546 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3547 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3548 // first received the funding_signed.
3549 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3550 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3551 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3553 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3554 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3555 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3556 funding_broadcastable = None;
3559 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3560 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3561 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3562 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3563 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3564 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3565 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3566 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3567 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3568 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3569 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3570 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3571 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3572 next_per_commitment_point,
3573 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3577 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3579 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3580 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3581 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3582 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3583 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3584 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3586 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3587 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3588 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3589 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3590 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3591 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3595 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3596 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3598 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3599 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3600 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3603 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3604 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3605 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3606 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3607 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3608 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3609 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3610 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3611 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3615 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3616 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3618 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3619 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3621 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3624 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3625 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3627 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3628 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3629 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3630 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3631 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3632 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3633 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3634 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3635 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3636 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3637 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3638 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3639 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3641 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3642 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3643 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3649 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3650 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3651 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3652 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3653 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3654 per_commitment_secret,
3655 next_per_commitment_point,
3657 next_local_nonce: None,
3661 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3662 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3663 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3664 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3665 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3667 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3668 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3669 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3670 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3671 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3672 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3673 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3674 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3675 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3676 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3681 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3682 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3684 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3685 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3686 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3687 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3688 reason: err_packet.clone()
3691 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3692 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3693 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3694 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3695 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3696 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3699 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3700 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3701 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3702 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3703 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3710 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3711 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3712 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3713 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3717 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3718 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3719 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3720 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3721 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3722 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3726 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3727 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3729 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3730 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3731 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3732 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3733 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3734 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3735 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3736 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3739 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3741 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3742 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3743 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3744 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3748 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3749 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3750 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3753 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3754 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3755 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3756 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3757 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3758 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3760 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3761 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3762 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3763 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3764 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3767 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3768 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3769 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3770 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3771 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3772 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3773 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3774 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3778 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3779 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3780 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3781 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3783 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3787 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3788 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3789 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3790 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3792 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3793 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3794 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3795 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3796 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3800 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3802 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3803 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3804 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3805 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3806 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3807 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3809 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3810 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3811 channel_ready: None,
3812 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3813 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3814 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3818 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3819 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3820 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3821 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3822 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3823 next_per_commitment_point,
3824 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3826 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3827 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3828 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3832 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3833 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3834 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3836 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3837 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3838 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3841 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3847 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3848 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3849 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3850 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3851 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3852 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3853 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3855 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3857 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3858 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3859 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3860 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3861 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3862 next_per_commitment_point,
3863 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3867 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3868 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3869 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3871 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3874 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3875 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3876 raa: required_revoke,
3877 commitment_update: None,
3878 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3880 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3881 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3882 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3884 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3887 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3888 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3889 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3890 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3891 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3892 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3895 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3896 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3897 raa: required_revoke,
3898 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3899 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3903 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3907 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3908 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3909 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3910 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3912 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3914 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3916 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3917 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3918 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3919 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3920 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3921 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3923 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3924 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3925 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3926 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3927 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3929 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3930 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3931 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3932 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3935 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3936 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3937 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3938 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3939 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3940 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3941 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3942 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3943 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3944 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3945 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3946 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3947 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3948 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3949 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3951 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3954 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3955 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3958 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3959 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3960 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3961 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3962 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3963 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3964 self.context.channel_state &
3965 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3966 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3967 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3968 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3971 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3972 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3973 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3974 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3975 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3976 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
3977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3979 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
3985 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3986 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3987 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3988 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3990 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3991 return Ok((None, None));
3994 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3995 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
3996 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
3998 return Ok((None, None));
4001 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4003 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4004 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4005 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4006 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4008 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4009 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4010 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4012 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4013 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4014 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4015 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4017 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4018 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4019 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4024 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4025 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4027 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4028 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4031 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4032 /// within our expected timeframe.
4034 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4035 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4036 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4039 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4042 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4043 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4046 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4047 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4048 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4049 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4051 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4054 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4055 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4056 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4057 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4060 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4061 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4065 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4067 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4068 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4071 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4072 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4073 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4076 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4079 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4080 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4081 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4082 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4084 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4087 assert!(send_shutdown);
4088 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4089 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4090 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4092 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4093 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4095 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4100 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4102 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4103 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4105 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4106 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4107 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4108 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4109 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4110 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4113 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4114 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4116 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4117 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4118 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4119 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4123 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4124 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4125 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4126 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4127 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4128 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4130 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4131 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4138 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4139 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4141 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4144 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4145 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4147 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4149 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4150 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4151 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4152 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4153 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4154 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4155 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4156 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4157 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4159 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4160 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4163 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4167 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4168 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4169 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4170 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4172 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4173 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4175 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4178 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4181 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4185 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4189 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4190 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4191 return Ok((None, None));
4194 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4195 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4196 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4199 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4201 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4204 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4205 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4206 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4207 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4208 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4212 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4213 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4218 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4219 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4220 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4221 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4222 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4223 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4224 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4228 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4230 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4231 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4232 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4233 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4235 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4238 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4239 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4240 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4242 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4243 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4244 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4245 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4249 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4250 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4251 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4252 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4254 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4255 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4256 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4262 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4263 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4266 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4267 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4269 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4270 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4273 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4274 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4275 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4276 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4277 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4279 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4281 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4283 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4284 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4287 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4288 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4289 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4290 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4291 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4292 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4293 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4294 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4299 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4300 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4301 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4302 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4308 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4309 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4310 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4311 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4313 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4319 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4320 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4321 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4322 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4323 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4324 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4325 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4327 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4328 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4331 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4333 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4334 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4340 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4341 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4342 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4343 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4344 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4345 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4346 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4348 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4349 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4356 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4357 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4360 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4361 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4364 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4365 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4369 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4370 &self.context.holder_signer
4374 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4376 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4377 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4378 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4379 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4380 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4381 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4383 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4385 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4393 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4394 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4398 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4399 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4400 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4401 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4404 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4405 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4406 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4407 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4410 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4411 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4412 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4413 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4414 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4415 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4418 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4419 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4420 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4421 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4422 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4423 if !release_monitor {
4424 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4433 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4434 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4437 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4438 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4439 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4441 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4442 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4443 if self.context.channel_state &
4444 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4445 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4446 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4447 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4448 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4451 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4452 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4453 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4454 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4455 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4456 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4458 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4459 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4460 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4462 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4463 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4464 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4465 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4466 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4467 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4473 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4474 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4475 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4478 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4479 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4480 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4483 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4484 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4485 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4488 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4489 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4490 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4491 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4492 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4493 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4498 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4499 self.context.channel_update_status
4502 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4503 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4504 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4507 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4509 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4510 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4511 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4515 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4516 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4517 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4520 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4524 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4525 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4526 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4528 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4529 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4530 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4532 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4533 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4536 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4537 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4538 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4539 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4540 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4541 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4542 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4543 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4544 self.context.channel_state);
4546 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4550 if need_commitment_update {
4551 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4552 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4553 let next_per_commitment_point =
4554 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4555 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4556 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4557 next_per_commitment_point,
4558 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4562 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4568 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4569 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4570 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4571 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4572 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4573 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4574 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4576 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4579 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4580 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4581 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4582 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4583 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4584 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4585 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4586 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4587 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4588 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4589 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4590 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4591 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4592 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4593 // channel and move on.
4594 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4595 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4597 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4598 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4599 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4601 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4602 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4603 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4604 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4605 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4606 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4607 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4611 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4612 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4613 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4614 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4615 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4619 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4620 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4621 // may have already happened for this block).
4622 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4623 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4624 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4625 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4628 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4629 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4630 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4631 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4639 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4640 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4641 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4642 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4644 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4645 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4648 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4650 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4651 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4652 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4653 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4655 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4658 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4661 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4662 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4663 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4664 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4666 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4669 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4670 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4671 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4673 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4674 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4676 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4677 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4678 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4686 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4688 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4689 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4690 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4692 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4693 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4696 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4697 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4698 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4699 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4700 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4701 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4702 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4703 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4704 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4707 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4708 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4709 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4710 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4712 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4713 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4714 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4716 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4717 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4718 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4719 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4721 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4722 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4723 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4724 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4725 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4726 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4727 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4730 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4731 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4733 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4736 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4737 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4738 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4739 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4740 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4741 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4742 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4743 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4744 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4745 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4746 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4747 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4748 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4749 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4750 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4751 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4752 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4758 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4763 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4764 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4766 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4767 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4768 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4769 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4771 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4774 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4775 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4776 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4777 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4778 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4779 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4781 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4782 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4785 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4786 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4787 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4788 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4790 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4791 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4793 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4794 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4795 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4796 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4797 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4798 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4804 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4805 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4806 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4807 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4809 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4812 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4816 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4820 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4821 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4825 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4829 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4830 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4833 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4837 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4839 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4844 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4846 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4851 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4853 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4854 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4855 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4856 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4857 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4861 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4863 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4864 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4865 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4866 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4867 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4868 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4869 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4871 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4872 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4873 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4874 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4875 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4876 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4877 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4878 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4879 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4880 contents: announcement,
4883 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4887 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4888 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4889 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4890 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4891 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4892 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4893 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4894 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4896 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4898 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4899 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4900 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4901 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4903 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4905 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4906 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4909 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4910 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4911 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4912 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4915 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4918 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4919 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4920 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4921 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4922 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4923 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4926 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4928 Err(_) => return None,
4930 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4931 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4936 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4937 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4938 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4939 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4940 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4941 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4942 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4943 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4944 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4945 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4946 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4947 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4948 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4949 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4950 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4951 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4954 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4957 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4958 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4959 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4960 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4961 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4962 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4963 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4964 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4965 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4967 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4968 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4969 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4970 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4971 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4972 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4973 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4974 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4975 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4977 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4978 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4979 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4980 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
4981 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
4982 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
4983 next_funding_txid: None,
4988 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4990 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4991 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4992 /// commitment update.
4994 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4995 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(
4996 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
4997 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
4998 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5000 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5001 skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
5002 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5004 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5005 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5010 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5011 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5013 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5015 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5016 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5018 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5019 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5020 /// regenerate them.
5022 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5023 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5025 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5026 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(
5027 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5028 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5029 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5030 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5031 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5032 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5034 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5035 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5036 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5039 if amount_msat == 0 {
5040 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5043 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5044 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5045 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5046 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5049 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5050 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5051 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5054 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5055 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5056 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5057 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5058 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5059 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5060 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5061 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5064 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5065 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5066 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5067 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5068 else { "to peer" });
5070 if need_holding_cell {
5071 force_holding_cell = true;
5074 // Now update local state:
5075 if force_holding_cell {
5076 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5081 onion_routing_packet,
5087 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5088 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5090 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5092 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5097 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5098 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5099 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5103 onion_routing_packet,
5106 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5111 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5112 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5113 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5114 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5116 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5117 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5118 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5120 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5121 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5125 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5126 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5127 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5128 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5129 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5130 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5131 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5134 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5135 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5136 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5137 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5138 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5139 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5142 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5144 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5145 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5146 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5148 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5149 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5152 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5153 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5154 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5155 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5156 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5157 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5158 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5159 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5162 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5166 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5167 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5168 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5169 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5171 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5173 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5174 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5175 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5176 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5177 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5178 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5179 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5180 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5181 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5182 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5183 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5189 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5192 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5193 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5194 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5195 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5196 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5197 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5199 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5200 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5201 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5202 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5205 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5206 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5210 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5211 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5213 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5215 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5216 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5217 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5218 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5220 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5221 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5222 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5223 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5224 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5225 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5229 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5230 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5234 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5235 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5238 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5239 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5241 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5242 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5243 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(
5244 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5245 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5246 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5247 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5248 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger);
5249 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5252 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5253 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5254 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5260 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5261 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5264 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5265 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5266 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5267 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5273 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5274 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5276 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5277 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5278 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5279 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5280 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5281 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5282 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5283 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5284 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5287 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5288 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5289 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5291 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5292 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5295 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5296 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5298 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5299 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5300 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5303 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5304 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5305 let mut chan_closed = false;
5306 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5310 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5312 None if !chan_closed => {
5313 // use override shutdown script if provided
5314 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5315 Some(script) => script,
5317 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5318 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5319 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5320 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5324 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5325 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5327 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5333 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5334 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5335 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5336 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5338 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5340 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5342 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5343 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5344 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5345 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5346 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5347 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5350 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5351 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5353 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5354 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5355 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5358 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5359 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5360 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5361 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5362 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5364 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5365 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5372 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5373 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5375 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5378 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5379 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5380 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5382 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5383 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5387 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5391 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5392 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5393 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5396 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5397 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5398 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5399 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5400 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5401 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5402 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5403 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5404 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5406 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5407 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5408 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5409 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5411 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5412 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5414 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5415 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5417 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5418 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5419 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5421 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5422 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5424 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5425 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5426 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5427 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5428 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5431 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5432 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5434 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5436 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5437 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5438 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5439 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5442 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5443 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5445 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5446 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5447 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5448 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5452 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5453 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5454 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5458 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5459 Ok(script) => script,
5460 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5463 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5466 context: ChannelContext {
5469 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5470 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5471 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5472 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5477 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5479 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5480 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5481 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5482 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5484 channel_value_satoshis,
5486 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5489 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5492 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5493 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5496 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5497 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5498 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5499 pending_update_fee: None,
5500 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5501 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5502 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5503 update_time_counter: 1,
5505 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5507 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5508 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5509 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5510 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5511 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5512 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5514 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5515 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5517 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5519 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5520 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5521 closing_fee_limits: None,
5522 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5524 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5526 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5527 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5528 short_channel_id: None,
5529 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5531 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5532 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5533 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5534 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5535 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5536 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5537 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5538 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5539 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5540 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5541 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5542 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5544 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5546 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5547 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5548 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5549 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5550 counterparty_parameters: None,
5551 funding_outpoint: None,
5552 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5554 funding_transaction: None,
5556 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5557 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5558 counterparty_node_id,
5560 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5562 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5564 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5565 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5567 announcement_sigs: None,
5569 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5570 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5571 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5572 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5574 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5575 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5577 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5578 outbound_scid_alias,
5580 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5581 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5583 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5584 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5589 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5594 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5595 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5596 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5597 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5598 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5599 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5602 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5603 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5604 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5605 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5606 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5607 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5608 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5609 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5610 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5611 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5612 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5614 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5615 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5617 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5618 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5619 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5620 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5623 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5624 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5626 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5629 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5630 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5631 return Err((self, e));
5635 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5637 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5639 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5640 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5641 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5643 let channel = Channel {
5644 context: self.context,
5647 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5648 temporary_channel_id,
5649 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5650 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5653 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5655 next_local_nonce: None,
5659 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5660 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5661 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5662 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5663 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5664 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5665 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5666 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5667 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5668 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5671 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5672 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5673 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5674 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5675 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5676 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5682 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5683 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5684 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5685 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5686 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5687 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5688 // We've exhausted our options
5691 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5692 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5695 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5696 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5697 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5698 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5700 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5701 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5702 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5703 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5704 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5706 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5708 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5709 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5712 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5713 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5714 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5716 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5717 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5720 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5721 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5724 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5725 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5729 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5730 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5731 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5732 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5733 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5734 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5735 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5736 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5737 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5738 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5739 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5740 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5741 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5742 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5743 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5744 first_per_commitment_point,
5745 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5746 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5747 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5748 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5750 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5755 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5756 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5758 // Check sanity of message fields:
5759 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5762 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5765 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5766 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5768 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5769 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5771 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5772 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5774 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5775 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5776 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5778 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5779 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5780 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5782 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5783 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5784 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5786 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5787 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5789 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5790 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5793 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5794 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5795 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5797 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5798 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5800 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5801 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5803 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5804 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5806 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5807 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5809 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5810 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5812 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5816 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5817 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5818 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5820 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5821 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5823 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5824 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5825 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5827 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5828 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5831 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5832 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5833 &Some(ref script) => {
5834 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5835 if script.len() == 0 {
5838 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5839 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5841 Some(script.clone())
5844 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5851 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5852 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5853 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5854 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5855 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5857 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5858 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5860 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5863 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5864 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5865 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5866 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5867 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5868 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5871 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5872 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5873 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5876 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5877 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5879 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5880 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5886 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5887 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5888 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5891 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5892 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5893 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5894 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5895 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5896 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5897 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5898 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5899 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5900 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5901 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5905 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5907 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5908 // support this channel type.
5909 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5910 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5914 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5915 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5916 // `static_remote_key`.
5917 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5918 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5920 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5921 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5924 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5927 channel_type.clone()
5929 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5930 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5936 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5937 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5938 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5939 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5940 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5941 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5942 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5943 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5944 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5947 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5948 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
5951 // Check sanity of message fields:
5952 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
5953 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5955 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5956 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
5958 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5961 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5962 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
5963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5965 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
5966 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
5968 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5971 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
5973 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5974 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
5975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
5977 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5980 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5984 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5985 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
5986 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
5988 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5989 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5991 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5994 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5995 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5997 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5998 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6000 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6001 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6003 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6007 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6009 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6010 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6015 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6016 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6017 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6018 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6021 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6024 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6025 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6026 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6028 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6032 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6033 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6034 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6035 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6036 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6040 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6041 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6042 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6043 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6044 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6047 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6048 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6049 &Some(ref script) => {
6050 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6051 if script.len() == 0 {
6054 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6055 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6057 Some(script.clone())
6060 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6067 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6068 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6069 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6070 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6074 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6075 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6080 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6081 Ok(script) => script,
6082 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6085 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6086 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6089 context: ChannelContext {
6092 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6093 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6095 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6100 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6102 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6103 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6104 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6105 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6108 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6111 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6114 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6115 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6116 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6118 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6119 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6120 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6121 pending_update_fee: None,
6122 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6123 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6124 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6125 update_time_counter: 1,
6127 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6129 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6130 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6131 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6132 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6133 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6134 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6136 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6137 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6138 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6139 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6141 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6142 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6143 closing_fee_limits: None,
6144 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6146 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6148 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6149 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6150 short_channel_id: None,
6151 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6153 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6154 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6155 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6156 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6157 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6158 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6159 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6160 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6161 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6162 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6163 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6164 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6165 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6167 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6169 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6170 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6171 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6172 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6173 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6174 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6175 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6177 funding_outpoint: None,
6178 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6180 funding_transaction: None,
6182 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6183 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6184 counterparty_node_id,
6186 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6188 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6190 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6191 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6193 announcement_sigs: None,
6195 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6196 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6197 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6198 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6200 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6201 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6203 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6204 outbound_scid_alias,
6206 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6207 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6209 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6210 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6215 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6222 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6223 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6226 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6227 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6228 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6229 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6232 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6233 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6235 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6236 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6237 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6238 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6240 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6241 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6243 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6244 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6246 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6247 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6250 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6251 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6253 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6256 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6257 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6258 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6260 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6261 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6262 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6263 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6265 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6266 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6267 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6268 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6269 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6270 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6271 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6272 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6273 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6274 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6275 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6276 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6277 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6278 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6279 first_per_commitment_point,
6280 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6281 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6282 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6284 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6286 next_local_nonce: None,
6290 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6291 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6293 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6295 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6296 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6299 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6300 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6302 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6303 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6305 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6306 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6307 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6308 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6309 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6310 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6311 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6312 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6313 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6316 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6317 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6319 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6320 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6321 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6322 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6324 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6325 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6327 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6328 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6331 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6332 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6333 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6335 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6338 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6339 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6341 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6342 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6343 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6345 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6347 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6348 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6350 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6351 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6352 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6353 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6356 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6357 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6358 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6359 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6360 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6362 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6364 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6365 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6366 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6369 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6370 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6371 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6375 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6376 initial_commitment_tx,
6379 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6380 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6383 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6384 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6387 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6389 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6390 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6391 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6392 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6393 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6394 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6395 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6396 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6397 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6398 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6399 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6401 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6403 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6405 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6406 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6407 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6408 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6410 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6412 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6413 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6414 let mut channel = Channel {
6415 context: self.context,
6417 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6418 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6419 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6421 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6425 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6426 }, channel_monitor))
6430 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6431 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6433 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6439 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6440 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6441 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6442 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6443 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6445 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6446 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6447 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6448 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6454 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6455 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6456 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6457 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6458 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6459 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6464 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6465 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6466 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6467 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6469 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6470 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6471 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6472 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6477 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6478 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6479 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6480 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6481 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6482 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6487 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6488 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6489 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6492 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6494 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6495 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6496 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6497 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6498 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6500 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6501 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6502 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6503 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6505 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6506 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6507 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6509 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6511 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6512 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6513 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6514 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6515 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6516 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6518 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6519 // deserialized from that format.
6520 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6521 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6522 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6524 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6526 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6527 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6528 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6530 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6531 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6532 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6533 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6536 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6537 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6538 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6541 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6542 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6543 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6544 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6546 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6547 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6549 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6551 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6553 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6555 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6558 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6560 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6565 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6566 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6568 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6569 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6570 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6571 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6572 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6573 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6574 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6576 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6578 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6580 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6583 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6584 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6585 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6588 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6590 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6591 preimages.push(preimage);
6593 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6594 reason.write(writer)?;
6596 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6598 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6599 preimages.push(preimage);
6601 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6602 reason.write(writer)?;
6605 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6606 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6607 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6609 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6610 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6611 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6615 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6616 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6617 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6619 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6620 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6624 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6625 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6626 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6627 source.write(writer)?;
6628 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6630 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6631 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6632 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6634 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6635 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6637 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6639 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6640 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6642 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6644 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6645 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6650 match self.context.resend_order {
6651 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6652 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6655 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6656 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6657 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6659 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6660 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6661 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6662 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6665 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6666 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6667 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6668 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6669 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6672 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6673 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6674 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6675 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6677 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6678 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6679 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6681 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6683 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6684 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6685 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6686 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6688 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6689 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6690 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6691 // consider the stale state on reload.
6694 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6695 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6696 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6698 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6699 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6700 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6702 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6703 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6705 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6706 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6707 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6709 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6710 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6712 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6715 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6716 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6717 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6719 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6722 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6723 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6725 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6726 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6727 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6729 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6731 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6733 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6735 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6736 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6737 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6738 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6739 htlc.write(writer)?;
6742 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6743 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6744 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6746 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6747 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6749 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6750 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6751 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6752 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6753 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6754 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6755 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6757 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6758 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6759 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6760 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6761 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6763 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6764 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6766 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6767 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6768 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6769 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6771 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6773 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6774 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6775 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6776 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6777 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6778 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6779 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6781 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6782 (2, chan_type, option),
6783 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6784 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6785 (5, self.context.config, required),
6786 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6787 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6788 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6789 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6790 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6791 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6792 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6793 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6794 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6795 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6796 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6797 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6798 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6799 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6800 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6801 (33, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6802 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6803 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6810 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6811 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6813 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6814 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6816 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6817 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6818 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6820 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6821 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6822 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6823 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6827 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6828 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6829 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6830 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6831 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6834 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6837 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6838 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6839 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6841 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6843 let mut keys_data = None;
6845 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6846 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6847 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6849 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6850 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6851 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6852 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6853 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6854 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6858 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6859 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6860 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6863 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6865 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6866 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6871 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6872 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6873 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6874 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6875 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6876 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6877 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6878 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6879 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6880 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6881 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6882 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6883 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6888 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6889 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6890 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6891 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6892 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6893 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6894 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6895 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6896 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6897 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6898 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6899 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6901 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6902 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6905 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6909 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6912 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6914 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6918 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6919 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6920 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6921 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6922 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6923 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6924 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6925 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6926 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6927 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6928 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6930 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6931 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6932 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6934 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6935 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6936 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6938 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6942 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6943 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6944 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6945 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6948 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6949 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6950 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6952 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6953 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6954 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6955 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6958 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6959 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6960 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6961 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6964 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6971 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6974 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6975 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6976 // consider the stale state on reload.
6977 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6980 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6981 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6984 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6987 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6988 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6991 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6992 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6996 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6997 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6999 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7000 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7002 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7004 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7008 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7009 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7011 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7012 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7017 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7018 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7019 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7020 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7022 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7025 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7028 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7030 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7031 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7033 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7036 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7038 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7039 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7040 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7042 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7043 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7044 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7048 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7049 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7050 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7052 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7058 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7059 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7060 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7061 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7062 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7063 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7064 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7065 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7066 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7067 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7069 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7070 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7071 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7072 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7073 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7074 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7075 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7077 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7078 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7079 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7080 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7082 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7084 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7085 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7087 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7088 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7089 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7090 (2, channel_type, option),
7091 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7092 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7093 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7094 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7095 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7096 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7097 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7098 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7099 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7100 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7101 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7102 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7103 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7104 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7105 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7106 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7107 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7108 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7109 (33, blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7110 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7111 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7114 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7115 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7116 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7117 // required channel parameters.
7118 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7119 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7120 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7122 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7124 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7125 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7126 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7127 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7130 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7131 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7132 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7134 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7135 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7137 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7138 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7143 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7144 if iter.next().is_some() {
7145 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7149 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7150 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7151 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7152 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7153 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7156 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7157 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7158 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7160 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7161 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7163 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7164 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7165 // separate u64 values.
7166 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7168 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7170 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7171 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7172 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7173 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7175 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7176 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7178 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7179 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7180 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7181 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7182 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7185 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7186 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7190 context: ChannelContext {
7193 config: config.unwrap(),
7197 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7198 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7199 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7202 temporary_channel_id,
7204 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7206 channel_value_satoshis,
7208 latest_monitor_update_id,
7211 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7214 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7215 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7218 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7219 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7220 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7221 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7225 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7226 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7227 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7228 monitor_pending_forwards,
7229 monitor_pending_failures,
7230 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7233 holding_cell_update_fee,
7234 next_holder_htlc_id,
7235 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7236 update_time_counter,
7239 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7240 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7241 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7242 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7244 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7245 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7246 closing_fee_limits: None,
7247 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7249 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7251 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7252 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7254 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7256 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7257 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7258 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7259 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7260 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7261 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7262 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7263 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7264 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7267 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7269 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7270 funding_transaction,
7272 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7273 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7274 counterparty_node_id,
7276 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7280 channel_update_status,
7281 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7285 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7286 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7287 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7288 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7290 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7291 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7293 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7294 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7295 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7297 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7298 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7300 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7301 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7303 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7306 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7315 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7316 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7317 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7318 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7319 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7321 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7322 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7323 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7324 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7325 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7326 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7327 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7328 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7329 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7330 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7331 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7332 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7333 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7334 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7335 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7336 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7337 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7338 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7339 use crate::util::test_utils;
7340 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7341 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7342 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7343 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7344 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7345 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7346 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7347 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7348 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7349 use crate::prelude::*;
7351 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7354 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7355 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7361 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7362 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7363 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7364 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7368 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7369 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7370 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7371 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7372 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7373 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7374 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7378 signer: InMemorySigner,
7381 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7382 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7385 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7386 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7388 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7389 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7392 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7396 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7398 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7399 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7400 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7401 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7402 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7405 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7406 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7407 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7408 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7412 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7413 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7414 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7418 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7419 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7420 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7421 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7423 let seed = [42; 32];
7424 let network = Network::Testnet;
7425 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7426 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7427 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7430 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7431 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7432 let config = UserConfig::default();
7433 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7434 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7435 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7437 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7438 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7442 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7443 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7445 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7446 let original_fee = 253;
7447 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7448 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7449 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7450 let seed = [42; 32];
7451 let network = Network::Testnet;
7452 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7454 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7455 let config = UserConfig::default();
7456 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7458 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7459 // same as the old fee.
7460 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7461 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7462 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7466 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7467 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7468 // dust limits are used.
7469 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7470 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7471 let seed = [42; 32];
7472 let network = Network::Testnet;
7473 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7474 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7475 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7477 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7478 // they have different dust limits.
7480 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7481 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7482 let config = UserConfig::default();
7483 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7485 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7486 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7487 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7488 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7489 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7491 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7492 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7493 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7494 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7495 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7497 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7498 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7499 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7500 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7502 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7503 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7504 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7506 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7507 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7509 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7510 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7511 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7513 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7514 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7515 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7516 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7519 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7521 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7522 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7523 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7524 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7525 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7526 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7527 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7528 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7529 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7531 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7534 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7535 // the dust limit check.
7536 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7537 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7538 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7539 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7541 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7542 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7543 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7544 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7545 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7546 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7547 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7551 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7552 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7553 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7554 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7555 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7556 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7557 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7558 let seed = [42; 32];
7559 let network = Network::Testnet;
7560 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7562 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7563 let config = UserConfig::default();
7564 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7566 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7567 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7569 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7570 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7571 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7572 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7573 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7574 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7576 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7577 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7578 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7579 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7580 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7582 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7584 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7585 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7586 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7587 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7588 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7590 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7591 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7592 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7593 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7594 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7598 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7599 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7600 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7601 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7602 let seed = [42; 32];
7603 let network = Network::Testnet;
7604 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7605 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7606 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7608 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7610 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7611 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7612 let config = UserConfig::default();
7613 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7615 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7616 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7617 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7618 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7620 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7621 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7622 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7624 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7625 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7626 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7627 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7629 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7630 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7631 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7633 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7634 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7636 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7637 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7638 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7639 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7640 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7641 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7642 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7644 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7646 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7647 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7648 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7649 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7650 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7654 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7655 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7656 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7657 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7658 let seed = [42; 32];
7659 let network = Network::Testnet;
7660 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7661 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7662 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7664 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7665 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7666 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7667 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7668 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7669 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7670 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7671 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7673 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7674 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7675 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7676 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7677 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7678 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7680 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7681 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7682 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7683 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7685 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7687 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7688 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7689 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7690 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7691 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7692 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7694 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7695 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7696 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7697 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7699 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7700 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7701 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7702 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7703 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7705 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7706 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7708 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7709 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7710 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7712 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7713 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7714 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7715 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7716 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7718 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7719 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7721 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7722 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7723 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7727 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7729 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7730 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7731 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7733 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7734 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7735 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7736 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7738 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7739 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7740 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7742 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7744 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7745 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7748 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7749 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7750 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7751 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7752 let seed = [42; 32];
7753 let network = Network::Testnet;
7754 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7755 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7756 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7759 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7760 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7761 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7763 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7764 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7766 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7767 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7768 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7770 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7771 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7773 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7775 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7776 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7778 // Channel Negotiations failed
7779 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7780 assert!(result.is_err());
7785 fn channel_update() {
7786 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7787 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7788 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7789 let seed = [42; 32];
7790 let network = Network::Testnet;
7791 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7792 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7793 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7795 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7796 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7797 let config = UserConfig::default();
7798 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7800 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7801 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7802 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7803 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7804 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7806 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7807 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7808 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7809 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7810 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7812 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7813 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7814 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7815 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7817 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7818 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7819 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7821 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7822 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7824 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7825 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7826 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7828 short_channel_id: 0,
7831 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7832 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7833 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7835 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7836 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7838 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7840 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7842 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7843 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7844 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7845 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7847 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7848 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7849 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7851 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7855 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7857 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7858 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7859 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7860 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7861 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7862 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7863 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7864 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7865 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7866 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7867 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7868 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7869 use crate::sync::Arc;
7871 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7872 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7873 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7874 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7876 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7878 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7879 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7880 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7881 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7882 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7884 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7885 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7891 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7892 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7893 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7895 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7896 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7897 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7898 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7899 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7900 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7902 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7904 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7905 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7906 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7907 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7908 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7909 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7911 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7912 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7913 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7914 selected_contest_delay: 144
7916 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7917 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7919 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7920 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7922 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7923 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7925 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7926 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7928 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7929 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7930 // build_commitment_transaction.
7931 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7932 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7933 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7934 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7935 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7937 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7938 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7939 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7940 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
7944 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7945 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7946 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
7947 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
7951 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7952 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7953 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7955 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7956 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7958 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7959 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7961 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7963 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7964 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7965 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7966 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7967 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7968 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7969 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7971 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7972 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7973 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7974 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7976 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7977 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7978 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7980 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7982 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7983 commitment_tx.clone(),
7984 counterparty_signature,
7985 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7986 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7987 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7989 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7990 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7992 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7993 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7994 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7996 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7997 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8000 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8001 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8003 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8004 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8005 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8006 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8007 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8008 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8009 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8010 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8012 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8015 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8016 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8017 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8021 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8024 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8025 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8026 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8028 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8029 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8030 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8031 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8032 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8033 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8034 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8035 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8037 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8041 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8042 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8043 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8044 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8046 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8047 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8049 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8050 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8051 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8053 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8054 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8055 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8056 "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", {});
8058 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8059 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8061 amount_msat: 1000000,
8063 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8064 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8066 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8069 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8070 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8072 amount_msat: 2000000,
8074 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8075 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8077 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8080 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8081 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8083 amount_msat: 2000000,
8085 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8086 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8087 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8088 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8090 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8093 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8094 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8096 amount_msat: 3000000,
8098 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8099 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8100 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8101 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8103 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8106 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8107 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8109 amount_msat: 4000000,
8111 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8112 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8114 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8118 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8119 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8120 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8122 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8123 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8124 "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", {
8127 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8128 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8129 "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" },
8132 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8133 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8134 "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" },
8137 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8138 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8139 "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" },
8142 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8143 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8144 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8147 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8148 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8149 "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" }
8152 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8153 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8154 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8156 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8157 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8158 "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", {
8161 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8162 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8163 "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" },
8166 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8167 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8168 "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" },
8171 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8172 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8173 "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" },
8176 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8177 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8178 "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" },
8181 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8182 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8183 "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" }
8186 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8187 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8188 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8190 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8191 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8192 "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", {
8195 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8196 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8197 "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" },
8200 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8201 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8202 "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" },
8205 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8206 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8207 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8210 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8211 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8212 "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" }
8215 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8216 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8217 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8218 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8220 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8221 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8222 "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", {
8225 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8226 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8227 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
8230 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8231 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8232 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8235 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8236 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8237 "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" },
8240 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8241 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8242 "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" }
8245 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8246 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8247 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8248 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8250 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8251 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8252 "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", {
8255 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8256 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8257 "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" },
8260 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8261 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8262 "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" },
8265 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8266 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8267 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e001473044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c1801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8270 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8271 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8272 "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" }
8275 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8276 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8277 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8279 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8280 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8281 "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", {
8284 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8285 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8286 "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" },
8289 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8290 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8291 "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" },
8294 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8295 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8296 "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" }
8299 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8300 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8301 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8303 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8304 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8305 "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", {
8308 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8309 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8310 "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" },
8313 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8314 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8315 "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" },
8318 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8319 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8320 "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" }
8323 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8324 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8325 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8327 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8328 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8329 "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", {
8332 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8333 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8334 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8337 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8338 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8339 "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" }
8342 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8343 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8344 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8345 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8346 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8347 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8349 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8350 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8351 "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", {
8354 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8355 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8356 "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" },
8359 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8360 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8361 "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" }
8364 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8365 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8366 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8367 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8368 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8370 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8371 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8372 "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", {
8375 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8376 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8377 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8380 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8381 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8382 "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" }
8385 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8386 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8387 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8389 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8390 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8391 "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", {
8394 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8395 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8396 "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" }
8399 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8400 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8401 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8402 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8403 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8405 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8406 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8407 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8410 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8411 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8412 "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" }
8415 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8416 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8417 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8418 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8419 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8421 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8422 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8423 "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", {
8426 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8427 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8428 "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" }
8431 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8432 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8433 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8434 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8436 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8437 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8438 "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", {});
8440 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8441 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8442 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8443 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8444 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8446 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8447 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8448 "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", {});
8450 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8451 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8452 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8453 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8454 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8456 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8457 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8458 "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", {});
8460 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8461 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8462 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8464 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8465 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8466 "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", {});
8468 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8469 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8470 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8471 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8472 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8474 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8475 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8476 "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", {});
8478 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8479 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8480 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8481 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8482 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8484 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8485 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8486 "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", {});
8488 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8489 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8490 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8491 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8492 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8493 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8495 amount_msat: 2000000,
8497 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8498 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8500 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8503 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8504 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8505 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8507 amount_msat: 5000001,
8509 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8510 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8511 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8512 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8514 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8517 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8518 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8520 amount_msat: 5000000,
8522 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8523 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8524 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8525 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8527 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8531 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8532 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8533 "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", {
8536 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8537 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8538 "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" },
8540 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8541 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8542 "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" },
8544 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8545 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8546 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
8549 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8550 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8551 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8552 "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", {
8555 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8556 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8557 "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" },
8559 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8560 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8561 "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" },
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8564 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8565 "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" }
8570 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8571 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8573 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8574 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8575 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8576 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8578 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8579 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8580 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8582 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8583 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8585 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8586 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8588 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8589 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8590 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8594 fn test_key_derivation() {
8595 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8596 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8598 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8599 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8601 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8602 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8604 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8605 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8607 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8608 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8610 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8611 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8613 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8614 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8616 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8617 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8621 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8622 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8623 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8624 let seed = [42; 32];
8625 let network = Network::Testnet;
8626 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8627 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8629 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8630 let config = UserConfig::default();
8631 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8632 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8634 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8635 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8637 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8638 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8639 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8640 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8641 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8642 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8643 assert!(res.is_ok());
8647 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8648 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8649 // resulting `channel_type`.
8650 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8651 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8652 let network = Network::Testnet;
8653 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8654 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8656 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8657 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8659 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8660 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8662 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8663 // need to signal it.
8664 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8665 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8666 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8669 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8671 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8672 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8673 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8675 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8676 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8677 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8680 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8681 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8682 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8683 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8684 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8687 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8688 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8692 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8693 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8694 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8695 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8696 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8697 let network = Network::Testnet;
8698 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8699 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8701 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8702 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8704 let config = UserConfig::default();
8706 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8707 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8708 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8709 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8710 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8712 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8713 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8714 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8717 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8718 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8719 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8721 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8722 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8723 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8724 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8725 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8726 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8728 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8732 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8733 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8735 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8736 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8737 let network = Network::Testnet;
8738 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8739 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8741 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8742 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8744 let config = UserConfig::default();
8746 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8747 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8748 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8749 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8750 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8751 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8752 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8753 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8755 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8756 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8757 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8758 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8759 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8760 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8763 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8764 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8766 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8767 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8768 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8769 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8771 assert!(res.is_err());
8773 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8774 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8775 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8777 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8778 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8779 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8782 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8784 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8785 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8786 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8787 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8790 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8791 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8793 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8794 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8796 assert!(res.is_err());