1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
34 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
41 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
42 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use crate::prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
50 use crate::sync::Mutex;
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelReady.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
277 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
278 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
443 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
446 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
447 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
448 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
449 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
450 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
451 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
452 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
453 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
454 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
455 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
456 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
457 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
458 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
459 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
460 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
462 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
463 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
464 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
465 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
467 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
468 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
469 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
470 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
472 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
473 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
474 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
475 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
476 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
478 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
479 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
480 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
481 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
483 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
484 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
485 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
487 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
488 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
489 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
490 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
491 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
493 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
494 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
495 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
498 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
499 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
500 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
501 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
503 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
504 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
505 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
506 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
508 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
512 channel_id: [u8; 32],
515 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
516 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
518 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
519 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
520 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
523 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
524 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
525 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
527 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
528 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
530 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
532 holder_signer: Signer,
533 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
534 destination_script: Script,
536 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
537 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
538 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
540 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
541 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
543 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
544 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
545 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
547 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
548 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
549 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
550 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
551 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
552 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
554 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
556 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
557 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
558 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
559 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
560 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
561 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
563 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
565 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
566 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
567 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
568 // HTLCs with similar state.
569 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
570 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
571 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
572 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
573 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
574 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
575 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
576 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
577 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
580 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
581 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
582 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
584 update_time_counter: u32,
586 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
587 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
588 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
589 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
590 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
591 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
593 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
594 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
596 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
597 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
598 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
599 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
601 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
602 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
604 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
606 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
609 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
610 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
611 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
612 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
613 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
615 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
616 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
617 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
618 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
619 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
621 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
622 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
623 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
624 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
625 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
626 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
627 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
628 channel_creation_height: u32,
630 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
633 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
638 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
648 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
651 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
653 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
656 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
660 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
664 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
666 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
667 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
669 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
670 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
673 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
675 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
677 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
678 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
679 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
680 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
682 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
683 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
684 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
686 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
687 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
688 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
690 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
691 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
692 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
693 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
695 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
699 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
700 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
701 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
702 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
703 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
705 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
706 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
709 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
710 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
711 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
712 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
713 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
714 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
715 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
717 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
718 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
720 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
721 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
722 // the channel's funding UTXO.
724 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
725 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
726 // associated channel mapping.
728 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
729 // to store all of them.
730 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
732 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
733 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
734 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
735 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
736 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
738 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
739 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
743 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
745 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
746 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
747 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
751 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
753 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
754 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
755 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
756 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
762 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
764 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
766 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
767 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
768 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
769 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
770 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
772 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
773 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
775 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
777 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
778 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
780 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
781 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
782 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
783 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
784 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
785 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
787 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
788 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
790 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
791 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
792 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
793 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
794 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
796 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
797 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
799 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
800 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
802 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
803 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
804 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
805 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
811 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
812 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
814 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
815 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
816 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
821 macro_rules! secp_check {
822 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
825 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
830 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
831 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
832 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
833 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
835 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
838 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
839 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
841 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
844 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
846 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
849 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
850 /// required by us according to the configured or default
851 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
853 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
855 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
856 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
857 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
858 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
859 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
862 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
863 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
864 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
865 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
866 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
867 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
868 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
871 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
872 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
875 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
876 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
877 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
878 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
879 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
880 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
881 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
882 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
887 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
888 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
889 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
890 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
891 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
892 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
893 // We've exhausted our options
896 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
897 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
901 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
902 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
903 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
904 outbound_scid_alias: u64
905 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
906 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
909 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
911 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
912 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
913 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
914 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
916 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
919 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
920 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
922 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
923 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
924 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
926 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
927 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
929 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
930 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
931 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
932 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
933 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
936 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
938 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
939 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
940 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
941 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
944 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
945 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
947 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
948 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
951 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
952 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
953 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
960 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
961 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
962 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
963 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
968 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
970 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
971 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
972 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
974 channel_value_satoshis,
976 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
979 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
980 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
982 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
983 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
986 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
987 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
988 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
989 pending_update_fee: None,
990 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
991 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
992 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
993 update_time_counter: 1,
995 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
997 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
998 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
999 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1000 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1001 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1002 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1004 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1005 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1006 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1007 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1009 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1010 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1011 closing_fee_limits: None,
1012 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1014 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1016 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1017 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1018 short_channel_id: None,
1019 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1021 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1022 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1023 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1024 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1025 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1026 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1027 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1028 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1029 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1030 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1031 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1033 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1035 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1036 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1037 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1038 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1039 counterparty_parameters: None,
1040 funding_outpoint: None,
1041 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1042 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1044 funding_transaction: None,
1046 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1047 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1048 counterparty_node_id,
1050 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1052 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1054 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1055 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1057 announcement_sigs: None,
1059 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1060 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1061 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1062 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1064 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1066 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1067 outbound_scid_alias,
1069 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1071 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1072 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1074 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1078 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1079 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1080 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1082 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1083 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1084 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1085 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1086 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1087 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1088 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1091 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1092 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1093 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1094 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1095 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1096 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1097 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1098 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1100 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1101 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1110 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1111 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1112 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1113 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1114 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1115 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1116 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1117 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1118 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1121 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1122 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1124 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1125 // support this channel type.
1126 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1127 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1131 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1135 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1136 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1137 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1138 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1139 // publicly announced.
1140 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1141 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1145 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1146 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1149 channel_type.clone()
1151 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1153 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1157 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1158 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1159 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1160 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1161 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1162 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1163 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1164 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1165 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1168 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1172 // Check sanity of message fields:
1173 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1176 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1179 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1182 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1183 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1186 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1189 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1192 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1194 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1195 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1198 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1201 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1205 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1206 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1209 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1212 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1215 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1218 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1221 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1224 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1228 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1230 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1231 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1236 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1237 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1238 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1239 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1242 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1245 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1246 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1247 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1249 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1253 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1254 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1255 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1256 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1257 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1261 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1262 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1263 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1264 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1268 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1269 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1270 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1271 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1272 if script.len() == 0 {
1275 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1276 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1278 Some(script.clone())
1281 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1282 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1288 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1289 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1292 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1293 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1298 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1299 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1301 let chan = Channel {
1304 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1305 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1307 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1312 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1314 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1315 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1316 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1319 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1322 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1323 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1325 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1326 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1327 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1329 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1330 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1331 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1332 pending_update_fee: None,
1333 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1334 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1335 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1336 update_time_counter: 1,
1338 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1340 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1341 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1342 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1343 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1344 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1345 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1347 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1348 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1349 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1350 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1352 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1353 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1354 closing_fee_limits: None,
1355 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1357 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1359 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1360 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1361 short_channel_id: None,
1362 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1364 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1365 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1366 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1367 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1368 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1369 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1370 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1371 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1372 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1373 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1374 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1375 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1377 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1379 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1380 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1381 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1382 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1383 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1384 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1385 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1387 funding_outpoint: None,
1388 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1389 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1391 funding_transaction: None,
1393 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1394 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1395 counterparty_node_id,
1397 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1399 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1401 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1402 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1404 announcement_sigs: None,
1406 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1407 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1408 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1409 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1411 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1413 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1414 outbound_scid_alias,
1416 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1418 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1419 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1427 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1428 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1429 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1430 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1431 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1433 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1434 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1435 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1436 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1437 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1438 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1439 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1441 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1442 where L::Target: Logger
1444 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1445 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1446 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1448 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1449 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1450 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1451 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1453 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1454 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1455 if match update_state {
1456 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1457 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1458 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1459 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1460 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1462 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1466 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1467 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1468 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1469 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1471 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1472 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1473 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1475 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1476 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1477 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1478 transaction_output_index: None
1483 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1484 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1485 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1486 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1487 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1490 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1492 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1493 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1494 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1496 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1497 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1500 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1501 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1504 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1506 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1507 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1508 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1510 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1511 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1517 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1518 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1519 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1520 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1521 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1522 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1523 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1527 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1528 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1530 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1532 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1533 if generated_by_local {
1534 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1535 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1544 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1546 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1547 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1548 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1549 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1550 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1551 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1552 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1555 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1556 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1557 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1558 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1562 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1563 preimages.push(preimage);
1567 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1568 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1570 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1572 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1573 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1575 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1576 if !generated_by_local {
1577 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1585 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1586 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1587 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1588 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1589 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1590 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1591 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1592 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1594 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1596 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1597 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1598 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1599 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1601 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1603 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1604 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1605 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1606 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1609 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1610 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1611 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1612 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1614 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1617 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1618 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1619 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1620 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1622 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1625 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1626 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1631 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1632 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1637 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1639 let channel_parameters =
1640 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1641 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1642 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1645 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1650 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1653 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1654 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1655 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1656 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1658 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1659 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1660 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1668 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1669 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1675 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1676 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1677 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1678 // outside of those situations will fail.
1679 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1683 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1688 1 + // script length (0)
1692 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1693 2 + // witness marker and flag
1694 1 + // witness element count
1695 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1696 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1697 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1698 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1699 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1700 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1702 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1703 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1704 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1710 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1711 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1712 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1713 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1715 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1716 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1717 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1719 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1720 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1721 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1722 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1723 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1724 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1727 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1728 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1731 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1732 value_to_holder = 0;
1735 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1736 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1737 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1738 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1740 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1741 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1744 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1745 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1749 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1750 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1751 /// our counterparty!)
1752 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1753 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1754 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1755 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1756 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1757 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1758 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1760 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1764 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1765 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1766 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1767 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1768 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1769 //may see payments to it!
1770 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1771 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1772 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1774 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1777 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1778 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1779 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1780 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1781 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1784 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1787 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1788 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1790 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1792 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1793 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1794 where L::Target: Logger {
1795 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1796 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1797 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1798 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1799 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1800 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1801 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1802 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1806 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1807 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1808 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1809 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1811 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1812 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1814 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1816 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1818 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1819 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1820 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1822 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1823 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1824 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1825 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1826 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1828 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1829 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1830 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1832 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1833 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1835 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1838 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1839 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1843 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1847 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1848 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1849 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1850 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1851 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1852 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1855 // Now update local state:
1857 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1858 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1859 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1860 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1861 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1862 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1863 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1867 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1868 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1869 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1870 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1871 // do not not get into this branch.
1872 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1873 match pending_update {
1874 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1875 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1876 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1877 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1878 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1879 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1880 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1883 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1884 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1885 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1886 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1887 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1888 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1889 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1895 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1896 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1897 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1900 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1901 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1903 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1904 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1907 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1908 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1910 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1911 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1913 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1914 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1917 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1920 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1921 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1922 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1923 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1928 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1929 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1930 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1931 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1932 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1935 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1936 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1937 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1938 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1939 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1941 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1942 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1943 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1947 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1948 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1949 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1950 /// before we fail backwards.
1951 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1952 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1953 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1954 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1955 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1957 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1959 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1960 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1961 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1963 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1964 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1965 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1967 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1968 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1969 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1971 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1976 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1977 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1983 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1984 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1985 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1986 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1987 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1991 // Now update local state:
1992 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1993 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1994 match pending_update {
1995 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1996 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1997 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1998 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2002 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2003 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2004 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2005 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2011 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2012 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2013 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2019 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2021 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2022 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2025 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2026 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2027 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2032 // Message handlers:
2034 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2035 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2037 // Check sanity of message fields:
2038 if !self.is_outbound() {
2039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2041 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2044 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2047 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2050 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2053 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2055 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2057 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2058 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2061 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2062 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2063 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2065 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2066 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2068 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2072 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2073 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2076 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2079 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2080 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2082 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2085 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2088 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2091 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2095 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2096 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2099 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2100 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2102 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2105 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2106 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2107 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2108 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2109 if script.len() == 0 {
2112 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2113 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2115 Some(script.clone())
2118 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2119 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2125 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2126 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2127 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2128 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2129 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2131 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2132 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2134 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2137 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2138 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2139 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2140 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2141 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2142 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2145 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2146 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2147 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2150 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2151 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2153 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2154 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2159 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2160 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2162 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2163 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2165 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2166 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2167 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2168 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2169 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2170 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2171 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2172 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2173 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2176 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2177 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2179 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2180 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2181 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2182 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2184 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2185 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2187 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2188 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2191 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2192 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2195 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2196 if self.is_outbound() {
2197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2199 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2200 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2201 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2205 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2208 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2209 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2210 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2211 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2214 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2215 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2216 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2217 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2218 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2220 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2222 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2223 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2227 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2228 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2229 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2233 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2234 initial_commitment_tx,
2237 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2238 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2241 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2242 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2244 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2246 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2247 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2248 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2249 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2250 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2251 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2252 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2253 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2254 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2256 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2258 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2260 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2261 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2262 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2263 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2265 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2267 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2268 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2270 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2273 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2274 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2275 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2276 if !self.is_outbound() {
2277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2279 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2280 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2282 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2283 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2284 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2285 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2288 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2290 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2291 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2292 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2293 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2295 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2296 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2298 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2299 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2301 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2302 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2303 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2304 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2305 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2310 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2311 initial_commitment_tx,
2314 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2315 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2318 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2319 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2322 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2323 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2324 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2325 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2326 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2327 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2328 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2329 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2330 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2331 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2333 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2335 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2337 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2338 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2339 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2340 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2342 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2344 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2347 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2348 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2350 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2351 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2352 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2353 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2356 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2357 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2358 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2359 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2360 // when routing outbound payments.
2361 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2365 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2367 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2368 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2369 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2370 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2371 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2372 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2373 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2374 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2375 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2377 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2378 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2379 let expected_point =
2380 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2381 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2383 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2385 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2386 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2387 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2388 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2389 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2391 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2399 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2400 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2402 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2404 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2407 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2408 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2409 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2410 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2416 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2417 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2418 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2419 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2420 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2421 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2422 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2423 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2424 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2427 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2430 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2431 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2432 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2434 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2435 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2436 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2437 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2438 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2439 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2441 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2442 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2448 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2449 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2450 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2451 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2452 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2453 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2454 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2455 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2456 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2459 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2462 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2463 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2464 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2466 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2467 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2468 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2469 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2470 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2471 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2473 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2474 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2478 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2479 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2480 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2481 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2482 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2483 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2484 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2486 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2487 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2489 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2496 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2497 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2498 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2499 /// corner case properly.
2500 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2501 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2502 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2504 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2505 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2506 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2507 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2510 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2512 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2513 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2514 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2517 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2518 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2519 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2520 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2522 outbound_capacity_msat,
2523 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2524 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2525 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2531 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2532 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2535 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2536 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2537 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2538 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2539 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2540 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2543 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2544 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2546 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2547 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2550 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2551 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2552 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2554 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2555 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2557 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2560 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2561 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2563 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2564 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2566 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2567 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2569 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2570 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2574 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2575 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2581 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2582 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2583 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2586 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2587 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2588 included_htlcs += 1;
2591 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2592 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2596 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2597 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2598 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2599 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2600 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2601 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2606 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2608 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2609 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2614 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2615 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2619 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2620 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2621 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2624 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2625 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2627 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2628 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2629 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2631 total_pending_htlcs,
2632 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2633 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2634 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2636 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2637 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2638 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2640 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2642 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2647 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2648 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2649 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2651 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2652 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2654 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2657 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2658 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2660 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2661 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2663 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2664 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2666 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2667 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2671 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2672 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2678 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2679 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2680 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2681 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2682 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2683 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2686 included_htlcs += 1;
2689 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2690 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2693 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2694 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2696 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2697 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2698 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2703 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2704 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2705 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2708 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2709 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2711 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2712 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2714 total_pending_htlcs,
2715 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2716 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2717 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2719 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2720 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2721 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2723 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2725 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2730 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2731 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2732 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2733 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2734 if local_sent_shutdown {
2735 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2737 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2738 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2739 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2740 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2742 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2743 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2745 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2746 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2748 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2751 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2752 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2755 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2756 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2757 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2760 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2761 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2763 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2764 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2765 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2766 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2767 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2768 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2769 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2770 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2771 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2772 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2773 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2775 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2776 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2777 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2778 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2779 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2780 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2784 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2787 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2788 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2789 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2791 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2792 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2793 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2794 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2795 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2796 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2797 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2801 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2802 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2803 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2804 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2805 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2806 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2807 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2811 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2812 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2813 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2814 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2815 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2816 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2819 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2820 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2821 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2822 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2823 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2825 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2829 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2830 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2833 if !self.is_outbound() {
2834 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2835 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2836 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2837 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2838 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2839 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2840 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2841 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2842 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2843 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2844 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2845 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2846 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2847 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2848 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2851 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2852 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2853 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2854 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2858 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2859 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2861 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2865 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2866 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2867 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2871 // Now update local state:
2872 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2873 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2874 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2875 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2876 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2877 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2878 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2883 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2885 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2886 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2887 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2888 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2889 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2890 None => fail_reason.into(),
2891 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2892 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2893 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2894 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2896 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2900 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2902 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2903 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2905 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2906 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2911 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2914 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2915 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2918 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2922 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2925 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2926 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2929 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2933 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2937 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2938 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2941 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2945 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2949 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2950 where L::Target: Logger
2952 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2953 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2955 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2956 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2958 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2959 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2962 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2964 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2966 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2967 let commitment_txid = {
2968 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2969 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2970 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2972 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2973 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2974 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2975 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2976 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2977 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2981 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2983 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2984 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2985 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2986 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2989 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2990 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2991 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2992 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2995 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2997 if self.is_outbound() {
2998 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2999 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3000 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3001 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3002 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3003 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3004 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3005 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3006 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3007 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3013 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3014 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3017 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3018 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3019 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3020 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3021 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3022 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3023 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3025 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3026 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3027 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3028 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3029 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3030 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3031 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3032 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3034 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3036 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3040 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3041 commitment_stats.tx,
3043 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3044 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3045 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3048 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3049 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3050 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3051 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3053 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3054 let mut need_commitment = false;
3055 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3056 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3057 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3058 need_commitment = true;
3062 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3063 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3064 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3065 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3066 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3067 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3071 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3072 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3073 Some(forward_info.clone())
3075 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3076 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3077 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3078 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3079 need_commitment = true;
3082 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3083 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3084 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3085 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3086 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3087 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3088 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3089 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3090 need_commitment = true;
3094 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3095 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3096 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3097 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3099 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3100 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3101 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3102 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3103 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3104 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3105 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3106 // includes the right HTLCs.
3107 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3108 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3109 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3110 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3111 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3112 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3114 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3115 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3116 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3119 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3120 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3121 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3122 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3123 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3124 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3125 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3126 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3127 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3131 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3132 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3134 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3135 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3136 per_commitment_secret,
3137 next_per_commitment_point,
3138 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3141 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3142 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3143 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3144 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3145 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3146 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3147 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3148 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3151 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3152 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3153 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3154 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3155 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3156 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3157 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3159 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3160 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3161 updates: Vec::new(),
3164 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3165 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3166 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3167 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3168 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3169 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3170 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3171 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3172 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3173 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3174 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3175 // to rebalance channels.
3176 match &htlc_update {
3177 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3178 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3179 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3182 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3183 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3184 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3185 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3186 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3187 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3188 // into the holding cell without ever being
3189 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3190 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3191 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3194 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3200 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3201 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3202 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3203 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3204 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3205 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3206 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3207 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3208 (msg, monitor_update)
3209 } else { unreachable!() };
3210 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3211 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3213 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3214 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3215 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3216 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3217 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3218 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3219 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3220 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3221 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3224 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3226 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3233 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3234 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3236 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3237 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3242 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3243 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3244 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3245 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3246 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3248 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3249 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3250 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3252 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3254 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3256 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3259 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3261 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3265 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3266 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3267 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3268 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3269 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3270 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3271 where L::Target: Logger,
3273 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3276 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3279 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3280 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3283 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3285 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3286 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3291 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3292 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3293 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3294 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3295 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3296 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3297 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3298 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3302 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3304 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3305 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3308 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3309 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3311 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3313 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3314 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3315 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3316 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3317 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3318 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3319 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3320 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3324 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3325 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3326 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3327 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3328 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3329 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3330 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3331 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3333 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3334 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3337 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3338 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3339 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3340 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3341 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3342 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3343 let mut require_commitment = false;
3344 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3347 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3348 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3349 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3351 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3352 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3353 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3354 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3355 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3356 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3361 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3362 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3363 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3364 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3365 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3367 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3368 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3369 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3374 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3375 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3377 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3381 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3382 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3384 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3385 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3386 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3387 require_commitment = true;
3388 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3389 match forward_info {
3390 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3391 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3392 require_commitment = true;
3394 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3395 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3396 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3398 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3399 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3400 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3404 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3405 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3406 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3407 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3413 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3414 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3415 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3416 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3418 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3419 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3420 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3421 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3422 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3423 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3424 require_commitment = true;
3428 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3430 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3431 match update_state {
3432 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3433 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3434 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3435 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3436 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3438 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3439 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3440 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3441 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3442 require_commitment = true;
3443 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3444 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3449 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3450 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3451 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3452 if require_commitment {
3453 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3454 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3455 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3456 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3457 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3458 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3459 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3460 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3461 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3463 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3464 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3465 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3466 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3467 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3468 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3469 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3471 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3475 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3476 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3477 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3478 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3479 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3481 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3482 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3483 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3486 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3487 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3488 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3489 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3492 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3493 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3494 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3495 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3497 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3500 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3501 if require_commitment {
3502 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3504 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3505 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3506 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3507 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3509 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3510 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3512 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3513 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3514 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3516 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3520 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3521 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3522 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3525 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3527 commitment_update: None,
3528 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3529 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3530 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3537 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3538 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3539 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3540 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3541 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3542 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3543 if !self.is_outbound() {
3544 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3546 if !self.is_usable() {
3547 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3549 if !self.is_live() {
3550 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3553 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3554 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3555 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3556 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3557 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3558 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3559 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3560 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3561 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3562 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3566 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3567 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3568 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3569 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3570 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3573 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3574 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3578 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3579 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3583 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3584 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3586 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3587 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3592 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3593 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3594 Some(update_fee) => {
3595 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3596 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3602 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3603 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3605 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3607 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3608 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3609 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3610 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3614 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3615 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3616 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3620 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3621 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3624 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3625 // will be retransmitted.
3626 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3627 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3628 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3630 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3631 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3633 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3634 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3635 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3636 // this HTLC accordingly
3637 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3640 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3641 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3642 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3643 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3646 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3647 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3648 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3649 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3650 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3651 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3656 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3658 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3659 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3660 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3661 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3665 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3666 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3667 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3668 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3669 // the update upon reconnection.
3670 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3674 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3675 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3678 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3679 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3680 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3681 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3682 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3683 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3685 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3686 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3687 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3688 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3689 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3690 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3692 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3693 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3694 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3695 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3696 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3697 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3698 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3701 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3702 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3703 /// to the remote side.
3704 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3705 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3706 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3708 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3709 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3710 // first received the funding_signed.
3711 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3712 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3713 self.funding_transaction.take()
3715 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3716 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3717 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3718 funding_broadcastable = None;
3721 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3722 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3723 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3724 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3725 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3726 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3727 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3728 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3729 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3730 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3731 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3732 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3733 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3734 next_per_commitment_point,
3735 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3739 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3741 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3742 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3743 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3744 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3745 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3746 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3748 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3749 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3750 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3751 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3752 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3753 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3757 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3758 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3760 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3761 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3764 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3765 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3766 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3767 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3768 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3769 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3770 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3771 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3772 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3776 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3777 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3779 if self.is_outbound() {
3780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3782 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3785 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3786 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3788 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3789 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3790 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3791 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3792 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3793 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3794 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3795 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3796 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3797 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3798 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3799 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3800 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3802 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3803 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3804 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3810 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3811 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3812 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3813 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3814 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3815 per_commitment_secret,
3816 next_per_commitment_point,
3820 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3821 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3822 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3823 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3824 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3826 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3827 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3828 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3829 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3830 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3831 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3832 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3833 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3834 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3839 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3840 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3842 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3843 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3844 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3845 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3846 reason: err_packet.clone()
3849 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3850 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3851 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3852 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3853 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3854 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3857 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3858 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3859 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3860 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3861 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3868 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3869 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3870 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3871 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3875 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3876 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3877 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3878 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3879 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3880 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3884 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3885 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3887 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3888 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3889 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3890 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3891 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3892 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3893 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3894 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3895 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3896 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3897 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3901 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3902 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3903 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3906 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3907 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3908 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3909 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3910 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3911 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3912 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3915 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3916 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3917 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3918 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3919 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3922 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3923 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3924 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3925 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3926 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3927 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3928 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3929 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3932 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3936 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3937 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3938 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3939 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3941 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3945 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3946 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3947 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3949 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3950 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3951 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3952 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3953 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3957 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3959 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3960 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3961 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3962 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3963 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3966 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3967 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3968 channel_ready: None,
3969 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3970 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3971 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3975 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3976 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3977 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3978 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3979 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3980 next_per_commitment_point,
3981 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3983 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3984 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3985 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3989 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3990 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3991 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3993 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3994 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3995 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3998 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4004 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4005 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4006 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4007 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4008 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4010 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4011 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4012 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4013 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4014 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4015 next_per_commitment_point,
4016 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4020 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4021 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4022 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4024 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4027 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4028 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4029 raa: required_revoke,
4030 commitment_update: None,
4031 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4033 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4034 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4035 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4037 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4040 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4041 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4042 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4043 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4044 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4045 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4048 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4049 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4050 raa: required_revoke,
4051 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4052 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4056 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4060 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4061 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4062 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4063 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4065 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4067 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4069 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4070 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4071 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4072 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4073 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4074 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4076 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4077 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4078 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4079 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4080 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4082 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4083 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4084 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4085 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4088 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4089 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4090 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4091 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4092 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4093 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4094 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4095 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4096 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4097 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4098 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4099 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4100 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4101 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4102 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4104 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4107 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4108 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4111 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4112 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4113 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4114 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4115 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4116 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4117 self.channel_state &
4118 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4119 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4120 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4121 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4124 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4125 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4126 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4127 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4128 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4129 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4132 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4138 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4139 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4140 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4141 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4143 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4144 return Ok((None, None));
4147 if !self.is_outbound() {
4148 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4149 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4151 return Ok((None, None));
4154 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4156 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4157 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4158 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4159 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4161 let sig = self.holder_signer
4162 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4163 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4165 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4166 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4167 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4168 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4170 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4171 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4172 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4177 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4178 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4179 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4180 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4182 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4185 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4186 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4187 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4188 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4191 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4192 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4196 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4198 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4199 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4202 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4203 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4204 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4207 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4210 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4211 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4212 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4213 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4215 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4218 assert!(send_shutdown);
4219 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4220 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4223 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4228 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4230 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4231 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4233 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4234 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4235 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4236 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4237 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4238 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4242 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4243 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4244 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4245 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4249 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4250 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4251 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4252 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4253 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4254 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4256 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4257 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4264 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4265 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4267 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4270 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4271 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4273 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4275 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4276 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4277 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4278 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4279 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4280 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4281 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4282 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4283 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4285 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4286 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4289 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4293 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4294 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4295 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4296 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4298 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4301 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4304 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4307 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4311 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4315 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4316 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4317 return Ok((None, None));
4320 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4321 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4322 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4325 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4327 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4330 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4331 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4332 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4333 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4334 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4338 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4339 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4344 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4345 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4346 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4347 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4348 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4349 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4350 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4354 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4356 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4357 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4358 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4359 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4361 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4364 let sig = self.holder_signer
4365 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4366 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4368 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4369 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4370 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4371 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4375 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4376 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4377 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4378 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4380 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4381 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4382 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4388 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4389 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4390 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4392 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4393 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4395 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4396 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4399 if !self.is_outbound() {
4400 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4401 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4402 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4403 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4405 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4406 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4407 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4409 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4410 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4413 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4414 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4415 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4416 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4417 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4418 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4419 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4420 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4422 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4425 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4426 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4427 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4428 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4430 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4434 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4435 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4436 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4437 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4439 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4445 // Public utilities:
4447 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4451 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4455 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4456 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4457 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4461 /// Gets the channel's type
4462 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4466 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4467 /// is_usable() returns true).
4468 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4469 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4470 self.short_channel_id
4473 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4474 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4475 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4478 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4479 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4480 self.outbound_scid_alias
4482 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4483 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4484 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4485 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4486 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4489 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4490 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4491 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4492 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4495 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4496 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4497 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4500 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4501 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4502 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4503 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4507 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4510 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4511 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4514 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4515 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4518 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4519 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4520 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4523 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4524 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4527 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4528 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4529 self.counterparty_node_id
4532 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4533 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4534 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4537 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4538 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4539 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4542 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4543 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4545 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4546 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4547 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4548 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4550 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4554 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4555 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4556 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4559 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4560 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4561 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4564 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4565 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4566 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4568 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4569 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4574 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4575 self.channel_value_satoshis
4578 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4579 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4582 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4583 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4586 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4587 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4590 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4591 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4592 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4595 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4596 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4597 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4600 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4601 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4602 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4605 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4606 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4607 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4608 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4609 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4612 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4614 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4615 self.prev_config = None;
4619 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4620 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4624 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4625 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4626 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4627 let did_channel_update =
4628 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4629 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4630 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4631 if did_channel_update {
4632 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4633 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4634 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4635 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4637 self.config.options = *config;
4641 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4642 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4643 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4644 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4645 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4646 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4647 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4649 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4650 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4653 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4655 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4656 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4662 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4663 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4664 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4665 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4666 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4667 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4668 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4670 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4671 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4678 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4682 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4683 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4684 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4685 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4686 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4687 // which are near the dust limit.
4688 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4689 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4690 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4691 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4692 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4694 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4695 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4697 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4700 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4701 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4704 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4705 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4708 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4709 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4713 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4718 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4720 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4721 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4722 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4723 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4724 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4725 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4727 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4729 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4737 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4738 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4742 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4743 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4744 self.update_time_counter
4747 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4748 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4751 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4752 self.config.announced_channel
4755 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4756 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4759 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4760 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4761 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4762 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4765 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4766 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4767 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4770 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4771 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4772 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4773 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4774 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4777 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4778 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4779 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4780 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4781 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4784 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4785 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4786 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4787 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4790 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4791 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4792 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4795 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4796 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4797 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4799 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4800 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4801 if self.channel_state &
4802 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4803 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4804 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4805 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4806 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4809 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4810 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4811 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4812 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4813 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4814 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4816 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4817 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4818 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4820 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4821 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4822 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4823 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4824 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4825 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4831 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4832 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4833 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4836 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4837 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4838 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4841 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4842 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4843 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4846 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4847 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4848 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4849 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4850 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4851 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4856 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4857 self.channel_update_status
4860 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4861 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4862 self.channel_update_status = status;
4865 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4867 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4868 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4869 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4873 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4874 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4875 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4878 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4882 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4883 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4884 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4886 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4887 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4888 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4890 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4891 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4894 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4895 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4896 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4897 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4898 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4899 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4900 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4901 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4902 self.channel_state);
4904 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4908 if need_commitment_update {
4909 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4910 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4911 let next_per_commitment_point =
4912 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4913 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4914 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4915 next_per_commitment_point,
4916 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4920 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4926 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4927 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4928 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4929 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4930 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4931 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4932 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4933 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4934 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4935 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4936 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4937 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4938 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4939 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4940 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4941 if self.is_outbound() {
4942 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4943 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4944 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4945 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4946 // channel and move on.
4947 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4948 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4950 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4951 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4952 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4954 if self.is_outbound() {
4955 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4956 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4957 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4958 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4959 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4960 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4964 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4965 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4966 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4967 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4968 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4972 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4973 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4974 // may have already happened for this block).
4975 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4976 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4977 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4978 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4981 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4982 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4983 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4984 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4992 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4993 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4994 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4995 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4997 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4998 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5001 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5003 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5004 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5005 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5008 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5009 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5010 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5011 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5012 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5014 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5015 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5017 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5018 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5019 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5027 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5029 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5030 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5031 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5033 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5034 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5037 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5038 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5039 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5040 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5041 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5042 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5043 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5044 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5045 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5048 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5049 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5050 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5051 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5053 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5054 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5055 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5057 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5058 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5059 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5060 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5062 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5063 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5064 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5065 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5066 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5067 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5068 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5071 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5072 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5074 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5077 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5078 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5079 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5080 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5081 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5082 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5083 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5084 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5085 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5086 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5087 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5088 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5089 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5090 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5091 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5092 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5093 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5099 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5104 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5105 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5107 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5108 if !self.is_outbound() {
5109 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5111 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5112 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5115 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5116 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5119 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5120 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5124 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5125 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5126 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5127 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5128 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5129 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5130 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5131 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5132 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5133 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5134 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5135 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5136 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5137 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5138 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5139 first_per_commitment_point,
5140 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5141 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5142 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5143 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5145 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5149 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5150 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5153 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5154 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5155 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5156 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5159 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5160 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5162 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5163 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5164 if self.is_outbound() {
5165 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5167 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5168 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5170 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5171 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5173 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5174 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5177 self.user_id = user_id;
5178 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5180 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5183 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5184 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5185 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5187 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5188 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5189 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5190 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5192 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5193 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5194 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5195 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5196 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5197 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5198 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5199 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5200 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5201 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5202 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5203 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5204 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5205 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5206 first_per_commitment_point,
5207 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5208 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5209 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5211 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5215 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5216 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5218 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5220 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5221 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5224 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5225 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5226 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5227 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5228 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5229 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5232 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5233 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5234 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5235 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5236 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5237 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5238 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5239 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5240 if !self.is_outbound() {
5241 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5243 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5244 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5246 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5247 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5248 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5249 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5252 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5253 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5255 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5258 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5259 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5264 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5266 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5268 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5269 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5270 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5272 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5273 temporary_channel_id,
5274 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5275 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5280 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5281 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5282 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5283 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5285 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5288 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5289 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5290 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5291 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5293 if !self.is_usable() {
5294 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5297 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5299 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5300 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5302 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5303 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5304 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5305 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5306 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5307 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5313 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5314 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5315 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5319 if !self.is_usable() {
5323 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5324 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5328 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5332 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5333 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5336 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5340 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5342 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5347 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5349 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5350 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5351 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5352 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5353 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5357 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5359 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5360 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5361 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5363 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5364 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5365 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5366 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5367 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5368 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5369 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5370 contents: announcement,
5373 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5377 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5378 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5379 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5380 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5381 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5383 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5385 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5386 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5387 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5388 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5390 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5391 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5392 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5393 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5396 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5397 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5398 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5399 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5402 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5405 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5406 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5407 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5408 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5411 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5413 Err(_) => return None,
5415 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5416 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5421 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5422 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5423 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5424 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5425 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5426 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5427 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5428 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5429 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5430 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5431 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5432 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5433 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5434 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5435 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5436 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5437 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5438 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5439 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5442 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5443 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5444 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5445 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5448 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5449 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5450 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5451 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5452 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5453 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5454 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5455 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5457 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5458 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5459 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5460 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5461 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5462 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5463 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5464 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5465 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5467 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5473 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5475 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5476 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5478 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5480 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5481 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5483 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5484 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5485 /// regenerate them.
5487 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5489 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5490 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5491 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5492 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5494 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5495 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5496 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5499 if amount_msat == 0 {
5500 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5503 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5504 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5507 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5508 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5509 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5510 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5511 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5512 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5513 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5514 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5517 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5518 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5519 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5520 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5522 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5523 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5524 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5527 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5528 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5529 if !self.is_outbound() {
5530 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5531 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5532 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5533 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5534 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5535 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5539 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5542 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5543 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5544 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5546 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5547 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5548 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5549 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5550 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5551 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5555 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5556 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5557 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5558 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5559 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5560 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5564 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5565 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5566 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5569 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5570 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5571 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5572 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5574 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5575 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5578 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5579 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5580 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5581 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5582 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5585 // Now update local state:
5586 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5587 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5592 onion_routing_packet,
5597 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5598 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5600 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5602 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5606 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5607 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5608 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5612 onion_routing_packet,
5614 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5619 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5620 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5621 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5622 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5623 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5624 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5625 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5627 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5628 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5630 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5631 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5633 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5634 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5636 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5637 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5638 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5639 have_updates = true;
5641 if have_updates { break; }
5643 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5644 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5645 have_updates = true;
5647 if have_updates { break; }
5650 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5652 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5654 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5655 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5656 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5657 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5658 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5660 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5661 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5662 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5664 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5665 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5669 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5670 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5671 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5672 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5673 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5674 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5675 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5678 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5679 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5680 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5681 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5682 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5683 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5686 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5688 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5689 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5690 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5691 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5692 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5693 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5695 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5698 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5699 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5702 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5703 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5704 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5705 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5706 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5707 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5708 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5709 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5712 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5713 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5716 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5717 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5718 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5719 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5720 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5721 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5722 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5724 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5726 if !self.is_outbound() {
5727 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5728 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5729 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5730 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5731 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5732 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5733 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5734 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5735 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5736 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5743 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5744 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5748 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5749 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5751 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5753 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5754 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5755 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5756 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5758 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5759 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5760 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5761 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5762 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5763 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5767 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5768 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5771 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5774 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5775 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5776 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5778 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5779 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5780 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5781 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5782 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5788 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5789 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5790 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5793 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5794 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5795 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5797 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5798 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5799 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5800 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5806 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5807 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5808 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5809 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5810 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5811 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5812 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5813 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5816 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5817 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5818 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5820 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5821 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5824 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5825 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5826 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5829 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5832 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5833 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5834 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5836 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5841 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5842 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5843 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5844 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5846 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5848 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5850 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5851 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5852 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5853 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5854 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5855 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5859 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5860 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5861 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5864 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5865 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5866 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5867 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5868 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5870 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5871 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5878 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5881 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5882 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5883 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5884 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5885 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5886 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5887 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5888 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5889 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5890 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5891 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5893 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5894 // return them to fail the payment.
5895 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5896 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5897 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5899 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5900 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5905 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5906 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5907 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5908 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5909 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5910 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5911 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5912 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5913 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5914 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5915 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5916 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5917 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5922 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5923 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5924 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5927 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&HTLCSource> {
5928 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5929 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5931 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, .. } => { Some(source) }
5935 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| &htlc.source))
5939 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5940 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5942 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5948 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5949 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5950 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5951 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5952 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5954 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5955 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5956 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5957 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5963 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5964 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5965 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5966 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5967 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5968 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5973 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5974 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5975 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5976 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5978 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5979 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5980 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5981 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
5986 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5987 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5988 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5989 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5990 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
5991 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5996 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
5997 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5998 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6001 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6003 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6004 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6005 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6006 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6007 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6009 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6010 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6011 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6012 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6014 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6015 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6016 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6018 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6020 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6021 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6022 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6023 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6024 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6025 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6027 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6028 // deserialized from that format.
6029 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6030 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6031 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6033 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6035 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6036 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6037 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6039 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6040 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6041 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6042 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6045 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6046 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6047 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6050 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6051 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6052 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6053 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6055 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6056 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6058 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6060 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6062 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6064 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6067 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6069 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6074 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6076 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6077 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6078 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6079 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6080 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6081 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6082 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6084 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6086 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6088 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6091 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6092 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6093 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6096 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6098 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6099 preimages.push(preimage);
6101 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6102 reason.write(writer)?;
6104 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6106 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6107 preimages.push(preimage);
6109 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6110 reason.write(writer)?;
6115 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6116 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6118 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6120 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6121 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6122 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6123 source.write(writer)?;
6124 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6126 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6128 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6129 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6131 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6133 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6134 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6139 match self.resend_order {
6140 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6141 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6144 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6145 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6146 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6148 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6149 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6150 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6151 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6154 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6155 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6156 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6157 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6158 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6161 if self.is_outbound() {
6162 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6163 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6164 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6166 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6167 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6168 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6170 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6172 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6173 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6174 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6175 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6177 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6178 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6179 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6180 // consider the stale state on reload.
6183 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6184 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6185 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6187 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6188 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6189 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6191 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6192 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6194 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6195 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6196 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6198 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6199 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6201 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6204 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6205 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6206 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6208 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6211 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6212 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6214 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6215 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6216 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6218 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6220 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6222 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6224 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6225 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6226 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6227 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6228 htlc.write(writer)?;
6231 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6232 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6233 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6235 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6236 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6238 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6239 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6240 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6241 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6242 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6243 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6244 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6246 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6247 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6248 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6249 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6250 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6252 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6254 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6255 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6256 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6257 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6259 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6260 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6261 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6262 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6263 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6264 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6265 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6267 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6268 (2, chan_type, option),
6269 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6270 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6271 (5, self.config, required),
6272 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6273 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6274 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6275 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6276 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6277 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6278 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6279 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6280 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6281 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6282 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6289 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6290 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6291 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6292 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6293 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6294 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6296 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6297 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6298 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6299 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6301 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6303 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6304 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6305 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6306 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6307 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6309 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6310 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6313 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6314 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6315 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6317 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6319 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6320 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6321 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6322 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6323 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6324 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6325 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6326 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6328 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6330 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6331 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6332 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6335 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6337 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6338 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6339 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6341 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6342 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6343 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6344 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6345 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6346 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6347 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6348 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6349 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6350 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6351 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6352 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6353 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6354 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6359 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6360 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6361 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6362 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6363 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6364 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6365 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6366 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6367 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6368 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6369 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6370 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6372 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6373 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6376 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6377 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6380 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6381 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6383 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6388 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6389 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6390 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6391 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6392 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6393 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6394 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6395 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6396 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6397 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6399 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6400 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6401 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6403 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6404 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6405 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6407 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6411 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6412 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6413 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6414 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6417 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6418 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6419 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6421 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6422 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6423 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6424 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6427 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6428 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6429 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6430 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6433 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6435 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6437 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6438 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6439 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6440 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6442 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6443 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6444 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6445 // consider the stale state on reload.
6446 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6449 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6450 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6451 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6453 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6456 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6458 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6460 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6462 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6463 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6465 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6466 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6468 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6469 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6472 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6475 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6477 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6478 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6480 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6481 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6486 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6487 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6488 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6489 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6491 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6494 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6495 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6497 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6499 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6503 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6505 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6507 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6508 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6509 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6511 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6512 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6513 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6517 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6518 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6519 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6521 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6527 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6528 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6529 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6530 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6531 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6532 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6533 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6534 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6535 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6536 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6538 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6539 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6540 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6541 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6542 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6543 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6545 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6547 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6548 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6549 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6550 (2, channel_type, option),
6551 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6552 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6553 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6554 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6555 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6556 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6557 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6558 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6559 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6560 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6561 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6562 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6563 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6564 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6567 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6568 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6569 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6571 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6572 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6574 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6575 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6580 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6581 if iter.next().is_some() {
6582 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6586 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6587 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6588 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6589 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6590 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6593 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6594 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6595 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6598 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6599 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6601 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6602 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6603 // separate u64 values.
6604 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6609 config: config.unwrap(),
6613 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6614 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6615 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6619 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6621 channel_value_satoshis,
6623 latest_monitor_update_id,
6626 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6629 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6630 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6633 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6634 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6635 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6639 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6640 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6641 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6642 monitor_pending_forwards,
6643 monitor_pending_failures,
6644 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6647 holding_cell_update_fee,
6648 next_holder_htlc_id,
6649 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6650 update_time_counter,
6653 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6654 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6655 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6656 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6658 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6659 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6660 closing_fee_limits: None,
6661 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6663 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6665 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6666 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6668 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6670 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6671 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6672 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6673 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6674 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6675 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6676 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6677 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6678 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6681 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6683 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6684 funding_transaction,
6686 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6687 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6688 counterparty_node_id,
6690 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6694 channel_update_status,
6695 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6699 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6700 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6701 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6702 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6704 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6706 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6707 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6708 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6710 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6712 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6713 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6715 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6723 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6724 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6725 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6726 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6727 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6729 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6730 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6731 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6732 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6733 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6734 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6735 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6736 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6737 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6738 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6739 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6740 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6741 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6742 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6743 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6744 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6745 use crate::util::test_utils;
6746 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6747 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6748 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6749 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6750 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6751 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6752 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6753 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6754 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6755 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6756 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6757 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6758 use crate::prelude::*;
6760 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6763 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6764 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6770 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6771 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6772 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6773 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6777 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6778 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6779 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6780 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6781 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6782 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6783 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6787 signer: InMemorySigner,
6789 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6790 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6792 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6793 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6794 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6795 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6796 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6797 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6798 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6799 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6802 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6803 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6804 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6805 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6808 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6809 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6811 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6814 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6815 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6816 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6819 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6820 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6821 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6825 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6826 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6827 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6828 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6830 let seed = [42; 32];
6831 let network = Network::Testnet;
6832 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6833 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6834 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6837 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6838 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6839 let config = UserConfig::default();
6840 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6841 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6842 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6844 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6845 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6849 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6850 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6852 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6853 let original_fee = 253;
6854 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6855 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6856 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6857 let seed = [42; 32];
6858 let network = Network::Testnet;
6859 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6861 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6862 let config = UserConfig::default();
6863 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6865 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6866 // same as the old fee.
6867 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6868 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6869 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6873 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6874 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6875 // dust limits are used.
6876 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6877 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6878 let seed = [42; 32];
6879 let network = Network::Testnet;
6880 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6881 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6883 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6884 // they have different dust limits.
6886 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6887 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6888 let config = UserConfig::default();
6889 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6891 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6892 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6893 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6894 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6895 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6897 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6898 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6899 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6900 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6901 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6903 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6904 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6905 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6907 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6908 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6909 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6910 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6913 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6915 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6916 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6917 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6918 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6919 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6921 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6922 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6923 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6924 payment_secret: None,
6925 payment_params: None,
6929 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6930 // the dust limit check.
6931 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6932 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6933 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6934 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6936 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6937 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6938 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6939 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6940 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6941 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6942 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6946 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6947 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6948 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6949 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6950 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6951 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6952 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6953 let seed = [42; 32];
6954 let network = Network::Testnet;
6955 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6957 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6958 let config = UserConfig::default();
6959 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6961 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6962 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6964 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6965 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6966 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6967 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6968 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6969 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6971 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6972 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6973 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6974 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6975 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6977 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6979 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6980 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6981 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6982 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6983 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6985 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6986 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6987 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6988 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6989 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6993 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6994 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6995 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6996 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6997 let seed = [42; 32];
6998 let network = Network::Testnet;
6999 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7000 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7001 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7003 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7005 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7006 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7007 let config = UserConfig::default();
7008 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7010 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7011 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7012 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7013 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7015 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7016 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7017 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7019 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7020 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7021 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7022 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7024 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7025 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7026 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
7028 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7029 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
7031 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7032 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7033 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7034 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7035 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7036 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7037 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7038 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7039 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7044 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7046 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7047 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7048 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7049 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7050 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7051 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7052 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7059 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7060 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7061 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7062 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7063 let seed = [42; 32];
7064 let network = Network::Testnet;
7065 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7066 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7067 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7069 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7070 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7071 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7072 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7073 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7074 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7075 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7076 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7078 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7079 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7080 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7081 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7082 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7083 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7085 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7086 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7087 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7088 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7090 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7092 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7093 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7094 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7095 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7096 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7097 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7099 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7100 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7101 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7102 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7104 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7105 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7106 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7107 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7108 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7110 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7111 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7113 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7114 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7115 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7117 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7118 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7119 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7120 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7121 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7123 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7124 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7126 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7127 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7128 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7132 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7134 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7135 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7136 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7138 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7139 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7140 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7141 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7143 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7144 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7145 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7147 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7149 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7150 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7153 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7154 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7155 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7156 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7157 let seed = [42; 32];
7158 let network = Network::Testnet;
7159 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7160 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7161 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7164 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7165 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7166 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7168 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7169 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7171 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7172 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7173 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7175 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7176 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7178 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7180 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7181 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7183 // Channel Negotiations failed
7184 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7185 assert!(result.is_err());
7190 fn channel_update() {
7191 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7192 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7193 let seed = [42; 32];
7194 let network = Network::Testnet;
7195 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7196 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7198 // Create a channel.
7199 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7200 let config = UserConfig::default();
7201 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7202 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7203 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7204 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7206 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7207 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7208 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7210 short_channel_id: 0,
7213 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7214 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7215 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7217 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7218 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7220 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7222 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7224 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7225 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7226 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7227 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7229 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7230 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7231 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7233 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7237 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7239 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7240 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7241 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7242 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7243 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7244 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7245 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7246 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7247 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7248 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7249 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7250 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7251 use crate::sync::Arc;
7253 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7254 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7255 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7256 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7258 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7260 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7261 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7262 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7263 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7264 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7265 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7267 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7268 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7273 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7274 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7275 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7277 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7278 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7279 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7280 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7281 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7282 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7284 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7286 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7287 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7288 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7289 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7290 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7291 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7293 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7294 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7295 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7296 selected_contest_delay: 144
7298 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7299 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7301 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7302 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7304 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7305 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7307 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7308 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7310 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7311 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7312 // build_commitment_transaction.
7313 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7314 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7315 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7316 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7317 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7319 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7320 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7321 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7322 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7326 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7327 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7328 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7329 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7333 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7334 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7335 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7337 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7338 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7340 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7341 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7343 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7345 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7346 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7347 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7348 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7349 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7350 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7351 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7353 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7354 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7355 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7356 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7358 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7359 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7360 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7362 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7364 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7365 commitment_tx.clone(),
7366 counterparty_signature,
7367 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7368 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7369 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7371 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7372 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7374 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7375 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7376 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7378 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7379 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7382 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7383 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7385 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7386 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7387 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7388 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7389 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7390 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7391 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7392 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7394 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7397 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7398 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7399 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7403 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7406 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7407 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7408 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7410 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7411 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7412 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7413 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7414 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7415 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7416 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7417 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7419 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7423 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7424 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7426 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7427 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7428 "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", {});
7430 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7431 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7432 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7433 "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", {});
7435 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7436 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7438 amount_msat: 1000000,
7440 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7441 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7443 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7446 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7447 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7449 amount_msat: 2000000,
7451 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7452 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7454 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7457 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7458 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7460 amount_msat: 2000000,
7462 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7463 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7464 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7466 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7469 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7470 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7472 amount_msat: 3000000,
7474 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7475 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7476 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7478 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7481 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7482 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7484 amount_msat: 4000000,
7486 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7487 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7489 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7493 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7494 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7495 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7497 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7498 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7499 "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", {
7502 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7503 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7504 "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" },
7507 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7508 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7509 "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" },
7512 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7513 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7514 "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" },
7517 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7518 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7519 "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" },
7522 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7523 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7524 "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" }
7527 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7528 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7529 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7531 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7532 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7533 "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", {
7536 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7537 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7538 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
7541 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7542 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7543 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7546 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7547 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7548 "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" },
7551 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7552 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7553 "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" },
7556 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7557 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7558 "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" }
7561 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7562 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7563 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7565 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7566 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7567 "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", {
7570 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7571 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7572 "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" },
7575 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7576 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7577 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7580 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7581 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7582 "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" },
7585 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7586 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7587 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7590 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7591 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7592 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7593 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7595 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7596 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7597 "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", {
7600 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7601 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7602 "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" },
7605 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7606 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7607 "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" },
7610 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7611 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7612 "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" },
7615 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7616 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7617 "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" }
7620 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7621 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7622 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7623 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7625 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7626 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7627 "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", {
7630 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7631 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7632 "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" },
7635 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7636 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7637 "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" },
7640 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7641 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7642 "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" },
7645 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7646 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7647 "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" }
7650 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7651 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7652 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7654 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7655 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7656 "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", {
7659 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7660 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7661 "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" },
7664 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7665 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7666 "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" },
7669 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7670 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7671 "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" }
7674 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7675 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7676 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7678 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7679 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7680 "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", {
7683 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7684 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7685 "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" },
7688 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7689 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7690 "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" },
7693 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7694 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7695 "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" }
7698 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7699 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7700 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7702 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7703 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7704 "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", {
7707 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7708 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7709 "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" },
7712 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7713 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7714 "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" }
7717 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7718 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7719 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7720 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7722 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7723 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7724 "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", {
7727 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7728 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7729 "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" },
7732 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7733 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7734 "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" }
7737 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7738 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7739 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7740 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7742 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7743 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7744 "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", {
7747 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7748 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7749 "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" },
7752 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7753 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7754 "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" }
7757 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7758 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7759 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7761 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7762 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7763 "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", {
7766 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7767 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7768 "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" }
7771 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7772 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7773 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7774 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7776 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7777 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7778 "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", {
7781 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7782 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7783 "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" }
7786 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7787 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7788 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7789 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7791 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7792 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7793 "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", {
7796 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7797 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7798 "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" }
7801 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7802 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7803 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7804 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7806 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7807 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7808 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7810 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7811 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7812 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7813 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7815 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7816 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7817 "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", {});
7819 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7820 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7821 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7822 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7824 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7825 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7826 "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", {});
7828 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7829 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7830 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7832 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7833 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7834 "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", {});
7836 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7837 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7838 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7839 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7841 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7842 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7843 "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", {});
7845 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7846 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7847 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7848 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7850 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7851 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7852 "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", {});
7854 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7855 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7856 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7857 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7858 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7859 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7861 amount_msat: 2000000,
7863 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7864 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7866 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7869 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7870 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7871 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7873 amount_msat: 5000000,
7875 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7876 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7877 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7879 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7882 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7883 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7885 amount_msat: 5000000,
7887 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7888 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7889 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7891 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7895 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7896 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7897 "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", {
7900 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7901 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7902 "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" },
7904 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7905 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7906 "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" },
7908 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7909 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7910 "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" }
7913 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7914 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7915 "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", {
7918 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7919 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7920 "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" },
7922 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7923 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7924 "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" },
7926 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7927 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7928 "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" }
7933 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7934 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7936 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7937 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7938 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7939 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7941 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7942 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7943 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7945 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7946 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7948 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7949 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7951 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7952 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7953 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7957 fn test_key_derivation() {
7958 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7959 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7961 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7962 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7964 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7965 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7967 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7968 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7970 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7971 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7973 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7974 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7976 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7977 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7979 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7980 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7984 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7985 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7986 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7987 let seed = [42; 32];
7988 let network = Network::Testnet;
7989 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7990 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7992 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7993 let config = UserConfig::default();
7994 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7995 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7997 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7998 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8000 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8001 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8002 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8003 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8004 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8005 assert!(res.is_ok());