1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
9 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
10 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
15 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
17 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
19 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
20 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
21 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
22 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
24 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
25 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
26 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
27 use util::transaction_utils;
28 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
29 use util::logger::Logger;
30 use util::errors::APIError;
31 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
34 use std::default::Default;
35 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
38 #[cfg(all(test, feature = "mutation_testing"))]
42 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
43 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
44 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
45 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
46 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
47 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
48 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
49 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
52 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
53 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
54 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
55 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
58 enum InboundHTLCState {
59 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
60 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
61 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
62 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
63 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
64 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
65 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
66 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
67 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
68 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
69 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
70 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
72 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
74 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
75 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
77 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
78 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
79 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
80 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
81 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
82 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
83 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
84 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
87 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
91 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
92 state: InboundHTLCState,
95 enum OutboundHTLCState {
96 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
97 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
98 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
99 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
100 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
101 /// money back (though we won't), and,
102 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
103 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
104 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
105 /// we'll never get out of sync).
106 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
107 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
108 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
110 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
111 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
112 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
113 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
114 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
115 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
116 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
117 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
118 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
119 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
120 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
121 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
122 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
123 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
124 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
127 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
132 state: OutboundHTLCState,
136 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
137 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
138 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
142 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
144 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
147 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
157 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
158 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
159 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
160 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
161 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
162 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
164 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
165 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
166 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
167 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
168 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
169 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
170 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
172 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
173 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
174 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
176 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
177 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
178 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
179 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
180 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
181 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
183 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
184 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
186 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
187 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
188 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
189 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
190 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
191 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
192 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
193 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
194 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
196 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
197 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
198 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
199 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
200 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
201 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
202 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
203 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
204 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
205 /// us their shutdown.
206 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
207 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
208 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
209 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
211 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
212 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
214 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
216 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
217 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
218 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
219 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
222 /// Status has been gossiped.
224 /// Status has been changed.
226 /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
230 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
231 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
232 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
234 pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
235 config: ChannelConfig,
239 channel_id: [u8; 32],
241 channel_outbound: bool,
242 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
243 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
245 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
248 local_keys: ChanSigner,
250 pub(super) local_keys: ChanSigner,
251 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
252 destination_script: Script,
254 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
255 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
256 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
258 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
259 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
260 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
261 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
262 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
263 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
265 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
266 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
267 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
268 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
269 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
270 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
272 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
274 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
275 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
276 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
277 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
278 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
280 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
281 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
282 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
284 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
285 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
286 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
287 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
288 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
289 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
290 // commitment_signed.
291 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
292 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
293 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
294 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
295 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
296 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
297 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
298 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
299 update_time_counter: u32,
302 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
303 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
304 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
305 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
306 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
307 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
309 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, our_sig)
311 funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
313 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
314 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
315 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
316 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
317 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
318 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
319 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
320 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
321 pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
322 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
324 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
326 pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
328 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
330 pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
332 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
333 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
334 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
335 local_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
336 // get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
337 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
338 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
339 their_to_self_delay: u16,
340 our_to_self_delay: u16,
342 pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
344 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
345 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
348 their_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
350 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
352 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
353 their_node_id: PublicKey,
355 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
357 /// Used exclusively to broadcast the latest local state, mostly a historical quirk that this
359 channel_monitor: Option<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
360 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
362 network_sync: UpdateStatus,
365 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
366 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
367 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
368 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
369 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 1;
370 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
371 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
374 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 896;
376 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 896;
378 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
380 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
382 const ANCHOR_VALUE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
384 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
386 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
388 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
389 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
390 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
391 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
392 Ignore(&'static str),
394 CloseDelayBroadcast(&'static str),
397 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Close(e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
402 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
417 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
418 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
419 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
422 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
425 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
426 pub(crate) fn get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
427 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
428 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
431 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
432 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
436 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError>
437 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
438 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
440 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
442 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
443 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
446 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
447 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
449 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
450 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
454 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
455 if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
456 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
459 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
463 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
465 channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
466 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
467 channel_outbound: true,
468 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
469 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
471 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
473 local_keys: chan_keys,
474 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
475 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
477 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
478 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
479 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
481 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
482 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
483 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
484 pending_update_fee: None,
485 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
486 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
487 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
488 update_time_counter: 1,
490 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
492 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
493 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
494 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
495 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
496 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
498 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
499 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
500 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
501 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
503 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
506 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
507 short_channel_id: None,
508 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
509 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
511 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
512 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
513 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
514 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
515 local_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
516 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
517 our_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
518 their_to_self_delay: 0,
519 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
520 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
521 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
524 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
526 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
527 their_node_id: their_node_id,
529 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
531 channel_monitor: None,
532 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
534 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
538 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
539 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
541 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
542 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
544 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 200 {
545 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
550 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
551 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
552 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError>
553 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
554 F::Target: FeeEstimator
556 let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
557 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
558 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
559 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
560 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
561 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
562 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
564 chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
565 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
567 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
571 // Check sanity of message fields:
572 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
575 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
576 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
578 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
581 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
582 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
584 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
585 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
587 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
588 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
590 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
592 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
595 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
598 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
602 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
603 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
604 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
606 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
607 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
609 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
612 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
613 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
615 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
616 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
618 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
619 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
621 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
625 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
627 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
628 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
629 if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
630 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
633 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
634 local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
636 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
638 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
639 let remote_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
640 if remote_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
643 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
646 if remote_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep"));
650 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
651 // for full fee payment
652 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
653 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + ANCHOR_VALUE_SATOSHIS * 1000 {
654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
657 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT - ANCHOR_VALUE_SATOSHIS * 1000;
658 // While its reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
659 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than the reserve.
660 if to_remote_msat <= remote_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
661 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
664 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
665 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
666 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
667 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
668 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
670 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
671 } else if script.len() == 0 {
673 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
675 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
678 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
679 &OptionalField::Absent => {
680 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
687 config: local_config,
689 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
690 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
691 channel_outbound: false,
692 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
694 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
696 local_keys: chan_keys,
697 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
698 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
700 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
701 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
702 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
704 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
705 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
706 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
707 pending_update_fee: None,
708 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
709 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
710 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
711 update_time_counter: 1,
713 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
715 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
716 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
717 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
718 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
719 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
721 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
722 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
723 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
724 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
726 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
729 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
730 short_channel_id: None,
731 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
732 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
734 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
735 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
736 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
737 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
738 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
739 local_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
740 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
741 our_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
742 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
743 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
744 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
745 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
747 their_pubkeys: Some(their_pubkeys),
748 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
750 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
751 their_node_id: their_node_id,
753 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
755 channel_monitor: None,
756 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
758 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
764 // Utilities to derive keys:
766 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
767 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), idx);
768 SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
771 // Utilities to build transactions:
773 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
774 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
775 let our_payment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_key());
777 let their_payment_point = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point.serialize();
778 if self.channel_outbound {
779 sha.input(&our_payment_point.serialize());
780 sha.input(their_payment_point);
782 sha.input(their_payment_point);
783 sha.input(&our_payment_point.serialize());
785 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
787 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
788 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
789 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
790 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
791 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
792 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
795 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
796 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
797 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
798 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
799 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
801 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
802 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
803 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
804 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
805 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
806 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
807 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
808 /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
809 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
810 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
811 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
813 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64, logger: &L) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
814 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
817 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
819 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
820 script_sig: Script::new(),
821 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
827 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
828 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
830 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
831 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
832 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
833 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
835 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
837 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
838 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
839 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
841 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
842 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
843 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
844 transaction_output_index: None
849 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
850 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
851 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
852 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
853 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
854 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
856 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
857 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
858 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
860 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
861 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
864 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
865 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
866 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
867 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
868 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
869 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
870 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
872 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
873 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
879 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
880 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
881 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
882 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
883 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
884 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
885 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
889 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
890 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
892 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
894 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
895 if generated_by_local {
896 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
897 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
906 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
907 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
908 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
909 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
910 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
911 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
912 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
916 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
917 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
919 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
921 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
922 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
924 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
925 if !generated_by_local {
926 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
934 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
935 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
936 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
937 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
938 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
939 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
940 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
941 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
943 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
945 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
946 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
947 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
948 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
950 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
952 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
953 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
954 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
955 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
958 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
959 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
960 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64 - ANCHOR_VALUE_SATOSHIS as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
962 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64 - ANCHOR_VALUE_SATOSHIS as i64)
965 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
966 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
968 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) || !txouts.is_empty() {
969 // Always push the anchor output so that local can get the transaction confirmed.
971 script_pubkey: Script::new(), //XXX
972 value: ANCHOR_VALUE_SATOSHIS
976 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
977 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
979 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
980 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
981 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
982 value: value_to_a as u64
986 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
987 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
988 let static_payment_pk = if local {
989 self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_point
991 self.local_keys.pubkeys().payment_point
994 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
995 .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&static_payment_pk)[..])
997 value: value_to_b as u64
1001 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1002 if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
1003 if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
1004 a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
1005 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1006 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1008 .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
1009 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1010 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1011 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1012 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1015 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1016 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
1017 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1018 outputs.push(out.0);
1019 if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
1020 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1021 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
1024 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
1025 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1029 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1032 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
1036 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1037 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1038 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1042 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
1043 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
1047 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1049 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1051 previous_output: self.funding_txo.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1052 script_sig: Script::new(),
1053 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1054 witness: Vec::new(),
1059 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1060 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1061 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1063 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1064 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1065 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1067 if value_to_self < 0 {
1068 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1069 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1070 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1071 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1072 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1075 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1076 txouts.push((TxOut {
1077 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1078 value: value_to_remote as u64
1082 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1083 txouts.push((TxOut {
1084 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1085 value: value_to_self as u64
1089 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1091 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1092 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1093 outputs.push(out.0);
1101 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1105 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1106 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1107 /// our counterparty!)
1108 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1109 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1110 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1111 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
1112 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
1113 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1114 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1116 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1120 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1121 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1122 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1123 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1124 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1125 //may see payments to it!
1126 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key());
1127 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1128 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1130 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1133 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1134 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1135 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1136 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1137 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
1138 make_funding_redeemscript(&our_funding_key, self.their_funding_pubkey())
1141 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1142 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1143 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1144 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1145 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1148 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1149 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1150 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1152 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1153 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1154 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1155 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1156 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1157 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1159 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1160 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1162 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1164 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1166 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1167 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1168 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1170 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1171 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1172 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1173 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1175 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1176 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1177 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1179 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1181 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1182 return Ok((None, None));
1185 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1186 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1193 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1194 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1197 // Now update local state:
1199 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1200 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1201 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1202 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1203 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1204 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1205 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1208 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone(), logger).unwrap();
1210 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1211 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1212 match pending_update {
1213 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1214 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1215 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1216 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1217 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1218 return Ok((None, None));
1221 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1222 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1223 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1224 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1225 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1226 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1227 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1233 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1234 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1235 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1237 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1241 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1242 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1244 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1245 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1247 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1248 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1251 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1252 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1253 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1254 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1255 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1258 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1259 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1260 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1261 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1262 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1263 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1264 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1265 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1266 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1268 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1269 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1270 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1272 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1273 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1277 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1278 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1279 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1281 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1282 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1283 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1284 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1285 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1287 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1289 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1290 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1291 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1293 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1294 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1295 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1297 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1298 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1299 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1303 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1310 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1311 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1314 // Now update local state:
1315 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1316 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1317 match pending_update {
1318 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1319 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1320 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1321 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1324 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1325 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1326 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1327 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1333 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1334 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1341 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1342 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1345 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1346 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1347 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1352 // Message handlers:
1354 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1355 // Check sanity of message fields:
1356 if !self.channel_outbound {
1357 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1359 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1360 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1362 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1363 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1365 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1366 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1368 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1371 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1374 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1375 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1377 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1380 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1383 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1386 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
1390 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1391 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
1394 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1395 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
1397 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1398 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
1400 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1401 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
1403 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1404 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
1406 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
1409 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
1413 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1414 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1415 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1416 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1417 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1418 Some(script.clone())
1419 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1420 } else if script.len() == 0 {
1422 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1424 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
1427 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1428 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1429 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
1434 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1435 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1436 self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1437 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1438 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1439 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1440 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1442 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1443 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1444 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1445 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1446 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1447 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1450 self.local_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
1451 self.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
1453 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1454 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1456 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1461 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1462 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1464 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1465 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1466 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1468 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
1469 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_initial_commitment_tx), log_bytes!(local_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1470 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
1472 let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig.clone(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1474 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1475 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1476 let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
1477 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0;
1479 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1480 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, localtx, remote_signature))
1483 fn their_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1484 &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("their_funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
1487 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1488 if self.channel_outbound {
1489 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
1491 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1492 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1493 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
1497 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1498 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1499 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1500 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1503 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1504 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
1506 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1509 self.funding_txo = None;
1514 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1516 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1517 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1518 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1519 macro_rules! create_monitor {
1521 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.local_keys.clone(),
1522 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay,
1523 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1524 &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1525 self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1526 self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1527 local_initial_commitment_tx.clone());
1529 channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1534 self.channel_monitor = Some(create_monitor!());
1535 let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
1537 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1538 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1539 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1540 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1542 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1543 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1544 signature: our_signature
1545 }, channel_monitor))
1548 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1549 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1550 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1551 if !self.channel_outbound {
1552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
1554 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1555 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
1557 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1558 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1559 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1560 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1563 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1565 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1566 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1568 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1569 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1570 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1572 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1574 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1575 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
1576 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer"));
1579 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1580 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1581 let funding_txo = self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap();
1582 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1583 macro_rules! create_monitor {
1585 let local_commitment_tx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), msg.signature.clone(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), their_funding_pubkey, local_keys.clone(), self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1586 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.local_keys.clone(),
1587 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay,
1588 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo.clone(), funding_txo_script.clone()),
1589 &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1590 self.their_to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1591 self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(),
1592 local_commitment_tx);
1594 channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1600 self.channel_monitor = Some(create_monitor!());
1601 let channel_monitor = create_monitor!();
1603 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1604 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1605 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1606 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1611 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1612 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1613 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1616 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1618 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1619 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1620 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1621 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1622 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1623 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1624 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1625 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1626 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1627 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1628 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1629 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1630 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1631 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1633 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1636 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1639 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1640 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1644 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1645 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1646 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1647 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1648 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1650 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1653 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1655 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1656 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1657 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1658 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1661 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1662 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1663 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1664 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1665 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1669 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1672 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1673 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1674 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1675 /// corner case properly.
1676 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1677 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1678 (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1679 cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1682 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1683 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1686 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1689 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
1692 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC"));
1695 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1696 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
1699 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1700 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1701 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
1703 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1704 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1705 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value"));
1707 // Check remote_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1708 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1709 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1710 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1711 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1712 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1713 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1714 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1715 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1716 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1717 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1719 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1720 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1721 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1722 debug_assert!(false, "This should be triggerable, and we should add a test case that does so!");
1723 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1724 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1725 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1728 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
1729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under their reserve value"));
1731 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1732 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
1734 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
1738 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1739 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
1740 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1744 // Now update local state:
1745 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1746 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1747 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1748 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1749 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1750 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1751 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1756 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1758 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1759 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1760 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1761 match check_preimage {
1763 Some(payment_hash) =>
1764 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1765 println!("FAIL: {:?}, {:?}", htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash);
1766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1770 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1772 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1773 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1775 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1778 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1781 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1784 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1785 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1786 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1788 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1789 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1792 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1793 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1796 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1797 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1800 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1801 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1804 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1808 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1809 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1810 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1812 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1813 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1816 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1820 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
1821 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1824 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1825 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state")));
1827 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1828 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish")));
1830 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1831 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds")));
1834 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1836 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1838 let mut update_fee = false;
1839 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1841 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1846 let mut local_commitment_tx = {
1847 let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
1848 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1849 (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
1851 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1852 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1853 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), log_bytes!(local_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1854 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey()) {
1855 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer")));
1858 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1860 let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
1861 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 + ANCHOR_VALUE_SATOSHIS;
1863 let remote_reserve_we_require = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1864 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + remote_reserve_we_require {
1865 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee")));
1869 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
1870 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote")));
1873 // TODO: Merge these two, sadly they are currently both required to be passed separately to
1875 let mut htlcs_without_source = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1876 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1877 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
1878 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1879 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1880 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1881 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1882 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
1883 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key) {
1884 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer")));
1886 htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx])));
1887 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
1889 htlcs_without_source.push((htlc.clone(), None));
1890 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
1894 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1895 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1897 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1898 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1899 if !self.channel_outbound {
1900 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1901 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1902 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1903 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1904 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1905 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1906 need_our_commitment = true;
1907 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1912 let their_funding_pubkey = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1914 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1915 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1916 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1917 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
1918 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, msg.signature.clone(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), &their_funding_pubkey, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_without_source),
1919 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
1922 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone(), logger).unwrap();
1924 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1925 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1926 Some(forward_info.clone())
1928 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1929 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1930 need_our_commitment = true;
1933 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1934 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
1935 Some(fail_reason.take())
1937 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
1938 need_our_commitment = true;
1942 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1943 // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
1944 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
1945 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1947 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1948 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
1949 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
1950 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1951 if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1952 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
1953 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
1954 // includes the right HTLCs.
1955 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1956 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1957 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1958 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1959 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1960 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1962 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
1963 // re-send the message on restoration)
1964 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA")));
1967 let (our_commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1968 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1969 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1970 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1971 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1972 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1973 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1974 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1975 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1977 } else if !need_our_commitment {
1978 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
1979 } else { (None, None) };
1981 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1982 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1983 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1984 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1985 }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
1988 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1989 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1990 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1991 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1992 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1993 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
1995 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1996 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
1997 updates: Vec::new(),
2000 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2001 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2002 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2003 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2004 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2006 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2007 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2008 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2009 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2010 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2011 // to rebalance channels.
2012 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
2013 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
2015 match &htlc_update {
2016 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2017 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2018 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2021 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2022 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2025 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2032 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2033 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2034 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2035 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2036 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2037 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2041 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2043 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2048 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2049 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2050 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2052 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2054 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2061 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
2062 if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
2063 // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
2064 // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
2070 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
2071 //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
2074 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2075 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
2076 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
2077 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
2080 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2081 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2082 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2083 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2084 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2090 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2091 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2092 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2093 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2094 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2096 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2098 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2100 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2101 update_fee: update_fee,
2103 }, monitor_update)))
2112 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2113 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2114 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2115 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2116 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2117 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
2118 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2121 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
2124 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2125 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2127 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
2131 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
2132 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
2133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
2137 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2138 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2139 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2140 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2141 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2142 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2143 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2144 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack"));
2148 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2149 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one"))?;
2150 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2151 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2152 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2153 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2154 idx: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2155 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2158 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone(), logger).unwrap();
2160 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2161 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2162 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2163 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2164 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2165 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
2166 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2167 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2169 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2170 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2171 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2172 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2173 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2174 let mut require_commitment = false;
2175 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2178 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2179 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2180 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2182 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2183 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2184 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2185 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2186 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2187 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2192 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2193 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2194 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2195 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2196 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2198 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2199 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2204 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2205 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2206 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2208 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2209 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2213 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2214 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2216 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2217 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2218 require_commitment = true;
2219 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2220 match forward_info {
2221 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2222 require_commitment = true;
2224 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2225 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2226 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2228 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2229 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2230 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2234 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2235 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2236 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2242 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2243 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2244 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2245 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2247 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2248 Some(fail_reason.take())
2250 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2251 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2252 require_commitment = true;
2256 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2258 if self.channel_outbound {
2259 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2260 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2263 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2264 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2265 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2266 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2267 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2268 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2269 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2270 require_commitment = true;
2271 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2276 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2277 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2278 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2279 if require_commitment {
2280 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2281 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2282 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2283 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2284 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2285 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2286 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2287 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2288 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2290 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2291 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2292 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update))
2295 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2296 Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)) => {
2297 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2298 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2299 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2301 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2302 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2303 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2306 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2307 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2308 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2309 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2311 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2314 if require_commitment {
2315 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2317 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2318 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2319 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2320 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2322 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2323 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2324 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2326 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2329 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2331 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update))
2338 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2339 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2340 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2341 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2342 if !self.channel_outbound {
2343 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2345 if !self.is_usable() {
2346 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2348 if !self.is_live() {
2349 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2352 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2353 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2357 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2358 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2360 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2361 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2362 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
2366 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2367 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2368 Some(update_fee) => {
2369 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2370 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2376 #[cfg_attr(all(test, feature = "mutation_testing"), mutate)]
2377 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2378 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2379 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2380 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2381 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2383 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2384 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2386 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2387 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2388 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2389 return outbound_drops;
2391 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2392 // will be retransmitted.
2393 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2395 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2396 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2398 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2399 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2400 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2401 // this HTLC accordingly
2402 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2405 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2406 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2407 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2408 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2411 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2412 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2413 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2414 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2415 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2416 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2421 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2423 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2424 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2425 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2426 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2427 // the update upon reconnection.
2428 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2432 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2434 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2435 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2438 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2441 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2442 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2446 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2447 /// updates are partially paused.
2448 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2449 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2450 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2451 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2452 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2453 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2454 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2455 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2456 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2457 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2458 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2459 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2460 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2463 #[cfg_attr(all(test, feature = "mutation_testing"), mutate)]
2464 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2465 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2466 /// to the remote side.
2467 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2468 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2469 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2471 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
2473 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2474 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2475 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2476 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2477 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2478 // monitor was persisted.
2479 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2480 assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2481 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2482 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2483 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2484 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2485 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2486 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2490 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2491 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2492 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2493 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2495 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2496 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2497 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2498 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2501 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2502 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2504 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2505 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2507 //XXX: Should we free_holding_cell_htlcs() here if we dont need a cs normally?
2509 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2510 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2511 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2512 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2513 if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2514 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2515 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2516 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2517 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2520 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2521 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2523 if self.channel_outbound {
2524 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2526 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2527 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2529 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2530 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2531 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2535 #[cfg_attr(all(test, feature = "mutation_testing"), mutate)]
2536 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2537 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2538 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2539 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2540 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2541 per_commitment_secret,
2542 next_per_commitment_point,
2546 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2547 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2548 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2549 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2550 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2552 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2553 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2554 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2555 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2556 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2557 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2558 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2559 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2560 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2565 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2566 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2568 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2569 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2570 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2571 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2572 reason: err_packet.clone()
2575 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2576 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2577 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2578 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2579 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2580 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2583 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2584 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2585 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2586 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2587 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2594 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2595 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2596 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2597 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2599 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2603 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2604 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2605 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2606 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2607 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2608 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2609 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2613 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2614 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2618 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2619 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2620 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2621 if chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1) != data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret {
2622 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided"));
2624 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2625 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2626 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting"
2630 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2634 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2635 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2636 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2638 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2639 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2640 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2641 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2645 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2646 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2647 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2648 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2649 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
2652 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2653 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2656 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2657 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2658 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2659 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2660 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2661 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2662 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2665 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2666 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2667 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2669 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2670 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2671 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2674 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2677 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2680 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2681 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2682 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2683 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2684 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2686 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2687 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2688 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2689 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2690 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2691 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2692 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2696 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2697 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2698 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2700 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2703 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2704 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2705 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2706 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2708 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
2709 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2710 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2711 Ok(Some((commitment_update, monitor_update))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2712 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2715 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2717 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2718 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2719 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2721 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2724 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2725 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2726 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2729 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2735 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
2736 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2738 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2739 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2740 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2744 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2745 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2746 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2748 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2749 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2751 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2752 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2753 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2755 if our_sig.is_none() { return None; }
2757 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, our_sig.clone().unwrap()));
2758 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2759 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2760 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2761 signature: our_sig.unwrap(),
2765 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2766 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2768 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2771 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2772 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2773 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2774 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
2777 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2778 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
2782 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2784 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2785 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2786 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2787 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
2790 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2791 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2792 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
2795 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2796 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2797 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
2800 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2803 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2805 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2806 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2808 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2809 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2810 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2811 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2812 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2813 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2815 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2816 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2822 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2823 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2824 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2826 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2829 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2830 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2831 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2835 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2836 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2838 Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2841 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, our_sig: &Signature) {
2842 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
2843 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
2844 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
2846 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2848 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()).serialize();
2849 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize();
2850 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
2851 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2852 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2854 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2855 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2857 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2858 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2860 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
2863 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
2864 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2866 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
2869 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2872 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
2875 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
2879 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2880 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2881 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
2884 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2886 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
2888 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
2891 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2892 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2893 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2894 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2895 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
2899 if let Some((_, last_fee, our_sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2900 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2901 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2902 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2903 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2904 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2908 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2909 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2910 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2911 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2912 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2913 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2914 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2915 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, our_sig.clone()));
2916 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2917 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2918 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2924 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
2925 if self.channel_outbound {
2926 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2927 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2928 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2929 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
2933 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2936 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2937 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2938 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2939 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
2943 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2947 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2948 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2949 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2950 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2952 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2953 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2955 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2956 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2957 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2959 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2962 // Public utilities:
2964 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2968 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2969 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2970 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2974 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2975 pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
2976 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2977 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2979 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap()
2982 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2983 /// is_usable() returns true).
2984 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2985 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2986 self.short_channel_id
2989 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2990 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2991 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2995 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2996 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3000 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3001 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3002 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
3005 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3006 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3007 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
3010 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3011 self.channel_value_satoshis
3014 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3015 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3019 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
3023 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3024 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3027 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3028 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3031 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3032 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3036 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
3041 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3043 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3044 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3045 channel_reserve_msat: self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3046 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3047 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3048 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3050 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3052 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3060 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3064 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3065 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3066 self.update_time_counter
3069 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3070 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3073 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3074 self.config.announced_channel
3077 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3078 self.channel_outbound
3081 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3082 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3083 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3084 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3086 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3087 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3089 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3090 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3092 if self.channel_outbound {
3093 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3094 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3097 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3098 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3103 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3104 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3105 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3108 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3109 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3110 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3111 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3112 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3115 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3116 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3117 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3118 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3119 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3122 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3123 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3124 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3125 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3128 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3129 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3130 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3133 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3134 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3135 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3136 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3137 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3138 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3143 pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3144 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3147 pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3148 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3151 pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3152 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3155 pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3156 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3159 pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3160 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3163 /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3164 /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3165 /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3166 /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3167 /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3168 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3170 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3171 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3173 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3175 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3177 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3178 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3179 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3181 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3182 if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3183 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3190 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3191 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3192 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3193 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3196 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3197 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
3198 if tx.txid() == self.funding_txo.unwrap().txid {
3199 let txo_idx = self.funding_txo.unwrap().index as usize;
3200 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3201 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3202 if self.channel_outbound {
3203 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3204 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3205 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3206 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3207 // channel and move on.
3208 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3209 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3211 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3212 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3213 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3214 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3215 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3218 if self.channel_outbound {
3219 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3220 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3221 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3222 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3223 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3224 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3228 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3229 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
3230 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3231 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
3236 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3237 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3238 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3239 if let Some(channel_monitor) = self.channel_monitor.as_mut() {
3240 channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3242 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3243 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3244 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3245 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3247 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3248 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3249 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3251 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3252 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3253 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3255 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3256 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3258 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3259 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3262 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
3264 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3265 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3266 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3267 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3268 if need_commitment_update {
3269 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3270 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3271 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
3272 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3273 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3274 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
3275 }), timed_out_htlcs));
3277 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3278 return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3284 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3287 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3288 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3289 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3290 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3291 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3292 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3293 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3297 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3298 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3300 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3301 if let Some(channel_monitor) = self.channel_monitor.as_mut() {
3302 channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3307 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3308 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3310 pub fn get_open_channel<F: Deref>(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &F) -> msgs::OpenChannel
3311 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3313 if !self.channel_outbound {
3314 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3316 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3317 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3320 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3321 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3324 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3327 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3328 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3329 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3330 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3331 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3332 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3333 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3334 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3335 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
3336 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3337 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3338 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3339 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3340 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_key()),
3341 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3342 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3343 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3344 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3345 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3349 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3350 if self.channel_outbound {
3351 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3353 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3354 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3356 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3357 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3360 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3362 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3363 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3364 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3365 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3366 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_remote_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3367 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3368 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3369 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3370 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3371 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3372 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3373 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_key()),
3374 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3375 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3376 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3377 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3381 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3382 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3383 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3384 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3385 Ok(self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3386 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0)
3389 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3390 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3391 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3392 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3393 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3394 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3395 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3396 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3397 if !self.channel_outbound {
3398 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3400 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3401 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3403 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3404 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3405 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3406 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3409 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_txo.clone());
3410 let our_signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3413 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3414 self.funding_txo = None;
3419 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3421 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3423 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3424 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3426 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3427 temporary_channel_id,
3428 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3429 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3430 signature: our_signature
3434 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3435 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3436 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3437 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3438 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3440 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3441 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3442 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3443 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3444 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
3446 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3447 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
3449 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3450 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
3453 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
3454 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
3456 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3457 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3458 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3459 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3460 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
3461 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
3462 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3463 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
3464 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3467 let sig = self.local_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3468 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement"))?;
3473 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3474 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3475 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3476 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3477 assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3478 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3479 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3480 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3481 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3482 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3483 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3484 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3485 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3486 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3487 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3488 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3489 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3490 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3491 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3494 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3495 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3496 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3497 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3500 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3501 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3502 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3503 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3504 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3505 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3506 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3507 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3509 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3510 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3511 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3512 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3513 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3514 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3515 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3516 // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3517 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3519 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3525 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3527 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3528 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3529 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3530 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3531 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3532 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3533 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3534 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3535 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3536 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
3539 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3540 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
3543 if amount_msat == 0 {
3544 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
3547 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
3548 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
3551 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3552 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3553 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3554 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3555 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3556 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3557 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3558 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
3561 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3562 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3563 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
3565 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3566 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3567 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"));
3570 // Check self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3571 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3572 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3573 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us under local channel reserve value"));
3576 // Now update local state:
3577 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3578 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3579 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3580 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3581 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3583 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3588 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3589 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3590 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3591 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3592 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3593 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3597 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3598 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3599 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3600 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3601 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3602 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3603 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3605 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3610 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3611 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3612 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3613 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3614 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3615 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3616 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3618 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3619 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3621 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3622 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3624 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3625 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3627 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3628 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3629 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3630 have_updates = true;
3632 if have_updates { break; }
3634 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3635 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3636 have_updates = true;
3638 if have_updates { break; }
3641 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3643 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
3645 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3646 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3647 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3648 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3650 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3651 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3652 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3654 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3658 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3659 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3660 Some(fail_reason.take())
3662 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3665 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3667 let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
3668 Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3669 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3670 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
3671 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3672 (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3674 Err(e) => return Err(e),
3677 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3678 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3679 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3680 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
3681 unsigned_commitment_tx: remote_commitment_tx.clone(),
3682 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
3683 commitment_number: self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3684 their_revocation_point: self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
3687 self.channel_monitor.as_mut().unwrap().update_monitor_ooo(monitor_update.clone(), logger).unwrap();
3688 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3689 Ok((res, monitor_update))
3692 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3693 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3694 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3695 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3696 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3697 if self.channel_outbound {
3698 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3702 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3703 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
3704 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
3707 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.2.len());
3708 for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3712 let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &remote_keys, &htlcs, self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3713 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?;
3715 htlc_signatures = res.1;
3717 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
3718 encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0),
3719 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
3720 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
3722 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
3723 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
3724 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.our_to_self_delay, htlc, &remote_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &remote_keys.revocation_key)),
3725 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys)),
3726 log_bytes!(remote_keys.a_htlc_key.serialize()),
3727 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3731 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3732 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3735 }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
3738 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3739 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3740 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3742 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3743 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3744 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3745 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3746 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3752 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3753 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3754 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3755 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3756 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3757 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3760 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3761 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3762 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3764 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3765 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3768 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3769 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3770 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3773 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3775 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3776 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3777 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3779 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3781 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3783 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3784 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3785 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3786 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3787 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3789 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3790 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3797 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3798 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3799 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3800 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3803 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3804 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3805 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3806 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3807 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3808 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3809 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3811 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3812 // return them to fail the payment.
3813 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3814 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3816 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3817 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3823 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3824 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3825 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3829 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3830 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3831 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3832 (self.funding_txo.clone(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3833 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3834 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3835 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3839 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3840 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3842 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3843 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3845 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3847 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3849 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3851 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3852 err_code.write(writer)?;
3854 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3856 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3863 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3864 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3865 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3866 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3867 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3868 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3869 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3874 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
3875 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3876 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3877 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3879 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3880 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3882 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3883 self.config.write(writer)?;
3885 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3886 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3887 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3888 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3890 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
3892 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3893 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3894 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
3896 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3897 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3898 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3900 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3901 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3902 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3903 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3906 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3907 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3908 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
3911 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3912 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3913 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3914 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3916 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
3917 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3919 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3921 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3923 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3925 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3928 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3930 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3935 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3936 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3937 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3938 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3939 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3940 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3941 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3943 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3945 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3947 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3950 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
3952 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3954 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3956 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3958 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
3960 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3965 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3966 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3968 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
3970 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3971 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3972 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3973 source.write(writer)?;
3974 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3976 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3978 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3979 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3981 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3983 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3984 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3989 match self.resend_order {
3990 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3991 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3994 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
3995 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3996 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3998 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3999 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4000 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4001 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4004 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4005 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4006 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4007 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4008 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4011 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4012 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4014 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4015 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4016 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4017 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4019 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4020 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4022 feerate.write(writer)?;
4026 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4029 self.funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4030 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4031 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4033 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4034 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4036 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4037 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4038 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4039 self.local_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4040 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4041 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4042 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
4043 self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
4044 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4045 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4047 self.their_pubkeys.write(writer)?;
4048 self.their_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4050 self.their_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4051 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
4053 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4055 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4057 self.channel_monitor.as_ref().unwrap().write_for_disk(writer)?;
4062 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
4063 fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4064 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4065 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4066 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4067 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4070 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4071 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4073 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4074 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4075 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
4076 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4078 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4080 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4081 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4082 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4084 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4085 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4086 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4088 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4089 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4090 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4091 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4092 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4093 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4094 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4095 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4096 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4097 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4098 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4099 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4100 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4101 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4106 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4107 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4108 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4109 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4110 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4111 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4112 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4113 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4114 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4115 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4116 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4117 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4118 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4119 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4120 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4121 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4126 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4127 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4128 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4129 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4130 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4131 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4132 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4133 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4134 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4135 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4137 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4138 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4139 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4141 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4142 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4143 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4145 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4149 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4150 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4151 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4152 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4155 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4156 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4157 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4159 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4160 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4161 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4162 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4165 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4166 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4167 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4168 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4171 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4172 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4174 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4175 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4176 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4177 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4179 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4181 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4182 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4185 let funding_txo = Readable::read(reader)?;
4186 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4187 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4189 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4190 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4192 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4193 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4194 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4195 let local_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4196 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4197 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4198 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4199 let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
4200 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4201 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4203 let their_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
4204 let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4206 let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4207 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4209 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4210 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4212 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = Readable::read(reader)?;
4213 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
4214 // doing full block connection operations on the internal ChannelMonitor copies
4215 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
4216 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4226 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4227 channel_value_satoshis,
4229 latest_monitor_update_id,
4235 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
4236 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
4239 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4240 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4241 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4245 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4246 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4247 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4248 monitor_pending_forwards,
4249 monitor_pending_failures,
4252 holding_cell_update_fee,
4254 next_remote_htlc_id,
4255 update_time_counter,
4258 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4259 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4260 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4261 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4263 last_sent_closing_fee,
4266 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4268 last_block_connected,
4269 funding_tx_confirmations,
4271 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
4272 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
4273 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4274 local_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4275 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
4276 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
4277 their_to_self_delay,
4279 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
4283 their_cur_commitment_point,
4285 their_prev_commitment_point,
4288 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4290 channel_monitor: Some(channel_monitor),
4293 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4300 use bitcoin::BitcoinHash;
4301 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4302 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4303 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4304 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
4305 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4306 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4307 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4308 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4310 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4311 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4312 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4313 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4314 use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
4316 use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
4317 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4318 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
4319 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4320 use util::config::UserConfig;
4321 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
4322 use util::test_utils;
4323 use util::logger::Logger;
4324 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4325 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4326 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4327 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4328 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4330 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
4332 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4335 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4336 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
4342 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4343 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4344 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4348 chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
4350 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4351 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
4353 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4354 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4355 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4356 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4357 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4358 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4361 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4362 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4363 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4364 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4367 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
4368 self.chan_keys.clone()
4370 fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { panic!(); }
4371 fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4374 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4375 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4379 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4380 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4381 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4382 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4383 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4384 let mut rng = thread_rng();
4385 rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
4386 let network = Network::Testnet;
4387 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4389 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4391 // Create Node A's channel
4392 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4393 let config = UserConfig::default();
4394 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4396 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4397 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(), &&feeest);
4398 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4399 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4401 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4402 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4403 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4405 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4406 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4407 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4408 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4410 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0);
4411 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4412 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4414 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4415 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4417 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4418 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4419 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4420 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4421 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4422 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4423 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4424 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4425 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4430 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4432 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4433 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4434 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4435 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4436 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4437 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4438 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4445 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4446 return; // Disabled as we don't have test vectors for the currently-partially-implemented option_anchor_outputs
4448 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4449 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4450 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4451 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4453 let mut chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
4455 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4456 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4457 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4458 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4459 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4461 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4462 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4466 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan_keys.funding_key()).serialize()[..],
4467 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4468 let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys: chan_keys.clone() };
4470 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4471 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4472 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4473 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, their_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4474 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
4475 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4477 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
4478 chan.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
4480 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4481 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4482 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4483 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4484 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4485 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4487 chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
4489 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
4490 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4492 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4493 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4495 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4496 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4498 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4499 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4500 // build_commitment_transaction.
4501 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
4502 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4503 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4504 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
4505 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
4507 chan.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
4509 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4512 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4513 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
4514 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $their_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $our_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
4517 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
4518 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4519 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4523 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4524 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4525 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
4526 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, chan.their_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
4528 let mut per_htlc = Vec::new();
4529 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
4531 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4532 per_htlc.push((unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
4534 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), per_htlc.len());
4536 localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), their_signature.clone(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.funding_key()), chan.their_funding_pubkey(), keys.clone(), chan.feerate_per_kw, per_htlc);
4537 let local_sig = chan_keys.sign_local_commitment(&localtx, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4538 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($our_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), local_sig);
4540 assert_eq!(serialize(&localtx.add_local_sig(&redeemscript, local_sig))[..],
4541 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4543 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(&localtx, chan.their_to_self_delay, &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4544 let mut htlc_sig_iter = localtx.per_htlc.iter().zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
4547 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4549 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4550 let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4551 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4552 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
4553 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
4555 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4558 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4559 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4560 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4564 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4567 let mut htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
4568 while (htlc_sig.1).1.is_none() { htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap(); }
4569 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx));
4571 let our_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($our_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4572 assert_eq!(Some(our_signature), *(htlc_sig.1).1);
4573 assert_eq!(serialize(&localtx.get_signed_htlc_tx((htlc_sig.1).0, &(htlc_sig.1).1.unwrap(), &preimage, chan.their_to_self_delay))[..],
4574 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4577 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next();
4578 if htlc_sig.is_none() { break; }
4579 assert!((htlc_sig.unwrap().1).1.is_none());
4584 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4585 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4587 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
4588 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
4589 "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", {});
4591 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4592 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4594 amount_msat: 1000000,
4596 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4597 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4599 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4602 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4603 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4605 amount_msat: 2000000,
4607 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4608 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4610 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4613 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4614 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4616 amount_msat: 2000000,
4618 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4619 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4620 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4622 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4625 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4626 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4628 amount_msat: 3000000,
4630 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4631 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4632 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4634 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4637 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4638 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4640 amount_msat: 4000000,
4642 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4643 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4645 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4649 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4650 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4651 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4653 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
4654 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
4655 "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", {
4658 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
4659 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
4660 "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" },
4663 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
4664 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
4665 "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" },
4668 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
4669 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
4670 "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" },
4673 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
4674 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
4675 "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" },
4678 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
4679 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
4680 "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" }
4683 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4684 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4685 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4687 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
4688 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
4689 "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", {
4692 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
4693 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
4694 "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" },
4697 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
4698 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
4699 "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" },
4702 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
4703 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
4704 "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" },
4707 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
4708 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
4709 "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" },
4712 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
4713 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
4714 "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" }
4717 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4718 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4719 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4721 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
4722 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
4723 "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", {
4726 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
4727 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
4728 "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" },
4731 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
4732 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
4733 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
4736 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
4737 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
4738 "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" },
4741 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
4742 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
4743 "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" }
4746 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4747 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4748 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4750 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
4751 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
4752 "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", {
4755 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
4756 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
4757 "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" },
4760 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
4761 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
4762 "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" },
4765 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
4766 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
4767 "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" },
4770 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
4771 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
4772 "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" }
4775 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4776 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4777 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4779 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
4780 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
4781 "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", {
4784 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
4785 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
4786 "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" },
4789 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
4790 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
4791 "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" },
4794 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
4795 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
4796 "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" }
4799 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4800 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4801 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4803 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
4804 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
4805 "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", {
4808 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
4809 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
4810 "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" },
4813 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
4814 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
4815 "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" },
4818 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
4819 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
4820 "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" }
4823 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4824 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4825 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4827 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
4828 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
4829 "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", {
4832 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
4833 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
4834 "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" },
4837 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
4838 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
4839 "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" }
4842 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4843 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4844 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4846 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
4847 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
4848 "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", {
4851 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
4852 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
4853 "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" },
4856 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
4857 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
4858 "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" }
4861 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4862 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4863 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4865 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
4866 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
4867 "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", {
4870 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
4871 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
4872 "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" }
4875 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4876 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4877 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4879 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
4880 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
4881 "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", {
4884 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
4885 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
4886 "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" }
4889 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4890 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4891 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4893 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
4894 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
4895 "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", {});
4897 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4898 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4899 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4901 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
4902 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
4903 "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", {});
4905 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4906 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4907 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4909 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
4910 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
4911 "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", {});
4913 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4914 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4915 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4917 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
4918 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
4919 "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", {});
4923 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4924 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4926 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4927 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4928 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4929 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4931 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4932 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4933 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4935 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4936 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4938 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
4939 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4941 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4942 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
4943 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4947 fn test_key_derivation() {
4948 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4949 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4951 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4952 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4954 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4955 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4957 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4958 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4960 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4961 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4963 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4964 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4966 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4967 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4969 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4970 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());