1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
309 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
310 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
312 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
316 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
318 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
322 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
323 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
324 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
325 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
326 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
328 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
329 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
331 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
333 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
334 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
336 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
337 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
338 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
339 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
340 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
341 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
343 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
344 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
346 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
347 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
348 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
349 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
350 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
352 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
353 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
355 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
356 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
358 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
359 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
360 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
361 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
367 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
368 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
370 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
371 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
377 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
378 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
380 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
381 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
382 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
387 macro_rules! secp_check {
388 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
391 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
396 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
397 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
398 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
399 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
400 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
401 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
402 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
403 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
405 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
407 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
409 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
413 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
415 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
416 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
417 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
419 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
420 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
422 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
423 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
424 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
425 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
426 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
428 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
429 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
433 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
439 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
442 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
443 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
444 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
445 holding_cell_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
449 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
450 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
451 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
452 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
453 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
454 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
455 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
456 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
457 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
458 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
461 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
462 struct HTLCCandidate {
464 origin: HTLCInitiator,
468 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
476 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
478 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
480 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
481 htlc_value_msat: u64,
482 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
487 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
488 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
489 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
490 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
491 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
493 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
494 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
495 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
496 htlc_value_msat: u64,
498 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
499 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
503 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
504 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
505 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
506 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
507 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
508 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
509 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
510 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
511 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
512 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
513 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
516 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
517 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
518 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
519 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
520 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
521 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
522 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
523 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
526 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
527 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
528 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
529 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
532 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
533 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
534 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
535 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
536 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
537 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
538 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
539 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
540 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
541 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
542 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
543 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
544 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
545 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
546 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
549 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
550 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
551 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
553 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
554 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
555 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
556 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
558 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
559 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
560 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
561 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
562 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
564 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
565 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
566 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
567 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
569 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
570 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
571 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
573 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
574 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
575 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
576 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
577 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
579 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
580 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
583 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
584 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
586 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
587 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
588 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
589 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
590 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
592 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
596 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
597 (0, update, required),
598 (2, blocked, required),
601 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
602 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
603 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
605 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
606 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
607 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
608 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
610 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
614 channel_id: [u8; 32],
615 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
618 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
619 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
621 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
622 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
623 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
626 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
627 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
628 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
631 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
633 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
635 holder_signer: Signer,
636 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
637 destination_script: Script,
639 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
640 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
641 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
643 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
644 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
645 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
646 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
647 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
648 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
650 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
651 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
652 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
653 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
654 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
655 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
657 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
659 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
660 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
661 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
663 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
664 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
665 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
666 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
667 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
668 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
669 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
671 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
673 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
674 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
675 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
676 // HTLCs with similar state.
677 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
678 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
679 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
680 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
681 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
682 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
683 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
684 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
685 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
688 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
689 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
690 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
692 update_time_counter: u32,
694 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
695 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
696 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
699 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
701 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
702 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
704 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
705 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
706 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
707 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
709 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
710 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
712 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
714 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
716 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
717 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
718 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
719 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
720 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
721 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
723 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
724 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
725 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
726 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
727 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
729 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
730 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
731 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
732 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
733 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
734 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
735 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
736 channel_creation_height: u32,
738 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
741 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
743 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
748 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
753 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
755 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
756 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
759 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
761 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
763 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
764 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
766 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
768 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
769 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
770 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
772 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
774 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
775 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
777 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
778 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
779 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
781 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
783 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
785 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
786 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
787 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
788 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
790 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
791 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
792 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
794 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
795 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
796 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
798 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
799 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
800 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
801 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
803 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
805 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
808 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
809 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
810 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
811 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
813 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
814 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
816 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
817 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
818 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
819 /// unblock the state machine.
821 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
822 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
823 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
825 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
826 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
827 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
829 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
830 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
831 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
832 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
833 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
834 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
835 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
836 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
838 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
839 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
841 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
842 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
843 // the channel's funding UTXO.
845 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
846 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
847 // associated channel mapping.
849 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
850 // to store all of them.
851 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
853 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
854 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
855 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
856 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
857 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
859 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
860 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
863 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
865 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
866 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
867 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
869 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
870 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
871 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
872 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
873 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
876 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
877 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
878 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
881 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
882 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
883 self.update_time_counter
886 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
887 self.latest_monitor_update_id
890 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
891 self.config.announced_channel
894 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
895 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
898 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
899 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
900 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
901 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
904 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
905 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
906 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
909 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
910 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
911 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
912 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
913 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
916 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
917 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
918 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
919 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
920 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
925 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
929 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
931 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
932 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
933 self.temporary_channel_id
936 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
940 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
941 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
942 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
946 /// Gets the channel's type
947 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
951 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
952 /// is_usable() returns true).
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
955 self.short_channel_id
958 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
959 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
960 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
963 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
964 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
965 self.outbound_scid_alias
968 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
969 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
970 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
971 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
972 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
975 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
976 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
977 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
978 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
981 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
982 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
983 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
986 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
987 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
988 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
989 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
993 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
996 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
997 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1000 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1001 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1004 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1005 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1006 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1009 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1010 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1013 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1014 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1015 self.counterparty_node_id
1018 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1019 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1020 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1023 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1024 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1025 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1028 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1029 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1031 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1032 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1033 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1034 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1036 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1040 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1041 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1042 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1045 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1046 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1050 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1051 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1052 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1054 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1055 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1060 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1061 self.channel_value_satoshis
1064 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1065 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1068 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1069 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1072 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1073 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1076 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1077 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1078 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1081 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1082 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1083 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1086 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1087 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1088 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1091 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1092 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1093 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1096 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1097 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1098 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1101 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1102 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1103 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1106 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1107 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1108 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1109 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1110 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1113 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1115 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1116 self.prev_config = None;
1120 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1121 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1125 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1126 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1127 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1128 let did_channel_update =
1129 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1130 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1131 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1132 if did_channel_update {
1133 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1134 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1135 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1136 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1138 self.config.options = *config;
1142 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1143 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1144 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1147 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1148 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1149 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1150 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1151 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1153 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1154 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1155 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1156 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1157 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1158 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1159 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1161 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1162 where L::Target: Logger
1164 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1165 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1166 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1168 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1169 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1170 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1171 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1173 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1174 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1175 if match update_state {
1176 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1177 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1178 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1179 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1180 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1182 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1186 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1187 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1188 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1189 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1191 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1192 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1193 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1195 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1196 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1197 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1198 transaction_output_index: None
1203 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1204 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1205 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1206 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1207 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1210 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1212 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1213 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1214 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1216 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1217 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1220 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1221 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1224 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1226 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1227 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1228 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1230 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1231 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1237 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1238 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1239 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1240 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1241 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1242 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1243 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1247 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1248 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1250 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1252 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1253 if generated_by_local {
1254 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1255 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1264 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1266 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1267 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1268 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1269 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1270 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1271 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1272 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1275 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1276 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1277 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1278 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1282 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1283 preimages.push(preimage);
1287 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1288 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1290 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1292 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1293 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1295 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1296 if !generated_by_local {
1297 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1305 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1306 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1307 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1308 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1309 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1310 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1311 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1312 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1314 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1316 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1317 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1318 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1319 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1321 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1323 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1324 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1325 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1326 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1329 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1330 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1331 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1332 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1334 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1337 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1338 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1339 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1340 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1342 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1345 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1346 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1351 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1352 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1357 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1359 let channel_parameters =
1360 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1361 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1362 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1365 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1370 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1373 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1374 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1375 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1376 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1378 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1379 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1380 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1388 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1389 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1395 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1396 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1397 /// our counterparty!)
1398 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1399 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1400 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1401 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1402 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1403 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1404 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1406 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1410 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1411 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1412 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1413 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1414 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1415 //may see payments to it!
1416 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1417 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1418 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1420 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1423 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1424 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1425 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1426 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1427 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1430 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1431 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1434 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1438 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1439 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1440 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1441 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1442 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1443 // which are near the dust limit.
1444 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1445 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1446 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1447 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1448 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1450 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1451 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1453 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1456 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1457 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1458 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1461 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1462 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1464 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1465 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1466 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1467 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1468 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1469 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1470 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1473 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1476 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1477 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1478 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1480 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1481 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1482 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1483 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1484 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1485 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1487 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1488 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1494 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1495 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1497 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1498 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1499 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1500 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1501 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1502 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1503 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1506 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1509 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1510 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1511 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1513 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1514 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1515 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1516 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1517 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1518 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1520 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1521 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1525 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1526 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1527 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1528 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1529 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1530 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1531 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1533 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1534 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1536 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1543 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1544 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1545 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1546 /// corner case properly.
1547 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1548 let context = &self;
1549 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1550 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1551 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1553 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1554 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1555 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1556 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1559 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1561 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1562 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1564 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1566 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1568 if context.is_outbound() {
1569 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1570 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1572 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1573 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1575 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1576 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1577 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1578 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1581 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1582 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1583 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1584 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1586 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1587 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1588 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1589 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1590 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1591 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1592 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1593 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1594 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1595 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1597 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1600 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1601 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1602 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1603 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1604 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1607 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1608 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1610 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1611 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1612 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1614 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1615 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1616 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1617 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1621 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1623 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1624 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1625 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1626 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1627 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1628 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1630 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1631 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1633 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1634 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1635 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1637 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1638 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1639 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1640 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1641 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1644 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1645 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1646 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1647 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1648 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1649 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1652 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1653 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1654 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1656 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1660 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1661 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1663 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1664 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1668 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1669 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1670 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1671 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1673 outbound_capacity_msat,
1674 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1675 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1680 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1681 let context = &self;
1682 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1685 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1686 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1688 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1689 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1691 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1692 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1694 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1695 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1696 let context = &self;
1697 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1699 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1702 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1703 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1705 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1706 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1708 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1709 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1711 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1712 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1716 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1717 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1723 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1724 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1725 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1728 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1729 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1730 included_htlcs += 1;
1733 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1734 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1738 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1739 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1740 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1741 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1742 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1743 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1748 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1750 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1751 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1756 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1757 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1761 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1762 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1766 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1767 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1769 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1770 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1771 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1773 total_pending_htlcs,
1774 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1775 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1776 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1778 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1779 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1780 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1782 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1784 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1789 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1790 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1792 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1793 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1795 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1796 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1798 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1799 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1800 let context = &self;
1801 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1803 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1806 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1807 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1809 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1810 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1812 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1813 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1815 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1816 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1821 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1827 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1828 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1829 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1830 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1831 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1832 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1835 included_htlcs += 1;
1838 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1839 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1842 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1843 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1845 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1846 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1847 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1852 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1853 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1857 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1858 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1860 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1861 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1863 total_pending_htlcs,
1864 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1865 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1866 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1868 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1869 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1870 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1872 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1874 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1879 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1880 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1881 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1882 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1888 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1889 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1890 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1891 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1892 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1893 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1894 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1895 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1896 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1897 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1898 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1900 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1901 // return them to fail the payment.
1902 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1903 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1904 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1906 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1907 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1912 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1913 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1914 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1915 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1916 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1917 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1918 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1919 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1920 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1921 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1922 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1923 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1924 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1929 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1930 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1931 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1935 // Internal utility functions for channels
1937 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1938 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1939 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1941 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1943 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1944 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1945 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1947 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1950 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1952 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1955 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1956 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1957 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1959 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1961 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1962 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1963 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1964 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1965 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1968 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1969 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1970 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1971 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1972 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1973 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1974 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1977 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1978 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1980 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1981 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1984 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1985 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1986 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1987 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1988 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1989 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1992 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1993 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1994 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1997 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1998 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1999 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2000 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2003 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2004 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2006 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2007 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2008 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2012 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2013 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2014 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2015 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2017 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2018 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2019 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2020 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2021 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2022 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2023 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2026 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2027 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2028 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2029 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2030 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2031 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2032 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2033 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2035 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2036 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2046 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2047 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2048 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2049 // outside of those situations will fail.
2050 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2054 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2059 1 + // script length (0)
2063 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2064 2 + // witness marker and flag
2065 1 + // witness element count
2066 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2067 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2068 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2069 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2070 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2071 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2073 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2074 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2075 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2081 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2082 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2083 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2084 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2086 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2087 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2088 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2090 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2091 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2092 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2093 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2094 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2095 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2098 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2099 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2102 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2103 value_to_holder = 0;
2106 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2107 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2108 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2109 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2111 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2112 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2115 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2116 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2119 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2122 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2123 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2125 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2127 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2128 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2129 where L::Target: Logger {
2130 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2131 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2132 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2133 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2134 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2135 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2136 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2137 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2141 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2142 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2143 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2144 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2146 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2147 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2149 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2151 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2153 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2154 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2155 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2157 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2158 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2159 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2160 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2161 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2163 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2164 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2165 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2167 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2168 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2170 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2173 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2174 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2178 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2182 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2183 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2184 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2185 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2186 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2187 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2190 // Now update local state:
2192 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2193 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2194 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2195 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2196 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2197 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2198 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2202 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2203 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2204 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2205 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2206 // do not not get into this branch.
2207 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2208 match pending_update {
2209 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2210 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2211 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2212 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2213 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2214 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2215 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2218 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2219 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2220 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2221 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2222 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2223 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2224 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2230 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2231 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2232 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2234 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2235 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2236 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2238 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2239 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2242 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2243 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2245 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2246 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2248 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2249 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2252 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2255 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2256 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2257 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2258 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2263 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2264 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2265 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2266 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2267 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2268 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2269 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2270 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2271 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2272 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2273 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2274 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2275 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2276 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2277 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2278 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2279 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2281 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2283 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2284 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2285 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2286 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2287 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2288 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2289 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2291 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2292 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2295 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2296 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2297 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2298 update, blocked: true,
2303 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2304 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2305 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2306 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2310 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2314 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2315 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2316 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2317 /// before we fail backwards.
2319 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2320 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2321 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2322 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2323 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2324 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2325 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2328 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2329 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2330 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2331 /// before we fail backwards.
2333 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2334 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2335 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2336 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2337 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2338 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2339 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2341 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2343 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2344 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2345 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2347 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2348 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2349 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2351 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2352 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2353 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2355 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2360 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2361 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2367 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2368 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2369 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2370 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2371 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2375 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2376 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2377 force_holding_cell = true;
2380 // Now update local state:
2381 if force_holding_cell {
2382 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2383 match pending_update {
2384 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2385 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2386 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2387 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2391 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2392 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2393 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2394 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2400 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2401 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2402 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2408 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2410 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2411 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2414 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2415 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2416 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2421 // Message handlers:
2423 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2424 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2425 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2426 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2427 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2429 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2432 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2433 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2435 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2438 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2439 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2440 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2441 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2444 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2446 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2447 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2448 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2449 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2451 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2452 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2454 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2455 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2457 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2458 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2459 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2460 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2461 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2462 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2466 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2467 initial_commitment_tx,
2470 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2471 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2474 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2475 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2478 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2479 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2480 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2481 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2482 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2483 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2484 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2485 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2486 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2487 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2488 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2489 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2491 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2493 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2495 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2496 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2497 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2498 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2500 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2502 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2503 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2507 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2508 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2510 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2511 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2512 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2513 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2515 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2518 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2519 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2520 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2523 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2524 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2525 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2526 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2527 // when routing outbound payments.
2528 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2532 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2534 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2535 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2536 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2537 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2538 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2539 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2540 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2541 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2542 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2544 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2545 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2546 let expected_point =
2547 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2548 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2550 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2551 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2552 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2553 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2554 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2555 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2557 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2558 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2559 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2560 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2561 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2563 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2564 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2571 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2572 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2574 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2576 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2579 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2580 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2581 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2582 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2583 if local_sent_shutdown {
2584 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2586 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2587 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2588 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2591 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2594 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2597 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2600 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2601 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2604 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2605 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2606 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2607 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2609 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2610 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2612 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2613 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2614 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2615 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2616 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2617 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2618 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2619 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2620 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2621 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2622 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2624 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2625 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2626 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2627 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2628 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2629 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2633 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2636 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2637 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2638 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2640 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2641 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2642 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2643 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2644 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2645 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2646 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2650 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2651 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2652 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2653 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2654 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2655 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2656 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2660 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2661 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2662 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2663 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2664 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2668 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2669 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2670 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2671 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2672 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2674 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2675 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2678 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2682 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2683 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2684 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2685 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2686 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2687 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2688 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2689 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2690 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2691 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2692 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2693 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2694 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2695 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2696 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2697 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2700 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2701 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2702 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2703 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2704 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2707 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2708 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2710 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2711 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2714 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2715 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2716 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2720 // Now update local state:
2721 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2722 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2723 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2724 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2725 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2726 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2727 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2732 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2734 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2735 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2736 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2737 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2738 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2739 None => fail_reason.into(),
2740 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2741 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2742 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2743 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2745 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2749 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2751 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2752 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2754 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2760 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2763 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2764 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2767 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2771 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2774 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2775 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2778 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2782 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2786 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2787 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2788 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2790 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2794 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2798 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2799 where L::Target: Logger
2801 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2802 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2804 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2807 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2811 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2813 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2815 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2816 let commitment_txid = {
2817 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2818 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2819 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2821 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2822 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2823 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2824 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2825 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2830 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2832 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2833 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2834 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2835 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2838 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2839 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2840 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2844 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2846 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2847 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2848 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2849 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2850 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2851 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2852 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2853 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2854 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2855 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2856 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2862 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2866 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2867 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2868 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2869 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2870 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2871 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2872 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2873 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2874 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2875 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2876 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2877 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2878 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2881 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2882 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2883 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2884 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2885 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2886 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
2887 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2889 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2890 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2891 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2892 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2893 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2894 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2895 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2898 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2899 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2902 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2904 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2905 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2906 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2909 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2912 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2913 commitment_stats.tx,
2915 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2916 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2917 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2920 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2921 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2923 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2924 let mut need_commitment = false;
2925 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2926 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2927 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2928 need_commitment = true;
2932 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2933 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2934 Some(forward_info.clone())
2936 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2937 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2938 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2939 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2940 need_commitment = true;
2943 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2944 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2945 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2946 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2947 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2948 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2949 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2950 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2951 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2952 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2953 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2954 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2955 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2956 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2958 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2960 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2961 need_commitment = true;
2965 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2966 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2967 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2968 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2969 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2970 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2972 nondust_htlc_sources,
2976 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2977 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2978 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2979 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2981 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2982 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2983 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2984 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2985 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2986 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2987 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2988 // includes the right HTLCs.
2989 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2990 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2991 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2992 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2993 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2994 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2996 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2997 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2998 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3001 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3002 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3003 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3004 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3005 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3006 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3007 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3008 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3009 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3013 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3014 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3015 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3016 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3019 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3020 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3021 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3022 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3023 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3024 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3025 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3026 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3029 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3030 /// for our counterparty.
3031 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3032 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3033 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3034 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3035 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3037 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3038 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3039 updates: Vec::new(),
3042 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3043 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3044 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3045 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3046 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3047 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3048 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3049 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3050 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3051 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3052 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3053 // to rebalance channels.
3054 match &htlc_update {
3055 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3056 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3057 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3060 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3061 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3062 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3063 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3064 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3065 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3066 // into the holding cell without ever being
3067 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3068 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3069 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3072 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3078 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3079 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3080 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3081 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3082 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3083 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3084 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3085 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3086 (msg, monitor_update)
3087 } else { unreachable!() };
3088 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3089 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3091 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3092 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3093 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3094 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3095 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3096 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3097 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3098 // for a full revocation before failing.
3099 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3102 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3104 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3111 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3112 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3114 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3115 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3120 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3121 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3122 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3123 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3124 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3126 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3127 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3128 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3130 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3131 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3137 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3138 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3139 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3140 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3141 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3142 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3143 where L::Target: Logger,
3145 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3146 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3148 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3151 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3155 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3157 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3158 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3163 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3164 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3165 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3166 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3167 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3168 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3169 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3170 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3174 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3176 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3177 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3180 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3181 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3183 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3185 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3186 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3187 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3188 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3189 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3190 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3191 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3192 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3196 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3197 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3198 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3199 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3200 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3201 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3202 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3203 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3204 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3206 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3207 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3210 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3211 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3212 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3213 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3214 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3215 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3216 let mut require_commitment = false;
3217 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3220 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3221 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3222 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3224 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3225 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3226 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3227 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3228 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3229 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3234 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3235 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3236 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3237 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3238 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3240 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3241 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3242 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3247 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3248 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3250 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3254 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3255 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3257 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3258 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3259 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3260 require_commitment = true;
3261 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3262 match forward_info {
3263 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3264 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3265 require_commitment = true;
3267 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3268 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3269 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3271 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3272 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3273 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3277 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3278 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3279 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3280 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3286 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3287 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3288 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3289 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3291 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3292 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3293 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3294 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3295 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3296 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3297 require_commitment = true;
3301 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3303 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3304 match update_state {
3305 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3306 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3307 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3308 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3309 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3311 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3312 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3313 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3314 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3315 require_commitment = true;
3316 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3317 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3322 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3323 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3324 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3325 if require_commitment {
3326 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3327 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3328 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3329 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3330 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3331 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3332 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3333 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3334 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3336 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3337 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3338 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3339 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3340 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3343 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3344 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3345 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3346 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3347 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3348 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3349 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3351 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3352 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3354 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3355 if require_commitment {
3356 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3358 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3359 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3360 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3361 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3363 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3364 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3365 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3366 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3368 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3369 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3370 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3376 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3377 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3378 /// commitment update.
3379 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3380 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3381 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3384 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3385 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3386 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3387 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3389 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3390 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3391 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3392 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3393 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3395 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3396 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3398 if !self.context.is_live() {
3399 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3402 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3403 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3404 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3405 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3406 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3407 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3408 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3409 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3410 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3411 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3415 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3416 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3417 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3418 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3419 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3422 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3423 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3427 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3428 force_holding_cell = true;
3431 if force_holding_cell {
3432 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3436 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3437 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3439 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3440 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3445 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3446 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3448 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3450 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3451 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3452 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3453 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3457 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3458 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3459 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3463 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3464 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3467 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3468 // will be retransmitted.
3469 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3470 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3471 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3473 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3474 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3476 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3477 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3478 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3479 // this HTLC accordingly
3480 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3483 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3484 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3485 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3486 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3489 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3490 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3491 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3492 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3493 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3494 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3499 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3501 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3502 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3503 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3504 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3508 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3509 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3510 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3511 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3512 // the update upon reconnection.
3513 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3517 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3519 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3520 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3523 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3524 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3525 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3526 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3527 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3528 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3529 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3531 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3532 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3533 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3534 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3535 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3536 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3537 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3539 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3540 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3541 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3542 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3543 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3544 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3545 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3548 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3549 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3550 /// to the remote side.
3551 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3552 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3553 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3554 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3557 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3559 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3560 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3561 let mut found_blocked = false;
3562 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3563 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3564 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3568 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3569 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3570 // first received the funding_signed.
3571 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3572 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3573 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3575 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3576 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3577 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3578 funding_broadcastable = None;
3581 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3582 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3583 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3584 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3585 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3586 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3587 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3588 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3589 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3590 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3591 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3592 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3593 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3594 next_per_commitment_point,
3595 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3599 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3601 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3602 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3603 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3604 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3605 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3606 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3608 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3609 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3610 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3611 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3612 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3613 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3617 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3618 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3620 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3621 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3622 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3625 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3626 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3627 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3628 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3629 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3630 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3631 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3632 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3633 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3637 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3638 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3640 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3643 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3646 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3647 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3649 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3650 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3651 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3652 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3653 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3654 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3655 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3656 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3657 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3658 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3659 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3660 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3661 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3663 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3665 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3671 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3672 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3673 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3674 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3675 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3676 per_commitment_secret,
3677 next_per_commitment_point,
3679 next_local_nonce: None,
3683 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3684 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3685 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3686 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3687 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3689 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3690 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3691 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3692 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3693 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3694 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3695 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3696 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3697 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3698 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3703 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3704 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3706 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3707 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3708 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3709 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3710 reason: err_packet.clone()
3713 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3714 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3715 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3716 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3717 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3718 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3721 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3722 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3723 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3724 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3725 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3732 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3733 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3734 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3735 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3739 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3740 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3741 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3742 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3743 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3744 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3748 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3749 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3751 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3752 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3753 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3754 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3755 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3756 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3757 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3758 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3761 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3763 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3764 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3765 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3766 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3767 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3770 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3771 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3772 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3775 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3776 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3777 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3778 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3779 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3782 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3783 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3784 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3785 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3786 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3789 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3790 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3791 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3792 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3793 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3794 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3795 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3796 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3800 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3801 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3802 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3803 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3805 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3809 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3810 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3811 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3812 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3814 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3815 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3816 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3817 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3818 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3822 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3824 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3825 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3826 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3827 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3828 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3831 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3832 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3833 channel_ready: None,
3834 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3835 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3836 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3840 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3841 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3842 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3843 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3844 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3845 next_per_commitment_point,
3846 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3848 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3849 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3850 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3854 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3855 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3856 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3858 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3859 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3860 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3863 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3869 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3870 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3871 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3872 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3873 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3874 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3875 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3877 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3879 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3880 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3881 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3882 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3883 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3884 next_per_commitment_point,
3885 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3889 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3890 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3891 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3893 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3896 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3897 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3898 raa: required_revoke,
3899 commitment_update: None,
3900 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3902 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3903 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3904 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3906 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3909 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3910 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3911 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3912 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3913 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3914 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3917 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3918 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3919 raa: required_revoke,
3920 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3921 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3925 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3929 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3930 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3931 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3932 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3934 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3936 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3938 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3939 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3940 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3941 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3942 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3943 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3945 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3946 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3947 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3948 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3949 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3951 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3952 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3953 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3954 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3957 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3958 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3959 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3960 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3961 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3962 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3963 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3964 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3965 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3966 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3967 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3968 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3969 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3970 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3971 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3973 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3976 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3977 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3980 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3981 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3982 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3983 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3984 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3985 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3986 self.context.channel_state &
3987 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3988 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3989 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3990 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3993 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3994 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3995 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3996 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3997 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3998 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
3999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4001 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4007 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4008 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4009 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4010 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4012 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4013 return Ok((None, None));
4016 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4017 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4018 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4020 return Ok((None, None));
4023 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4025 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4026 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4027 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4028 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4030 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4031 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4032 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4034 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4035 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4036 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4037 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4039 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4040 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4041 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4046 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4047 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4049 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4050 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4053 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4054 /// within our expected timeframe.
4056 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4057 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4058 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4061 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4064 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4065 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4068 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4069 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4070 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4071 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4073 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4076 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4077 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4078 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4079 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4082 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4083 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4087 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4089 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4090 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4093 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4094 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4095 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4098 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4101 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4102 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4103 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4104 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4106 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4109 assert!(send_shutdown);
4110 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4111 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4112 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4114 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4117 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4122 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4124 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4125 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4127 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4128 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4129 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4130 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4131 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4132 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4135 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4136 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4137 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4140 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4141 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4142 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4143 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4147 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4148 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4149 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4150 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4151 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4152 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4154 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4155 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4162 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4163 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4165 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4168 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4169 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4171 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4173 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4174 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4175 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4176 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4177 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4178 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4179 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4180 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4181 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4183 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4184 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4187 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4191 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4192 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4193 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4194 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4196 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4199 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4202 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4205 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4209 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4213 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4214 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4215 return Ok((None, None));
4218 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4219 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4220 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4223 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4225 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4228 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4229 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4230 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4231 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4232 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4236 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4237 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4242 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4243 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4244 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4245 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4246 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4247 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4248 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4252 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4254 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4255 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4256 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4257 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4259 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4262 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4263 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4264 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4266 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4267 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4268 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4269 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4273 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4274 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4275 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4276 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4278 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4279 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4280 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4286 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4287 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4290 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4291 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4293 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4294 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4297 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4298 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4299 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4300 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4301 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4303 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4305 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4307 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4308 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4311 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4312 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4313 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4314 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4315 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4316 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4317 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4318 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4323 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4324 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4325 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4326 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4332 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4333 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4334 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4335 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4337 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4343 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4344 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4345 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4346 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4347 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4348 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4349 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4351 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4352 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4355 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4357 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4358 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4364 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4365 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4366 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4367 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4368 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4369 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4370 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4372 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4373 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4380 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4381 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4384 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4385 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4388 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4389 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4393 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4394 &self.context.holder_signer
4398 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4400 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4401 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4402 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4403 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4404 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4405 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4407 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4409 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4417 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4418 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4422 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4423 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4424 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4425 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4428 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4429 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4430 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4433 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4434 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4435 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4436 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4437 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4438 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4439 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
4440 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
4446 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
4447 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
4448 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
4449 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
4450 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4451 update, blocked: !release_monitor
4456 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
4457 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
4459 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4460 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4461 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
4462 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
4465 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
4466 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
4469 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4470 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4471 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
4472 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
4478 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4479 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
4482 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
4483 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4484 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
4485 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
4488 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4489 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4490 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4492 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4493 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4494 if self.context.channel_state &
4495 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4496 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4497 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4498 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4499 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4502 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4503 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4504 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4505 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4506 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4507 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4509 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4510 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4511 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4513 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4514 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4515 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4516 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4517 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4518 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4524 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4525 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4526 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4529 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4530 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4531 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4534 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4535 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4536 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4539 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4540 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4541 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4542 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4543 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4544 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4549 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4550 self.context.channel_update_status
4553 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4554 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4555 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4558 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4560 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4561 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4562 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4566 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4567 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4568 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4571 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4575 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4576 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4577 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4579 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4580 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4581 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4583 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4584 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4587 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4588 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4589 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4590 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4591 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4592 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4593 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4594 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4595 self.context.channel_state);
4597 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4601 if need_commitment_update {
4602 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4603 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4604 let next_per_commitment_point =
4605 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4606 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4607 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4608 next_per_commitment_point,
4609 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4613 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4619 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4620 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4621 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4622 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4623 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4624 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4625 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4627 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4630 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4631 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4632 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4633 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4634 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4635 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4636 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4637 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4638 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4639 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4640 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4641 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4642 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4643 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4644 // channel and move on.
4645 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4646 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4648 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4649 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4650 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4652 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4653 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4654 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4655 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4656 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4657 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4658 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4662 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4663 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4664 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4665 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4666 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4670 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4671 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4672 // may have already happened for this block).
4673 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4674 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4675 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4676 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4679 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4680 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4681 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4682 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4690 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4691 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4692 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4693 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4695 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4696 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4699 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4701 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4702 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4703 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4704 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4706 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4709 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4712 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4713 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4714 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4715 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4717 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4720 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4721 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4722 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4724 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4725 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4727 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4728 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4729 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4737 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4739 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4740 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4741 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4743 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4744 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4747 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4748 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4749 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4750 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4751 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4752 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4753 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4754 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4755 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4758 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4759 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4760 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4761 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4763 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4764 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4765 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4767 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4768 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4769 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4770 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4772 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4773 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4774 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4775 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4776 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4777 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4778 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4781 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4782 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4784 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4787 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4788 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4789 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4790 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4791 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4792 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4793 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4794 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4795 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4796 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4797 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4798 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4799 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4800 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4801 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4802 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4803 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4809 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4814 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4815 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4817 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4818 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4819 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4820 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4822 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4825 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4826 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4827 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4828 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4829 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4830 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4832 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4833 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4836 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4837 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4838 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4839 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4841 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4842 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4844 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4845 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4846 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4847 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4848 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4849 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4855 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4856 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4857 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4858 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4860 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4863 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4867 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4871 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4872 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4876 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4880 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4881 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4884 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4888 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4890 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4895 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4897 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4902 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4904 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4905 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4906 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4907 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4908 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4912 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4914 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4915 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4916 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4917 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4918 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4919 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4920 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4922 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4923 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4924 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4925 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4926 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4927 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4928 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4929 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4930 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4931 contents: announcement,
4934 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4938 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4939 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4940 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4941 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4942 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4943 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4944 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4945 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4947 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4949 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4950 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4951 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4952 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4954 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4955 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4956 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4957 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4960 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4961 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4962 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4963 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4966 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4969 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4970 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4971 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4972 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4973 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4974 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4977 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4979 Err(_) => return None,
4981 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4982 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4987 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4988 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4989 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4990 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4991 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4992 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4993 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4994 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4995 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4996 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4997 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4998 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4999 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5000 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5001 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5002 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5005 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5008 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5009 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5010 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5011 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5012 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5013 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5014 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5015 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5016 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5018 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5019 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5020 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5021 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5022 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5023 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5024 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5025 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5026 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5028 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5029 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5030 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5031 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5032 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5033 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5034 next_funding_txid: None,
5039 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5041 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5042 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5043 /// commitment update.
5045 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5046 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5047 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5048 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5050 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5051 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5053 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5054 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5059 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5060 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5062 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5064 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5065 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5067 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5068 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5069 /// regenerate them.
5071 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5072 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5074 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5075 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5076 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5077 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5078 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5079 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5081 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5082 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5083 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5086 if amount_msat == 0 {
5087 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5090 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5091 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5092 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5093 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5096 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5097 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5098 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5101 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5102 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5103 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5104 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5105 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5106 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5107 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5108 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5111 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5112 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5113 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5114 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5115 else { "to peer" });
5117 if need_holding_cell {
5118 force_holding_cell = true;
5121 // Now update local state:
5122 if force_holding_cell {
5123 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5128 onion_routing_packet,
5133 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5134 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5136 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5138 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5142 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5143 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5144 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5148 onion_routing_packet,
5149 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
5151 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5156 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5157 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5158 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5159 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5161 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5162 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5163 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5165 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5166 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5170 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5171 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5172 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5173 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5174 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5175 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5176 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5179 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5180 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5181 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5182 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5183 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5184 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5187 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5189 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5190 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5191 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5193 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5194 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5197 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5198 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5199 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5200 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5201 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5202 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5203 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5204 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5207 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5211 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5212 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5213 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5214 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5216 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5218 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5219 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5220 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5221 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5222 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5223 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5224 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5225 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5226 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5227 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
5228 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5234 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5237 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5238 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5239 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5240 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5242 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5244 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5245 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5246 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5247 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5250 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5251 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5255 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5256 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5258 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5260 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5261 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5262 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5263 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5265 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5266 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5267 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5268 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5269 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5270 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5274 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5275 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5279 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5280 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5283 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5284 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5286 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5287 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5288 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5289 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5290 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5293 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5294 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5295 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5301 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5302 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5305 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5306 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5307 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5308 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5314 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5315 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5317 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5318 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5319 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5320 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5321 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5322 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5323 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5324 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5325 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5328 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5329 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5330 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5332 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5333 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5336 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5337 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5339 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5340 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5341 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5344 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5345 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5346 let mut chan_closed = false;
5347 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5351 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5353 None if !chan_closed => {
5354 // use override shutdown script if provided
5355 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5356 Some(script) => script,
5358 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5359 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5360 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5361 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5365 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5366 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5368 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5374 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5375 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5376 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5377 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5379 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5381 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5383 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5384 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5385 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5386 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5387 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5388 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5391 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5392 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
5393 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
5396 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5397 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5398 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5401 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5402 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5403 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5404 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5405 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5407 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5408 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5415 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5416 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5418 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5421 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5422 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5423 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5425 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5426 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5430 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5434 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5435 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5436 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5439 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5440 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5441 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5442 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5443 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5444 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5445 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5446 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5447 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5449 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5450 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5451 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5452 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5454 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5455 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5457 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5458 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5460 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5461 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5462 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5464 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5465 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5467 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5468 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5469 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5470 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5471 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5474 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5475 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5477 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5479 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5480 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
5481 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5482 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5485 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5486 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5488 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5489 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5490 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5491 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5495 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5496 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5497 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5501 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5502 Ok(script) => script,
5503 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5506 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5509 context: ChannelContext {
5512 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5513 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5514 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5515 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5520 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5522 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5523 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5524 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5525 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5527 channel_value_satoshis,
5529 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5532 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5535 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5536 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5539 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5540 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5541 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5542 pending_update_fee: None,
5543 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5544 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5545 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5546 update_time_counter: 1,
5548 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5550 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5551 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5552 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5553 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5554 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5555 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5557 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5558 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5559 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5560 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5562 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5563 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5564 closing_fee_limits: None,
5565 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5567 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5569 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5570 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5571 short_channel_id: None,
5572 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5574 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5575 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5576 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5577 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5578 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5579 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5580 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5581 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5582 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5583 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5584 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5585 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5587 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5589 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5590 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5591 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5592 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5593 counterparty_parameters: None,
5594 funding_outpoint: None,
5595 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
5596 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
5598 funding_transaction: None,
5600 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5601 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5602 counterparty_node_id,
5604 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5606 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5608 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5609 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5611 announcement_sigs: None,
5613 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5614 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5615 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5616 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5618 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5619 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5621 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5622 outbound_scid_alias,
5624 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5625 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5627 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5628 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5633 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5638 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5639 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5640 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5641 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5642 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5643 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5646 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5647 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5648 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5649 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5650 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5651 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5652 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5653 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5654 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5655 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5656 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5658 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5659 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5661 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5662 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5663 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5664 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5667 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5668 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5670 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5673 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5674 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5675 return Err((self, e));
5679 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5681 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5683 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5684 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5685 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5687 let channel = Channel {
5688 context: self.context,
5691 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5692 temporary_channel_id,
5693 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5694 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5697 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5699 next_local_nonce: None,
5703 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5704 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5705 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5706 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5707 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5708 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5709 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5710 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5711 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5712 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5715 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5716 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5717 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5719 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
5720 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5721 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5722 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5729 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5730 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5731 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5732 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5733 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5734 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5735 // We've exhausted our options
5738 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5739 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5742 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5743 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5744 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5745 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5747 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5748 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5749 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
5750 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
5751 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5752 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5754 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5756 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5759 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5760 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5761 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5763 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5764 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5767 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5768 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5771 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5772 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5776 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5777 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5778 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5779 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5780 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5781 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5782 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5783 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5784 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5785 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5786 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5787 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5788 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5789 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5790 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5791 first_per_commitment_point,
5792 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5793 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5794 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5795 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5797 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5802 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5803 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5805 // Check sanity of message fields:
5806 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5807 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5809 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5810 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5812 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5815 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5816 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5818 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5819 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5821 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5822 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5823 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5825 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5826 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5827 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5829 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5830 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5831 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5833 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5836 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5837 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5840 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5841 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5842 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5844 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5845 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5847 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5850 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5851 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5853 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5856 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5859 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5863 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5864 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5867 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5868 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5870 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5871 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5872 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5874 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
5877 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5878 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5879 &Some(ref script) => {
5880 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5881 if script.len() == 0 {
5884 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5885 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5887 Some(script.clone())
5890 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5897 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5898 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5899 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5900 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5901 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5903 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5904 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5906 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5909 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5910 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5911 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5912 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5913 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5914 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5917 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5918 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5919 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5922 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5923 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5925 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5926 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5932 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5933 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5934 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5937 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5938 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5939 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5940 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5941 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5942 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5943 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5944 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5945 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5946 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5947 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5948 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5951 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5953 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5954 // support this channel type.
5955 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5956 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5957 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5960 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5961 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5962 // `static_remote_key`.
5963 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5966 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5967 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5970 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5973 channel_type.clone()
5975 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5976 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5981 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5983 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
5984 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5985 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5986 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5987 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5988 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5989 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5990 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5991 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5994 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5995 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
5998 // Check sanity of message fields:
5999 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6002 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6005 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6006 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6008 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6009 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6010 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6012 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6015 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6016 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6018 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6020 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6021 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6024 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6025 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6027 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6031 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6032 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6035 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6038 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6039 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6041 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6044 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6047 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6050 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6054 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6056 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6057 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6062 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6063 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6064 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6065 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6068 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6071 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6072 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6073 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6075 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6079 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6080 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6081 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6082 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
6083 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6087 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6088 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6089 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6090 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6091 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6094 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6095 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6096 &Some(ref script) => {
6097 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6098 if script.len() == 0 {
6101 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6104 Some(script.clone())
6107 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6114 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6115 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6116 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6117 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6121 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6122 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6127 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6128 Ok(script) => script,
6129 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6132 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6133 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6136 context: ChannelContext {
6139 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6140 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6142 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6147 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6149 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6150 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6151 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6152 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6155 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6158 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6161 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6162 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6163 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6165 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6166 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6167 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6168 pending_update_fee: None,
6169 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6170 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6171 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6172 update_time_counter: 1,
6174 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6176 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6177 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6178 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6179 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6180 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6181 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6183 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6184 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6185 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6186 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6188 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6189 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6190 closing_fee_limits: None,
6191 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6193 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6195 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6196 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6197 short_channel_id: None,
6198 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6200 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6201 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6202 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6203 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6204 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6205 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6206 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6207 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6208 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6209 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6210 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6211 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6212 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6214 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6216 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6217 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6218 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6219 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6220 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6221 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6222 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6224 funding_outpoint: None,
6225 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
6226 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6228 funding_transaction: None,
6230 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6231 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6232 counterparty_node_id,
6234 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6236 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6238 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6239 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6241 announcement_sigs: None,
6243 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6244 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6245 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6246 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6248 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6249 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6251 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6252 outbound_scid_alias,
6254 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6255 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6257 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6258 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6263 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6270 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6271 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6274 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6275 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6276 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6277 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6280 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6281 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6283 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6284 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6285 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6286 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6288 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6289 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6291 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6292 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6294 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6295 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6298 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6299 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6301 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6304 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6305 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6306 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6308 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6309 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6310 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6311 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6313 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6314 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6315 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6316 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6317 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6318 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6319 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6320 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6321 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6322 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6323 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6324 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6325 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6326 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6327 first_per_commitment_point,
6328 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6329 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6330 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6332 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6334 next_local_nonce: None,
6338 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6339 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6341 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6343 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6344 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6347 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6348 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6350 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6351 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6353 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6354 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6355 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6356 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6357 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6358 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6359 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6360 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6361 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6364 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6365 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6367 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6368 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6369 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6370 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6372 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6373 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6375 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6376 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6379 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6380 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6381 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6383 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6386 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6387 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6389 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6390 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6391 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6393 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6395 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6396 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6398 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6399 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6400 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6401 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6404 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6405 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6406 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6407 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6408 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6410 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6412 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6413 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6414 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6417 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6418 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6419 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6423 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6424 initial_commitment_tx,
6427 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6428 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6431 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6432 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6435 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6437 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6438 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6439 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6440 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6441 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6442 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6443 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6444 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6445 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6446 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6447 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6449 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6451 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6453 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6454 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6455 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6456 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6458 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6460 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6461 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6462 let mut channel = Channel {
6463 context: self.context,
6465 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6466 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6467 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6469 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6473 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6474 }, channel_monitor))
6478 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6479 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6481 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6487 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6488 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6489 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6490 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6491 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6493 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6494 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6495 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6496 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6502 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6503 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6504 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6505 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6506 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6507 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6512 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6514 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6515 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6517 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6518 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6519 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6520 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6525 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6526 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6527 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6528 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6529 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6530 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6535 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6536 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6537 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6540 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6542 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6543 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6544 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6545 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6546 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6548 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6549 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6550 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6551 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6553 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6554 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6555 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6557 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6559 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6560 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6561 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6562 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6563 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6564 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6566 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6567 // deserialized from that format.
6568 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6569 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6570 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6572 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6574 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6575 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6576 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6578 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6579 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6580 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6581 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6584 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6585 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6586 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6589 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6590 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6591 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6592 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6594 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6595 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6597 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6599 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6601 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6603 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6606 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6608 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6613 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6615 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6616 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6617 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6618 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6619 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6620 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6621 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6623 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6625 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6627 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6630 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6631 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6632 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6635 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6637 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6638 preimages.push(preimage);
6640 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6641 reason.write(writer)?;
6643 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6645 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6646 preimages.push(preimage);
6648 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6649 reason.write(writer)?;
6654 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6655 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6657 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6659 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6660 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6661 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6662 source.write(writer)?;
6663 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6665 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6667 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6668 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6670 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6672 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6673 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6678 match self.context.resend_order {
6679 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6680 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6683 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6684 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6685 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6687 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6688 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6689 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6690 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6693 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6694 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6695 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6696 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6697 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6700 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6701 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6702 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6703 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6705 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6706 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6707 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6709 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6711 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6712 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6713 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6714 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6716 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6717 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6718 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6719 // consider the stale state on reload.
6722 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6723 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6724 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6726 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6727 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6728 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6730 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6731 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6733 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6734 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6735 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6737 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6738 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6740 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6743 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6744 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6745 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6747 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6750 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6751 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6753 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6754 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6755 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6757 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6759 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6761 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6764 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6766 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6767 htlc.write(writer)?;
6770 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6771 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6772 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6774 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6775 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6777 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6778 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6779 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6780 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6781 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6782 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6783 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6785 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6786 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6787 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6788 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6789 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6791 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6792 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6794 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6795 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6796 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6797 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6799 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6801 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6802 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6803 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6804 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6805 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6806 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6807 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6809 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6810 (2, chan_type, option),
6811 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6812 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6813 (5, self.context.config, required),
6814 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6815 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6816 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6817 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6818 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6819 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6820 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6821 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6822 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6823 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6824 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6825 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6826 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6827 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6828 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6829 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6836 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6837 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6839 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6840 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6842 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6843 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6844 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6846 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6847 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6848 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6849 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6851 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6853 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6854 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6855 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6859 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6860 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6863 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6864 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6865 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 let mut keys_data = None;
6871 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6872 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6873 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6875 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6876 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6877 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6878 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6879 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6880 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6884 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6885 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6886 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6889 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6891 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6892 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6893 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6898 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6899 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6900 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6901 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6902 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6903 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6904 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6905 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6906 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6907 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6908 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6909 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6914 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6915 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6916 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6917 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6918 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6919 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6920 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6921 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6922 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6923 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6924 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6925 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6927 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6928 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6931 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6935 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6938 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6943 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6944 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6945 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6946 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6947 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6948 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6949 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6950 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6951 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6952 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6954 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6955 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6956 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6958 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6959 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6960 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6962 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6966 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6967 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6968 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6969 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6972 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6974 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6976 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6977 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6978 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6979 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6982 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6983 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6984 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6985 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6988 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6992 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6995 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6997 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6998 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6999 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7000 // consider the stale state on reload.
7001 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7004 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7011 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7012 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7017 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7018 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7020 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7021 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7023 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7024 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7027 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7028 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7030 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7032 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7033 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7035 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7036 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7041 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7042 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7043 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7044 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7046 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7049 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7052 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7054 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7055 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7057 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7058 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7062 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7063 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7064 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7066 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7068 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7072 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7073 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7074 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7076 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7082 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7083 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7084 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7085 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7086 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7087 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7088 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7089 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7090 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7091 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7093 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7094 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7095 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7096 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7097 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7098 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7099 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7101 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7102 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7103 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7104 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7106 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7108 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7109 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7110 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7111 (2, channel_type, option),
7112 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7113 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7114 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7115 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7116 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7117 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7118 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7119 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7120 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7121 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7122 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7123 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7124 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7125 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7126 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7127 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7128 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7129 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7130 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7133 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7134 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7135 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7136 // required channel parameters.
7137 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7138 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7139 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7141 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7143 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7144 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7145 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7146 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7149 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7150 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7151 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7153 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7154 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7156 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7157 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7162 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7163 if iter.next().is_some() {
7164 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7168 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7169 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7170 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7171 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7172 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7175 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7176 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7178 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7179 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7180 // separate u64 values.
7181 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7183 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7186 context: ChannelContext {
7189 config: config.unwrap(),
7193 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7194 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7195 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7198 temporary_channel_id,
7200 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7202 channel_value_satoshis,
7204 latest_monitor_update_id,
7207 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7210 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7211 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7214 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7215 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7216 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7217 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7221 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7222 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7223 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7224 monitor_pending_forwards,
7225 monitor_pending_failures,
7226 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7229 holding_cell_update_fee,
7230 next_holder_htlc_id,
7231 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7232 update_time_counter,
7235 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7236 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7237 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7238 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7240 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7241 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7242 closing_fee_limits: None,
7243 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7245 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7247 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7248 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7250 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7252 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7253 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7254 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7255 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7256 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7257 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7258 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7259 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7260 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7263 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7265 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7266 funding_transaction,
7268 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7269 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7270 counterparty_node_id,
7272 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7276 channel_update_status,
7277 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7281 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7282 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7283 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7284 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7286 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7287 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7289 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7290 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7291 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7293 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7294 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7296 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7297 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7299 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7302 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7311 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7312 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7313 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7314 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7315 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7317 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7318 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7320 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7321 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7322 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7323 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7324 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7325 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7326 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7327 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7328 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7329 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7330 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7331 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7332 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7333 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7334 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7335 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7336 use crate::util::test_utils;
7337 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7338 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7339 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7340 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7341 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7342 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7343 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7344 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7345 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7346 use crate::prelude::*;
7348 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7351 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7352 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7358 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7359 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7360 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7361 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7365 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7366 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7367 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7368 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7369 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7370 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7371 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7375 signer: InMemorySigner,
7378 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7379 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7382 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7383 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7385 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7386 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7389 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7393 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7395 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7396 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7397 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7398 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7399 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7402 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7403 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7404 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7405 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7409 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7410 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7411 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7415 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7416 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7417 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7418 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7420 let seed = [42; 32];
7421 let network = Network::Testnet;
7422 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7423 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7424 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7427 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7428 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7429 let config = UserConfig::default();
7430 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7431 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7432 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7434 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7435 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7439 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7440 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7442 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7443 let original_fee = 253;
7444 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7445 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7446 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7447 let seed = [42; 32];
7448 let network = Network::Testnet;
7449 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7451 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7452 let config = UserConfig::default();
7453 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7455 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7456 // same as the old fee.
7457 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7458 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7459 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7463 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7464 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7465 // dust limits are used.
7466 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7467 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7468 let seed = [42; 32];
7469 let network = Network::Testnet;
7470 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7471 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7472 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7474 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7475 // they have different dust limits.
7477 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7478 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7479 let config = UserConfig::default();
7480 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7482 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7483 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7484 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7485 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7486 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7488 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7489 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7490 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7491 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7492 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7494 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7495 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7496 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7497 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7499 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7500 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7501 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7503 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7504 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7506 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7507 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7508 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7510 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7511 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7512 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7513 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7516 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7518 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7519 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7520 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7521 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7522 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7523 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7524 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7525 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7526 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7530 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7531 // the dust limit check.
7532 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7533 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7534 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7535 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7537 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7538 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7539 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7540 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7541 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7542 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7543 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7547 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7548 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7549 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7550 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7551 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7552 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7553 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7554 let seed = [42; 32];
7555 let network = Network::Testnet;
7556 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7558 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7559 let config = UserConfig::default();
7560 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7562 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7563 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7565 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7566 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7567 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7568 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7569 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7570 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7572 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7573 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7574 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7575 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7576 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7578 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7580 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7581 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7582 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7583 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7584 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7586 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7587 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7588 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7589 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7590 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7594 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7595 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7596 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7597 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7598 let seed = [42; 32];
7599 let network = Network::Testnet;
7600 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7601 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7602 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7604 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7606 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7607 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7608 let config = UserConfig::default();
7609 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7611 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7612 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7613 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7614 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7616 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7617 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7618 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7620 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7621 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7622 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7623 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7625 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7626 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7627 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7629 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7630 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7632 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7633 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7634 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7635 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7636 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7637 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7638 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7640 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7642 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7643 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7644 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7645 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7646 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7650 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7651 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7652 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7653 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7654 let seed = [42; 32];
7655 let network = Network::Testnet;
7656 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7657 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7658 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7660 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7661 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7662 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7663 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7664 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7665 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7666 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7667 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7669 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7670 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7671 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7672 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7673 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7674 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7676 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7677 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7678 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7679 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7681 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7683 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7684 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7685 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7686 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7687 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7688 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7690 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7691 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7692 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7693 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7695 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7696 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7697 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7698 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7699 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7701 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7702 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7704 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7705 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7706 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7708 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7709 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7710 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7711 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7712 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7714 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7715 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7717 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7718 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7719 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7723 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7725 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7726 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7727 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7729 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7730 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7731 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7732 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7734 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7735 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7736 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7738 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7740 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7741 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7744 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7745 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7746 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7747 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7748 let seed = [42; 32];
7749 let network = Network::Testnet;
7750 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7751 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7752 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7755 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7756 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7757 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7759 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7760 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7762 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7763 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7764 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7766 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7767 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7769 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7771 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7772 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7774 // Channel Negotiations failed
7775 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7776 assert!(result.is_err());
7781 fn channel_update() {
7782 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7783 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7784 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7785 let seed = [42; 32];
7786 let network = Network::Testnet;
7787 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7788 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7789 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7791 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7792 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7793 let config = UserConfig::default();
7794 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7796 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7797 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7798 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7799 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7800 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7802 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7803 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7804 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7805 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7806 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7808 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7809 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7810 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7811 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7813 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7814 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7815 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7817 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7818 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7820 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7821 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7822 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7824 short_channel_id: 0,
7827 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7828 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7829 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7831 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7832 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7834 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7836 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7838 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7839 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7840 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7841 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7843 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7844 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7845 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7847 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7851 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7853 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7854 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7855 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7856 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7857 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7858 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7859 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7860 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7861 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7862 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7863 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7864 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7865 use crate::sync::Arc;
7867 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7868 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7869 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7870 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7872 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7874 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7875 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7876 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7877 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7878 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7880 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7881 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7887 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7888 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7889 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7891 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7892 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7893 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7894 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7895 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7896 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7898 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7900 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7901 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7902 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7903 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7904 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7905 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7907 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7908 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7909 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7910 selected_contest_delay: 144
7912 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7913 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7915 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7916 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7918 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7919 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7921 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7922 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7924 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7925 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7926 // build_commitment_transaction.
7927 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7928 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7929 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7930 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7931 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7933 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7934 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7935 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7936 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7940 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7941 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7942 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7943 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7947 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7948 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7949 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7951 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7952 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7954 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7955 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7957 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7959 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7960 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7961 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7962 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7963 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7964 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7965 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7967 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7968 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7969 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7970 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7972 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7973 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7974 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7976 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7978 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7979 commitment_tx.clone(),
7980 counterparty_signature,
7981 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7982 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7983 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7985 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7986 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7988 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7989 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7990 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7992 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7993 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7996 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7997 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7999 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8000 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8001 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8002 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8003 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8004 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8005 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8006 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8008 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8011 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8012 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8013 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8017 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8020 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8021 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
8022 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8024 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8025 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8026 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8027 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8028 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8029 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8030 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8031 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8033 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8037 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8038 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8039 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8040 "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", {});
8042 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8043 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8045 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8046 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8047 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8049 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8050 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8051 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8052 "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", {});
8054 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8055 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8057 amount_msat: 1000000,
8059 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8060 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8062 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8065 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8066 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8068 amount_msat: 2000000,
8070 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8071 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8073 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8076 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8077 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8079 amount_msat: 2000000,
8081 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8082 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8083 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8085 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8088 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8089 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8091 amount_msat: 3000000,
8093 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8094 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8095 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8097 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8100 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8101 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8103 amount_msat: 4000000,
8105 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8106 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8108 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8112 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8113 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8114 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8116 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8117 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8118 "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", {
8121 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8122 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8123 "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" },
8126 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8127 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8128 "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" },
8131 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8132 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8133 "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" },
8136 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8137 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8138 "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" },
8141 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8142 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8143 "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" }
8146 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8147 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8148 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8150 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8151 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8152 "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", {
8155 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8156 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8157 "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" },
8160 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8161 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8162 "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" },
8165 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8166 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8167 "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" },
8170 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8171 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8172 "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" },
8175 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8176 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8177 "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" }
8180 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8181 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8182 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8184 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8185 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8186 "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", {
8189 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8190 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8191 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8194 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8195 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8196 "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" },
8199 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8200 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8201 "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" },
8204 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8205 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8206 "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" }
8209 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8210 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8211 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8212 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8214 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8215 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8216 "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", {
8219 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8220 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8221 "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" },
8224 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8225 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8226 "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" },
8229 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8230 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8231 "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" },
8234 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8235 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8236 "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" }
8239 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8240 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8241 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8242 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8244 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8245 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8246 "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", {
8249 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8250 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8251 "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" },
8254 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8255 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8256 "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" },
8259 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8260 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8261 "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" },
8264 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8265 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8266 "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" }
8269 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8270 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8271 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8273 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8274 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8275 "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", {
8278 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8279 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8280 "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" },
8283 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8284 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8285 "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" },
8288 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8289 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8290 "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" }
8293 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8294 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8295 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8297 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8298 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8299 "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", {
8302 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8303 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8304 "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" },
8307 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8308 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8309 "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" },
8312 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8313 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8314 "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" }
8317 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8318 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8319 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8321 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8322 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8323 "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", {
8326 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8327 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8328 "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" },
8331 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8332 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8333 "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" }
8336 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8337 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8338 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8339 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8341 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8342 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8343 "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", {
8346 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8347 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8348 "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" },
8351 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8352 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8353 "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" }
8356 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8357 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8358 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8359 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8361 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8362 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8363 "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", {
8366 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8367 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8368 "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" },
8371 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8372 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8373 "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" }
8376 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8377 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8378 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8380 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8381 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8382 "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", {
8385 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8386 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8387 "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" }
8390 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8391 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8392 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8393 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8395 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8396 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8397 "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", {
8400 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8401 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8402 "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" }
8405 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8406 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8407 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8408 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8410 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8411 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8412 "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", {
8415 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8416 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8417 "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" }
8420 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8421 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8422 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8423 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8425 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8426 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8427 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8429 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8430 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8431 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8432 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8434 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8435 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8436 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8438 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8439 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8440 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8441 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8443 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8444 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8445 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8447 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8448 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8449 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8451 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8452 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8453 "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", {});
8455 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8456 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8457 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8458 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8460 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8461 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8462 "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", {});
8464 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8465 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8466 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8467 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8469 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8470 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8471 "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", {});
8473 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8474 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8475 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8476 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8477 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8478 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8480 amount_msat: 2000000,
8482 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8483 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8485 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8488 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8489 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8490 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8492 amount_msat: 5000001,
8494 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8495 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8496 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8498 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8501 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8502 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8504 amount_msat: 5000000,
8506 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8507 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8508 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8510 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8514 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8515 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8516 "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", {
8519 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8520 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8521 "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" },
8523 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8524 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8525 "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" },
8527 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8528 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8529 "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" }
8532 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8533 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8534 "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", {
8537 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8538 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8539 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8541 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8542 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8543 "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" },
8545 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8546 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8547 "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" }
8552 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8553 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8555 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8556 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8557 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8558 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8560 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8561 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8562 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8564 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8565 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8567 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8568 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8570 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8571 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8572 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8576 fn test_key_derivation() {
8577 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8578 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8580 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8581 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8583 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8584 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8586 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8587 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8589 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8590 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8592 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8593 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8595 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8596 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8598 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8599 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8603 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8604 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8605 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8606 let seed = [42; 32];
8607 let network = Network::Testnet;
8608 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8609 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8611 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8612 let config = UserConfig::default();
8613 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8614 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8616 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8617 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8619 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8620 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8621 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8622 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8623 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8624 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8625 assert!(res.is_ok());
8630 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8631 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8632 // resulting `channel_type`.
8633 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8634 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8635 let network = Network::Testnet;
8636 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8637 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8639 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8640 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8642 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8643 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8645 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8646 // need to signal it.
8647 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8648 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8649 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8652 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8654 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8655 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8656 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8658 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8659 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8660 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8663 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8664 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8665 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8666 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8667 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8670 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8671 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8676 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8677 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8678 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8679 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8680 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8681 let network = Network::Testnet;
8682 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8683 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8685 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8686 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8688 let config = UserConfig::default();
8690 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8691 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8692 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8693 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8694 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8696 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8697 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8698 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8701 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8702 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8703 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8705 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8706 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8707 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8708 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8709 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8710 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8712 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8717 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8718 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8720 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8721 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8722 let network = Network::Testnet;
8723 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8724 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8726 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8727 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8729 let config = UserConfig::default();
8731 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8732 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8733 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8734 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8735 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8736 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8737 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8738 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8740 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8741 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8742 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8743 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8744 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8745 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8748 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8749 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8751 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8752 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8753 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8754 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8756 assert!(res.is_err());
8758 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8759 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8760 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8762 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8763 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8764 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8767 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8769 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8770 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8771 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8772 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8775 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8776 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8778 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8779 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8781 assert!(res.is_err());