1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
40 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
196 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
199 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
200 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
202 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
203 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
208 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
209 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
217 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
221 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
222 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
227 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
228 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
232 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
247 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
248 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
249 /// move on to ChannelReady.
250 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
251 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
252 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
254 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
255 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
256 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
257 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
258 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
259 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
260 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
262 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
263 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
264 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
266 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
267 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
268 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
273 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
274 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
276 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
277 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
278 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
279 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
280 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
281 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
282 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
283 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
284 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
286 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
287 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
288 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
289 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
290 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
291 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
292 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
293 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
294 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
295 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
296 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
297 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
299 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
300 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
302 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
304 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
305 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
306 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
307 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
308 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
309 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
310 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
311 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
313 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
315 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
317 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
321 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
323 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
324 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
325 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
327 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
328 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
330 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
331 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
332 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
333 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
334 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
336 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
337 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
341 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
347 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
350 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
351 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 holding_cell_msat: u64,
354 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
357 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
358 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
359 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
360 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
361 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
362 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
363 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
364 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
369 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
370 struct HTLCCandidate {
372 origin: HTLCInitiator,
376 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
384 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
386 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
388 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
389 htlc_value_msat: u64,
390 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
395 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
396 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
397 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
398 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
399 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
401 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
402 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
403 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
404 htlc_value_msat: u64,
406 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
407 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
411 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
412 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
413 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
414 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
415 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
420 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
421 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
424 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
425 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
426 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
427 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
428 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
429 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
430 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
431 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
434 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
435 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
436 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
437 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
438 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
439 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
440 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
441 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
442 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
443 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
444 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
445 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
446 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
447 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
448 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
450 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
451 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
452 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
453 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
455 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
456 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
457 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
458 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
460 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
461 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
462 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
463 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
464 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
466 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
467 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
468 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
469 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
471 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
472 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
473 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
475 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
476 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
477 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
478 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
479 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
481 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
482 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
483 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
486 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
487 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
488 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
489 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
491 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
492 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
493 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
494 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
496 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
500 channel_id: [u8; 32],
503 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
504 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
506 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
507 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
508 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
510 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
511 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
512 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
513 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
515 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
516 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
518 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
520 holder_signer: Signer,
521 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
522 destination_script: Script,
524 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
525 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
526 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
528 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
529 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
530 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
531 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
532 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
533 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
535 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
536 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
537 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
538 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
539 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
540 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
542 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
544 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
545 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
546 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
548 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
549 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
550 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
551 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
552 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
553 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
554 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
556 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
558 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
559 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
560 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
561 // HTLCs with similar state.
562 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
563 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
564 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
565 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
566 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
567 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
568 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
569 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
570 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
573 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
574 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
575 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
577 update_time_counter: u32,
579 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
580 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
581 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
582 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
583 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
584 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
586 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
587 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
589 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
590 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
591 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
592 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
594 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
595 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
597 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
599 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
601 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
602 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
603 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
604 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
605 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
606 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
608 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
609 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
610 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
611 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
612 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
614 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
615 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
616 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
617 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
618 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
619 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
620 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
621 channel_creation_height: u32,
623 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
626 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
628 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
631 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
633 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
636 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
638 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
641 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
644 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
646 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
648 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
649 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
651 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
653 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
654 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
657 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
659 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
660 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
662 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
663 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
664 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
666 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
668 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
670 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
671 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
672 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
673 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
675 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
676 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
677 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
679 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
680 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
681 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
683 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
684 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
685 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
686 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
688 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
690 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
692 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
693 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
694 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
695 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
696 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
698 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
699 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
701 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
702 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
703 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
704 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
705 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
706 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
707 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
708 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
710 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
711 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
713 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
714 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
715 // the channel's funding UTXO.
717 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
718 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
719 // associated channel mapping.
721 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
722 // to store all of them.
723 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
725 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
726 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
727 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
728 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
729 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
731 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
732 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
734 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
735 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
736 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
738 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
739 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
740 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
741 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
742 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
745 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
746 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
748 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
749 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
750 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
754 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
756 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
757 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
758 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
759 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
763 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
765 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
769 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
770 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
771 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
772 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
773 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
775 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
776 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
778 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
780 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
781 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
783 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
784 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
785 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
786 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
787 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
788 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
790 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
791 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
793 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
794 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
795 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
796 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
797 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
799 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
800 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
802 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
803 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
805 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
806 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
807 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
808 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
814 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
815 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
817 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
818 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
819 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
824 macro_rules! secp_check {
825 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
828 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
833 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
834 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
835 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
836 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
838 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
840 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
841 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
842 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
844 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
847 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
849 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
852 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
853 /// required by us according to the configured or default
854 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
856 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
858 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
859 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
860 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
861 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
862 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
865 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
866 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
867 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
868 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
869 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
870 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
871 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
874 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
875 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
878 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
879 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
880 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
881 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
882 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
883 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
884 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
885 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
886 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
887 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
890 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
891 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
892 // `only_static_remotekey`.
894 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
895 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
896 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
897 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
904 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
905 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
906 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
907 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
908 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
909 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
910 // We've exhausted our options
913 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
914 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
917 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
918 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
919 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
920 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
922 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
923 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
924 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
925 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
926 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
927 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
929 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
931 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
935 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
936 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
937 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
938 outbound_scid_alias: u64
939 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
940 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
941 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
942 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
944 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
945 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
946 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
947 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
949 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
950 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
952 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
953 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
955 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
956 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
957 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
959 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
960 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
962 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
963 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
964 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
965 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
969 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
970 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
972 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
974 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
975 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
976 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
980 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
981 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
983 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
984 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
987 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
988 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
989 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
996 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
997 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
998 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
999 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1004 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1006 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1007 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1008 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1010 channel_value_satoshis,
1012 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1015 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1016 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1018 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1019 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1022 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1023 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1024 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1025 pending_update_fee: None,
1026 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1027 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1028 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1029 update_time_counter: 1,
1031 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1033 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1034 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1035 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1036 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1037 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1038 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1040 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1041 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1042 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1043 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1045 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1046 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1047 closing_fee_limits: None,
1048 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1050 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1052 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1053 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1054 short_channel_id: None,
1055 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1057 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1058 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1059 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1060 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1061 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1062 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1063 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1064 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1065 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1066 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1067 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1069 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1071 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1072 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1073 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1074 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1075 counterparty_parameters: None,
1076 funding_outpoint: None,
1077 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1078 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1080 funding_transaction: None,
1082 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1083 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1084 counterparty_node_id,
1086 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1088 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1090 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1091 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1093 announcement_sigs: None,
1095 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1096 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1097 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1098 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1100 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1102 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1103 outbound_scid_alias,
1105 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1107 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1108 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1113 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1117 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1118 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1119 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1121 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1122 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1123 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1124 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1125 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1126 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1127 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1130 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1131 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1132 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1133 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1134 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1135 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1136 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1137 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1139 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1140 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1149 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1150 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1151 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1152 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1153 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1154 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1155 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1156 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1157 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1158 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1162 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1164 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1165 // support this channel type.
1166 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1167 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1171 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1172 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1173 // `static_remote_key`.
1174 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1177 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1178 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1181 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1184 channel_type.clone()
1186 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1187 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1192 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1194 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1195 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1196 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1197 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1198 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1199 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1200 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1201 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1202 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1205 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1209 // Check sanity of message fields:
1210 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1213 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1216 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1219 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1220 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1226 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1229 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1231 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1232 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1235 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1238 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1242 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1243 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1246 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1249 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1252 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1258 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1261 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1265 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1267 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1268 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1273 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1274 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1275 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1276 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1279 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1282 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1283 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1284 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1286 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1290 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1291 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1292 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1293 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1294 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1298 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1299 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1300 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1301 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1305 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1306 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1307 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1308 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1309 if script.len() == 0 {
1312 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1315 Some(script.clone())
1318 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1319 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1325 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1326 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1329 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1330 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1335 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1336 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1338 let chan = Channel {
1341 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1342 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1344 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1349 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1351 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1352 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1353 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1356 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1359 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1360 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1362 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1363 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1366 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1367 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1369 pending_update_fee: None,
1370 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1371 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1372 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1373 update_time_counter: 1,
1375 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1377 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1378 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1379 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1380 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1381 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1384 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1385 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1386 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1387 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1389 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1390 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1391 closing_fee_limits: None,
1392 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1394 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1396 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1397 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1398 short_channel_id: None,
1399 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1401 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1402 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1403 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1404 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1405 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1406 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1407 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1408 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1409 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1410 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1411 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1412 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1414 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1416 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1417 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1418 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1419 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1420 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1421 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1422 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1424 funding_outpoint: None,
1425 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1426 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1428 funding_transaction: None,
1430 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1431 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1432 counterparty_node_id,
1434 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1436 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1438 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1439 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1441 announcement_sigs: None,
1443 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1444 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1445 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1446 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1448 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1450 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1451 outbound_scid_alias,
1453 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1456 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1461 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1467 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1468 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1469 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1470 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1471 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1473 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1474 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1475 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1476 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1477 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1478 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1479 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1481 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1482 where L::Target: Logger
1484 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1485 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1486 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1488 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1489 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1490 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1491 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1493 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1494 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1495 if match update_state {
1496 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1497 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1498 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1499 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1500 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1502 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1506 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1507 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1508 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1509 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1511 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1512 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1513 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1515 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1516 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1517 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1518 transaction_output_index: None
1523 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1524 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1525 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1526 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1527 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1530 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1532 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1533 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1534 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1536 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1537 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1540 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1541 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1544 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1546 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1547 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1548 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1550 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1551 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1557 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1558 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1559 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1560 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1562 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1563 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1567 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1568 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1570 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1572 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1573 if generated_by_local {
1574 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1575 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1584 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1586 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1587 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1588 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1589 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1591 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1592 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1595 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1596 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1597 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1598 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1602 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1603 preimages.push(preimage);
1607 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1608 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1610 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1612 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1613 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1615 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1616 if !generated_by_local {
1617 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1625 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1626 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1627 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1628 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1629 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1630 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1631 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1632 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1634 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1636 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1637 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1638 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1639 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1641 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1643 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1644 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1645 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1646 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1649 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1650 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1651 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1652 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1654 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1657 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1658 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1659 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1660 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1662 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1665 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1666 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1671 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1672 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1677 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1679 let channel_parameters =
1680 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1681 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1682 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1685 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1690 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1693 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1694 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1695 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1696 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1698 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1699 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1700 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1708 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1709 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1715 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1716 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1717 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1718 // outside of those situations will fail.
1719 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1723 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1728 1 + // script length (0)
1732 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1733 2 + // witness marker and flag
1734 1 + // witness element count
1735 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1736 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1737 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1738 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1739 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1740 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1742 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1743 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1744 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1750 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1751 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1752 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1753 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1755 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1756 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1757 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1759 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1760 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1761 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1762 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1763 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1764 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1767 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1768 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1771 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1772 value_to_holder = 0;
1775 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1776 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1777 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1778 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1780 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1781 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1784 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1785 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1789 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1790 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1791 /// our counterparty!)
1792 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1793 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1794 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1795 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1796 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1797 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1798 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1800 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1804 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1805 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1806 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1807 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1808 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1809 //may see payments to it!
1810 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1811 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1812 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1814 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1817 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1818 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1819 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1820 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1821 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1824 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1827 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1828 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1830 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1832 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1833 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1834 where L::Target: Logger {
1835 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1836 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1837 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1838 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1839 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1840 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1841 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1842 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1846 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1847 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1848 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1849 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1851 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1852 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1854 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1856 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1858 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1859 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1860 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1862 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1863 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1864 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1865 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1866 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1868 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1869 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1870 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1872 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1873 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1875 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1878 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1879 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1883 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1887 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1888 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1889 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1890 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1891 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1892 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1895 // Now update local state:
1897 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1898 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1899 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1900 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1901 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1902 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1903 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1907 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1908 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1909 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1910 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1911 // do not not get into this branch.
1912 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1913 match pending_update {
1914 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1915 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1916 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1917 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1918 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1919 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1920 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1923 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1924 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1925 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1926 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1927 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1928 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1929 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1935 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1936 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1937 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1939 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1940 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1941 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1944 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1947 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1948 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1950 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1951 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1953 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1954 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1957 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1960 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1961 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1962 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1963 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1968 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1969 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1970 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1971 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1972 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1973 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1974 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1975 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1976 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1977 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1978 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1979 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1983 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1984 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1985 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1986 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1987 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1991 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
1995 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1996 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1997 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1998 /// before we fail backwards.
2000 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2001 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2002 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2003 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2004 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2005 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2006 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2009 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2010 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2011 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2012 /// before we fail backwards.
2014 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2015 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2016 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2017 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2018 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2019 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2020 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2022 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2024 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2025 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2026 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2028 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2029 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2030 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2032 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2033 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2034 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2036 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2041 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2042 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2048 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2049 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2050 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2051 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2052 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2056 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2057 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2058 force_holding_cell = true;
2061 // Now update local state:
2062 if force_holding_cell {
2063 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2064 match pending_update {
2065 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2066 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2067 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2068 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2072 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2073 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2074 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2081 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2082 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2083 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2089 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2091 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2092 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2095 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2096 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2097 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2102 // Message handlers:
2104 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2105 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2107 // Check sanity of message fields:
2108 if !self.is_outbound() {
2109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2111 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2114 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2117 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2120 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2123 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2125 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2127 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2128 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2131 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2132 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2135 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2138 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2142 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2143 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2146 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2149 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2152 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2155 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2156 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2158 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2161 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2165 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2166 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2169 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2170 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2172 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2173 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2176 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2179 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2180 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2181 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2182 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2183 if script.len() == 0 {
2186 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2187 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2189 Some(script.clone())
2192 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2193 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2194 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2199 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2200 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2201 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2202 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2203 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2205 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2206 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2208 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2211 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2212 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2213 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2214 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2215 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2216 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2219 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2220 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2221 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2224 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2225 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2227 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2228 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2233 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2234 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2236 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2237 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2239 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2240 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2241 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2242 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2243 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2244 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2245 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2246 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2247 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2250 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2251 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2253 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2254 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2255 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2256 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2258 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2259 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2261 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2262 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2265 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2266 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2269 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2270 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2271 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2273 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2276 if self.is_outbound() {
2277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2279 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2280 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2281 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2285 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2288 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2289 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2290 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2291 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2294 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2295 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2296 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2297 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2298 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2300 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2302 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2303 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2307 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2308 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2309 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2313 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2314 initial_commitment_tx,
2317 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2318 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2321 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2322 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2324 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2326 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2327 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2328 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2329 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2330 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2331 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2332 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2333 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2334 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2335 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2336 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2338 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2340 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2342 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2343 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2344 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2345 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2347 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2349 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2350 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2352 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2353 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2355 }, channel_monitor))
2358 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2359 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2360 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2361 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2362 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2364 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2367 if !self.is_outbound() {
2368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2370 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2373 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2374 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2375 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2376 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2379 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2381 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2382 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2383 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2384 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2386 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2387 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2389 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2390 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2392 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2393 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2394 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2395 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2396 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2401 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2402 initial_commitment_tx,
2405 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2406 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2409 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2410 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2413 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2414 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2415 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2416 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2417 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2418 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2419 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2420 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2421 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2422 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2423 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2424 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2426 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2428 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2430 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2431 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2432 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2433 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2435 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2437 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2438 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2442 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2443 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2445 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2446 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2447 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2448 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2450 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2453 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2454 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2455 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2458 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2459 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2460 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2461 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2462 // when routing outbound payments.
2463 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2467 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2469 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2470 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2471 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2472 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2473 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2474 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2475 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2476 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2477 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2479 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2480 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2481 let expected_point =
2482 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2483 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2485 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2487 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2488 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2489 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2490 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2491 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2493 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2494 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2498 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2501 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2502 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2504 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2506 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2509 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2510 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2511 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2512 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2518 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2519 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2520 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2521 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2522 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2523 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2524 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2525 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2526 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2529 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2532 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2533 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2534 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2536 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2537 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2538 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2539 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2540 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2541 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2543 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2544 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2550 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2551 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2552 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2553 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2554 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2555 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2556 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2557 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2558 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2561 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2564 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2565 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2566 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2568 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2569 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2570 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2571 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2572 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2573 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2575 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2576 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2580 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2581 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2582 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2583 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2584 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2585 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2586 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2588 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2589 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2591 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2598 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2599 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2600 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2601 /// corner case properly.
2602 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2603 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2604 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2606 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2607 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2608 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2609 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2612 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2614 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2615 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2616 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2619 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2620 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2621 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2622 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2624 outbound_capacity_msat,
2625 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2626 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2627 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2633 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2634 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2637 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2638 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2639 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2640 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2641 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2642 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2645 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2646 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2648 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2649 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2652 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2653 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2654 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2656 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2657 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2659 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2662 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2663 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2665 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2666 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2668 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2669 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2671 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2672 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2676 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2677 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2683 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2684 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2685 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2688 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2689 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2690 included_htlcs += 1;
2693 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2694 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2698 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2699 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2700 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2701 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2702 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2703 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2708 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2710 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2711 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2716 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2717 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2721 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2722 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2723 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2726 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2727 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2729 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2730 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2731 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2733 total_pending_htlcs,
2734 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2735 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2736 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2738 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2739 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2740 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2742 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2744 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2749 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2750 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2751 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2753 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2754 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2756 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2759 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2760 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2762 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2763 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2765 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2766 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2768 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2769 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2773 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2774 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2780 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2781 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2782 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2783 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2784 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2785 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2788 included_htlcs += 1;
2791 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2792 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2795 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2796 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2798 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2799 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2800 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2805 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2806 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2810 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2811 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2813 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2814 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2816 total_pending_htlcs,
2817 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2819 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2821 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2822 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2823 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2825 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2827 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2832 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2833 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2834 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2835 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2836 if local_sent_shutdown {
2837 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2839 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2840 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2841 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2844 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2847 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2850 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2853 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2857 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2858 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2859 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2862 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2865 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2866 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2867 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2868 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2869 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2870 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2871 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2872 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2873 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2874 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2875 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2877 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2878 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2879 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2880 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2881 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2882 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2886 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2889 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2890 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2891 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2893 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2894 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2895 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2896 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2897 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2898 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2899 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2903 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2904 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2905 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2906 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2907 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2908 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2909 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2913 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2914 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2915 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2916 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2917 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2918 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2921 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2922 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2923 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2924 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2925 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2927 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2931 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2932 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2935 if !self.is_outbound() {
2936 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2937 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2938 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2939 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2940 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2941 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2942 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2943 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2944 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2945 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2946 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2947 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2948 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2949 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2950 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2953 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2954 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2955 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2956 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2957 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2960 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2961 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2963 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2967 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2968 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2969 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2973 // Now update local state:
2974 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2975 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2976 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2977 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2978 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2979 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2980 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2985 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2987 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2988 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2989 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2990 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2991 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2992 None => fail_reason.into(),
2993 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2994 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2995 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2998 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3002 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3004 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3005 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3007 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3013 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3016 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3017 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3018 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3020 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3021 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3024 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3027 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3028 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3031 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3032 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3035 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3039 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3040 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3041 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3043 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3044 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3047 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3051 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3052 where L::Target: Logger
3054 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3057 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3060 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3064 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3066 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3068 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3069 let commitment_txid = {
3070 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3071 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3072 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3074 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3075 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3076 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3077 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3078 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3083 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3085 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3086 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3087 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3088 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3091 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3092 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3093 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3094 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3097 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3099 if self.is_outbound() {
3100 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3101 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3102 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3103 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3104 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3105 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3106 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3107 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3108 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3109 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3115 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3119 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3120 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3121 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3122 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3123 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3124 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3125 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3127 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3128 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3129 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3130 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3131 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3132 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3133 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3136 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3138 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3142 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3143 commitment_stats.tx,
3145 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3146 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3147 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3150 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3151 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3153 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3154 let mut need_commitment = false;
3155 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3156 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3157 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3158 need_commitment = true;
3162 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3163 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3164 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3165 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3166 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3167 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3171 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3172 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3173 Some(forward_info.clone())
3175 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3176 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3177 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3178 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3179 need_commitment = true;
3182 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3183 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3184 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3185 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3186 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3187 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3188 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3189 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3190 need_commitment = true;
3194 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3195 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3196 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3197 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3199 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3200 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3201 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3202 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3203 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3204 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3205 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3206 // includes the right HTLCs.
3207 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3208 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3209 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3210 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3211 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3212 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3214 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3215 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3216 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3217 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3220 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3221 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3222 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3223 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3224 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3225 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3226 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3227 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3228 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3232 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3233 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3234 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3235 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3236 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3239 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3240 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3241 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3242 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3243 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3244 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3245 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3246 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3249 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3250 /// for our counterparty.
3251 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3252 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3253 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3254 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3255 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3257 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3258 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3259 updates: Vec::new(),
3262 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3263 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3264 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3265 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3266 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3267 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3268 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3269 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3270 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3271 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3272 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3273 // to rebalance channels.
3274 match &htlc_update {
3275 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3276 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3277 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3280 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3281 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3282 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3283 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3284 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3285 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3286 // into the holding cell without ever being
3287 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3288 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3289 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3292 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3298 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3299 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3300 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3301 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3302 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3303 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3304 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3305 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3306 (msg, monitor_update)
3307 } else { unreachable!() };
3308 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3309 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3311 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3312 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3313 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3314 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3315 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3316 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3317 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3318 // for a full revocation before failing.
3319 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3322 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3324 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3331 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3332 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3334 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3335 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3340 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3341 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3342 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3343 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3344 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3346 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3347 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3348 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3350 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3351 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3352 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3358 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3359 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3360 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3361 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3362 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3363 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3364 where L::Target: Logger,
3366 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3369 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3372 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3376 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3378 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3379 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3380 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3384 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3385 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3386 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3387 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3388 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3389 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3390 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3391 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3395 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3397 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3398 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3401 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3402 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3404 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3406 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3407 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3408 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3409 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3410 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3411 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3412 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3413 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3417 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3418 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3419 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3420 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3421 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3422 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3423 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3424 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3426 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3427 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3430 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3431 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3432 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3433 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3434 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3435 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3436 let mut require_commitment = false;
3437 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3440 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3441 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3442 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3444 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3445 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3446 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3447 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3448 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3449 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3454 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3455 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3456 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3457 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3458 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3460 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3461 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3462 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3467 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3468 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3470 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3474 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3475 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3477 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3478 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3479 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3480 require_commitment = true;
3481 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3482 match forward_info {
3483 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3484 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3485 require_commitment = true;
3487 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3488 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3489 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3491 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3492 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3493 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3497 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3498 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3499 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3500 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3506 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3507 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3508 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3509 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3511 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3512 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3513 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3514 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3515 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3516 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3517 require_commitment = true;
3521 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3523 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3524 match update_state {
3525 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3526 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3527 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3528 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3529 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3531 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3532 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3533 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3534 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3535 require_commitment = true;
3536 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3537 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3542 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3543 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3544 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3545 if require_commitment {
3546 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3547 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3548 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3549 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3550 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3551 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3552 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3553 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3554 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3556 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3557 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3558 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3559 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3560 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3561 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3564 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3565 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3566 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3567 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3568 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3569 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3570 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3572 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3573 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3574 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3576 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3577 if require_commitment {
3578 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3580 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3581 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3582 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3583 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3585 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3586 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3587 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3588 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3589 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3591 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3592 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3593 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3594 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3600 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3601 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3602 /// commitment update.
3603 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3604 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3605 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3608 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3609 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3610 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3611 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3613 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3614 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3615 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3616 if !self.is_outbound() {
3617 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3619 if !self.is_usable() {
3620 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3622 if !self.is_live() {
3623 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3626 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3627 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3628 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3629 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3630 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3631 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3632 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3633 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3634 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3635 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3639 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3640 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3641 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3642 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3643 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3646 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3647 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3651 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3652 force_holding_cell = true;
3655 if force_holding_cell {
3656 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3660 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3661 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3663 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3664 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3669 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3670 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3672 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3674 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3675 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3676 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3677 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3681 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3682 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3683 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3687 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3688 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3691 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3692 // will be retransmitted.
3693 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3694 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3695 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3697 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3698 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3700 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3701 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3702 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3703 // this HTLC accordingly
3704 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3707 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3708 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3709 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3710 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3713 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3714 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3715 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3716 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3717 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3718 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3723 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3725 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3726 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3727 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3728 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3732 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3733 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3734 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3735 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3736 // the update upon reconnection.
3737 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3741 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3742 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3745 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3746 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3747 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3748 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3749 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3750 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3751 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3753 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3754 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3755 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3756 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3757 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3758 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3759 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3761 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3762 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3763 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3764 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3765 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3766 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3767 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3770 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3771 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3772 /// to the remote side.
3773 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3774 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3775 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3776 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3779 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3781 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3782 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3783 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3785 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3786 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3787 // first received the funding_signed.
3788 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3789 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3790 self.funding_transaction.take()
3792 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3793 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3794 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3795 funding_broadcastable = None;
3798 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3799 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3800 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3801 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3802 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3803 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3804 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3805 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3806 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3807 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3808 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3809 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3810 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3811 next_per_commitment_point,
3812 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3816 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3818 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3819 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3820 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3821 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3822 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3823 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3825 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3826 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3827 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3828 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3829 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3830 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3834 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3835 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3837 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3838 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3841 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3842 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3843 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3844 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3845 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3846 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3847 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3848 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3849 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3853 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3854 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3856 if self.is_outbound() {
3857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3859 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3862 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3863 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3865 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3866 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3867 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3868 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3869 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3870 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3871 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3872 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3873 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3874 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3875 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3877 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3879 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3880 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3881 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3887 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3888 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3889 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3890 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3891 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3892 per_commitment_secret,
3893 next_per_commitment_point,
3897 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3898 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3899 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3900 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3901 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3903 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3904 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3905 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3906 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3907 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3908 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3909 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3910 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3911 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3916 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3917 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3919 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3920 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3921 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3922 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3923 reason: err_packet.clone()
3926 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3927 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3928 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3929 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3930 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3931 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3934 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3935 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3936 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3937 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3938 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3945 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3946 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3947 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3948 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3952 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3953 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3954 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3955 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3956 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3957 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3961 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3962 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3964 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3965 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3966 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3967 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3968 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3969 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3970 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3971 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3974 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3976 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3977 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3978 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3979 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3983 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3984 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3985 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3988 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3989 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3990 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3991 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3992 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3993 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3994 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3997 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3998 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3999 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4000 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4001 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4004 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4005 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4006 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4007 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4008 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4009 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4010 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4011 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4014 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4018 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4019 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4020 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4021 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4023 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4027 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4028 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4029 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4031 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4032 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4033 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4034 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4035 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4039 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4041 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4042 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4043 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4044 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4045 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4046 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4048 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4049 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4050 channel_ready: None,
4051 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4052 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4053 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4057 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4058 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4059 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4060 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4061 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4062 next_per_commitment_point,
4063 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4065 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4066 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4067 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4071 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4072 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4073 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4075 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4076 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4077 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4080 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4086 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4087 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4088 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4089 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4090 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4092 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4093 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4094 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4095 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4096 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4097 next_per_commitment_point,
4098 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4102 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4103 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4104 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4106 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4109 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4110 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4111 raa: required_revoke,
4112 commitment_update: None,
4113 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4115 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4116 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4117 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4119 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4122 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4123 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4124 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4125 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4126 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4127 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4130 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4131 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4132 raa: required_revoke,
4133 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4134 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4138 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4142 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4143 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4144 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4145 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4147 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4149 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4151 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4152 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4153 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4154 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4155 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4156 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4158 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4159 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4160 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4161 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4162 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4164 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4165 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4166 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4167 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4170 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4171 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4172 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4173 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4174 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4175 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4176 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4177 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4178 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4179 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4180 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4181 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4182 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4183 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4184 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4186 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4189 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4190 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4193 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4194 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4195 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4196 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4197 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4198 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4199 self.channel_state &
4200 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4201 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4202 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4203 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4206 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4207 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4208 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4209 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4210 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4211 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4214 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4220 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4221 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4222 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4223 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4225 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4226 return Ok((None, None));
4229 if !self.is_outbound() {
4230 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4231 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4233 return Ok((None, None));
4236 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4238 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4239 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4240 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4241 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4243 let sig = self.holder_signer
4244 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4245 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4247 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4248 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4249 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4250 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4252 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4253 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4254 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4259 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4260 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4261 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4262 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4264 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4267 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4268 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4269 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4270 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4273 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4274 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4278 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4280 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4281 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4284 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4285 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4286 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4289 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4292 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4293 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4294 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4295 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4297 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4300 assert!(send_shutdown);
4301 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4302 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4305 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4310 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4312 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4313 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4315 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4316 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4317 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4318 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4319 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4320 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4323 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4324 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4325 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4327 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4328 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4329 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4330 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4334 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4335 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4336 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4337 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4338 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4339 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4341 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4342 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4349 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4350 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4352 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4355 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4356 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4358 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4360 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4361 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4362 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4363 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4364 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4365 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4366 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4367 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4368 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4370 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4371 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4374 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4378 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4379 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4380 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4381 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4383 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4386 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4389 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4392 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4393 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4396 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4400 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4401 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4402 return Ok((None, None));
4405 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4406 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4407 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4410 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4412 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4415 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4416 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4417 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4418 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4419 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4423 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4424 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4429 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4430 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4431 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4432 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4433 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4434 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4435 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4439 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4441 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4442 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4443 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4444 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4446 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4449 let sig = self.holder_signer
4450 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4451 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4453 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4454 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4455 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4456 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4460 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4461 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4462 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4463 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4465 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4466 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4467 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4473 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4474 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4475 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4477 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4478 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4480 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4481 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4484 if !self.is_outbound() {
4485 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4486 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4487 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4488 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4490 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4491 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4492 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4494 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4495 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4498 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4499 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4500 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4501 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4502 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4503 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4504 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4505 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4507 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4510 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4511 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4512 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4513 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4515 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4519 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4520 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4521 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4522 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4524 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4530 // Public utilities:
4532 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4536 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4540 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4541 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4542 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4546 /// Gets the channel's type
4547 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4551 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4552 /// is_usable() returns true).
4553 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4554 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4555 self.short_channel_id
4558 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4559 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4560 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4563 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4564 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4565 self.outbound_scid_alias
4567 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4568 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4569 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4570 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4571 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4574 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4575 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4576 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4577 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4580 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4581 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4582 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4585 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4586 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4587 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4588 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4592 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4595 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4596 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4599 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4600 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4603 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4604 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4605 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4608 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4609 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4612 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4613 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4614 self.counterparty_node_id
4617 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4618 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4619 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4622 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4623 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4624 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4627 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4628 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4630 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4631 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4632 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4633 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4635 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4639 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4640 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4641 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4644 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4645 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4646 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4649 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4650 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4651 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4653 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4654 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4659 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4660 self.channel_value_satoshis
4663 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4664 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4667 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4668 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4671 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4672 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4675 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4676 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4677 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4680 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4681 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4682 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4685 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4686 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4687 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4690 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4691 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4692 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4693 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4694 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4697 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4699 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4700 self.prev_config = None;
4704 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4705 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4709 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4710 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4711 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4712 let did_channel_update =
4713 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4714 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4715 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4716 if did_channel_update {
4717 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4718 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4719 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4720 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4722 self.config.options = *config;
4726 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4727 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4728 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4729 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4730 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4731 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4732 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4734 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4735 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4738 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4740 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4741 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4747 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4748 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4749 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4750 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4751 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4752 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4753 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4755 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4756 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4763 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4767 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4768 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4769 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4770 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4771 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4772 // which are near the dust limit.
4773 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4774 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4775 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4776 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4777 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4779 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4780 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4782 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4785 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4786 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4789 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4790 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4793 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4794 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4798 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4803 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4805 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4806 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4807 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4808 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4809 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4810 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4812 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4814 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4822 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4823 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4827 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4828 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4829 self.update_time_counter
4832 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4833 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4836 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4837 self.config.announced_channel
4840 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4841 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4844 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4845 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4846 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4847 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4850 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4851 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4852 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4855 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4856 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4857 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4858 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4859 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4862 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4863 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4864 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4865 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4866 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4869 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4870 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4871 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4872 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4875 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4876 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4879 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4880 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4881 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4884 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4885 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4886 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4888 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4889 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4890 if self.channel_state &
4891 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4892 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4893 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4894 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4895 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4898 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4899 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4900 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4901 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4902 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4903 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4905 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4906 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4907 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4909 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4910 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4911 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4912 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4913 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4914 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4920 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4921 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4922 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4925 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4926 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4927 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4930 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4931 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4932 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4935 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4936 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4937 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4938 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4939 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4940 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4945 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4946 self.channel_update_status
4949 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4950 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4951 self.channel_update_status = status;
4954 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4956 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4957 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4958 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4962 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4963 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4964 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4967 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4971 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4972 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4973 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4975 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4976 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4977 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4979 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4980 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4983 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4984 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4985 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4986 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4987 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4988 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4989 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4990 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4991 self.channel_state);
4993 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4997 if need_commitment_update {
4998 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4999 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5000 let next_per_commitment_point =
5001 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5002 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5003 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5004 next_per_commitment_point,
5005 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5009 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5015 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5016 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5017 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5018 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5019 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5020 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5021 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5023 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5026 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5027 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5028 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5029 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5030 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5031 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5032 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5033 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5034 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5035 if self.is_outbound() {
5036 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5037 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5038 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5039 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5040 // channel and move on.
5041 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5042 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5044 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5045 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5046 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5048 if self.is_outbound() {
5049 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5050 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5051 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5052 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5053 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5054 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5058 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5059 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5060 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5061 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5062 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5066 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5067 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5068 // may have already happened for this block).
5069 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5070 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5071 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5072 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5075 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5076 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5077 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5078 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5086 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5087 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5088 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5089 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5091 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5092 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5095 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5097 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5098 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5099 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5100 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5102 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5105 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5108 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5109 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5110 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5111 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5113 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5116 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5117 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5118 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5120 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5121 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5123 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5124 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5125 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5133 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5135 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5136 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5137 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5139 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5140 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5143 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5144 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5145 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5146 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5147 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5148 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5149 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5150 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5151 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5154 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5155 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5156 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5157 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5159 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5160 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5161 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5163 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5164 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5165 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5166 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5168 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5169 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5170 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5171 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5172 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5173 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5174 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5177 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5178 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5180 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5183 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5184 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5185 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5186 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5187 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5188 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5189 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5190 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5191 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5192 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5193 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5194 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5195 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5196 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5197 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5198 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5199 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5205 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5210 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5211 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5213 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5214 if !self.is_outbound() {
5215 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5217 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5218 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5221 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5222 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5225 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5226 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5230 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5231 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5232 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5233 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5234 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5235 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5236 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5237 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5238 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5239 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5240 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5241 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5242 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5243 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5244 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5245 first_per_commitment_point,
5246 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5247 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5248 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5249 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5251 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5255 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5256 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5259 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5260 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5261 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5262 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5265 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5266 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5268 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5269 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5270 if self.is_outbound() {
5271 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5273 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5274 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5276 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5277 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5279 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5280 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5283 self.user_id = user_id;
5284 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5286 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5289 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5290 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5291 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5293 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5294 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5295 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5296 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5298 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5299 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5300 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5301 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5302 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5303 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5304 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5305 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5306 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5307 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5308 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5309 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5310 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5311 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5312 first_per_commitment_point,
5313 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5314 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5315 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5317 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5321 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5322 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5324 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5326 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5327 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5330 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5331 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5332 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5333 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5334 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5335 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5338 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5339 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5340 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5341 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5342 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5343 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5344 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5345 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5346 if !self.is_outbound() {
5347 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5349 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5350 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5352 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5353 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5354 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5355 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5358 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5359 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5361 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5364 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5365 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5370 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5372 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5374 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5375 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5376 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5378 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5379 temporary_channel_id,
5380 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5381 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5386 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5387 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5388 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5389 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5391 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5394 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5395 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5396 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5397 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5398 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5399 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5401 if !self.is_usable() {
5402 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5405 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5406 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5407 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5408 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5410 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5411 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5413 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5414 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5415 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5416 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5417 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5418 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5424 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5425 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5426 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5427 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5429 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5432 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5436 if !self.is_usable() {
5440 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5441 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5445 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5449 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5450 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5453 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5457 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5459 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5464 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5466 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5471 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5473 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5474 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5475 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5476 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5477 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5481 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5483 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5484 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5485 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5486 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5487 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5488 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5489 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5491 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5492 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5493 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5494 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5495 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5496 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5497 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5498 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5499 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5500 contents: announcement,
5503 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5507 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5508 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5509 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5510 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5511 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5512 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5513 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5514 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5516 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5518 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5519 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5520 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5521 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5523 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5525 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5526 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5529 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5530 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5531 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5532 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5535 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5538 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5539 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5540 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5541 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5542 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5543 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5546 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5548 Err(_) => return None,
5550 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5551 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5556 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5557 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5558 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5559 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5560 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5561 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5562 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5563 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5564 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5565 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5566 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5567 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5568 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5569 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5570 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5571 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5572 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5573 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5574 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5577 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5578 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5579 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5580 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5583 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5584 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5585 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5586 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5587 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5588 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5589 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5590 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5592 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5593 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5594 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5595 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5596 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5597 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5598 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5599 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5600 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5602 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5608 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5610 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5611 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5612 /// commitment update.
5614 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5615 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5616 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5617 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5619 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5620 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5622 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5623 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5628 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5629 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5631 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5633 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5634 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5636 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5637 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5638 /// regenerate them.
5640 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5641 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5643 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5644 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5645 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5646 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5647 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5648 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5650 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5651 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5652 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5655 if amount_msat == 0 {
5656 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5659 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5660 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5663 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5664 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5665 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5666 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5667 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5668 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5669 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5670 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5673 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5674 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5675 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5676 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5678 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5679 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5680 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5683 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5684 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5685 if !self.is_outbound() {
5686 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5687 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5688 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5689 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5690 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5691 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5695 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5698 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5699 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5700 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5702 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5703 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5704 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5705 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5706 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5707 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5711 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5712 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5713 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5714 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5715 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5716 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5720 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5721 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5722 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5725 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5726 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5727 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5728 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5730 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5731 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5734 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5735 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5736 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5737 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5738 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5741 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5742 force_holding_cell = true;
5745 // Now update local state:
5746 if force_holding_cell {
5747 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5752 onion_routing_packet,
5757 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5758 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5760 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5762 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5766 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5767 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5768 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5772 onion_routing_packet,
5774 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5779 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5780 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5781 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5782 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5784 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5785 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5786 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5788 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5789 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5793 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5794 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5795 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5796 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5797 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5798 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5799 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5802 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5803 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5804 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5805 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5806 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5807 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5810 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5812 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5813 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5814 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5816 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5817 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5820 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5821 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5822 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5823 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5824 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5825 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5826 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5827 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5830 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5834 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5835 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5836 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5837 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5839 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5841 if !self.is_outbound() {
5842 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5843 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5844 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5845 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5846 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5847 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5848 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5849 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5850 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5851 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5857 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5860 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5861 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5862 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5863 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5864 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5865 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5867 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5868 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5869 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5870 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5873 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5874 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5878 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5879 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5881 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5883 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5884 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5885 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5886 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5888 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5889 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5890 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5891 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5892 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5893 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5897 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5898 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5901 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5904 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5905 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5907 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5908 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5909 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5910 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5911 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5914 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5915 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5916 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5917 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
5923 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5924 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5925 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5928 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5929 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5932 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5933 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5934 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5935 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5941 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5942 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5944 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5945 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5946 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5947 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5948 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5949 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5950 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5951 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5952 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5955 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5956 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5957 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5959 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5960 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5963 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5964 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5965 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5968 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5969 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5970 let mut chan_closed = false;
5971 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5975 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5977 None if !chan_closed => {
5978 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5979 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5980 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5982 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5988 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5989 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5990 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5991 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5993 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5995 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5997 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5998 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5999 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6000 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6001 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6002 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6005 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6006 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6007 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6009 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6010 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6011 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6014 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6015 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6016 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6017 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6018 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6020 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6021 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6028 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6029 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6031 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6034 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6035 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6036 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6037 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6038 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6039 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6040 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6041 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6042 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6043 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6044 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6046 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6047 // return them to fail the payment.
6048 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6049 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6050 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6052 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6053 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6058 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6059 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6060 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6061 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6062 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6063 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6064 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6065 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6066 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6067 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6068 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6069 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6070 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6075 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6076 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6077 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6080 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6081 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6082 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6084 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6085 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6089 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6093 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6094 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6096 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6102 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6103 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6104 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6105 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6106 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6108 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6109 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6110 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6111 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6117 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6118 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6119 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6120 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6121 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6122 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6127 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6128 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6129 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6130 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6132 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6133 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6134 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6135 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6140 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6141 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6142 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6143 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6144 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6145 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6150 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6151 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6152 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6155 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6157 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6158 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6159 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6160 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6161 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6163 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6164 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6165 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6166 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6168 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6169 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6170 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6172 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6174 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6175 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6176 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6177 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6178 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6179 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6181 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6182 // deserialized from that format.
6183 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6184 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6185 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6187 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6189 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6190 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6191 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6193 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6194 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6195 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6196 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6199 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6200 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6201 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6204 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6205 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6206 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6207 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6209 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6210 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6212 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6214 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6216 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6218 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6221 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6223 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6228 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6230 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6231 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6232 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6233 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6234 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6235 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6236 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6238 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6240 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6242 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6245 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6246 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6247 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6250 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6252 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6253 preimages.push(preimage);
6255 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6256 reason.write(writer)?;
6258 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6260 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6261 preimages.push(preimage);
6263 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6264 reason.write(writer)?;
6269 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6270 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6274 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6275 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6276 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6277 source.write(writer)?;
6278 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6280 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6282 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6283 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6285 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6287 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6288 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6293 match self.resend_order {
6294 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6295 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6298 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6299 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6300 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6302 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6303 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6304 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6305 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6308 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6309 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6310 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6311 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6312 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6315 if self.is_outbound() {
6316 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6317 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6318 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6320 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6321 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6322 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6324 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6326 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6327 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6328 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6329 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6331 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6332 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6333 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6334 // consider the stale state on reload.
6337 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6338 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6339 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6341 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6342 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6343 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6345 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6346 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6348 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6349 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6350 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6352 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6353 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6355 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6358 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6359 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6360 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6362 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6365 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6366 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6368 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6369 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6370 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6372 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6374 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6376 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6378 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6379 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6380 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6381 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6382 htlc.write(writer)?;
6385 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6386 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6387 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6389 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6390 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6392 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6393 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6394 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6395 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6396 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6397 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6398 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6400 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6401 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6402 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6403 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6404 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6406 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6408 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6409 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6410 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6411 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6413 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6414 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6415 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6416 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6417 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6418 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6419 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6421 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6422 (2, chan_type, option),
6423 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6424 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6425 (5, self.config, required),
6426 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6427 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6428 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6429 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6430 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6431 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6432 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6433 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6434 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6435 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6436 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6437 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6444 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6445 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6447 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6448 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6450 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6451 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6452 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6454 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6455 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6456 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6457 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6459 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6461 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6462 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6463 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6465 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6467 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6468 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6472 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6475 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6477 let mut keys_data = None;
6479 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6480 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6481 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6482 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6483 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6484 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6485 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6486 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6487 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6488 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6492 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6493 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6494 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6497 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6499 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6501 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6503 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6505 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6506 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6507 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6508 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6509 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6510 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6511 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6512 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6513 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6514 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6515 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6516 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6521 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6522 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6523 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6524 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6525 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6526 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6527 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6528 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6529 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6530 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6531 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6532 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6534 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6535 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6538 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6539 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6542 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6543 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6545 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6550 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6552 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6553 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6554 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6555 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6556 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6557 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6558 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6559 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6561 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6562 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6563 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6565 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6566 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6567 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6569 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6573 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6574 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6575 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6576 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6579 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6580 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6581 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6583 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6584 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6585 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6586 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6589 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6590 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6591 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6592 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6595 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6597 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6599 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6600 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6601 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6602 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6604 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6605 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6606 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6607 // consider the stale state on reload.
6608 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6611 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6612 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6613 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6615 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6618 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6619 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6620 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6623 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6624 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6625 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6627 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6628 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6630 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6631 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6633 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6634 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6635 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6637 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6639 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6640 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6642 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6643 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6646 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6648 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6649 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6650 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6651 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6653 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6656 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6657 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6659 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6661 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6662 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6664 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6665 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6669 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6670 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6671 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6673 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6674 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6675 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6679 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6680 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6681 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6683 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6689 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6690 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6691 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6692 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6693 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6694 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6695 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6696 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6697 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6698 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6700 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6701 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6702 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6703 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6704 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6705 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6707 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6708 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6710 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6711 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6712 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6713 (2, channel_type, option),
6714 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6715 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6716 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6717 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6718 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6719 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6720 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6721 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6722 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6723 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6724 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6725 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6726 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6727 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6728 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6731 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6732 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6733 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6734 // required channel parameters.
6735 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6736 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6737 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6739 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6741 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6742 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6743 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6744 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6747 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6748 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6749 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6751 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6752 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6754 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6755 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6760 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6761 if iter.next().is_some() {
6762 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6766 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6767 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6768 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6769 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6770 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6773 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6774 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6776 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6777 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6778 // separate u64 values.
6779 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6784 config: config.unwrap(),
6788 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6789 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6790 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6794 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6796 channel_value_satoshis,
6798 latest_monitor_update_id,
6801 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6804 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6805 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6808 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6809 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6810 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6814 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6815 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6816 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6817 monitor_pending_forwards,
6818 monitor_pending_failures,
6819 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6822 holding_cell_update_fee,
6823 next_holder_htlc_id,
6824 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6825 update_time_counter,
6828 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6829 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6830 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6831 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6833 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6834 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6835 closing_fee_limits: None,
6836 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6838 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6840 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6841 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6843 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6845 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6846 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6847 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6848 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6849 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6850 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6851 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6852 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6853 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6856 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6858 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6859 funding_transaction,
6861 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6862 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6863 counterparty_node_id,
6865 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6869 channel_update_status,
6870 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6874 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6875 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6876 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6877 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6879 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6881 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6882 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6883 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6885 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6887 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6888 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6890 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6893 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6901 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6902 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6903 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6904 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6905 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6907 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6908 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6910 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6911 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6912 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6913 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6914 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6915 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6916 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6917 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6918 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6919 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6920 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6921 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6922 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6923 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6924 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6925 use crate::util::test_utils;
6926 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6927 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6928 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6929 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6930 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6931 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6932 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6933 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6934 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6935 use crate::prelude::*;
6937 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6940 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6941 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6947 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6948 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6949 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6950 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6954 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6955 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6956 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6957 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6958 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6959 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6960 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6964 signer: InMemorySigner,
6967 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6968 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6971 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6972 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6974 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6975 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6978 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6982 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6984 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6985 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6986 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6987 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6988 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6991 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6992 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6993 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6994 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6998 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6999 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7000 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7004 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7005 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7006 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7007 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7009 let seed = [42; 32];
7010 let network = Network::Testnet;
7011 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7012 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7013 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7016 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7017 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7018 let config = UserConfig::default();
7019 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7020 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7021 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7023 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7024 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7028 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7029 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7031 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7032 let original_fee = 253;
7033 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7034 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7035 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7036 let seed = [42; 32];
7037 let network = Network::Testnet;
7038 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7040 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7041 let config = UserConfig::default();
7042 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7044 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7045 // same as the old fee.
7046 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7047 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7048 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7052 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7053 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7054 // dust limits are used.
7055 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7056 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7057 let seed = [42; 32];
7058 let network = Network::Testnet;
7059 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7060 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7062 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7063 // they have different dust limits.
7065 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7066 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7067 let config = UserConfig::default();
7068 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7070 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7071 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7072 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7073 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7074 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7076 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7077 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7078 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7079 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7080 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7082 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7083 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7084 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7086 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7087 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7088 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7089 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7092 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7094 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7095 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7096 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7097 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7098 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7100 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7101 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7102 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7103 payment_secret: None,
7104 payment_params: None,
7108 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7109 // the dust limit check.
7110 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7111 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7112 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7113 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7115 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7116 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7117 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7118 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7119 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7120 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7121 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7125 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7126 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7127 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7128 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7129 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7130 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7131 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7132 let seed = [42; 32];
7133 let network = Network::Testnet;
7134 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7136 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7137 let config = UserConfig::default();
7138 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7140 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7141 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7143 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7144 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7145 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7146 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7147 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7148 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7150 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7151 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7152 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7153 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7154 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7156 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7158 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7159 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7160 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7161 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7162 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7164 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7165 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7166 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7167 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7168 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7172 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7173 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7174 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7175 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7176 let seed = [42; 32];
7177 let network = Network::Testnet;
7178 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7179 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7180 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7182 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7184 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7185 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7186 let config = UserConfig::default();
7187 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7189 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7190 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7191 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7192 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7194 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7195 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7196 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7198 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7199 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7200 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7201 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7203 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7204 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7205 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7207 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7208 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7210 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7211 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7212 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7213 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7214 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7215 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7216 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7217 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7218 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7223 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7225 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7226 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7227 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7228 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7229 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7230 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7231 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7238 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7239 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7240 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7241 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7242 let seed = [42; 32];
7243 let network = Network::Testnet;
7244 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7245 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7246 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7248 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7249 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7250 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7251 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7252 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7253 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7254 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7255 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7257 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7258 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7259 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7260 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7261 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7262 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7264 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7265 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7266 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7267 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7269 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7271 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7272 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7273 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7274 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7275 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7276 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7278 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7279 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7280 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7281 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7283 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7284 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7285 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7286 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7287 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7289 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7290 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7292 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7293 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7294 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7296 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7297 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7298 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7299 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7300 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7302 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7303 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7305 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7306 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7307 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7311 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7313 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7314 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7315 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7317 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7318 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7319 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7320 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7322 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7323 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7324 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7326 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7328 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7329 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7332 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7333 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7334 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7335 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7336 let seed = [42; 32];
7337 let network = Network::Testnet;
7338 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7339 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7340 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7343 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7344 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7345 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7347 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7348 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7350 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7351 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7352 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7354 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7355 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7357 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7359 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7360 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7362 // Channel Negotiations failed
7363 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7364 assert!(result.is_err());
7369 fn channel_update() {
7370 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7371 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7372 let seed = [42; 32];
7373 let network = Network::Testnet;
7374 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7375 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7377 // Create a channel.
7378 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7379 let config = UserConfig::default();
7380 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7381 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7382 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7383 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7385 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7386 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7387 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7389 short_channel_id: 0,
7392 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7393 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7394 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7396 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7397 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7399 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7401 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7403 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7404 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7405 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7406 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7408 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7409 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7410 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7412 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7416 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7418 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7419 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7420 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7421 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7422 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7423 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7424 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7425 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7426 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7427 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7428 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7429 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7430 use crate::sync::Arc;
7432 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7433 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7434 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7435 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7437 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7439 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7440 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7441 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7442 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7443 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7445 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7446 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7451 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7452 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7453 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7455 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7456 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7457 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7458 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7459 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7460 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7462 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7464 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7465 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7466 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7467 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7468 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7469 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7471 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7472 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7473 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7474 selected_contest_delay: 144
7476 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7477 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7479 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7480 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7482 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7483 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7485 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7486 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7488 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7489 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7490 // build_commitment_transaction.
7491 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7492 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7493 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7494 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7495 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7497 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7498 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7499 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7500 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7504 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7505 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7506 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7507 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7511 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7512 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7513 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7515 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7516 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7518 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7519 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7521 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7523 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7524 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7525 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7526 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7527 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7528 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7529 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7531 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7532 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7533 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7534 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7536 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7537 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7538 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7540 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7542 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7543 commitment_tx.clone(),
7544 counterparty_signature,
7545 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7546 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7547 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7549 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7550 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7552 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7553 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7554 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7556 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7557 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7560 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7561 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7563 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7564 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7565 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7566 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7567 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7568 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7569 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7570 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7572 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7575 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7576 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7577 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7581 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7584 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7585 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7586 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7588 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7589 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7590 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7591 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7592 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7593 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7594 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7595 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7597 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7601 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7602 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7604 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7605 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7606 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7608 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7609 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7610 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7611 "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", {});
7613 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7614 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7616 amount_msat: 1000000,
7618 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7619 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7621 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7624 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7625 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7627 amount_msat: 2000000,
7629 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7630 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7632 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7635 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7636 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7638 amount_msat: 2000000,
7640 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7641 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7642 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7644 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7647 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7648 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7650 amount_msat: 3000000,
7652 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7653 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7654 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7656 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7659 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7660 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7662 amount_msat: 4000000,
7664 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7665 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7667 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7671 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7672 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7673 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7675 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7676 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7677 "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", {
7680 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7681 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7682 "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" },
7685 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7686 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7687 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7690 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7691 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7692 "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" },
7695 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7696 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7697 "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" },
7700 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7701 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7702 "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" }
7705 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7706 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7707 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7709 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7710 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7711 "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", {
7714 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7715 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7716 "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" },
7719 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7720 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7721 "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" },
7724 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7725 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7726 "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" },
7729 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7730 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7731 "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" },
7734 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7735 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7736 "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" }
7739 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7740 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7741 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7743 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7744 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7745 "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", {
7748 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7749 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7750 "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" },
7753 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7754 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7755 "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" },
7758 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7759 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7760 "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" },
7763 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7764 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7765 "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" }
7768 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7769 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7770 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7771 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7773 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7774 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7775 "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", {
7778 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7779 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7780 "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" },
7783 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7784 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7785 "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" },
7788 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7789 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7790 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
7793 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7794 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7795 "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" }
7798 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7799 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7800 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7801 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7803 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7804 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7805 "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", {
7808 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7809 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7810 "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" },
7813 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7814 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7815 "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" },
7818 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7819 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7820 "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" },
7823 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7824 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7825 "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" }
7828 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7829 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7830 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7832 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7833 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7834 "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", {
7837 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7838 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7839 "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" },
7842 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7843 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7844 "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" },
7847 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7848 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7849 "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" }
7852 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7853 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7854 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7856 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7857 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7858 "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", {
7861 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7862 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7863 "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" },
7866 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7867 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7868 "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" },
7871 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7872 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7873 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7876 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7877 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7878 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7880 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7881 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7882 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7885 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7886 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7887 "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" },
7890 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7891 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7892 "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" }
7895 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7896 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7897 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7898 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7900 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7901 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7902 "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", {
7905 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7906 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7907 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
7910 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7911 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7912 "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" }
7915 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7916 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7917 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7918 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7920 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7921 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7922 "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", {
7925 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7926 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7927 "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" },
7930 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7931 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7932 "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" }
7935 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7936 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7937 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7939 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7940 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7941 "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", {
7944 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7945 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7946 "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" }
7949 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7950 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7951 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7952 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7954 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7955 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7956 "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", {
7959 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7960 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7961 "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" }
7964 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7965 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7966 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7967 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7969 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7970 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7971 "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", {
7974 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7975 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7976 "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" }
7979 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7980 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7981 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7982 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7984 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7985 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7986 "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", {});
7988 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7989 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7990 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7991 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7993 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7994 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7995 "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", {});
7997 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7998 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7999 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8000 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8002 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8003 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8004 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8006 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8007 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8008 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8010 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8011 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8012 "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", {});
8014 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8015 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8016 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8017 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8019 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8020 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8021 "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", {});
8023 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8024 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8025 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8026 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8028 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8029 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8030 "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", {});
8032 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8033 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8034 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8035 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8036 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8037 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8039 amount_msat: 2000000,
8041 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8042 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8044 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8047 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8048 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8049 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8051 amount_msat: 5000000,
8053 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8054 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8055 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8057 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8060 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8061 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8063 amount_msat: 5000000,
8065 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8066 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8067 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8069 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8073 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8074 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8075 "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", {
8078 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8079 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8080 "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" },
8082 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8083 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8084 "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" },
8086 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8087 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8088 "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" }
8091 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8092 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8093 "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", {
8096 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8097 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8098 "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" },
8100 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8101 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8102 "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" },
8104 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8105 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8106 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe290400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e83473044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced401008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
8111 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8112 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8114 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8115 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8116 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8117 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8119 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8120 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8121 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8123 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8124 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8126 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8127 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8129 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8130 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8131 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8135 fn test_key_derivation() {
8136 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8137 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8139 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8140 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8142 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8143 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8145 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8146 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8148 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8149 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8151 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8152 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8154 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8155 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8157 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8158 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8162 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8163 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8164 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8165 let seed = [42; 32];
8166 let network = Network::Testnet;
8167 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8168 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8170 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8171 let config = UserConfig::default();
8172 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8173 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8175 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8176 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8178 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8179 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8180 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8181 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8182 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8183 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8184 assert!(res.is_ok());
8189 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8190 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8191 // resulting `channel_type`.
8192 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8193 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8194 let network = Network::Testnet;
8195 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8196 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8198 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8199 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8201 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8202 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8204 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8205 // need to signal it.
8206 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8207 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8208 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8211 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8213 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8214 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8215 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8217 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8218 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8219 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8222 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8223 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8224 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8225 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8226 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8229 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8230 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8235 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8236 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8237 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8238 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8239 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8240 let network = Network::Testnet;
8241 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8242 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8244 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8245 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8247 let config = UserConfig::default();
8249 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8250 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8251 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8252 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8253 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8255 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8256 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8257 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8260 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8261 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8262 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8264 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8265 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8266 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8267 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8268 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8269 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8271 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8276 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8277 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8279 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8280 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8281 let network = Network::Testnet;
8282 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8283 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8285 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8286 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8288 let config = UserConfig::default();
8290 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8291 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8292 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8293 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8294 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8295 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8296 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8297 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8299 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8300 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8301 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8302 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8303 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8304 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8307 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8308 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8310 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8311 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8312 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8313 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8315 assert!(res.is_err());
8317 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8318 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8319 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8321 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8322 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8323 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8326 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8328 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8329 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8330 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8331 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8334 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8335 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8337 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8338 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8340 assert!(res.is_err());