1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
304 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
305 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
307 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
309 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
311 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
314 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
318 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
322 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
324 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
325 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
326 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
327 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
328 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
330 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
331 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
333 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
335 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
336 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
338 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
339 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
340 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
341 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
342 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
343 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
345 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
346 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
348 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
349 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
350 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
351 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
352 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
354 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
355 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
357 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
358 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
360 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
361 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
362 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
363 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
370 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
372 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
379 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
380 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
382 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
389 macro_rules! secp_check {
390 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
398 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
399 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
400 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
401 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
402 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
404 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
405 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
407 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
409 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
411 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
415 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
417 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
418 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
419 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
421 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
422 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
424 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
425 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
426 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
427 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
428 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
430 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
431 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
435 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
441 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
444 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
445 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 holding_cell_msat: u64,
448 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
451 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
452 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
453 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
454 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
455 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
456 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
457 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
458 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
463 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
464 struct HTLCCandidate {
466 origin: HTLCInitiator,
470 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
478 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
480 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
482 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
483 htlc_value_msat: u64,
484 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
489 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
490 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
491 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
492 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
493 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
495 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
496 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
500 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
501 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
505 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
506 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
507 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
508 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
509 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
510 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
511 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
512 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
513 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
514 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
515 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
518 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
519 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
520 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
521 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
522 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
523 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
524 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
525 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
528 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
531 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
532 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
533 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
534 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
535 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
538 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
539 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
540 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
541 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
542 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
543 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
544 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
545 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
546 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
547 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
548 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
549 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
550 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
552 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
554 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
555 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
556 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
557 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
559 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
560 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
561 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
562 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
564 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
565 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
566 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
567 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
568 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
570 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
571 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
572 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
573 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
575 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
576 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
577 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
579 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
580 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
581 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
582 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
583 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
585 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
586 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
589 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
590 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
592 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
593 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
594 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
595 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
597 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
598 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
601 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
602 (0, update, required),
605 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
606 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
607 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
608 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
609 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
611 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
612 /// in a timely manner.
613 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
616 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
617 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
618 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
620 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
621 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
622 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
623 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
627 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
628 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
629 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
631 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
632 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
633 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
634 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
636 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
640 channel_id: [u8; 32],
641 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
644 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
645 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
647 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
648 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
649 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
651 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
652 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
653 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
654 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
656 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
657 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
659 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
661 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
662 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
663 destination_script: Script,
665 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
666 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
667 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
669 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
670 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
671 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
672 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
673 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
674 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
676 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
677 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
678 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
679 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
680 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
681 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
683 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
685 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
686 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
687 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
689 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
690 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
691 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
692 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
693 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
694 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
695 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
697 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
699 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
700 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
701 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
702 // HTLCs with similar state.
703 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
704 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
705 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
706 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
707 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
708 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
709 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
710 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
711 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
714 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
715 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
716 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
718 update_time_counter: u32,
720 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
721 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
722 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
723 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
724 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
725 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
727 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
728 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
730 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
731 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
732 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
733 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
735 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
736 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
738 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
740 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
742 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
743 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
744 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
745 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
746 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
747 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
748 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
749 channel_creation_height: u32,
751 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
754 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
756 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
759 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
761 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
764 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
766 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
768 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
769 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
772 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
774 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
776 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
777 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
779 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
781 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
782 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
783 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
785 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
787 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
788 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
790 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
791 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
792 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
794 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
796 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
798 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
799 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
800 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
801 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
803 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
804 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
805 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
807 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
808 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
809 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
811 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
812 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
813 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
814 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
815 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
816 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
817 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
818 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
820 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
821 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
822 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
823 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
824 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
826 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
827 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
829 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
830 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
831 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
832 /// unblock the state machine.
834 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
835 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
836 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
838 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
839 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
840 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
842 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
843 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
844 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
845 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
846 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
847 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
848 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
849 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
851 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
852 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
854 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
855 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
856 // the channel's funding UTXO.
858 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
859 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
860 // associated channel mapping.
862 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
863 // to store all of them.
864 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
866 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
867 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
868 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
869 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
870 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
872 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
873 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
875 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
876 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
878 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
879 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
880 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
882 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
883 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
884 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
887 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
888 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
889 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
890 self.update_time_counter
893 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
894 self.latest_monitor_update_id
897 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
898 self.config.announced_channel
901 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
902 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
905 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
906 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
907 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
908 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
911 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
912 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
913 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
916 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
917 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
918 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
919 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
920 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
923 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
924 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
925 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
926 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
928 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
929 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
931 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
932 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
934 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
935 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
937 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
940 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
941 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
942 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
943 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
945 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
946 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
947 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
948 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
951 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
952 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
955 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
960 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
964 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
966 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
967 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
968 self.temporary_channel_id
971 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
975 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
976 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
977 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
981 /// Gets the channel's type
982 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
986 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
988 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
989 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
990 self.short_channel_id
993 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
994 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
995 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
998 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
999 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1000 self.outbound_scid_alias
1003 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1004 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1005 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1006 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1007 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1008 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1011 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1012 /// get_funding_created.
1013 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1014 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1017 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1018 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1019 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1022 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1023 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1024 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1025 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1029 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1032 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1033 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1036 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1037 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1040 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1041 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1042 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1045 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1046 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1049 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1050 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1051 self.counterparty_node_id
1054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1055 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1056 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1059 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1060 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1061 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1064 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1065 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1067 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1068 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1069 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1070 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1072 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1076 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1077 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1078 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1081 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1082 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1083 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1086 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1087 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1088 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1090 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1091 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1096 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1097 self.channel_value_satoshis
1100 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1101 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1104 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1105 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1108 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1109 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1110 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1112 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1113 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1114 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1115 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1116 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1118 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1122 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1123 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1124 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1127 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1128 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1129 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1132 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1133 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1134 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1137 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1138 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1139 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1142 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1143 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1144 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1147 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1148 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1149 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1152 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1153 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1154 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1155 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1156 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1159 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1161 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1162 self.prev_config = None;
1166 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1167 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1171 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1172 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1173 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1174 let did_channel_update =
1175 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1176 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1177 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1178 if did_channel_update {
1179 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1180 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1181 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1182 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1184 self.config.options = *config;
1188 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1189 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1190 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1193 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1194 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1195 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1196 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1197 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1199 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1200 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1201 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1202 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1203 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1204 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1205 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1207 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1208 where L::Target: Logger
1210 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1211 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1212 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1214 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1215 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1216 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1217 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1219 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1220 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1221 if match update_state {
1222 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1223 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1224 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1225 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1226 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1228 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1232 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1233 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1234 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1235 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1237 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1238 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1239 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1241 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1242 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1243 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1244 transaction_output_index: None
1249 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1250 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1251 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1252 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1253 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1256 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1258 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1259 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1260 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1262 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1263 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1266 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1267 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1270 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1272 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1273 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1274 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1276 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1277 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1283 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1284 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1285 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1286 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1287 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1288 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1289 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1293 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1294 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1296 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1298 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1299 if generated_by_local {
1300 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1301 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1310 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1312 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1313 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1314 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1315 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1316 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1317 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1318 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1321 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1322 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1323 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1328 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1329 preimages.push(preimage);
1333 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1334 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1338 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1339 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1341 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1342 if !generated_by_local {
1343 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1351 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1352 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1353 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1354 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1355 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1356 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1357 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1358 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1360 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1362 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1363 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1364 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1365 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1367 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1369 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1370 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1371 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1372 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1375 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1376 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1377 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1378 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1380 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1383 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1384 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1385 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1386 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1388 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1391 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1392 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1397 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1398 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1403 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1405 let channel_parameters =
1406 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1407 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1408 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1415 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1418 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1419 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1420 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1421 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1423 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1424 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1425 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1433 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1434 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1440 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1441 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1442 /// our counterparty!)
1443 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1444 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1445 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1446 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1447 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1448 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1449 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1451 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1455 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1456 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1457 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1458 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1459 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1460 //may see payments to it!
1461 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1462 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1463 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1465 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1468 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1469 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1470 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1471 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1472 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1475 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1476 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1479 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1483 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1484 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1485 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1486 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1487 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1488 // which are near the dust limit.
1489 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1490 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1491 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1492 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1493 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1495 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1496 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1498 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1501 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1502 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1503 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1506 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1507 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1509 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1510 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1511 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1512 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1513 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1514 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1515 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1518 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1521 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1522 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1523 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1525 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1526 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1527 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1528 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1529 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1530 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1532 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1533 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1539 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1540 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1542 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1543 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1544 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1545 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1546 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1547 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1548 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1551 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1554 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1555 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1556 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1558 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1559 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1560 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1561 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1562 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1563 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1565 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1566 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1570 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1571 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1572 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1573 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1574 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1575 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1576 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1578 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1579 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1581 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1588 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1589 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1590 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1591 /// corner case properly.
1592 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1593 -> AvailableBalances
1594 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1596 let context = &self;
1597 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1598 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1599 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1601 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1602 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1604 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1606 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1608 if context.is_outbound() {
1609 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1610 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1612 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1613 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1615 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1616 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1617 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1618 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1621 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1622 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1623 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1624 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1626 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1627 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1628 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1629 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1630 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1631 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1632 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1633 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1634 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1635 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1637 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1640 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1641 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1642 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1643 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1644 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1647 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1648 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1650 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1651 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1652 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1654 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1655 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1656 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1657 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1661 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1663 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1664 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1665 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1666 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1667 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1668 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1669 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1671 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1672 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1674 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1675 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1676 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1678 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1679 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1680 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1681 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1682 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1685 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1686 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1687 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1688 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1689 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1690 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1693 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1694 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1695 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1697 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1701 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1702 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1704 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1705 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1709 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1710 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1711 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1712 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1714 outbound_capacity_msat,
1715 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1716 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1720 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1721 let context = &self;
1722 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1725 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1726 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1728 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1729 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1731 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1732 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1734 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1735 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1736 let context = &self;
1737 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1739 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1742 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1743 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1745 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1746 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1748 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1749 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1751 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1752 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1756 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1757 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1763 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1764 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1765 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1768 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1769 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1770 included_htlcs += 1;
1773 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1774 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1778 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1779 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1780 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1781 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1782 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1783 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1788 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1790 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1791 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1796 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1797 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1801 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1802 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1803 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1806 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1807 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1809 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1810 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1811 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1813 total_pending_htlcs,
1814 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1815 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1816 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1818 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1822 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1824 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1829 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1830 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1832 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1833 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1835 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1836 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1838 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1839 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1840 let context = &self;
1841 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1843 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1846 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1847 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1849 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1850 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1852 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1853 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1855 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1860 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1861 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1867 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1868 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1869 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1870 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1871 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1872 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1875 included_htlcs += 1;
1878 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1879 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1882 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1883 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1885 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1886 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1887 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1892 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1893 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1897 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1898 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1900 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1901 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1903 total_pending_htlcs,
1904 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1905 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1906 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1908 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1909 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1910 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1912 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1914 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1919 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1920 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1921 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1922 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1928 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1929 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1930 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1931 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1932 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1933 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1934 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1935 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1936 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1937 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1938 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1940 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1941 // return them to fail the payment.
1942 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1943 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1944 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1946 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1947 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1952 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1953 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1954 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1955 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1956 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1957 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1958 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1959 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1960 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1961 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1962 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1963 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1964 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1969 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1970 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1971 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1975 // Internal utility functions for channels
1977 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1978 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1979 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1981 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1983 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1984 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1985 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1987 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1990 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1992 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1995 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1996 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1997 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1999 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2001 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2002 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2003 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2004 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2005 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2008 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2009 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2010 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2011 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2012 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2013 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2014 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2017 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2018 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2020 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2021 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2024 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2025 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2026 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2027 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2028 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2029 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2032 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2033 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2034 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2037 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2038 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2039 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2040 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2043 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2044 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2046 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2047 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2048 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2052 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2053 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2054 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2056 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2057 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2058 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2059 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2061 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2062 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2063 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2064 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2065 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2066 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2067 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2068 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2069 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2070 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2075 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2076 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2077 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2078 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2079 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2080 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2082 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2084 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2085 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2086 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2087 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2088 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2089 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2090 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2091 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2093 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2094 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2104 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2105 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2106 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2107 // outside of those situations will fail.
2108 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2112 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2117 1 + // script length (0)
2121 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2122 2 + // witness marker and flag
2123 1 + // witness element count
2124 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2125 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2126 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2127 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2128 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2129 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2131 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2132 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2133 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2139 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2140 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2141 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2142 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2144 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2145 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2146 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2148 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2149 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2150 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2151 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2152 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2153 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2156 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2157 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2160 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2161 value_to_holder = 0;
2164 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2165 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2166 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2167 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2169 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2170 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2173 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2174 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2177 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2180 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2181 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2183 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2185 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2186 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2187 where L::Target: Logger {
2188 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2189 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2190 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2191 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2192 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2193 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2194 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2195 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2199 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2200 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2201 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2202 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2204 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2205 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2207 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2209 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2211 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2212 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2213 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2215 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2216 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2217 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2218 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2219 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2221 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2222 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2223 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2225 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2228 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2231 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2232 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2236 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2240 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2242 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2243 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2244 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2245 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2248 // Now update local state:
2250 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2251 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2252 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2253 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2254 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2255 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2256 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2260 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2261 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2262 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2263 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2264 // do not not get into this branch.
2265 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2266 match pending_update {
2267 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2268 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2269 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2270 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2271 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2272 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2273 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2276 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2277 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2278 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2279 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2280 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2281 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2282 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2288 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2289 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2290 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2292 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2293 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2294 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2296 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2300 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2301 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2303 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2304 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2306 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2307 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2310 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2313 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2314 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2315 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2316 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2321 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2322 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2323 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2324 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2325 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2326 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2327 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2328 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2329 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2330 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2331 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2332 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2333 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2334 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2335 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2337 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2338 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2339 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2340 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2341 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2344 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2345 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2346 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2352 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2353 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2355 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2359 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2360 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2361 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2362 /// before we fail backwards.
2364 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2365 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2366 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2367 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2368 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2369 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2370 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2373 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2374 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2375 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2376 /// before we fail backwards.
2378 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2379 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2380 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2381 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2382 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2383 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2384 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2386 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2388 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2389 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2390 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2392 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2393 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2394 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2396 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2397 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2398 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2400 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2405 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2406 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2412 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2413 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2414 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2415 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2416 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2420 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2421 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2422 force_holding_cell = true;
2425 // Now update local state:
2426 if force_holding_cell {
2427 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2428 match pending_update {
2429 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2430 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2431 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2432 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2436 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2437 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2438 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2439 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2445 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2446 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2447 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2453 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2455 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2456 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2459 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2460 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2461 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2466 // Message handlers:
2468 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2469 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2470 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2471 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2472 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2476 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2479 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2482 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2483 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2484 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2485 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2488 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2490 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2491 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2492 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2493 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2495 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2496 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2498 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2499 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2501 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2502 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2503 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2504 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2505 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2506 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2510 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2511 initial_commitment_tx,
2514 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2515 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2518 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2519 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2522 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2523 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2524 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2525 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2526 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2527 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2528 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2529 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2530 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2531 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2532 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2533 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2535 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2537 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2539 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2540 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2541 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2542 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2544 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2546 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2547 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2551 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2552 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2554 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2555 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2556 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2557 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2559 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2562 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2563 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2564 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2567 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2568 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2569 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2570 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2571 // when routing outbound payments.
2572 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2576 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2578 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2579 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2580 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2581 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2582 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2583 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2584 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2585 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2586 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2588 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2589 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2590 let expected_point =
2591 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2592 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2594 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2595 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2596 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2597 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2598 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2599 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2601 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2602 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2603 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2604 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2605 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2607 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2615 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2616 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2618 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2620 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2623 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2624 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2625 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2626 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2627 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2628 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2630 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2631 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2632 if local_sent_shutdown {
2633 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2635 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2636 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2637 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2638 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2640 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2643 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2646 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2649 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2650 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2653 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2654 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2655 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2658 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2659 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2661 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2662 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2663 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2664 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2665 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2666 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2667 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2668 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2669 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2670 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2671 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2673 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2674 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2675 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2676 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2677 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2678 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2682 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2683 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2686 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2687 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2688 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2690 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2691 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2692 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2693 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2694 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2695 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2696 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2700 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2701 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2702 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2703 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2704 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2705 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2706 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2710 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2711 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2712 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2713 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2714 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2715 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2718 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2719 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2720 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2721 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2722 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2724 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2728 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2732 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2733 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2734 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2735 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2736 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2737 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2738 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2739 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2740 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2741 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2742 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2743 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2744 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2745 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2746 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2747 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2750 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2751 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2752 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2753 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2757 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2760 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2761 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2764 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2765 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2766 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2770 // Now update local state:
2771 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2772 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2773 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2774 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2775 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2776 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2777 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2782 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2784 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2785 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2786 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2787 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2788 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2789 None => fail_reason.into(),
2790 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2791 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2792 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2793 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2795 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2799 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2801 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2802 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2804 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2805 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2810 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2813 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2814 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2817 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2818 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2821 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2824 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2825 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2828 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2832 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2836 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2837 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2840 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2844 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2848 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2849 where L::Target: Logger
2851 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2854 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2857 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2861 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2863 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2865 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2866 let commitment_txid = {
2867 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2868 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2869 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2871 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2872 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2873 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2874 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2875 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2880 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2882 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2883 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2884 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2885 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2888 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2889 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2890 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2891 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2896 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2897 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2898 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2899 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2900 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2901 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2902 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2903 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2904 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2905 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2906 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2912 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2916 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2917 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2918 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2919 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2920 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2921 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2922 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2923 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2924 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2925 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2926 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2927 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2928 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2931 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2932 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2933 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2934 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2935 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2936 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2937 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2939 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2940 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2941 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2942 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2943 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2944 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2945 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2948 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2949 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2952 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2954 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2955 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2956 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2959 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2962 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2963 commitment_stats.tx,
2965 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2966 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2967 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2970 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2971 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2973 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2974 let mut need_commitment = false;
2975 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2976 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2977 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2978 need_commitment = true;
2982 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2983 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2984 Some(forward_info.clone())
2986 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2987 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2988 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2989 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2990 need_commitment = true;
2993 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2994 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2995 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2996 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2997 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2998 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2999 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3000 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3001 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3002 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3003 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3004 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3005 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3006 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3008 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3010 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3011 need_commitment = true;
3015 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3016 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3017 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3018 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3019 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3020 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3022 nondust_htlc_sources,
3026 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3027 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3028 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3029 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3031 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3032 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3033 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3034 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3035 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3036 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3037 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3038 // includes the right HTLCs.
3039 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3040 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3041 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3042 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3043 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3044 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3046 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3047 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3048 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3051 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3052 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3053 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3054 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3055 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3056 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3057 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3058 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3059 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3063 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3064 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3065 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3066 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3069 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3070 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3071 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3072 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3073 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3074 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3075 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3077 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3078 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3079 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3080 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3083 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3084 /// for our counterparty.
3085 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3086 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3087 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3088 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3090 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3091 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3092 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3093 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3095 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3096 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3097 updates: Vec::new(),
3100 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3101 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3102 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3103 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3104 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3105 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3106 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3107 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3108 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3109 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3110 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3111 // to rebalance channels.
3112 match &htlc_update {
3113 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3114 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3115 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3117 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3118 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3120 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3123 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3124 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3125 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3126 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3127 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3128 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3129 // into the holding cell without ever being
3130 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3131 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3132 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3135 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3141 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3142 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3143 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3144 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3145 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3146 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3147 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3148 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3149 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3150 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3151 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3152 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3154 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3155 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3156 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3157 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3158 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3159 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3160 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3161 // for a full revocation before failing.
3162 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3163 update_fail_count += 1;
3166 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3168 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3175 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3176 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3178 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3179 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3184 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3185 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3186 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3187 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3188 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3190 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3191 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3192 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3194 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3195 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3201 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3202 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3203 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3204 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3205 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3206 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3207 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3208 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3209 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3211 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3214 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3217 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3221 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3223 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3224 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3229 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3230 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3231 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3232 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3233 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3234 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3235 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3236 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3240 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3242 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3243 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3246 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3247 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3248 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3249 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3251 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3255 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3256 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3257 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3258 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3259 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3260 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3261 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3262 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3266 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3267 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3268 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3269 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3270 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3271 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3272 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3273 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3274 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3276 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3277 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3280 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3281 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3282 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3283 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3284 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3285 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3286 let mut require_commitment = false;
3287 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3290 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3291 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3292 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3294 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3295 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3296 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3297 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3298 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3299 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3304 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3305 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3306 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3307 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3308 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3310 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3311 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3312 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3317 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3318 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3320 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3324 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3325 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3327 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3328 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3329 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3330 require_commitment = true;
3331 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3332 match forward_info {
3333 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3334 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3335 require_commitment = true;
3337 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3338 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3339 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3341 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3342 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3343 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3347 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3348 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3349 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3350 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3356 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3357 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3358 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3359 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3361 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3362 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3363 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3364 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3365 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3366 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3367 require_commitment = true;
3371 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3373 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3374 match update_state {
3375 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3376 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3377 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3378 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3379 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3381 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3382 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3383 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3384 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3385 require_commitment = true;
3386 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3387 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3392 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3393 let release_state_str =
3394 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3395 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3396 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3397 if !release_monitor {
3398 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3399 update: monitor_update,
3401 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3403 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3408 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3409 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3410 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3411 if require_commitment {
3412 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3413 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3414 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3415 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3416 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3417 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3418 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3419 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3420 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3422 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3423 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3424 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3425 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3426 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3429 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3430 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3431 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3432 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3433 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3434 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3436 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3437 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
3439 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3440 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3442 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3443 if require_commitment {
3444 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3446 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3447 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3448 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3449 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3451 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3452 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()),
3453 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3456 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3457 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3459 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3460 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
3462 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3463 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3469 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3470 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3471 /// commitment update.
3472 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3473 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3474 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3476 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3477 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3480 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3481 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3482 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3483 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3485 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3486 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3487 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3488 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3489 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3490 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3491 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3493 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3494 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3496 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3497 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3499 if !self.context.is_live() {
3500 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3503 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3504 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3505 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3506 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3507 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3508 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3509 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3510 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3511 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3512 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3516 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3517 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3518 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3519 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3520 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3521 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3524 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3525 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3529 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3530 force_holding_cell = true;
3533 if force_holding_cell {
3534 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3538 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3539 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3541 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3542 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3547 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3548 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3550 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3552 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3553 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3554 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3555 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3559 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3560 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3561 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3565 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3566 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3569 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3570 // will be retransmitted.
3571 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3572 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3573 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3575 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3576 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3578 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3579 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3580 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3581 // this HTLC accordingly
3582 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3585 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3586 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3587 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3588 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3591 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3592 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3593 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3594 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3595 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3596 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3601 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3603 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3604 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3605 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3606 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3610 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3611 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3612 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3613 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3614 // the update upon reconnection.
3615 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3619 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3621 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3622 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3625 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3626 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3627 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3628 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3629 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3630 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3631 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3633 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3634 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3635 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3636 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3637 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3638 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3639 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3641 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3642 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3643 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3644 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3645 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3646 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3647 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3650 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3651 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3652 /// to the remote side.
3653 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3654 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3655 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3656 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3659 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3661 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3662 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3664 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3665 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3666 // first received the funding_signed.
3667 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3668 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3669 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3671 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3672 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3673 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3674 funding_broadcastable = None;
3677 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3678 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3679 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3680 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3681 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3682 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3683 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3684 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3685 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3686 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3687 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3688 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3689 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3690 next_per_commitment_point,
3691 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3695 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3697 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3698 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3699 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3700 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3701 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3702 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3704 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3705 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3706 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3707 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3708 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3709 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3713 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3714 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3716 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3717 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3718 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3721 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3722 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3723 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3724 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3725 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3726 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3727 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3728 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3729 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3733 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3734 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3736 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3737 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3739 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3740 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3742 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3743 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3745 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3746 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3747 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3748 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3749 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3750 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3751 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3752 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3753 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3754 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3755 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3756 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3757 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3758 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3760 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3761 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3762 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3768 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3769 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3770 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3771 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3772 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3773 per_commitment_secret,
3774 next_per_commitment_point,
3776 next_local_nonce: None,
3780 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3781 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3782 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3783 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3784 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3786 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3787 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3788 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3789 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3790 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3791 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3792 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3793 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3794 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3795 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3800 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3801 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3803 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3804 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3805 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3806 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3807 reason: err_packet.clone()
3810 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3811 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3812 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3813 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3814 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3815 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3818 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3819 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3820 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3821 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3822 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3829 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3830 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3831 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3832 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3836 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3837 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3838 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3839 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3840 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3841 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3845 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3846 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3848 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3849 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3850 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3851 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3852 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3853 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3854 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3855 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3858 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3860 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3861 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3862 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3863 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3867 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3868 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3872 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3873 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3874 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3875 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3876 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3879 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3880 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3881 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3882 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3883 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3886 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3887 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3888 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3889 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3890 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3891 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3892 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3893 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3897 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3898 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3899 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3900 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3902 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3906 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3907 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3908 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3909 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3911 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3912 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3913 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3914 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3915 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3919 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3921 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3922 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3923 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3924 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3925 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3928 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3929 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3930 channel_ready: None,
3931 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3932 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3933 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3937 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3938 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3939 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3940 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3941 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3942 next_per_commitment_point,
3943 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3945 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3946 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3947 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3951 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3952 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3953 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3955 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3956 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3957 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3960 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3963 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3966 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3967 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3968 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3969 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3970 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3971 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3972 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3974 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3976 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3977 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3978 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3979 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3980 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3981 next_per_commitment_point,
3982 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3986 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3987 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3988 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3990 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3993 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3994 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3995 raa: required_revoke,
3996 commitment_update: None,
3997 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3999 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4000 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4001 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4003 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4006 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4007 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4008 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4009 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4010 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4011 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4014 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4015 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4016 raa: required_revoke,
4017 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4018 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4022 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4026 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4027 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4028 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4029 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4031 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4033 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4035 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4036 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4037 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4038 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4039 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4040 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4042 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4043 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4044 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4045 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4046 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4048 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4049 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4050 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4051 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4054 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4055 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4056 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4057 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4058 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4059 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4060 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4061 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4062 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4063 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4064 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4065 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4066 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4067 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4068 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4070 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4073 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4074 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4077 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4078 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4079 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4080 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4081 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4082 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4085 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4086 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4087 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4088 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4089 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4090 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4091 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4093 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4099 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4100 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4101 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4102 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4104 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4105 return Ok((None, None));
4108 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4109 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4110 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4112 return Ok((None, None));
4115 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4117 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4118 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4119 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4120 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4122 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4123 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4125 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4126 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4128 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4129 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4130 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4131 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4133 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4134 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4135 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4142 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4143 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4145 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4146 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4149 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4150 /// within our expected timeframe.
4152 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4153 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4154 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4157 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4160 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4161 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4165 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4166 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4168 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4171 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4172 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4173 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4174 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4177 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4178 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4182 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4184 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4185 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4188 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4189 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4190 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4193 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4196 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4197 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4198 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4199 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4201 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4204 assert!(send_shutdown);
4205 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4206 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4207 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4209 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4212 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4217 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4219 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4220 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4222 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4223 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4224 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4225 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4226 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4227 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4230 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4231 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4233 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4234 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4235 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4236 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4240 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4241 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4242 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4243 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4244 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4245 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4247 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4248 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4255 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4256 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4258 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4261 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4262 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4264 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4266 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4267 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4268 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4269 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4270 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4271 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4272 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4273 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4274 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4276 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4277 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4280 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4284 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4285 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4286 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4287 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4289 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4292 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4295 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4298 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4302 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4306 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4307 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4308 return Ok((None, None));
4311 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4312 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4313 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4316 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4318 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4321 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4322 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4323 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4324 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4325 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4329 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4330 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4335 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4336 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4337 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4338 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4339 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4340 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4341 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4345 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4347 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4348 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4349 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4350 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4352 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4355 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4356 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4358 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4359 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4361 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4362 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4363 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4364 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4368 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4369 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4370 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4371 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4373 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4374 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4375 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4383 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4384 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4385 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4387 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4388 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4390 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4391 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4394 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4395 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4396 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4397 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4398 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4400 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4401 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4402 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4404 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4405 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4408 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4409 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4410 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4411 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4412 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4413 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4414 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4415 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4417 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4420 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4421 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4422 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4423 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4425 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4429 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4430 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4431 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4432 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4434 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4440 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4441 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4442 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4443 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4444 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4445 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4446 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4448 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4449 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4452 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4454 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4455 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4461 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4462 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4463 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4464 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4465 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4466 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4467 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4469 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4470 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4477 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4478 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4481 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4482 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4485 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4486 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4490 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4491 &self.context.holder_signer
4495 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4497 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4498 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4499 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4500 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4501 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4502 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4504 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4506 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4514 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4515 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4519 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4520 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4521 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4522 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4525 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4526 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4527 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4528 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4531 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4532 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4533 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4534 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4535 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4536 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4539 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4540 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4541 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4542 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4543 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4544 if !release_monitor {
4545 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4554 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4555 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4558 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4559 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4560 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4562 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4563 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4564 if self.context.channel_state &
4565 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4566 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4567 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4568 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4569 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4572 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4573 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4574 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4575 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4576 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4577 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4579 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4580 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4581 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4583 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4584 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4585 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4586 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4587 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4588 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4594 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4595 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4596 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4599 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4600 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4601 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4604 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4605 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4606 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4609 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4610 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4611 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4612 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4613 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4614 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4619 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4620 self.context.channel_update_status
4623 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4624 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4625 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4628 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4630 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4631 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4632 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4636 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4637 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4638 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4641 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4645 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4646 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4647 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4649 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4650 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4651 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4653 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4654 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4657 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4658 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4659 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4660 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4661 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4662 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4663 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4664 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4665 self.context.channel_state);
4667 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4671 if need_commitment_update {
4672 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4673 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4674 let next_per_commitment_point =
4675 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4676 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4677 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4678 next_per_commitment_point,
4679 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4683 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4689 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4690 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4691 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4692 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4693 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4694 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4695 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4697 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4700 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4701 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4702 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4703 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4704 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4705 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4706 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4707 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4708 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4709 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4710 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4711 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4712 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4713 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4714 // channel and move on.
4715 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4716 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4718 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4719 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4720 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4722 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4723 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4724 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4725 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4726 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4727 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4728 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4732 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4733 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4734 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4735 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4736 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4740 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4741 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4742 // may have already happened for this block).
4743 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4744 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4745 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4746 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4749 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4750 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4751 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4752 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4760 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4761 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4762 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4763 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4765 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4766 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4769 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4771 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4772 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4773 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4774 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4776 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4779 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4782 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4783 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4784 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4785 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4787 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4790 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4791 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4792 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4794 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4795 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4797 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4798 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4799 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4807 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4809 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4810 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4811 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4813 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4814 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4817 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4818 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4819 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4820 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4821 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4822 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4823 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4824 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4825 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4828 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4829 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4830 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4831 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4833 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4834 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4835 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4837 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4838 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4839 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4840 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4842 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4843 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4844 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4845 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4846 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4847 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4848 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4851 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4852 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4854 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4857 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4858 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4859 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4860 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4861 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4862 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4863 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4864 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4865 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4866 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4867 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4868 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4869 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4870 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4871 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4872 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4873 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4879 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4884 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4885 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4887 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4888 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4889 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4890 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4892 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4895 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4897 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4898 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4899 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4900 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4901 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4902 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4904 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4905 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4908 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4909 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4910 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4911 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4912 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4913 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4915 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4916 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4919 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4920 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4921 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4922 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4923 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4929 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4930 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4931 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4932 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4934 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4937 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4941 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4945 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4946 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4950 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4954 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4955 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4958 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4962 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4964 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4969 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4970 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4971 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4973 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4978 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4980 None => return None,
4983 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4985 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4986 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4988 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4989 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4995 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4997 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4998 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4999 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5000 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5001 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5002 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5003 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5005 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5006 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5007 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5008 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5009 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5010 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5011 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5012 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5013 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5014 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5015 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5016 contents: announcement,
5021 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5025 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5026 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5027 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5028 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5029 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5030 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5031 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5032 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5034 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5036 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5038 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5039 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5041 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5043 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5044 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5047 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5048 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5049 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5050 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5053 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5056 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5057 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5058 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5059 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5060 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5061 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5064 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5066 Err(_) => return None,
5068 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5069 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5074 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5075 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5076 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5077 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5078 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5079 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5080 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5081 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5082 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5083 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5084 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5085 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5086 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5087 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5088 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5089 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5092 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5095 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5096 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5097 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5098 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5099 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5100 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5101 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5102 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5103 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5105 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5106 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5107 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5108 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5109 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5110 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5111 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5112 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5113 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5115 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5116 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5117 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5118 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5119 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5120 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5121 next_funding_txid: None,
5126 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5128 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5129 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5130 /// commitment update.
5132 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5133 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5134 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5135 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5136 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5137 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5138 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5141 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5142 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5143 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5145 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5146 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5151 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5152 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5154 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5156 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5157 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5159 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5160 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5161 /// regenerate them.
5163 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5164 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5166 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5167 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5168 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5169 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5170 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5171 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5172 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5174 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5175 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5177 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5178 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5179 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5182 if amount_msat == 0 {
5183 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5186 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5187 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5188 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5189 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5192 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5193 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5194 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5197 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5198 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5199 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5200 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5201 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5202 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5203 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5204 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5207 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5208 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5209 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5210 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5211 else { "to peer" });
5213 if need_holding_cell {
5214 force_holding_cell = true;
5217 // Now update local state:
5218 if force_holding_cell {
5219 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5224 onion_routing_packet,
5230 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5231 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5233 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5235 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5240 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5241 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5242 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5246 onion_routing_packet,
5249 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5254 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5255 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5256 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5257 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5259 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5260 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5261 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5263 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5264 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5268 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5269 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5270 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5271 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5272 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5273 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5274 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5277 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5278 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5279 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5280 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5281 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5282 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5285 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5287 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5288 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5289 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5291 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5292 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5295 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5296 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5297 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5298 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5299 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5300 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5301 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5302 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5305 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5309 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5310 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5311 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5312 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5314 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5316 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5317 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5318 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5319 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5320 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5321 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5322 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5323 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5324 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5325 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5326 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5332 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5335 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5336 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5337 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5338 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5339 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5340 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5342 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5343 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5344 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5346 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5347 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5348 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5351 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5352 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5356 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5357 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5359 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5361 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5362 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5363 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5364 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5366 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5367 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5368 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5369 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5370 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5371 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5375 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5376 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5380 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5381 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5386 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5387 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5389 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5390 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5391 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5392 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5393 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5394 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5395 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5396 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5398 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5399 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5400 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5403 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5404 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5405 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5411 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5412 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5415 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5416 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5417 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5418 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5424 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5425 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5427 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5428 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5429 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5430 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5431 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5433 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5434 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5435 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5438 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5439 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5440 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5442 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5443 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5446 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5447 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5449 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5450 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5451 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5454 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5455 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5456 let mut chan_closed = false;
5457 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5461 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5463 None if !chan_closed => {
5464 // use override shutdown script if provided
5465 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5466 Some(script) => script,
5468 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5469 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5470 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5471 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5475 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5476 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5478 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5484 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5485 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5486 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5487 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5489 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5491 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5493 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5494 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5495 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5496 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5497 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5498 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5501 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5502 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5504 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5505 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5506 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5509 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5510 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5511 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5512 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5513 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5515 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5516 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5523 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5524 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5526 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5529 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5530 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5531 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5533 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5534 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5538 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5542 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5543 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5544 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5545 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5548 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5549 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5550 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5551 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5552 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5553 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5554 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5555 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5557 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5558 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5559 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5560 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5562 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5563 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5565 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5566 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5568 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5569 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5570 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5572 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5573 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5575 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5576 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5577 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5578 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5579 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5582 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5583 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5585 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5586 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5588 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5590 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5592 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5593 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5594 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5595 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5598 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5599 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5601 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5602 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5603 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5604 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5608 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5609 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5610 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5614 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5615 Ok(script) => script,
5616 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5619 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5622 context: ChannelContext {
5625 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5626 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5627 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5628 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5633 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5635 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5636 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5637 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5638 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5640 channel_value_satoshis,
5642 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5644 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5645 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5648 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5649 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5652 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5653 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5654 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5655 pending_update_fee: None,
5656 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5657 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5658 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5659 update_time_counter: 1,
5661 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5663 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5664 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5665 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5666 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5667 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5668 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5670 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5671 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5672 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5673 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5675 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5676 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5677 closing_fee_limits: None,
5678 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5680 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5681 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5682 short_channel_id: None,
5683 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5685 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5686 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5687 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5688 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5689 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5690 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5691 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5692 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5693 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5694 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5695 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5696 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5698 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5700 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5701 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5702 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5703 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5704 counterparty_parameters: None,
5705 funding_outpoint: None,
5706 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5708 funding_transaction: None,
5710 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5711 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5712 counterparty_node_id,
5714 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5716 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5718 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5719 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5721 announcement_sigs: None,
5723 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5724 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5725 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5726 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5728 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5729 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5731 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5732 outbound_scid_alias,
5734 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5735 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5737 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5738 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5743 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5745 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5749 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5750 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5751 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5752 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5753 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5754 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5755 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5756 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5757 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5762 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5763 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5764 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5765 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5766 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5767 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5768 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5769 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5770 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5771 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5772 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5774 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5775 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5777 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5778 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5779 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5780 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5783 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5784 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5786 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5789 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5790 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5791 return Err((self, e));
5795 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5797 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5799 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5800 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5801 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5803 let channel = Channel {
5804 context: self.context,
5807 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5808 temporary_channel_id,
5809 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5810 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5813 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5815 next_local_nonce: None,
5819 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5820 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5821 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5822 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5823 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5824 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5825 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5826 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5827 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5828 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5831 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5832 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5833 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5834 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5835 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5836 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5842 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5843 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5844 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5845 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5846 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5847 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5849 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5851 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5852 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5853 // We've exhausted our options
5856 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5857 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5860 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5861 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5862 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5863 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5865 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5866 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5867 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5868 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5869 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5870 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5872 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5874 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5875 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5878 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5879 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5880 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5882 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5883 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5886 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5887 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5890 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5891 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5895 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5896 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5897 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5898 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5899 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5900 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5901 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5902 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5903 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5904 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5905 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5906 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5907 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5908 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5909 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5910 first_per_commitment_point,
5911 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5912 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5913 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5914 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5916 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5921 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5922 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5924 // Check sanity of message fields:
5925 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5928 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5931 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5932 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5934 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5935 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5937 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5938 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5940 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5941 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5942 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5944 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5945 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5946 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5948 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5949 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5950 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5952 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5955 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5956 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5959 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5960 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5961 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5963 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5964 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5966 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5967 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5969 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5970 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5972 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5973 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5975 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5976 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5978 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5979 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5982 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5983 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5986 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5987 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5989 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5990 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5993 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5994 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5997 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5998 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5999 &Some(ref script) => {
6000 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6001 if script.len() == 0 {
6004 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6007 Some(script.clone())
6010 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6012 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6017 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6018 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6019 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6020 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6021 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6023 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6024 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6026 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6029 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6030 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6031 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6032 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6033 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6034 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6037 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6038 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6039 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6042 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6043 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6045 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6046 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6052 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6053 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6054 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6055 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6058 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6059 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6060 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6061 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6062 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6063 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6064 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6065 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6066 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6067 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6068 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6071 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6073 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6074 // support this channel type.
6075 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6076 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6080 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6081 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6082 // `static_remote_key`.
6083 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6086 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6087 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6090 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6091 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6093 channel_type.clone()
6095 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6096 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6102 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6103 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6104 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6105 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6106 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6107 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6108 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6109 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6110 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6113 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6117 // Check sanity of message fields:
6118 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6121 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6124 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6127 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6128 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6131 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6134 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6137 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6139 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6140 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6143 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6146 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6150 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6151 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6154 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6157 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6160 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6163 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6164 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6166 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6169 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6170 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6173 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6175 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6176 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6181 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6182 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6183 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6184 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6187 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6190 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6191 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6192 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6194 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6198 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6199 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6200 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6201 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6202 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6206 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6207 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6208 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6209 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6213 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6214 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6215 &Some(ref script) => {
6216 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6217 if script.len() == 0 {
6220 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6223 Some(script.clone())
6226 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6228 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6233 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6234 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6235 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6236 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6240 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6241 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6246 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6247 Ok(script) => script,
6248 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6251 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6252 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6254 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6257 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6261 context: ChannelContext {
6264 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6265 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6267 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6272 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6274 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6275 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6276 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6277 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6280 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6282 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6283 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6286 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6287 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6288 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6290 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6291 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6292 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6293 pending_update_fee: None,
6294 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6295 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6296 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6297 update_time_counter: 1,
6299 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6301 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6302 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6303 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6304 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6305 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6306 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6308 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6309 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6310 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6311 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6313 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6314 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6315 closing_fee_limits: None,
6316 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6318 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6319 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6320 short_channel_id: None,
6321 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6323 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6324 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6325 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6326 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6327 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6328 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6329 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6330 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6331 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6332 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6333 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6334 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6337 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6339 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6340 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6341 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6342 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6343 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6344 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6345 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6347 funding_outpoint: None,
6348 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6350 funding_transaction: None,
6352 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6353 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6354 counterparty_node_id,
6356 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6358 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6360 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6361 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6363 announcement_sigs: None,
6365 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6366 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6367 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6368 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6370 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6371 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6373 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6374 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6376 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6377 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6379 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6380 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6385 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6387 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6393 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6394 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6396 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6397 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6398 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6399 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6401 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6402 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6404 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6405 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6408 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6411 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6412 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6413 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6415 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6416 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6417 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6418 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6420 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6421 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6422 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6423 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6424 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6425 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6426 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6427 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6428 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6429 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6430 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6431 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6432 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6433 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6434 first_per_commitment_point,
6435 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6436 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6437 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6439 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6441 next_local_nonce: None,
6445 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6446 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6448 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6450 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6451 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6454 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6455 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6457 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6458 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6460 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6461 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6462 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6463 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6464 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6465 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6466 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6467 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6468 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6471 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6472 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6474 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6475 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6476 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6477 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6479 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6480 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6481 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6482 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6483 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6485 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6486 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6491 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6492 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6493 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6497 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6498 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6500 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6501 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6502 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6504 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6506 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6507 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6508 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6509 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6512 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6513 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6514 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6515 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6516 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6518 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6520 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6521 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6522 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6525 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6526 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6527 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6531 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6532 initial_commitment_tx,
6535 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6536 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6539 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6540 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6543 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6545 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6546 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6547 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6548 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6549 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6550 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6551 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6552 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6553 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6554 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6555 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6557 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6559 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6561 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6562 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6563 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6564 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6566 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6568 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6569 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6570 let mut channel = Channel {
6571 context: self.context,
6573 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6574 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6575 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6577 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6581 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6582 }, channel_monitor))
6586 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6587 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6589 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6595 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6596 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6597 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6598 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6599 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6601 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6602 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6603 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6604 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6610 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6611 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6612 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6613 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6614 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6615 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6620 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6621 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6622 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6623 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6625 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6626 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6627 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6628 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6633 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6634 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6635 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6636 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6637 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6638 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6643 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6644 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6645 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6648 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6650 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6651 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6652 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6653 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6654 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6656 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6657 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6658 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6659 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6661 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6662 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6663 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6665 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6667 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6668 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6669 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6670 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6671 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6672 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6673 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6675 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6676 // deserialized from that format.
6677 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6678 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6679 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6681 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6683 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6684 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6685 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6687 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6688 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6689 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6690 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6693 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6694 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6695 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6698 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6699 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6700 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6701 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6703 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6704 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6706 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6708 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6710 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6712 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6715 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6717 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6722 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6723 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6725 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6726 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6727 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6728 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6729 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6730 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6731 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6733 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6735 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6737 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6740 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6741 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6742 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6745 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6747 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6748 preimages.push(preimage);
6750 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6751 reason.write(writer)?;
6753 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6755 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6756 preimages.push(preimage);
6758 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6759 reason.write(writer)?;
6762 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6763 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6764 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6766 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6767 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6768 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6772 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6773 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6774 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6776 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6777 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6781 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6782 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6783 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6784 source.write(writer)?;
6785 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6787 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6788 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6789 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6791 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6792 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6794 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6796 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6797 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6799 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6801 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6802 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6807 match self.context.resend_order {
6808 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6809 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6812 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6813 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6814 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6816 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6817 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6818 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6819 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6822 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6823 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6824 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6825 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6826 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6829 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6830 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6831 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6832 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6834 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6835 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6836 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6838 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6840 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6841 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6842 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6843 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6845 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6846 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6847 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6848 // consider the stale state on reload.
6851 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6852 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6853 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6855 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6856 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6857 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6859 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6860 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6862 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6863 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6864 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6866 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6867 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6869 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6872 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6873 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6874 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6876 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6879 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6880 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6882 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6883 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6884 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6886 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6888 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6890 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6893 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6895 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6896 htlc.write(writer)?;
6899 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6900 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6901 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6903 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6904 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6906 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6907 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6908 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6909 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6910 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6911 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6912 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6914 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6915 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6916 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6917 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6918 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6920 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6921 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6923 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6924 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6925 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6926 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6928 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6930 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6931 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6932 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6933 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6934 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6935 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6936 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6938 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6939 (2, chan_type, option),
6940 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6941 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6942 (5, self.context.config, required),
6943 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6944 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6945 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6946 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6947 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6948 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6949 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6950 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6951 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6952 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6953 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6954 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6955 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6956 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6957 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6958 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6959 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6960 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6967 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6968 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
6970 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6971 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6973 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6974 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6975 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6977 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6978 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6979 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6980 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6984 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6985 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6986 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6987 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6988 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6991 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6995 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6996 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6998 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7000 let mut keys_data = None;
7002 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7003 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7004 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7006 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7007 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7008 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7009 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7010 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7011 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7015 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7016 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7017 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7020 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7022 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7028 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7029 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7030 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7031 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7032 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7033 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7034 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7035 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7036 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7037 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7038 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7039 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7040 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7045 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7047 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7048 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7049 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7050 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7051 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7052 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7053 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7054 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7055 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7056 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7058 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7062 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7063 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7066 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7067 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7069 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7071 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7075 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7076 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7077 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7078 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7079 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7080 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7081 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7082 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7083 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7084 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7085 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7087 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7088 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7089 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7091 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7092 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7093 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7095 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7099 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7100 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7101 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7102 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7105 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7106 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7107 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7109 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7110 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7111 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7112 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7115 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7116 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7117 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7118 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7121 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7123 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7125 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7126 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7127 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7128 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7130 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7131 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7132 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7133 // consider the stale state on reload.
7134 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7137 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7139 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7141 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7144 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7145 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7146 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7148 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7149 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7150 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7153 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7154 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7156 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7157 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7159 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7160 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7161 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7163 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7165 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7166 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7168 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7169 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7172 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7174 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7175 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7176 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7177 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7179 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7182 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7183 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7187 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7188 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7190 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7191 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7193 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7195 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7196 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7197 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7199 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7200 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7201 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7205 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7206 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7207 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7209 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7215 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7216 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7217 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7218 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7219 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7220 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7221 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7222 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7223 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7224 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7226 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7227 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7228 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7229 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7230 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7231 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7232 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7234 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7235 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7236 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7237 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7239 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7241 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7242 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7244 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7245 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7246 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7247 (2, channel_type, option),
7248 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7249 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7250 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7251 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7252 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7253 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7254 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7255 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7256 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7257 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7258 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7259 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7260 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7261 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7262 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7263 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7264 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7265 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7266 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7267 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7268 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7271 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7272 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7273 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7274 // required channel parameters.
7275 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7276 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7277 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7279 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7281 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7282 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7283 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7284 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7287 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7288 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7289 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7291 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7292 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7294 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7295 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7300 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7301 if iter.next().is_some() {
7302 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7306 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7307 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7308 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7309 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7310 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7313 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7314 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7315 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7317 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7318 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7320 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7321 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7322 // separate u64 values.
7323 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7325 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7327 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7328 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7329 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7330 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7332 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7333 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7335 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7336 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7337 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7338 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7339 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7342 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7343 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7347 context: ChannelContext {
7350 config: config.unwrap(),
7354 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7355 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7356 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7359 temporary_channel_id,
7361 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7363 channel_value_satoshis,
7365 latest_monitor_update_id,
7367 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7368 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7371 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7372 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7375 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7376 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7377 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7378 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7382 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7383 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7384 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7385 monitor_pending_forwards,
7386 monitor_pending_failures,
7387 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7390 holding_cell_update_fee,
7391 next_holder_htlc_id,
7392 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7393 update_time_counter,
7396 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7397 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7398 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7399 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7401 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7402 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7403 closing_fee_limits: None,
7404 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7406 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7407 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7409 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7411 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7412 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7413 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7414 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7415 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7416 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7417 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7418 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7419 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7422 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7424 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7425 funding_transaction,
7427 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7428 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7429 counterparty_node_id,
7431 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7435 channel_update_status,
7436 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7440 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7441 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7442 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7443 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7445 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7446 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7448 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7449 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7450 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7452 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7453 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7456 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7458 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7461 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7470 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7471 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7472 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7473 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7474 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7476 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7477 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7478 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7479 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7480 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7481 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7482 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7483 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7484 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7485 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7486 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7487 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7488 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7489 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7490 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7491 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7492 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7493 use crate::util::test_utils;
7494 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7495 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7496 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7497 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7498 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7499 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7500 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7501 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7502 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7503 use crate::prelude::*;
7505 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7508 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7509 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7515 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7516 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7517 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7518 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7522 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7523 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7524 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7525 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7526 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7527 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7528 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7529 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7533 signer: InMemorySigner,
7536 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7537 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7540 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7541 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7543 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7544 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7547 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7551 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7553 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7554 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7555 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7556 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7557 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7560 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7561 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7562 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7563 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7567 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7568 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7569 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7573 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7574 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7575 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7576 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7578 let seed = [42; 32];
7579 let network = Network::Testnet;
7580 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7581 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7582 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7585 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7586 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7587 let config = UserConfig::default();
7588 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7589 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7590 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7592 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7593 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7597 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7598 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7600 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7601 let original_fee = 253;
7602 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7603 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7604 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7605 let seed = [42; 32];
7606 let network = Network::Testnet;
7607 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7609 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7610 let config = UserConfig::default();
7611 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7613 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7614 // same as the old fee.
7615 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7616 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7617 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7621 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7622 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7623 // dust limits are used.
7624 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7625 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7626 let seed = [42; 32];
7627 let network = Network::Testnet;
7628 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7629 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7630 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7632 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7633 // they have different dust limits.
7635 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7636 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7637 let config = UserConfig::default();
7638 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7640 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7641 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7642 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7643 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7644 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7646 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7647 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7648 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7649 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7650 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7652 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7653 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7654 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7655 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7657 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7658 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7659 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7661 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7662 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7664 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7665 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7666 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7668 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7669 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7670 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7671 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7674 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7676 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7677 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7678 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7679 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7680 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7681 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7682 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7683 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7684 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7686 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7689 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7690 // the dust limit check.
7691 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7692 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7693 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7694 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7696 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7697 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7698 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7699 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7700 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7701 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7702 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7706 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7707 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7708 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7709 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7710 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7711 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7712 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7713 let seed = [42; 32];
7714 let network = Network::Testnet;
7715 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7717 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7718 let config = UserConfig::default();
7719 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7721 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7722 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7724 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7725 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7726 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7727 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7728 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7729 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7731 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7732 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7733 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7734 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7735 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7737 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7739 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7740 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7741 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7742 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7743 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7745 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7746 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7747 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7748 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7749 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7753 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7754 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7755 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7756 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7757 let seed = [42; 32];
7758 let network = Network::Testnet;
7759 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7760 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7761 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7763 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7765 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7766 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7767 let config = UserConfig::default();
7768 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7770 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7771 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7772 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7773 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7775 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7776 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7777 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7779 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7780 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7781 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7782 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7784 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7785 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7786 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7788 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7789 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7791 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7792 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7793 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7794 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7795 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7796 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7797 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7799 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7801 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7802 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7803 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7804 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7805 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7809 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7810 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7811 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7812 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7813 let seed = [42; 32];
7814 let network = Network::Testnet;
7815 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7816 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7817 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7819 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7820 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7821 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7822 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7823 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7824 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7825 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7826 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7828 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7829 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7830 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7831 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7832 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7833 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7835 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7836 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7837 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7838 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7840 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7842 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7843 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7844 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7845 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7846 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7847 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7849 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7850 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7851 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7852 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7854 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7855 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7856 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7857 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7858 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7860 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7861 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7863 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7864 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7865 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7867 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7868 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7869 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7870 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7871 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7873 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7874 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7876 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7877 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7878 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7882 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7884 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7885 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7886 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7888 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7889 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7890 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7891 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7893 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7894 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7895 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7897 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7899 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7900 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7903 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7904 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7905 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7906 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7907 let seed = [42; 32];
7908 let network = Network::Testnet;
7909 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7910 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7911 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7914 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7915 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7916 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7918 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7919 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7921 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7922 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7923 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7925 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7926 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7928 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7930 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7931 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7933 // Channel Negotiations failed
7934 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7935 assert!(result.is_err());
7940 fn channel_update() {
7941 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7942 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7943 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7944 let seed = [42; 32];
7945 let network = Network::Testnet;
7946 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7947 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7948 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7950 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7951 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7952 let config = UserConfig::default();
7953 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7955 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7956 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7957 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7958 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7959 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7961 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7962 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7963 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7964 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7965 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7967 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7968 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7969 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7970 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7972 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7973 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7974 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7976 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7977 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7979 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7980 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7981 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7983 short_channel_id: 0,
7986 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7987 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7988 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7990 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7991 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7993 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7995 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7997 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7998 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7999 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8000 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8002 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8003 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8004 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8006 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8010 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8012 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8013 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8014 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8015 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8016 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8017 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8018 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8019 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8020 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8021 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8022 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8023 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8024 use crate::sync::Arc;
8026 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8027 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8028 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8029 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8031 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8033 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8034 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8035 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8036 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8037 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8039 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8040 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8046 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8047 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8048 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8050 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8051 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8052 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8053 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8054 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8055 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8057 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8059 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8060 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8061 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8062 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8063 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8064 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8066 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8067 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8068 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8069 selected_contest_delay: 144
8071 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8072 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8074 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8075 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8077 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8078 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8080 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8081 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8083 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8084 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8085 // build_commitment_transaction.
8086 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8087 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8088 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8089 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8090 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8092 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8093 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8094 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8095 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8099 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8100 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8101 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8102 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8106 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8107 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8108 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8110 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8111 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8113 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8114 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8116 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8118 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8119 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8120 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8121 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8122 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8123 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8124 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8126 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8127 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8128 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8129 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8131 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8132 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8133 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8135 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8137 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8138 commitment_tx.clone(),
8139 counterparty_signature,
8140 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8141 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8142 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8144 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8145 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8147 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8148 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8149 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8151 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8152 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8155 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8156 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8158 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8159 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8160 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8161 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8162 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8163 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8164 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8165 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8167 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8170 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8171 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8172 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8176 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8179 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8180 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8181 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8183 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8184 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8185 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8186 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8187 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8188 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8189 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8190 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8192 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8196 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8197 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8198 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8199 "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", {});
8201 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8202 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8204 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8205 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8206 "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", {});
8208 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8209 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8210 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8211 "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", {});
8213 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8214 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8216 amount_msat: 1000000,
8218 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8219 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8221 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8224 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8225 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8227 amount_msat: 2000000,
8229 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8230 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8232 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8235 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8236 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8238 amount_msat: 2000000,
8240 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8241 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8242 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8243 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8245 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8248 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8249 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8251 amount_msat: 3000000,
8253 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8254 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8255 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8256 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8258 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8261 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8262 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8264 amount_msat: 4000000,
8266 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8267 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8269 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8273 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8274 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8275 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8277 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8278 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8279 "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", {
8282 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8283 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8284 "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" },
8287 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8288 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8289 "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" },
8292 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8293 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8294 "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" },
8297 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8298 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8299 "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" },
8302 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8303 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8304 "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" }
8307 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8308 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8309 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8311 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8312 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8313 "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", {
8316 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8317 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8318 "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" },
8321 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8322 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8323 "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" },
8326 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8327 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8328 "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" },
8331 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8332 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8333 "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" },
8336 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8337 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8338 "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" }
8341 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8342 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8343 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8345 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8346 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8347 "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", {
8350 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8351 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8352 "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" },
8355 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8356 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8357 "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" },
8360 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8361 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8362 "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" },
8365 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8366 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8367 "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" }
8370 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8371 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8372 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8373 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8375 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8376 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8377 "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", {
8380 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8381 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8382 "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" },
8385 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8386 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8387 "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" },
8390 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8391 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8392 "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" },
8395 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8396 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8397 "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" }
8400 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8401 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8402 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8403 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8405 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8406 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8407 "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", {
8410 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8411 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8412 "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" },
8415 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8416 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8417 "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" },
8420 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8421 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8422 "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" },
8425 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8426 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8427 "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" }
8430 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8431 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8432 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8434 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8435 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8436 "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", {
8439 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8440 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8441 "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" },
8444 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8445 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8446 "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" },
8449 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8450 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8451 "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" }
8454 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8455 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8456 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8458 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8459 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8460 "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", {
8463 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8464 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8465 "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" },
8468 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8469 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8470 "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" },
8473 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8474 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8475 "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" }
8478 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8479 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8480 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8482 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8483 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8484 "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", {
8487 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8488 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8489 "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" },
8492 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8493 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8494 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8497 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8498 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8499 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8500 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8501 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8502 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8504 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8505 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8506 "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", {
8509 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8510 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8511 "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" },
8514 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8515 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8516 "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" }
8519 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8520 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8521 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8522 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8523 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8525 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8526 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8527 "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", {
8530 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8531 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8532 "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" },
8535 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8536 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8537 "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" }
8540 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8541 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8542 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8544 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8545 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8546 "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", {
8549 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8550 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8551 "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" }
8554 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8555 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8556 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8557 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8558 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8560 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8561 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8562 "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", {
8565 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8566 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8567 "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" }
8570 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8571 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8572 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8573 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8574 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8576 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8577 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8578 "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", {
8581 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8582 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8583 "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" }
8586 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8587 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8588 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8589 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8591 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8592 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8593 "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", {});
8595 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8596 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8597 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8598 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8599 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8601 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8602 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8603 "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", {});
8605 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8606 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8607 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8608 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8609 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8611 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8612 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8613 "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", {});
8615 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8616 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8617 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8619 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8620 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8621 "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", {});
8623 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8624 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8625 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8626 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8627 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8629 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8630 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8631 "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", {});
8633 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8634 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8635 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8636 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8637 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8639 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8640 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8641 "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", {});
8643 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8644 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8645 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8646 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8647 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8648 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8650 amount_msat: 2000000,
8652 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8653 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8655 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8658 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8659 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8660 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8662 amount_msat: 5000001,
8664 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8665 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8666 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8667 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8669 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8672 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8673 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8675 amount_msat: 5000000,
8677 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8678 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8679 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8680 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8682 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8686 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8687 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8688 "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", {
8691 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8692 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8693 "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" },
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8697 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8699 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8700 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8701 "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" }
8704 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8705 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8707 "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", {
8710 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8711 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8712 "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" },
8714 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8715 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8716 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
8718 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8719 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8720 "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" }
8725 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8726 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8728 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8729 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8730 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8731 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8733 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8734 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8735 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8737 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8738 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8740 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8741 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8743 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8744 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8745 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8749 fn test_key_derivation() {
8750 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8751 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8753 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8754 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8756 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8757 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8759 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8760 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8762 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8763 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8765 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8766 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8768 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8769 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8771 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8772 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8776 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8777 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8778 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8779 let seed = [42; 32];
8780 let network = Network::Testnet;
8781 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8782 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8784 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8785 let config = UserConfig::default();
8786 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8787 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8789 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8790 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8792 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8793 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8794 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8795 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8796 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8797 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8798 assert!(res.is_ok());
8802 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8803 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8804 // resulting `channel_type`.
8805 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8806 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8807 let network = Network::Testnet;
8808 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8809 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8811 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8812 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8814 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8815 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8817 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8818 // need to signal it.
8819 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8820 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8821 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8824 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8826 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8827 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8828 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8830 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8831 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8832 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8835 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8836 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8837 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8838 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8839 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8842 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8843 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8847 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8848 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8849 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8850 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8851 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8852 let network = Network::Testnet;
8853 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8854 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8856 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8857 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8859 let config = UserConfig::default();
8861 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8862 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8863 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8864 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8865 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8867 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8868 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8869 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8872 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8873 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8874 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8876 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8877 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8878 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8879 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8880 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8881 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8883 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8887 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8888 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8890 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8891 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8892 let network = Network::Testnet;
8893 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8894 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8896 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8897 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8899 let config = UserConfig::default();
8901 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8902 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8903 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8904 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8905 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8906 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8907 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8908 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8910 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8911 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8912 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8913 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8914 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8915 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8918 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8919 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8921 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8922 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8923 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8924 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8926 assert!(res.is_err());
8928 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8929 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8930 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8932 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8933 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8934 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8937 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8939 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8940 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8941 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8942 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8945 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8946 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8948 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8949 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8951 assert!(res.is_err());