_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  16
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  26 use ln::msgs;
  27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  30 use ln::chan_utils;
  31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  34 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
  35 use util::transaction_utils;
  36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  37 use util::logger::Logger;
  38 use util::errors::APIError;
  39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  40
  41 use std;
  42 use std::default::Default;
  43 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  44 use std::ops::Deref;
  45 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  46
  47 #[cfg(test)]
  48 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  49         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  50         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  51         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  52         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  53         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  54         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  55         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  56         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  57 }
  58
  59 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  60         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  61         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  62         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  63 }
  64
  65 enum InboundHTLCState {
  66         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  67         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  68         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  69         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  70         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  71         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  72         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  73         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  74         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  75         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  76         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  77         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  78         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  79         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  80         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  81         ///
  82         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  83         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  84         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  85         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  86         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  87         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  88         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  89         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  90         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  91         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  92         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  93         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  94         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  95         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
  96         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
  97         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
  98         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
  99         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 100         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 101         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 102         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 103         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 104         Committed,
 105         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 106         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 107         /// we'll drop it.
 108         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 109         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 110         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 111         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 112         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 113         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 114         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 115         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 116 }
 117
 118 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 119         htlc_id: u64,
 120         amount_msat: u64,
 121         cltv_expiry: u32,
 122         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 123         state: InboundHTLCState,
 124 }
 125
 126 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 127         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 128         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 129         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 130         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 131         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 132         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 133         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 134         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 135         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 136         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 137         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 138         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 139         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 140         Committed,
 141         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 142         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 143         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 144         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 145         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 146         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 147         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 148         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 149         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 150         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 151         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 152         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 153         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 154         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 155         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 156 }
 157
 158 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 159         htlc_id: u64,
 160         amount_msat: u64,
 161         cltv_expiry: u32,
 162         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 163         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 164         source: HTLCSource,
 165 }
 166
 167 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 168 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 169         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 170                 // always outbound
 171                 amount_msat: u64,
 172                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 173                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 174                 source: HTLCSource,
 175                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 176         },
 177         ClaimHTLC {
 178                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 179                 htlc_id: u64,
 180         },
 181         FailHTLC {
 182                 htlc_id: u64,
 183                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 184         },
 185 }
 186
 187 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 188 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 189 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 190 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 191 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 192 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 193 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 194 enum ChannelState {
 195         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 196         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 197         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 198         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 199         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 200         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 201         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 202         FundingCreated = 4,
 203         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 204         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 205         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 206         FundingSent = 8,
 207         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 208         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 209         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 210         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 211         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 212         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 213         ChannelFunded = 64,
 214         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 215         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 216         /// dance.
 217         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 218         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 219         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 220         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 221         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 222         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 223         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 224         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 225         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 226         /// later.
 227         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 228         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 229         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 230         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 231         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 232         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 233         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 234         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 235         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 236         /// us their shutdown.
 237         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 238         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 239         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 240         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 241 }
 242 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 243 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 244
 245 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 246
 247 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
 248 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
 249 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
 250 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
 251 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 252 enum UpdateStatus {
 253         /// Status has been gossiped.
 254         Fresh,
 255         /// Status has been changed.
 256         DisabledMarked,
 257         /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
 258         DisabledStaged,
 259 }
 260
 261 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 262 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 263 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 264 // inbound channel.
 265 //
 266 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 267 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 268 pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
 269         config: ChannelConfig,
 270
 271         user_id: u64,
 272
 273         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 274         channel_state: u32,
 275         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 276         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 277
 278         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 279
 280         #[cfg(not(test))]
 281         holder_keys: ChanSigner,
 282         #[cfg(test)]
 283         pub(super) holder_keys: ChanSigner,
 284         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 285         destination_script: Script,
 286
 287         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 288         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 289         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 290
 291         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 292         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 293         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 294         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 295         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 296         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 297
 298         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 299         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 300         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 301         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 302         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 303         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 304         /// send it first.
 305         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 306
 307         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 308         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 309         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 310         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 311         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 312
 313         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 314         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 315         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 316         //
 317         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 318         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 319         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 320         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 321         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 322         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 323         // commitment_signed.
 324         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 325         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 326         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 327         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 328         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 329         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 330         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 331         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 332         update_time_counter: u32,
 333         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 334
 335         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 336         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 337         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 338         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 339         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 340         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 341
 342         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 343
 344         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
 345         /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
 346         /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
 347         /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
 348         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 349         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 350         /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
 351         /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
 352         pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
 353         funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
 354
 355         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 356         #[cfg(test)]
 357         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 358         #[cfg(not(test))]
 359         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 360         #[cfg(test)]
 361         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 362         #[cfg(not(test))]
 363         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 364         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 365         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 366         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 367         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 368         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 369         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 370         #[cfg(test)]
 371         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 372         #[cfg(not(test))]
 373         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 374         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 375         minimum_depth: u32,
 376
 377         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 378
 379         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 380
 381         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 382         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 383
 384         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 385
 386         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 387
 388         network_sync: UpdateStatus,
 389 }
 390
 391 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 392 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
 393 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
 394 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
 395 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
 396 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 397 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
 398
 399 #[cfg(not(test))]
 400 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 401 #[cfg(test)]
 402 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 403 #[cfg(not(test))]
 404 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 405 #[cfg(test)]
 406 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 407
 408 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 409 /// it's 2^24.
 410 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 411
 412 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 413 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 414 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 415 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 416         Ignore(String),
 417         Close(String),
 418         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 419 }
 420
 421 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 422         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 423                 match self {
 424                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 425                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 426                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 427                 }
 428         }
 429 }
 430
 431 macro_rules! secp_check {
 432         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 433                 match $res {
 434                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 435                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 436                 }
 437         };
 438 }
 439
 440 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
 441         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 442         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 443                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 444         }
 445
 446         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 447         /// required by us.
 448         ///
 449         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 450         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 451                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 452                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 453         }
 454
 455         fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
 456                 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
 457         }
 458
 459         // Constructors:
 460         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError>
 461         where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
 462               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 463         {
 464                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 465                 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 466                 let pubkeys = chan_keys.pubkeys().clone();
 467
 468                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 469                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 470                 }
 471                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 472                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 473                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 474                 }
 475                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 476                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 477                 }
 478                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 479                 if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
 480                         return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
 481                 }
 482
 483                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 484
 485                 Ok(Channel {
 486                         user_id,
 487                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 488
 489                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 490                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 491                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 492                         channel_value_satoshis,
 493
 494                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 495
 496                         holder_keys: chan_keys,
 497                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 498                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 499
 500                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 501                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 502                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 503
 504                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 505                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 506                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 507                         pending_update_fee: None,
 508                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 509                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 510                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 511                         update_time_counter: 1,
 512
 513                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 514
 515                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 516                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 517                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 518                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 519                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 520
 521                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 522                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 523                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 524                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 525
 526                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 527
 528                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 529                         short_channel_id: None,
 530                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 531                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 532
 533                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 534                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 535                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
 536                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 537                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 538                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 539                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 540                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 541                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 542
 543                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 544                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 545                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 546                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 547                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 548                                 funding_outpoint: None
 549                         },
 550                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 551
 552                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 553                         counterparty_node_id,
 554
 555                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 556
 557                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 558
 559                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 560                 })
 561         }
 562
 563         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 564                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 565         {
 566                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 567                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 568                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 569                 }
 570                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 571                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 572                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 573                 }
 574                 Ok(())
 575         }
 576
 577         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 578         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 579         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError>
 580                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
 581           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 582         {
 583                 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 584                 let pubkeys = chan_keys.pubkeys().clone();
 585                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 586                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 587                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 588                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 589                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 590                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 591                 };
 592                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 593
 594                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 595                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 596                 }
 597
 598                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 599                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 600                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 601                 }
 602                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 603                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 604                 }
 605                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 606                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 607                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 608                 }
 609                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 610                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 611                 }
 612                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 613                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 614                 }
 615                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 616                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 617                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 618                 }
 619                 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 620
 621                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 622                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 623                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 624                 }
 625                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 626                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 627                 }
 628                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 629                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 630                 }
 631
 632                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 633                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 634                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 635                 }
 636                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 637                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 638                 }
 639                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 640                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 641                 }
 642                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 643                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 644                 }
 645                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 646                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 647                 }
 648                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
 649                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 650                 }
 651                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
 652                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 653                 }
 654
 655                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 656
 657                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 658                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 659                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 660                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 661                         }
 662                 }
 663                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 664                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 665
 666                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 667
 668                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
 669                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 670                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 671                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 672                 }
 673                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
 674                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
 675                 }
 676                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 677                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 678                 }
 679
 680                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 681                 // for full fee payment
 682                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 683                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 684                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 685                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 686                 }
 687
 688                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 689                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 690                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 691                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 692                 }
 693
 694                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 695                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 696                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 697                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
 698                                         if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 699                                                 Some(script.clone())
 700                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 701                                         } else if script.len() == 0 {
 702                                                 None
 703                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 704                                         } else {
 705                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 706                                         }
 707                                 },
 708                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 709                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 710                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 711                                 }
 712                         }
 713                 } else { None };
 714
 715                 let chan = Channel {
 716                         user_id,
 717                         config: local_config,
 718
 719                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 720                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 721                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 722
 723                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 724
 725                         holder_keys: chan_keys,
 726                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 727                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 728
 729                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 730                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 731                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 732
 733                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 734                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 735                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 736                         pending_update_fee: None,
 737                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 738                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 739                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 740                         update_time_counter: 1,
 741
 742                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 743
 744                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 745                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 746                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 747                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 748                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 749
 750                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 751                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 752                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 753                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 754
 755                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 756
 757                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 758                         short_channel_id: None,
 759                         last_block_connected: Default::default(),
 760                         funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
 761
 762                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 763                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 764                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 765                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
 766                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 767                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 768                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 769                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 770                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 771                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 772
 773                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 774                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 775                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 776                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 777                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 778                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 779                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 780                                 }),
 781                                 funding_outpoint: None
 782                         },
 783                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 784
 785                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 786                         counterparty_node_id,
 787
 788                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 789
 790                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 791
 792                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
 793                 };
 794
 795                 Ok(chan)
 796         }
 797
 798         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 799         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 800         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 801         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 802         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 803         /// an HTLC to a).
 804         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 805         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 806         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 807         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 808         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 809         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 810         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 811         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 812         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 813         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 814         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 815         #[inline]
 816         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 817                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 818                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 819                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 820
 821                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 822                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 823                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 824                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 825
 826                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 827
 828                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 829                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 830                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 831                                         offered: $offered,
 832                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 833                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 834                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 835                                         transaction_output_index: None
 836                                 }
 837                         }
 838                 }
 839
 840                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 841                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 842                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 843                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 844                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 845                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 846                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 847                                         } else {
 848                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 849                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 850                                         }
 851                                 } else {
 852                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 853                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 854                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 855                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 856                                         } else {
 857                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 858                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 859                                         }
 860                                 }
 861                         }
 862                 }
 863
 864                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 865                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 866                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 867                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 868                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 869                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 870                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 871                         };
 872
 873                         if include {
 874                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 875                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 876                         } else {
 877                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 878                                 match &htlc.state {
 879                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 880                                                 if generated_by_local {
 881                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 882                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 883                                                         }
 884                                                 }
 885                                         },
 886                                         _ => {},
 887                                 }
 888                         }
 889                 }
 890
 891                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 892                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 893                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 894                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 895                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 896                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 897                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 898                         };
 899
 900                         if include {
 901                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 902                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 903                         } else {
 904                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 905                                 match htlc.state {
 906                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 907                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 908                                         },
 909                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 910                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 911                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 912                                                 }
 913                                         },
 914                                         _ => {},
 915                                 }
 916                         }
 917                 }
 918
 919                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
 920                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
 921                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
 922                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
 923                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
 924                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
 925                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
 926                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
 927
 928                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 929                 {
 930                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
 931                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
 932                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
 933                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 934                         } else {
 935                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
 936                         };
 937                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
 938                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
 939                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
 940                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
 941                 }
 942
 943                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 944                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
 945                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
 946                 } else {
 947                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
 948                 };
 949
 950                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
 951                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
 952
 953                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
 954                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
 955                 } else {
 956                         value_to_a = 0;
 957                 }
 958
 959                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
 960                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
 961                 } else {
 962                         value_to_b = 0;
 963                 }
 964
 965                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
 966
 967                 let channel_parameters =
 968                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
 969                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
 970                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
 971                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
 972                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
 973                                                                              keys.clone(),
 974                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
 975                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
 976                                                                              &channel_parameters
 977                 );
 978                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
 979                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
 980                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
 981                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
 982
 983                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
 984         }
 985
 986         #[inline]
 987         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
 988                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
 989                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
 990         }
 991
 992         #[inline]
 993         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
 994                 let mut ret =
 995                 (4 +                                           // version
 996                  1 +                                           // input count
 997                  36 +                                          // prevout
 998                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
 999                  4 +                                           // sequence
1000                  1 +                                           // output count
1001                  4                                             // lock time
1002                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1003                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1004                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1005                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1006                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1007                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1008                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1009                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1010                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1011                 }
1012                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1013                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1014                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1015                 }
1016                 ret
1017         }
1018
1019         #[inline]
1020         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1021                 let txins = {
1022                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1023                         ins.push(TxIn {
1024                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1025                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1026                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1027                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1028                         });
1029                         ins
1030                 };
1031
1032                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1033                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1034                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1035
1036                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1037                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1038                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1039
1040                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1041                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1042                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1043                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1044                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1045                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1046                 }
1047
1048                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1049                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1050                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1051                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1052                         }, ()));
1053                 }
1054
1055                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1056                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1057                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1058                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1059                         }, ()));
1060                 }
1061
1062                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1063
1064                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1065                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1066                         outputs.push(out.0);
1067                 }
1068
1069                 (Transaction {
1070                         version: 2,
1071                         lock_time: 0,
1072                         input: txins,
1073                         output: outputs,
1074                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1075         }
1076
1077         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1078                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1079         }
1080
1081         #[inline]
1082         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1083         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1084         /// our counterparty!)
1085         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1086         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1087         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1088                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1089                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1090                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1091                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1092
1093                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1094         }
1095
1096         #[inline]
1097         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1098         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1099         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1100         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1101                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1102                 //may see payments to it!
1103                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1104                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1105                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1106
1107                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1108         }
1109
1110         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1111         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1112         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1113         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1114                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1115         }
1116
1117         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1118         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1119         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1120         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1121                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1122         }
1123
1124         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1125         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1126         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1127         ///
1128         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1129         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1130         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1131                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1132                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1133                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1134                 // either.
1135                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1136                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1137                 }
1138                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1139
1140                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1141
1142                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1143                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1144                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1145
1146                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1147                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1148                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1149                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1150                                 match htlc.state {
1151                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1152                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1153                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1154                                                 } else {
1155                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1156                                                 }
1157                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1158                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1159                                         },
1160                                         _ => {
1161                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1162                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1163                                         }
1164                                 }
1165                                 pending_idx = idx;
1166                                 break;
1167                         }
1168                 }
1169                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1170                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1171                 }
1172
1173                 // Now update local state:
1174                 //
1175                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1176                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1177                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1178                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1179                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1180                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1181                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1182                         }],
1183                 };
1184
1185                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1186                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1187                                 match pending_update {
1188                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1189                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1190                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1191                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1192                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1193                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1194                                                 }
1195                                         },
1196                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1197                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1198                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1199                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1200                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1201                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1202                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1203                                                 }
1204                                         },
1205                                         _ => {}
1206                                 }
1207                         }
1208                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1209                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1210                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1211                         });
1212                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1213                 }
1214
1215                 {
1216                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1217                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1218                         } else {
1219                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1220                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1221                         }
1222                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1223                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1224                 }
1225
1226                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1227                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1228                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1229                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1230                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1231         }
1232
1233         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1234                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1235                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1236                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1237                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1238                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1239                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1240                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1241                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1242                         },
1243                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1244                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1245                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1246                         },
1247                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1248                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1249                 }
1250         }
1251
1252         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1253         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1254         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1255         ///
1256         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1257         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1258         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1259                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1260                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1261                 }
1262                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1263
1264                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1265                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1266                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1267
1268                 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1269                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1270                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1271                                 match htlc.state {
1272                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1273                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1274                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1275                                                 return Ok(None);
1276                                         },
1277                                         _ => {
1278                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1279                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1280                                         }
1281                                 }
1282                                 pending_idx = idx;
1283                         }
1284                 }
1285                 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1286                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1287                 }
1288
1289                 // Now update local state:
1290                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1291                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1292                                 match pending_update {
1293                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1294                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1295                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1296                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1297                                                 }
1298                                         },
1299                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1300                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1301                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1302                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1303                                                 }
1304                                         },
1305                                         _ => {}
1306                                 }
1307                         }
1308                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1309                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1310                                 err_packet,
1311                         });
1312                         return Ok(None);
1313                 }
1314
1315                 {
1316                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1317                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1318                 }
1319
1320                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1321                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1322                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1323                         reason: err_packet
1324                 }))
1325         }
1326
1327         // Message handlers:
1328
1329         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1330                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1331                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1332                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1333                 }
1334                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1335                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1336                 }
1337                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1338                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1339                 }
1340                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1341                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1342                 }
1343                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1344                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1345                 }
1346                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1347                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1348                 }
1349                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1350                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1351                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1352                 }
1353                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1354                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1355                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1356                 }
1357                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1358                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1359                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1360                 }
1361                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1362                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1363                 }
1364                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1365                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1366                 }
1367
1368                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1369                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1370                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1371                 }
1372                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1373                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1374                 }
1375                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1376                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1377                 }
1378                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1379                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1380                 }
1381                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1382                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1383                 }
1384                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1385                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1386                 }
1387                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1388                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1389                 }
1390
1391                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1392                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1393                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1394                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1395                                         if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1396                                                 Some(script.clone())
1397                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1398                                         } else if script.len() == 0 {
1399                                                 None
1400                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1401                                         } else {
1402                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. scriptpubkey: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1403                                         }
1404                                 },
1405                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1406                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1407                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1408                                 }
1409                         }
1410                 } else { None };
1411
1412                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1413                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1414                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1415                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1416                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1417                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1418
1419                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1420                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1421                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1422                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1423                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1424                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1425                 };
1426
1427                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1428                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1429                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1430                 });
1431
1432                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1433                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1434
1435                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1436
1437                 Ok(())
1438         }
1439
1440         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1441                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1442
1443                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1444                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1445                 {
1446                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1447                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1448                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1449                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1450                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1451                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1452                 }
1453
1454                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1455                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1456
1457                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1458                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1459                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1460
1461                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1462                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1463
1464                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1465                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1466         }
1467
1468         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1469                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1470         }
1471
1472         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1473                 if self.is_outbound() {
1474                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1475                 }
1476                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1477                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1478                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1479                         // channel.
1480                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1481                 }
1482                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1483                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1484                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1485                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1486                 }
1487
1488                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1489                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1490                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1491                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1492                 self.holder_keys.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1493
1494                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1495                         Ok(res) => res,
1496                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1497                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1498                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1499                         },
1500                         Err(e) => {
1501                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1502                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1503                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1504                         }
1505                 };
1506
1507                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1508                         initial_commitment_tx,
1509                         msg.signature,
1510                         Vec::new(),
1511                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1512                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1513                 );
1514
1515                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1516
1517                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1518                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1519                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1520                 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
1521                                                               &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1522                                                               &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1523                                                               &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1524                                                               funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1525                                                               obscure_factor,
1526                                                               holder_commitment_tx);
1527
1528                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1529
1530                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1531                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1532                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1533                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1534
1535                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1536                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1537                         signature
1538                 }, channel_monitor))
1539         }
1540
1541         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1542         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1543         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1544                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1545                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1546                 }
1547                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1548                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1549                 }
1550                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1551                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1552                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1553                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1554                 }
1555
1556                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1557
1558                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1559                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1560                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1561                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1562
1563                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1564
1565                 let holder_keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1566                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1567                 {
1568                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1569                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1570                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1571                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1572                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1573                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1574                         }
1575                 }
1576
1577                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1578                         initial_commitment_tx,
1579                         msg.signature,
1580                         Vec::new(),
1581                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1582                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1583                 );
1584
1585
1586                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1587                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1588                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1589                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1590                 let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.holder_keys.clone(),
1591                                                               &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1592                                                               &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1593                                                               &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1594                                                               funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1595                                                               obscure_factor,
1596                                                               holder_commitment_tx);
1597
1598                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1599
1600                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1601                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1602                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1603                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1604
1605                 Ok(channel_monitor)
1606         }
1607
1608         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1609                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1610                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1611                 }
1612
1613                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1614
1615                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1616                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1617                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1618                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1619                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1620                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1621                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1622                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1623                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1624                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1625                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1626                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1627                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1628                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1629                         }
1630                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1631                         return Ok(());
1632                 } else {
1633                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1634                 }
1635
1636                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1637                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1638                 Ok(())
1639         }
1640
1641         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1642         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1643                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1644                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1645                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1646                 }
1647                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1648         }
1649
1650         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1651         /// holding cell.
1652         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1653                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1654                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1655                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1656                 }
1657
1658                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1659                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1660                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1661                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1662                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1663                         }
1664                 }
1665
1666                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1667         }
1668
1669         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1670         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1671         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1672         /// corner case properly.
1673         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1674                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1675                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1676                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1677         }
1678
1679         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1680         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1681         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1682                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1683                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1684                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1685         }
1686
1687         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local (i.e our) next commitment transaction
1688         // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next
1689         // commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
1690         // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust
1691         // HTLCs are excluded.
1692         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1693                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1694
1695                 let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
1696                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1697                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1698                                 continue
1699                         }
1700                         match htlc.state {
1701                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1702                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1703                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1704                                 _ => {},
1705                         }
1706                 }
1707
1708                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1709                         match htlc {
1710                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1711                                 _ => {},
1712                         }
1713                 }
1714
1715                 self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
1716         }
1717
1718         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction
1719         // based on the number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their
1720         // next commitment tx. `addl_htcs` is an optional parameter allowing the caller
1721         // to add a number of additional HTLCs to the calculation. Note that dust HTLCs
1722         // are excluded.
1723         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, addl_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1724                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1725
1726                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next
1727                 // commitment_signed, all inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be
1728                 // included) and only committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1729                 let mut their_acked_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len();
1730                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1731                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis {
1732                                 continue
1733                         }
1734                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next
1735                         // commitment_signed, i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1736                         match htlc.state {
1737                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1738                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => their_acked_htlcs += 1,
1739                                 _ => {},
1740                         }
1741                 }
1742
1743                 self.commit_tx_fee_msat(their_acked_htlcs + addl_htlcs)
1744         }
1745
1746         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1747         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1748                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1749                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1750                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1751                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1752                 }
1753                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1754                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1755                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1756                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1757                 }
1758                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1759                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1760                 }
1761                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1762                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1763                 }
1764                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1765                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1766                 }
1767                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1768                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1769                 }
1770
1771                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1772                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1773                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1774                 }
1775                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1776                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1777                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1778                 }
1779                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1780                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1781                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1782                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1783                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1784                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1785                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1786                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1787                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1788                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1789                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1790                 // transaction).
1791                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1792                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1793                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1794                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1795                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1796                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1797                         }
1798                 }
1799
1800                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1801                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1802                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1803                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1804                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1805                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1806                 }
1807
1808                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1809                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1810                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1811                         // +1 for this HTLC.
1812                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1)
1813                 };
1814                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1815                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1816                 };
1817
1818                 let chan_reserve_msat =
1819                         Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1820                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1821                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1822                 }
1823
1824                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1825                         // `+1` for this HTLC, `2 *` and `+1` fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from the
1826                         // spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's side,
1827                         // only on the sender's.
1828                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output fees,
1829                         // we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep the extra +1
1830                         // as we should still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of
1831                         // being sensitive to fee spikes.
1832                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1);
1833                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1834                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
1835                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
1836                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
1837                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
1838                         }
1839                 } else {
1840                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
1841
1842                         // +1 for this HTLC.
1843                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
1844                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1845                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
1846                         }
1847                 }
1848                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1849                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
1850                 }
1851                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1852                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
1853                 }
1854
1855                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1856                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
1857                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1858                         }
1859                 }
1860
1861                 // Now update local state:
1862                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
1863                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1864                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1865                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1866                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1867                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1868                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
1869                 });
1870                 Ok(())
1871         }
1872
1873         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1874         #[inline]
1875         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1876                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1877                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1878                                 match check_preimage {
1879                                         None => {},
1880                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
1881                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1882                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
1883                                                 }
1884                                 };
1885                                 match htlc.state {
1886                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1887                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
1888                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1889                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1890                                         },
1891                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1892                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
1893                                 }
1894                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1895                         }
1896                 }
1897                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
1898         }
1899
1900         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1901                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1902                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1903                 }
1904                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1905                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1906                 }
1907
1908                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1909                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1910         }
1911
1912         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1913                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1914                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1915                 }
1916                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1917                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1918                 }
1919
1920                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1921                 Ok(())
1922         }
1923
1924         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1925                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1926                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1927                 }
1928                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1929                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1930                 }
1931
1932                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1933                 Ok(())
1934         }
1935
1936         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
1937         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1938                                 L::Target: Logger
1939         {
1940                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1941                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
1942                 }
1943                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1944                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
1945                 }
1946                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1947                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
1948                 }
1949
1950                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1951
1952                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
1953
1954                 let mut update_fee = false;
1955                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1956                         update_fee = true;
1957                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1958                 } else {
1959                         self.feerate_per_kw
1960                 };
1961
1962                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
1963                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
1964                         let commitment_txid = {
1965                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
1966                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1967                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1968
1969                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1970                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
1971                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
1972                                 }
1973                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
1974                         };
1975                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1976                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
1977                 };
1978
1979                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1980                 if update_fee {
1981                         let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1982
1983                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1984                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
1985                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
1986                         }
1987                 }
1988
1989                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
1990                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
1991                 }
1992
1993                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
1994                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
1995                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
1996                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1997                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
1998                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
1999                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2000                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2001                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2002                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2003                                 }
2004                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2005                         } else {
2006                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2007                         }
2008                 }
2009
2010                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2011                         commitment_tx,
2012                         msg.signature,
2013                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2014                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2015                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2016                 );
2017
2018                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2019                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2020
2021                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2022                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2023                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2024                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2025                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2026                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2027                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2028                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2029                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2030                                         need_commitment = true;
2031                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2032                                 }
2033                         }
2034                 }
2035
2036                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2037                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2038                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2039                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2040                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2041                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2042                         }]
2043                 };
2044
2045                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2046                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2047                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2048                         } else { None };
2049                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2050                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2051                                 need_commitment = true;
2052                         }
2053                 }
2054                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2055                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2056                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2057                         } else { None } {
2058                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2059                                 need_commitment = true;
2060                         }
2061                 }
2062
2063                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2064                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2065                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2066                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2067
2068                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2069                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2070                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2071                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2072                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2073                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2074                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2075                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2076                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2077                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2078                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2079                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2080                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2081                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2082                         }
2083                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2084                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2085                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2086                 }
2087
2088                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2089                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2090                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2091                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2092                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2093                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2094                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2095                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2096                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2097                         (Some(msg), None)
2098                 } else if !need_commitment {
2099                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2100                 } else { (None, None) };
2101
2102                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2103                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2104                         per_commitment_secret,
2105                         next_per_commitment_point,
2106                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2107         }
2108
2109         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2110         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2111         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2112                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2113                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2114                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2115
2116                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2117                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2118                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2119                         };
2120
2121                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2122                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2123                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2124                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2125                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2126                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2127                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2128                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2129                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2130                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2131                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2132                                 // to rebalance channels.
2133                                 match &htlc_update {
2134                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2135                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2136                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2137                                                         Err(e) => {
2138                                                                 match e {
2139                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2140                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2141                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2142                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2143                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2144                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2145                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2146                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2147                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2148                                                                         },
2149                                                                         _ => {
2150                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2151                                                                         },
2152                                                                 }
2153                                                         }
2154                                                 }
2155                                         },
2156                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2157                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2158                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2159                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2160                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2161                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2162                                                                 }
2163                                                         },
2164                                                         Err(e) => {
2165                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2166                                                                 else {
2167                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2168                                                                 }
2169                                                         }
2170                                                 }
2171                                         },
2172                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2173                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2174                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2175                                                         Err(e) => {
2176                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2177                                                                 else {
2178                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2179                                                                 }
2180                                                         }
2181                                                 }
2182                                         },
2183                                 }
2184                         }
2185                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2186                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2187                         }
2188                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2189                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2190                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2191                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2192                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2193                                 })
2194                         } else {
2195                                 None
2196                         };
2197
2198                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2199                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2200                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2201                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2202                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2203
2204                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2205                                 update_add_htlcs,
2206                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2207                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2208                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2209                                 update_fee,
2210                                 commitment_signed,
2211                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2212                 } else {
2213                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2214                 }
2215         }
2216
2217         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2218         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2219         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2220         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2221         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2222         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2223                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2224                                         L::Target: Logger,
2225         {
2226                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2227                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2228                 }
2229                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2230                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2231                 }
2232                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2233                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2234                 }
2235
2236                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2237                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2238                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2239                         }
2240                 }
2241
2242                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2243                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2244                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2245                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2246                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2247                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2248                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2249                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2250                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2251                 }
2252
2253                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2254                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2255                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2256                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2257                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2258                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2259                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2260                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2261                         }],
2262                 };
2263
2264                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2265                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2266                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2267                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2268                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2269                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2270                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2271                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2272
2273                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2274                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2275                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2276                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2277                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2278                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2279                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2280
2281                 {
2282                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2283                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2284                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2285
2286                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2287                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2288                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2289                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2290                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2291                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2292                                         }
2293                                         false
2294                                 } else { true }
2295                         });
2296                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2297                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2298                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2299                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2300                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2301                                         } else {
2302                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2303                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2304                                         }
2305                                         false
2306                                 } else { true }
2307                         });
2308                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2309                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2310                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2311                                         true
2312                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2313                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2314                                         true
2315                                 } else { false };
2316                                 if swap {
2317                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2318                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2319
2320                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2321                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2322                                                 require_commitment = true;
2323                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2324                                                 match forward_info {
2325                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2326                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2327                                                                 match fail_msg {
2328                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2329                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2330                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2331                                                                         },
2332                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2333                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2334                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2335                                                                         },
2336                                                                 }
2337                                                         },
2338                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2339                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2340                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2341                                                         }
2342                                                 }
2343                                         }
2344                                 }
2345                         }
2346                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2347                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2348                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2349                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2350                                 }
2351                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2352                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2353                                 } else { None } {
2354                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2355                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2356                                         require_commitment = true;
2357                                 }
2358                         }
2359                 }
2360                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2361
2362                 if self.is_outbound() {
2363                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2364                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2365                         }
2366                 } else {
2367                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2368                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2369                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2370                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2371                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2372                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2373                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2374                                         require_commitment = true;
2375                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2376                                 }
2377                         }
2378                 }
2379
2380                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2381                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2382                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2383                         if require_commitment {
2384                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2385                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2386                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2387                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2388                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2389                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2390                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2391                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2392                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2393                         }
2394                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2395                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2396                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2397                 }
2398
2399                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2400                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2401                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2402                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2403                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2404                                 }
2405                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2406                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2407                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2408                                 }
2409
2410                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2411                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2412                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2413                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2414
2415                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2416                         },
2417                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2418                                 if require_commitment {
2419                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2420
2421                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2422                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2423                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2424                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2425
2426                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2427                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2428                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2429                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2430                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2431                                                 update_fee: None,
2432                                                 commitment_signed
2433                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2434                                 } else {
2435                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2436                                 }
2437                         }
2438                 }
2439
2440         }
2441
2442         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2443         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2444         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2445         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2446                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2447                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2448                 }
2449                 if !self.is_usable() {
2450                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2451                 }
2452                 if !self.is_live() {
2453                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2454                 }
2455
2456                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2457                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2458                         return None;
2459                 }
2460
2461                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2462                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2463
2464                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2465                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2466                         feerate_per_kw,
2467                 })
2468         }
2469
2470         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2471                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2472                         Some(update_fee) => {
2473                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2474                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2475                         },
2476                         None => Ok(None)
2477                 }
2478         }
2479
2480         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2481         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2482         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2483         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2484         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2485         /// completed.
2486         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2487                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2488
2489                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2490                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2491                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2492                         return outbound_drops;
2493                 }
2494                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2495                 // will be retransmitted.
2496                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2497
2498                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2499                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2500                         match htlc.state {
2501                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2502                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2503                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2504                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2505                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2506                                         false
2507                                 },
2508                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2509                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2510                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2511                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2512                                         true
2513                                 },
2514                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2515                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2516                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2517                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2518                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2519                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2520                                         true
2521                                 },
2522                         }
2523                 });
2524                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2525
2526                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2527                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2528                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2529                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2530                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2531                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2532                         }
2533                 }
2534
2535                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2536                         match htlc_update {
2537                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2538                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2539                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2540                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2541                                 // logic.
2542                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2543                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2544                                         false
2545                                 },
2546                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2547                         }
2548                 });
2549                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2550                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2551                 outbound_drops
2552         }
2553
2554         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2555         /// updates are partially paused.
2556         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2557         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2558         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2559         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2560         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2561                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2562                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2563                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2564                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2565                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2566                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2567                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2568                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2569         }
2570
2571         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2572         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2573         /// to the remote side.
2574         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2575                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2576                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2577
2578                 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2579
2580                 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2581                 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2582                 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2583                 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2584                 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2585                 // monitor was persisted.
2586                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2587                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2588                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2589                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2590                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2591                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2592                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2593                         })
2594                 } else { None };
2595
2596                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2597                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2598                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2599                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2600
2601                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2602                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2603                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2604                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2605                 }
2606
2607                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2608                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2609                 } else { None };
2610                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2611                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2612                 } else { None };
2613
2614                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2615                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2616                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2617                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2618                         if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2619                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2620                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2621                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2622                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2623         }
2624
2625         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2626                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2627         {
2628                 if self.is_outbound() {
2629                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2630                 }
2631                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2632                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2633                 }
2634                 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2635                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2636                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2637                 Ok(())
2638         }
2639
2640         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2641                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2642                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_keys.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2643                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2644                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2645                         per_commitment_secret,
2646                         next_per_commitment_point,
2647                 }
2648         }
2649
2650         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2651                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2652                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2653                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2654                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2655
2656                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2657                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2658                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2659                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2660                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2661                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2662                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2663                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2664                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2665                                 });
2666                         }
2667                 }
2668
2669                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2670                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2671                                 match reason {
2672                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2673                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2674                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2675                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2676                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2677                                                 });
2678                                         },
2679                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2680                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2681                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2682                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2683                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2684                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2685                                                 });
2686                                         },
2687                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2688                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2689                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2690                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2691                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2692                                                 });
2693                                         },
2694                                 }
2695                         }
2696                 }
2697
2698                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2699                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2700                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2701                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2702                         update_fee: None,
2703                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2704                 }
2705         }
2706
2707         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2708         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2709         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2710                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2711                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2712                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2713                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2714                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2715                 }
2716
2717                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2718                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2719                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2720                 }
2721
2722                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2723                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2724                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2725                                         let expected_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2726                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2727                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2728                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2729                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2730                                         }
2731                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2732                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2733                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2734                                                 ));
2735                                         }
2736                                 },
2737                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2738                         }
2739                 }
2740
2741                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2742                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2743                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2744
2745                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2746                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2747                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2748                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2749                         })
2750                 } else { None };
2751
2752                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2753                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2754                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2755                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2756                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2757                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2758                                 }
2759                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2760                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2761                         }
2762
2763                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2764                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2765                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2766                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2767                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2768                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2769                 }
2770
2771                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2772                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2773                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2774                         None
2775                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2776                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2777                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2778                                 None
2779                         } else {
2780                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2781                         }
2782                 } else {
2783                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2784                 };
2785
2786                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2787                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2788                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2789                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2790                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2791
2792                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2793                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2794                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2795                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2796                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2797                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2798                         })
2799                 } else { None };
2800
2801                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2802                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2803                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2804                         } else {
2805                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2806                         }
2807
2808                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2809                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2810                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2811                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2812                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2813                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
2814                                         }
2815                                 }
2816
2817                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2818                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2819                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2820                                 // now!
2821                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
2822                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2823                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2824                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
2825                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2826                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2827                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
2828                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2829                                         },
2830                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
2831                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2832                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2833                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
2834                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2835                                         },
2836                                 }
2837                         } else {
2838                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2839                         }
2840                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
2841                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
2842                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2843                         } else {
2844                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2845                         }
2846
2847                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2848                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2849                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2850                         }
2851
2852                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2853                 } else {
2854                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2855                 }
2856         }
2857
2858         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
2859                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2860         {
2861                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2862                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2863                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2864                         return None;
2865                 }
2866
2867                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2868                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2869                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2870                 }
2871                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
2872                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
2873
2874                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2875                 let sig = self.holder_keys
2876                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2877                         .ok();
2878                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
2879                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
2880
2881                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
2882                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2883                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2884                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2885                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
2886                 })
2887         }
2888
2889         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2890                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2891         {
2892                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2893                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2894                 }
2895                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2896                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2897                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2898                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2899                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
2900                 }
2901                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2902                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2903                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
2904                         }
2905                 }
2906                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2907
2908                 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2909                 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2910                 if self.is_outbound() && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2911                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got counterparty shutdown_scriptpubkey ({}) of absurd length from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2912                 }
2913
2914                 //Check counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2915                 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2916                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2917                 }
2918
2919                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2920                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2921                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
2922                         }
2923                 } else {
2924                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2925                 }
2926
2927                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2928
2929                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2930                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2931
2932                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2933                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2934                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2935                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2936                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2937                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2938                         match htlc_update {
2939                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2940                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2941                                         false
2942                                 },
2943                                 _ => true
2944                         }
2945                 });
2946                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2947                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2948                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2949
2950                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2951                         None
2952                 } else {
2953                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2954                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2955                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2956                         })
2957                 };
2958
2959                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2960                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2961
2962                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2963         }
2964
2965         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
2966                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
2967                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
2968                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
2969
2970                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2971
2972                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
2973                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
2974                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
2975                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2976                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2977                 } else {
2978                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2979                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2980                 }
2981                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2982                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2983
2984                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
2985         }
2986
2987         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
2988                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2989         {
2990                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2991                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
2992                 }
2993                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2994                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2995                 }
2996                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2997                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
2998                 }
2999                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3000                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3001                 }
3002
3003                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3004                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3005                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3006                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3007                 }
3008                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3009
3010                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3011                         Ok(_) => {},
3012                         Err(_e) => {
3013                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3014                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3015                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3016                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3017                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3018                         },
3019                 };
3020
3021                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3022                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3023                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3024                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3025                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3026                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3027                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3028                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3029                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3030                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3031                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3032                         }
3033                 }
3034
3035                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3036                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3037                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3038                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3039                                 let sig = self.holder_keys
3040                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3041                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3042                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3043                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3044                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3045                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3046                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3047                                         signature: sig,
3048                                 }), None))
3049                         }
3050                 }
3051
3052                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3053                 if self.is_outbound() {
3054                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3055                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3056                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3057                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3058                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3059                                         }
3060                                 }
3061                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3062                         }
3063                 } else {
3064                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3065                 }
3066                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3067                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3068                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3069                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3070                                 }
3071                         }
3072                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3073                 }
3074
3075                 let sig = self.holder_keys
3076                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3077                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3078                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3079                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3080                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3081
3082                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3083                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3084
3085                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3086                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3087                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3088                         signature: sig,
3089                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3090         }
3091
3092         // Public utilities:
3093
3094         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3095                 self.channel_id
3096         }
3097
3098         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3099         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3100         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3101                 self.user_id
3102         }
3103
3104         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3105         /// is_usable() returns true).
3106         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3107         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3108                 self.short_channel_id
3109         }
3110
3111         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3112         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3113         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3114                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3115         }
3116
3117         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3118                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3119         }
3120
3121         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3122                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3123         }
3124
3125         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3126                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3127         }
3128
3129         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3130                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3131         }
3132
3133         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3134         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3135                 self.counterparty_node_id
3136         }
3137
3138         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3139         #[cfg(test)]
3140         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3141                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3142         }
3143
3144         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3145         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3146                 return cmp::min(
3147                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3148                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3149                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3150                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 9 / 10,
3151
3152                         Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3153                 );
3154         }
3155
3156         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3157         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3158                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3159         }
3160
3161         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3162                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3163         }
3164
3165         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3166                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3167         }
3168
3169         #[cfg(test)]
3170         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3171                 self.feerate_per_kw
3172         }
3173
3174         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3175                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3176         }
3177
3178         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3179                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3180         }
3181
3182         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3183                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3184         }
3185
3186         #[cfg(test)]
3187         pub fn get_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
3188                 &self.holder_keys
3189         }
3190
3191         #[cfg(test)]
3192         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3193                 ChannelValueStat {
3194                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3195                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3196                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3197                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3198                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3199                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3200                                 let mut res = 0;
3201                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3202                                         match h {
3203                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3204                                                         res += amount_msat;
3205                                                 }
3206                                                 _ => {}
3207                                         }
3208                                 }
3209                                 res
3210                         },
3211                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3212                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3213                 }
3214         }
3215
3216         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3217         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3218                 self.update_time_counter
3219         }
3220
3221         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3222                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3223         }
3224
3225         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3226                 self.config.announced_channel
3227         }
3228
3229         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3230                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3231         }
3232
3233         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3234         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3235         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3236                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3237         {
3238                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3239                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3240
3241                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3242                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3243
3244                 if self.is_outbound() {
3245                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3246                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3247                 }
3248
3249                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3250                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3251
3252                 res as u32
3253         }
3254
3255         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3256         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3257                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3258         }
3259
3260         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3261         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3262         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3263                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3264                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3265         }
3266
3267         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3268         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3269         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3270         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3271                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3272         }
3273
3274         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3275         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3276         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3277                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3278         }
3279
3280         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3281         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3282                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3283         }
3284
3285         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3286         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3287         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3288         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3289                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3290                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3291                         true
3292                 } else { false }
3293         }
3294
3295         pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3296                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3297         }
3298
3299         pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3300                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3301         }
3302
3303         pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3304                 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3305         }
3306
3307         pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3308                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3309         }
3310
3311         pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3312                 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3313         }
3314
3315         /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3316         /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3317         /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3318         /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3319         /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3320         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3321         ///
3322         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3323         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3324         /// post-shutdown.
3325         /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3326         ///
3327         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3328         /// back.
3329         pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3330                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3331                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3332                         match htlc_update {
3333                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3334                                         if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3335                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3336                                                 false
3337                                         } else { true }
3338                                 },
3339                                 _ => true
3340                         }
3341                 });
3342                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3343                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3344                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3345                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3346                         }
3347                 }
3348                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3349                         for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3350                                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3351                                 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3352                                         let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3353                                         if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3354                                                         tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3355                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3356                                                         // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3357                                                         // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3358                                                         // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3359                                                         // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3360                                                         // channel and move on.
3361                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3362                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3363                                                 }
3364                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3365                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3366                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3367                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3368                                                         data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3369                                                 });
3370                                         } else {
3371                                                 if self.is_outbound() {
3372                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
3373                                                                 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3374                                                                         // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3375                                                                         // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3376                                                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3377                                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3378                                                                 }
3379                                                         }
3380                                                 }
3381                                                 if height > 0xff_ff_ff || (index_in_block) > 0xff_ff_ff {
3382                                                         panic!("Block was bogus - either height 16 million or had > 16 million transactions");
3383                                                 }
3384                                                 assert!(txo_idx <= 0xffff); // txo_idx is a (u16 as usize), so this is just listed here for completeness
3385                                                 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3386                                                 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64)         << (5*8)) |
3387                                                                              ((index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3388                                                                              ((txo_idx as u64)        << (0*8)));
3389                                         }
3390                                 }
3391                         }
3392                 }
3393                 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3394                         self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3395                         self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3396                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3397                                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3398                                         let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3399                                                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3400                                                 true
3401                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3402                                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3403                                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3404                                                 true
3405                                         } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3406                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3407                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3408                                                 false
3409                                         } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3410                                                 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3411                                         } else {
3412                                                 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3413                                                 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3414                                                 false
3415                                         };
3416                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
3417
3418                                         //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3419                                         //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3420                                         //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3421                                         //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3422                                         if need_commitment_update {
3423                                                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3424                                                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3425                                                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3426                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3427                                                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3428                                                         }), timed_out_htlcs));
3429                                                 } else {
3430                                                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3431                                                         return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3432                                                 }
3433                                         }
3434                                 }
3435                         }
3436                 }
3437                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3438         }
3439
3440         /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3441         /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3442         /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3443         pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3444                 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3445                         self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3446                         if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3447                                 return true;
3448                         }
3449                 }
3450                 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3451                 if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3452                         self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3453                 }
3454                 false
3455         }
3456
3457         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3458         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3459
3460         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3461                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3462                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3463                 }
3464                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3465                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3466                 }
3467
3468                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3469                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3470                 }
3471
3472                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3473                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3474
3475                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3476                         chain_hash,
3477                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3478                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3479                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3480                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3481                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3482                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3483                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3484                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3485                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3486                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3487                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3488                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3489                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3490                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3491                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3492                         first_per_commitment_point,
3493                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3494                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3495                 }
3496         }
3497
3498         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3499                 if self.is_outbound() {
3500                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3501                 }
3502                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3503                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3504                 }
3505                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3506                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3507                 }
3508
3509                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_keys.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3510                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3511
3512                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3513                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3514                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3515                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3516                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3517                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3518                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3519                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3520                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3521                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3522                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3523                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3524                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3525                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3526                         first_per_commitment_point,
3527                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3528                 }
3529         }
3530
3531         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3532         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3533                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3534                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3535                 Ok(self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3536                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3537         }
3538
3539         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3540         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3541         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3542         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3543         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3544         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3545         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3546         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3547                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3548                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3549                 }
3550                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3551                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3552                 }
3553                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3554                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3555                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3556                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3557                 }
3558
3559                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3560                 self.holder_keys.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3561
3562                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3563                         Ok(res) => res,
3564                         Err(e) => {
3565                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3566                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3567                                 return Err(e);
3568                         }
3569                 };
3570
3571                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3572
3573                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3574
3575                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3576                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3577
3578                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3579                         temporary_channel_id,
3580                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3581                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3582                         signature
3583                 })
3584         }
3585
3586         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3587         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3588         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3589         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3590         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3591         /// closing).
3592         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3593         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3594         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3595                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3596                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3597                 }
3598                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3599                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3600                 }
3601                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3602                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3603                 }
3604
3605                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3606
3607                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3608                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3609                         chain_hash,
3610                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3611                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3612                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3613                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3614                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3615                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3616                 };
3617
3618                 let sig = self.holder_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3619                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3620
3621                 Ok((msg, sig))
3622         }
3623
3624         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3625         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3626         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3627                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3628                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3629                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3630                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3631                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3632                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3633                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3634                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3635                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3636                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3637                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3638                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3639                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3640                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3641                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3642                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3643                         })
3644                 } else {
3645                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3646                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3647                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3648                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3649                         })
3650                 };
3651                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3652                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3653                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3654                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3655                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3656                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3657                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3658                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3659
3660                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3661                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3662                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3663                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3664                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3665                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3666                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3667                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3668                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3669                         // overflow here.
3670                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3671                         data_loss_protect,
3672                 }
3673         }
3674
3675
3676         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3677
3678         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3679         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3680         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3681         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3682         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3683         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3684         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3685         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3686                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3687                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3688                 }
3689                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3690                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3691                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3692                 }
3693
3694                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3695                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3696                 }
3697
3698                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3699                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3700                 }
3701
3702                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3703                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3704                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3705                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3706                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3707                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3708                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3709                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3710                 }
3711
3712                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3713                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3714                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3715                 }
3716                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3717                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3718                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3719                 }
3720
3721                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3722                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3723
3724                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3725                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3726                         // 1 additional HTLC corresponding to this HTLC.
3727                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
3728                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3729                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3730                         }
3731                 }
3732
3733                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3734                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3735                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3736                 }
3737
3738                 // The `+1` is for the HTLC currently being added to the commitment tx and
3739                 // the `2 *` and `+1` are for the fee spike buffer.
3740                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3741                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(1 + 1)
3742                 } else { 0 };
3743                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3744                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3745                 }
3746
3747                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3748                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3749                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3750                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3751                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3752                 }
3753
3754                 // Now update local state:
3755                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3756                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3757                                 amount_msat,
3758                                 payment_hash,
3759                                 cltv_expiry,
3760                                 source,
3761                                 onion_routing_packet,
3762                         });
3763                         return Ok(None);
3764                 }
3765
3766                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3767                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3768                         amount_msat,
3769                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3770                         cltv_expiry,
3771                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3772                         source,
3773                 });
3774
3775                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3776                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3777                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3778                         amount_msat,
3779                         payment_hash,
3780                         cltv_expiry,
3781                         onion_routing_packet,
3782                 };
3783                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3784
3785                 Ok(Some(res))
3786         }
3787
3788         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3789         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3790         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3791         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3792         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3793                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3794                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3795                 }
3796                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3797                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3798                 }
3799                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3800                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3801                 }
3802                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3803                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3804                 }
3805                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3806                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3807                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3808                                 have_updates = true;
3809                         }
3810                         if have_updates { break; }
3811                 }
3812                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3813                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3814                                 have_updates = true;
3815                         }
3816                         if have_updates { break; }
3817                 }
3818                 if !have_updates {
3819                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3820                 }
3821                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
3822         }
3823         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3824         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3825                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3826                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3827                 // is acceptable.
3828                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3829                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3830                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3831                         } else { None };
3832                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
3833                                 htlc.state = state;
3834                         }
3835                 }
3836                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3837                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3838                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
3839                         } else { None } {
3840                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3841                         }
3842                 }
3843                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3844
3845                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
3846                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3847                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3848                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
3849                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3850                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3851                         },
3852                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
3853                 };
3854
3855                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3856                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3857                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3858                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
3859                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
3860                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
3861                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
3862                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
3863                         }]
3864                 };
3865                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3866                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
3867         }
3868
3869         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3870         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3871         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3872                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3873                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3874                         if self.is_outbound() {
3875                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3876                         }
3877                 }
3878
3879                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3880                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
3881                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
3882                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
3883
3884                 {
3885                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
3886                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3887                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
3888                         }
3889
3890                         let res = self.holder_keys.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
3891                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
3892                         signature = res.0;
3893                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
3894
3895                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
3896                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
3897                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
3898                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
3899
3900                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
3901                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
3902                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
3903                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
3904                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
3905                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3906                         }
3907                 }
3908
3909                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3910                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3911                         signature,
3912                         htlc_signatures,
3913                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
3914         }
3915
3916         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3917         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3918         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3919         /// more info.
3920         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3921                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3922                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3923                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3924                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3925                         },
3926                         None => Ok(None)
3927                 }
3928         }
3929
3930         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3931         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3932         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3933                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3934                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3935                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
3936                         }
3937                 }
3938                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3939                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3940                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
3941                         }
3942                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3943                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
3944                         }
3945                 }
3946                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3947                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3948                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
3949                 }
3950
3951                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3952
3953                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3954                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3955                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3956                 } else {
3957                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3958                 }
3959                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3960
3961                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3962                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3963                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3964                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3965                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3966                         match htlc_update {
3967                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3968                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3969                                         false
3970                                 },
3971                                 _ => true
3972                         }
3973                 });
3974
3975                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3976                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3977                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
3978                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3979         }
3980
3981         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3982         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3983         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3984         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3985         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3986         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3987                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3988
3989                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3990                 // return them to fail the payment.
3991                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3992                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3993                         match htlc_update {
3994                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3995                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3996                                 },
3997                                 _ => {}
3998                         }
3999                 }
4000                 let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4001                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4002                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4003                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4004                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4005                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4006                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4007                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4008                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4009                                 Some(funding_txo.clone())
4010                         } else { None }
4011                 } else { None };
4012
4013                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4014                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4015                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4016                 (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4017                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4018                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4019                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4020         }
4021 }
4022
4023 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4024 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4025
4026 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4027         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4028                 match self {
4029                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4030                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4031                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4032                         },
4033                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4034                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4035                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4036                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4037                         },
4038                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4039                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4040                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4041                         },
4042                 }
4043                 Ok(())
4044         }
4045 }
4046
4047 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4048         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4049                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4050                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4051                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4052                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4053                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4054                 })
4055         }
4056 }
4057
4058 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
4059         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4060                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4061                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4062
4063                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4064                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4065
4066                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4067                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4068
4069                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4070                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4071                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4072
4073                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4074
4075                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4076                 self.holder_keys.write(&mut key_data)?;
4077                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4078                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4079                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4080                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4081
4082                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4083                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4084
4085                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4086                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4087                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4088
4089                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4090                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4091                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4092                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4093                         }
4094                 }
4095                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4096                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4097                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4098                                 continue; // Drop
4099                         }
4100                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4101                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4102                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4103                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4104                         match &htlc.state {
4105                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4106                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4107                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4108                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4109                                 },
4110                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4111                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4112                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4113                                 },
4114                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4115                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4116                                 },
4117                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4118                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4119                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4120                                 },
4121                         }
4122                 }
4123
4124                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4125                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4126                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4127                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4128                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4129                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4130                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4131                         match &htlc.state {
4132                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4133                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4134                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4135                                 },
4136                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4137                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4138                                 },
4139                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4140                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4141                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4142                                 },
4143                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4144                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4145                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4146                                 },
4147                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4148                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4149                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4150                                 },
4151                         }
4152                 }
4153
4154                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4155                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4156                         match update {
4157                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4158                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4159                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4160                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4161                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4162                                         source.write(writer)?;
4163                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4164                                 },
4165                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4166                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4167                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4168                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4169                                 },
4170                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4171                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4172                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4173                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4174                                 }
4175                         }
4176                 }
4177
4178                 match self.resend_order {
4179                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4180                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4181                 }
4182
4183                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4184                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4185                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4186
4187                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4188                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4189                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4190                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4191                 }
4192
4193                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4194                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4195                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4196                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4197                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4198                 }
4199
4200                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4201                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4202
4203                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4204                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4205                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4206                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4207
4208                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4209                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4210                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4211                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4212                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4213                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4214                         },
4215                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4216                 }
4217
4218                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4219                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4220
4221                 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4222                 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4223
4224                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4225                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4226                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4227                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4228                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4229                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4230                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4231                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4232
4233                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4234                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4235
4236                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4237                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4238
4239                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4240
4241                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4242                 Ok(())
4243         }
4244 }
4245
4246 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4247 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<ChanSigner>
4248                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner> {
4249         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4250                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4251                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4252                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4253                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4254                 }
4255
4256                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4257                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4258
4259                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4260                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4261                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4262
4263                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4264
4265                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4266                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4267                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4268                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4269                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4270                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4271                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4272                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4273                 }
4274                 let holder_keys = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4275
4276                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4277                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4278
4279                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4280                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4281                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4282
4283                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4284                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4285                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4286                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4287                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4288                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4289                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4290                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4291                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4292                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4293                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4294                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4295                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4296                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4297                                 },
4298                         });
4299                 }
4300
4301                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4302                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4303                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4304                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4305                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4306                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4307                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4308                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4309                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4310                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4311                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4312                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4313                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4314                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4315                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4316                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4317                                 },
4318                         });
4319                 }
4320
4321                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4322                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4323                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4324                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4325                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4326                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4327                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4328                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4329                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4330                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4331                                 },
4332                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4333                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4334                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4335                                 },
4336                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4337                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4338                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4339                                 },
4340                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4341                         });
4342                 }
4343
4344                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4345                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4346                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4347                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4348                 };
4349
4350                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4351                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4352                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4353
4354                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4355                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4356                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4357                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4358                 }
4359
4360                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4361                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4362                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4363                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4364                 }
4365
4366                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4367                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4368
4369                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4370                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4371                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4372                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4373
4374                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4375                         0 => None,
4376                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4377                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4378                 };
4379
4380                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4381                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4382
4383                 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4384                 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4385
4386                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4387                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4388                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4389                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4390                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4391                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4392                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4393                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4394
4395                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4396                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4397
4398                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4399                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4400
4401                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4402                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4403
4404                 Ok(Channel {
4405                         user_id,
4406
4407                         config,
4408                         channel_id,
4409                         channel_state,
4410                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
4411                         channel_value_satoshis,
4412
4413                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4414
4415                         holder_keys,
4416                         shutdown_pubkey,
4417                         destination_script,
4418
4419                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4420                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4421                         value_to_self_msat,
4422
4423                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4424                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4425                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4426
4427                         resend_order,
4428
4429                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4430                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4431                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4432                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4433                         monitor_pending_failures,
4434
4435                         pending_update_fee,
4436                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4437                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4438                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4439                         update_time_counter,
4440                         feerate_per_kw,
4441
4442                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4443                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4444                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4445                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4446
4447                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4448
4449                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4450                         short_channel_id,
4451                         last_block_connected,
4452                         funding_tx_confirmations,
4453
4454                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4455                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4456                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4457                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4458                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4459                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4460                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4461                         minimum_depth,
4462
4463                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4464                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4465
4466                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4467                         counterparty_node_id,
4468
4469                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4470
4471                         commitment_secrets,
4472
4473                         network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4474                 })
4475         }
4476 }
4477
4478 #[cfg(test)]
4479 mod tests {
4480         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4481         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4482         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4483         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4484         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4485         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4486         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4487         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4488         use hex;
4489         use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4490         use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4491         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4492         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4493         use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
4494         use ln::chan_utils;
4495         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4496         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4497         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
4498         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4499         use util::config::UserConfig;
4500         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingChannelKeys;
4501         use util::test_utils;
4502         use util::logger::Logger;
4503         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4504         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4505         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4506         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4507         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4508         use std::sync::Arc;
4509
4510         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4511                 fee_est: u32
4512         }
4513         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4514                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4515                         self.fee_est
4516                 }
4517         }
4518
4519         #[test]
4520         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4521                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4522                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4523         }
4524
4525         struct Keys {
4526                 chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
4527         }
4528         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4529                 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
4530
4531                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4532                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4533                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4534                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4535                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4536                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4537                 }
4538
4539                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4540                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4541                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4542                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4543                 }
4544
4545                 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
4546                         self.chan_keys.clone()
4547                 }
4548                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4549                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::ChanKeySigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4550         }
4551
4552         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4553                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4554         }
4555
4556         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4557         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4558         #[test]
4559         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4560                 let original_fee = 253;
4561                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4562                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4563                 let seed = [42; 32];
4564                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4565                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4566
4567                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4568                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4569                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4570
4571                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4572                 // same as the old fee.
4573                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4574                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4575                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4576         }
4577
4578         #[test]
4579         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4580                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4581                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4582                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4583                 let seed = [42; 32];
4584                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4585                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4586
4587                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4588
4589                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4590                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4591                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4592                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4593
4594                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4595                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4596                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4597                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingChannelKeys>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4598
4599                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4600                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4601                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4602
4603                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4604                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4605                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4606                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4607                 }]};
4608                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4609                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4610                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4611
4612                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4613                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4614
4615                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4616                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4617                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4618                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4619                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4620                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4621                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4622                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4623                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4624                         },
4625                         _ => panic!()
4626                 }
4627
4628                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4629                 // is sane.
4630                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4631                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4632                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4633                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4634                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4635                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4636                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4637                         },
4638                         _ => panic!()
4639                 }
4640         }
4641
4642         #[test]
4643         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4644                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4645                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4646                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4647                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4648
4649                 let mut chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
4650                         &secp_ctx,
4651                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4652                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4653                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4654                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4655                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4656
4657                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4658                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4659                         10_000_000,
4660                         (0, 0)
4661                 );
4662
4663                 assert_eq!(chan_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4664                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4665                 let keys_provider = Keys { chan_keys: chan_keys.clone() };
4666
4667                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4668                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4669                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4670                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4671                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4672
4673                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
4674
4675                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4676                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4677                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4678                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4679                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4680                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4681                 };
4682                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
4683                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4684                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
4685                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
4686                         });
4687                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
4688                 chan_keys.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
4689
4690                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
4691                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4692
4693                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4694                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4695
4696                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4697                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4698
4699                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4700                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4701                 // build_commitment_transaction.
4702                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
4703                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4704                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4705                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
4706                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
4707
4708                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4709                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
4710                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
4711                         } ) => { {
4712                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
4713                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
4714
4715                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4716                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4717                                                 .collect();
4718                                         (res.0, htlcs)
4719                                 };
4720                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
4721                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4722                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4723                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4724                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
4725                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
4726
4727                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
4728                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
4729                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
4730                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
4731                                 $({
4732                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4733                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
4734                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
4735                                 })*
4736                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
4737
4738                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4739                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
4740                                         counterparty_signature,
4741                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
4742                                         &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4743                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4744                                 );
4745                                 let holder_sig = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
4746                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
4747
4748                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4749                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
4750                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
4751
4752                                 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
4753
4754                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
4755                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
4756
4757                                 $({
4758                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4759
4760                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
4761                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4762                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4763                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
4764                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
4765
4766                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4767                                         if !htlc.offered {
4768                                                 for i in 0..5 {
4769                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4770                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4771                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4772                                                         }
4773                                                 }
4774
4775                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4776                                         }
4777
4778                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
4779                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
4780
4781                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4782                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
4783                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
4784                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
4785                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
4786                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
4787                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
4788                                 })*
4789                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
4790                         } }
4791                 }
4792
4793                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4794                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4795
4796                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
4797                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
4798                                                  "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", {});
4799
4800                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4801                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4802                                 htlc_id: 0,
4803                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
4804                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
4805                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4806                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4807                         };
4808                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4809                         out
4810                 });
4811                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4812                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4813                                 htlc_id: 1,
4814                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
4815                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
4816                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4817                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4818                         };
4819                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4820                         out
4821                 });
4822                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4823                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4824                                 htlc_id: 2,
4825                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
4826                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
4827                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4828                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4829                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4830                         };
4831                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4832                         out
4833                 });
4834                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4835                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4836                                 htlc_id: 3,
4837                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
4838                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
4839                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4840                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4841                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4842                         };
4843                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4844                         out
4845                 });
4846                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4847                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4848                                 htlc_id: 4,
4849                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
4850                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
4851                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4852                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4853                         };
4854                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4855                         out
4856                 });
4857
4858                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4859                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4860                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4861
4862                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
4863                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
4864                                  "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", {
4865
4866                                   { 0,
4867                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
4868                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
4869                                   "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" },
4870
4871                                   { 1,
4872                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
4873                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
4874                                   "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" },
4875
4876                                   { 2,
4877                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
4878                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
4879                                   "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" },
4880
4881                                   { 3,
4882                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
4883                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
4884                                   "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" },
4885
4886                                   { 4,
4887                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
4888                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
4889                                   "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" }
4890                 } );
4891
4892                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4893                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4894                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4895
4896                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
4897                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
4898                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
4899
4900                                   { 0,
4901                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
4902                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
4903                                   "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" },
4904
4905                                   { 1,
4906                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
4907                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
4908                                   "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" },
4909
4910                                   { 2,
4911                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
4912                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
4913                                   "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" },
4914
4915                                   { 3,
4916                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
4917                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
4918                                   "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" },
4919
4920                                   { 4,
4921                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
4922                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
4923                                   "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" }
4924                 } );
4925
4926                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4927                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4928                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4929
4930                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
4931                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
4932                                  "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", {
4933
4934                                   { 0,
4935                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
4936                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
4937                                   "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" },
4938
4939                                   { 1,
4940                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
4941                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
4942                                   "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
4943
4944                                   { 2,
4945                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
4946                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
4947                                   "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" },
4948
4949                                   { 3,
4950                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
4951                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
4952                                   "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
4953                 } );
4954
4955                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4956                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4957                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4958
4959                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
4960                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
4961                                  "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", {
4962
4963                                   { 0,
4964                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
4965                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
4966                                   "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" },
4967
4968                                   { 1,
4969                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
4970                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
4971                                   "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" },
4972
4973                                   { 2,
4974                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
4975                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
4976                                   "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" },
4977
4978                                   { 3,
4979                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
4980                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
4981                                   "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" }
4982                 } );
4983
4984                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4985                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4986                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4987
4988                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
4989                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
4990                                  "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", {
4991
4992                                   { 0,
4993                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
4994                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
4995                                   "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" },
4996
4997                                   { 1,
4998                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
4999                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5000                                   "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" },
5001
5002                                   { 2,
5003                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5004                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5005                                   "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" }
5006                 } );
5007
5008                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5009                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5010                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5011
5012                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5013                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5014                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5015
5016                                   { 0,
5017                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5018                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5019                                   "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" },
5020
5021                                   { 1,
5022                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5023                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5024                                   "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" },
5025
5026                                   { 2,
5027                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5028                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5029                                   "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" }
5030                 } );
5031
5032                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5033                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5034                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5035
5036                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5037                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5038                                  "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", {
5039
5040                                   { 0,
5041                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5042                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5043                                   "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" },
5044
5045                                   { 1,
5046                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5047                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5048                                   "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" }
5049                 } );
5050
5051                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5052                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5053                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5054
5055                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5056                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5057                                  "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", {
5058
5059                                   { 0,
5060                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5061                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5062                                   "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" },
5063
5064                                   { 1,
5065                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5066                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5067                                   "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" }
5068                 } );
5069
5070                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5071                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5072                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5073
5074                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5075                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5076                                  "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", {
5077
5078                                   { 0,
5079                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5080                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5081                                   "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" }
5082                 } );
5083
5084                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5085                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5086                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5087
5088                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5089                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5090                                  "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", {
5091
5092                                   { 0,
5093                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5094                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5095                                   "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" }
5096                 } );
5097
5098                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5099                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5100                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5101
5102                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5103                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5104                                  "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", {});
5105
5106                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5107                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5108                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5109
5110                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5111                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5112                                  "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", {});
5113
5114                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5115                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5116                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5117
5118                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5119                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5120                                  "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", {});
5121
5122                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5123                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5124                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5125
5126                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5127                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5128                                  "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", {});
5129         }
5130
5131         #[test]
5132         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5133                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5134
5135                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5136                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5137                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5138                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5139
5140                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5141                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5142                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5143
5144                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5145                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5146
5147                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5148                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5149
5150                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5151                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5152                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5153         }
5154
5155         #[test]
5156         fn test_key_derivation() {
5157                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5158                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5159
5160                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5161                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5162
5163                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5164                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5165
5166                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5167                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5168
5169                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5170                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5171
5172                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5173                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5174
5175                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5176                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5177
5178                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5179                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5180         }
5181 }