1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
34 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
41 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
42 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use crate::prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
50 use crate::sync::Mutex;
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelReady.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
277 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
278 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
443 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
446 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
447 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
448 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
449 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
450 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
451 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
452 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
453 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
454 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
455 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
456 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
457 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
458 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
459 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
460 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
462 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
463 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
464 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
465 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
467 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
468 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
469 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
470 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
472 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
473 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
474 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
475 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
476 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
478 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
479 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
480 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
481 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
483 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
484 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
485 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
487 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
488 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
489 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
490 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
491 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
493 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
494 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
495 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
498 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
499 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
500 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
501 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
503 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
504 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
505 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
506 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
508 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
512 channel_id: [u8; 32],
515 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
516 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
518 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
519 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
520 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
523 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
524 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
525 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
527 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
528 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
530 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
532 holder_signer: Signer,
533 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
534 destination_script: Script,
536 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
537 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
538 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
540 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
541 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
543 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
544 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
545 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
547 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
548 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
549 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
550 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
551 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
552 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
554 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
556 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
557 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
558 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
559 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
560 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
561 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
563 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
565 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
566 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
567 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
568 // HTLCs with similar state.
569 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
570 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
571 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
572 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
573 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
574 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
575 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
576 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
577 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
580 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
581 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
582 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
584 update_time_counter: u32,
586 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
587 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
588 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
589 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
590 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
591 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
593 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
594 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
596 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
597 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
598 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
599 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
601 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
602 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
604 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
606 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
609 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
610 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
611 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
612 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
613 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
615 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
616 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
617 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
618 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
619 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
621 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
622 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
623 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
624 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
625 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
626 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
627 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
628 channel_creation_height: u32,
630 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
633 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
638 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
640 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
648 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
651 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
653 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
656 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
660 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
664 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
666 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
667 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
669 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
670 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
673 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
675 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
677 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
678 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
679 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
680 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
682 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
683 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
684 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
686 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
687 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
688 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
690 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
691 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
692 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
693 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
695 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
699 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
700 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
701 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
702 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
703 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
705 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
706 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
709 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
710 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
711 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
712 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
713 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
714 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
715 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
717 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
718 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
720 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
721 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
722 // the channel's funding UTXO.
724 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
725 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
726 // associated channel mapping.
728 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
729 // to store all of them.
730 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
732 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
733 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
734 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
735 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
736 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
738 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
739 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
743 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
745 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
746 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
747 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
751 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
753 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
754 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
755 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
756 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
762 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
764 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
766 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
767 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
768 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
769 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
770 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
772 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
773 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
775 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
777 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
778 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
780 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
781 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
782 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
783 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
784 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
785 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
787 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
788 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
790 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
791 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
792 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
793 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
794 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
796 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
797 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
799 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
800 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
802 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
803 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
804 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
805 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
811 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
812 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
814 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
815 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
816 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
821 macro_rules! secp_check {
822 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
825 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
830 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
831 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
832 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
833 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
835 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
838 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
839 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
841 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
844 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
846 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
849 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
850 /// required by us according to the configured or default
851 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
853 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
855 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
856 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
857 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
858 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
859 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
862 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
863 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
864 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
865 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
866 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
867 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
868 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
871 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
872 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
875 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
876 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
877 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
878 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
879 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
880 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
881 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
882 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
887 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
888 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
889 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
890 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
891 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
892 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
893 // We've exhausted our options
896 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
897 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
901 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
902 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
903 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
904 outbound_scid_alias: u64
905 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
906 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
909 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
911 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
912 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
913 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
915 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
916 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
918 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
921 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
922 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
925 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
926 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
928 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
929 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
930 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
931 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
935 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
937 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
938 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
939 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
940 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
943 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
944 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
946 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
947 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
950 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
951 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
952 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
959 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
960 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
961 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
962 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
967 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
969 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
970 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
971 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
973 channel_value_satoshis,
975 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
978 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
979 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
981 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
982 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
985 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
986 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
987 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
988 pending_update_fee: None,
989 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
990 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
991 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
992 update_time_counter: 1,
994 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
996 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
997 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
998 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
999 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1000 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1001 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1003 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1004 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1005 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1006 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1008 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1009 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1010 closing_fee_limits: None,
1011 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1013 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1015 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1016 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1017 short_channel_id: None,
1018 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1020 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1021 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1022 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1023 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1024 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1025 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1026 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1027 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1028 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1029 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1030 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1032 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1034 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1035 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1036 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1037 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1038 counterparty_parameters: None,
1039 funding_outpoint: None,
1040 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1041 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1043 funding_transaction: None,
1045 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1046 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1047 counterparty_node_id,
1049 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1051 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1053 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1054 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1056 announcement_sigs: None,
1058 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1059 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1060 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1061 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1063 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1065 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1066 outbound_scid_alias,
1068 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1070 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1071 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1073 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1077 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1078 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1079 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1081 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1082 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1083 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1084 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1085 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1086 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1087 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1090 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1091 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1092 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1093 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1094 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1095 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1096 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1097 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1099 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1100 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1104 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1109 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1110 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1111 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1112 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1113 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1114 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1115 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1116 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1117 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1120 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1121 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1123 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1124 // support this channel type.
1125 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1126 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1130 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1134 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1135 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1136 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1137 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1138 // publicly announced.
1139 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1140 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1144 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1148 channel_type.clone()
1150 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1152 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1156 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1157 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1158 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1159 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1160 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1161 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1162 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1163 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1166 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1170 // Check sanity of message fields:
1171 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1174 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1177 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1178 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1180 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1181 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1184 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1187 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1190 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1192 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1193 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1196 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1199 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1203 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1204 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1205 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1207 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1210 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1213 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1216 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1219 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1222 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1226 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1228 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1229 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1234 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1235 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1236 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1237 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1238 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1240 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1241 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1243 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1244 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1245 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1247 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1251 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1252 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1253 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1254 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1255 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1259 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1260 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1261 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1262 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1266 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1267 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1268 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1269 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1270 if script.len() == 0 {
1273 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1276 Some(script.clone())
1279 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1280 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1286 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1287 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1290 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1291 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1296 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1297 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1299 let chan = Channel {
1302 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1303 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1305 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1310 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1312 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1313 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1314 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1317 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1320 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1321 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1323 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1324 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1325 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1327 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1328 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1329 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1330 pending_update_fee: None,
1331 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1332 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1333 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1334 update_time_counter: 1,
1336 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1338 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1339 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1340 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1341 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1342 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1343 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1345 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1346 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1347 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1348 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1350 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1351 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1352 closing_fee_limits: None,
1353 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1355 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1357 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1358 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1359 short_channel_id: None,
1360 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1362 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1363 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1364 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1365 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1366 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1367 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1368 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1369 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1370 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1371 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1372 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1373 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1375 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1377 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1378 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1379 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1380 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1381 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1382 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1383 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1385 funding_outpoint: None,
1386 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1387 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1389 funding_transaction: None,
1391 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1392 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1393 counterparty_node_id,
1395 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1397 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1399 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1400 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1402 announcement_sigs: None,
1404 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1405 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1406 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1407 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1409 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1411 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1412 outbound_scid_alias,
1414 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1416 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1417 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1425 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1426 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1427 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1428 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1429 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1431 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1432 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1433 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1434 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1435 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1436 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1437 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1439 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1440 where L::Target: Logger
1442 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1443 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1444 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1446 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1447 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1448 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1449 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1451 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1452 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1453 if match update_state {
1454 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1455 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1456 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1457 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1458 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1460 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1464 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1465 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1466 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1467 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1469 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1470 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1471 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1473 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1474 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1475 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1476 transaction_output_index: None
1481 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1482 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1483 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1484 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1485 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1488 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1490 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1491 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1492 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1494 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1495 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1498 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1499 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1502 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1504 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1505 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1506 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1508 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1509 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1515 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1516 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1517 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1518 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1519 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1520 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1521 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1525 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1526 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1530 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1531 if generated_by_local {
1532 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1533 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1542 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1544 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1545 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1546 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1547 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1548 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1549 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1550 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1553 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1554 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1555 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1556 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1560 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1561 preimages.push(preimage);
1565 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1566 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1568 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1570 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1571 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1573 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1574 if !generated_by_local {
1575 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1583 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1584 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1585 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1586 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1587 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1588 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1589 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1590 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1592 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1594 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1595 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1596 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1597 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1599 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1601 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1602 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1603 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1604 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1607 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1608 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1609 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1610 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1612 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1615 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1616 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1617 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1618 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1620 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1623 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1624 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1629 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1630 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1635 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1637 let channel_parameters =
1638 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1639 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1640 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1643 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1648 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1651 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1652 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1653 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1654 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1656 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1657 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1658 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1666 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1667 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1673 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1674 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1675 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1676 // outside of those situations will fail.
1677 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1681 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1686 1 + // script length (0)
1690 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1691 2 + // witness marker and flag
1692 1 + // witness element count
1693 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1694 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1695 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1696 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1697 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1698 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1700 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1701 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1702 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1708 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1709 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1710 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1711 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1713 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1714 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1715 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1717 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1718 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1719 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1720 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1721 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1722 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1725 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1726 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1729 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1730 value_to_holder = 0;
1733 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1734 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1735 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1736 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1738 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1739 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1742 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1743 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1747 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1748 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1749 /// our counterparty!)
1750 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1751 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1752 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1753 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1754 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1755 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1756 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1758 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1762 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1763 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1764 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1765 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1766 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1767 //may see payments to it!
1768 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1769 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1770 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1772 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1775 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1776 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1777 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1778 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1779 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1782 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1785 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1786 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1788 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1790 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1791 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1792 where L::Target: Logger {
1793 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1794 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1795 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1796 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1797 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1798 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1799 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1800 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1804 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1805 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1806 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1807 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1809 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1810 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1812 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1814 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1816 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1817 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1818 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1820 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1821 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1822 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1823 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1824 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1826 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1827 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1828 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1830 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1831 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1833 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1836 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1837 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1841 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1845 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1846 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1847 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1848 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1849 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1850 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1853 // Now update local state:
1855 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1856 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1857 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1858 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1859 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1860 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1861 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1865 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1866 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1867 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1868 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1869 // do not not get into this branch.
1870 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1871 match pending_update {
1872 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1873 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1874 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1875 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1876 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1877 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1878 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1881 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1882 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1883 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1884 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1885 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1886 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1887 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1893 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1894 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1895 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1897 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1898 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1899 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1901 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1902 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1905 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1906 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1908 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1909 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1911 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1912 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1915 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1918 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1919 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1920 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1921 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1926 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1927 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1928 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1929 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1930 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1933 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1934 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1935 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1936 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1937 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1939 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1940 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1941 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1945 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1946 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1947 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1948 /// before we fail backwards.
1950 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(()). Thus, will always return
1951 /// Ok(()) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1952 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
1953 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1954 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
1955 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
1958 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1959 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1960 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1961 /// before we fail backwards.
1962 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1963 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1964 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
1965 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1966 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1967 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1969 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1971 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1972 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1973 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1975 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1976 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1977 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1979 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1980 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1981 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1983 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1988 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1989 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1995 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1996 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1997 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1998 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1999 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2003 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2004 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "We don't expect to need to use the holding cell if we weren't trying to");
2005 force_holding_cell = true;
2008 // Now update local state:
2009 if force_holding_cell {
2010 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2011 match pending_update {
2012 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2013 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2014 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2015 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2019 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2020 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2021 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2022 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2028 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2029 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2030 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2036 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2038 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2039 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2042 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2043 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2044 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2049 // Message handlers:
2051 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2052 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2054 // Check sanity of message fields:
2055 if !self.is_outbound() {
2056 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2058 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2059 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2061 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2062 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2064 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2067 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2068 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2070 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2072 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2074 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2075 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2078 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2079 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2080 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2082 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2085 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2089 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2090 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2093 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2096 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2097 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2099 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2102 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2105 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2108 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2112 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2113 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2116 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2117 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2119 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2122 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2123 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2124 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2125 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2126 if script.len() == 0 {
2129 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2132 Some(script.clone())
2135 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2136 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2142 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2143 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2144 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2145 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2146 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2148 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2149 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2151 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2154 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2155 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2156 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2157 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2158 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2159 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2162 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2163 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2164 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2167 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2168 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2170 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2171 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2176 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2177 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2179 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2180 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2182 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2183 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2184 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2185 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2186 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2187 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2188 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2189 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2190 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2193 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2194 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2196 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2197 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2198 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2199 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2201 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2202 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2204 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2205 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2208 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2209 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2212 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2213 if self.is_outbound() {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2216 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2217 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2218 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2220 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2222 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2223 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2225 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2226 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2227 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2228 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2231 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2232 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2233 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2234 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2235 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2237 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2239 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2240 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2241 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2244 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2245 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2246 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2250 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2251 initial_commitment_tx,
2254 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2255 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2258 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2259 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2261 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2263 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2264 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2265 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2266 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2267 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2268 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2269 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2270 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2271 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2273 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2275 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2277 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2278 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2279 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2280 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2282 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2284 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2285 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2287 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2290 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2291 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2292 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2293 if !self.is_outbound() {
2294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2296 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2299 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2300 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2301 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2302 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2305 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2307 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2308 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2309 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2310 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2312 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2313 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2315 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2316 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2318 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2319 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2320 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2321 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2322 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2327 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2328 initial_commitment_tx,
2331 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2332 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2335 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2336 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2339 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2340 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2341 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2342 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2343 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2344 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2345 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2346 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2347 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2348 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2350 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2352 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2354 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2355 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2356 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2357 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2359 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2361 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2364 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2365 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2367 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2368 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2369 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2370 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2373 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2374 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2375 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2376 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2377 // when routing outbound payments.
2378 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2382 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2384 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2385 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2386 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2387 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2388 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2389 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2390 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2391 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2392 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2394 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2395 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2396 let expected_point =
2397 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2398 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2400 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2402 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2403 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2404 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2405 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2406 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2408 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2409 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2416 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2417 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2419 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2421 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2424 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2425 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2426 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2427 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2433 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2434 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2435 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2436 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2437 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2438 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2439 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2440 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2441 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2444 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2447 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2448 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2449 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2451 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2452 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2453 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2454 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2455 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2456 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2458 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2459 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2465 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2466 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2467 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2468 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2469 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2470 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2471 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2472 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2473 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2476 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2479 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2480 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2481 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2483 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2484 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2485 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2486 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2487 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2488 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2490 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2491 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2495 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2496 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2497 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2498 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2499 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2500 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2501 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2503 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2504 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2506 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2513 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2514 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2515 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2516 /// corner case properly.
2517 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2518 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2519 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2521 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2522 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2523 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2524 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2527 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2529 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2530 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2531 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2534 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2535 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2536 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2537 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2539 outbound_capacity_msat,
2540 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2541 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2542 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2548 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2549 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2552 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2553 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2554 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2555 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2556 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2557 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2560 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2561 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2563 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2564 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2567 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2568 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2569 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2571 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2572 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2574 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2577 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2578 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2580 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2581 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2583 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2584 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2586 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2587 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2591 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2592 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2598 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2599 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2600 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2603 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2604 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2605 included_htlcs += 1;
2608 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2609 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2613 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2614 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2615 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2616 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2617 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2618 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2623 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2625 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2626 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2631 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2632 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2636 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2637 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2638 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2641 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2642 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2644 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2645 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2646 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2648 total_pending_htlcs,
2649 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2650 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2651 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2653 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2654 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2655 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2657 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2659 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2664 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2665 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2666 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2668 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2669 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2671 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2674 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2675 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2677 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2678 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2680 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2681 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2683 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2684 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2688 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2689 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2695 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2696 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2697 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2698 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2699 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2700 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2703 included_htlcs += 1;
2706 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2707 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2710 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2711 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2713 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2714 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2715 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2720 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2721 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2722 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2725 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2726 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2728 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2729 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2731 total_pending_htlcs,
2732 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2733 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2734 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2736 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2737 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2738 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2740 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2742 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2747 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2748 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2749 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2750 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2751 if local_sent_shutdown {
2752 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2754 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2755 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2756 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2759 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2762 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2765 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2768 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2769 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2772 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2773 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2774 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2775 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2777 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2778 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2780 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2781 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2782 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2783 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2784 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2785 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2786 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2787 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2788 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2789 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2790 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2792 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2793 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2794 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2795 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2796 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2797 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2801 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2804 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2805 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2806 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2808 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2809 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2810 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2811 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2812 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2813 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2814 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2818 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2819 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2820 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2821 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2822 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2823 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2824 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2828 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2829 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2830 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2831 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2832 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2836 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2837 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2838 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2839 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2840 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2842 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2846 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2847 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2850 if !self.is_outbound() {
2851 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2852 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2853 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2854 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2855 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2856 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2857 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2858 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2859 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2860 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2861 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2862 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2863 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2864 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2865 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2868 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2869 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2870 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2871 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2872 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2875 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2878 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2879 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2882 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2883 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2884 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2888 // Now update local state:
2889 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2890 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2891 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2892 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2893 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2894 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2895 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2900 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2902 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2903 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2904 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2905 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2906 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2907 None => fail_reason.into(),
2908 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2909 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2910 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2911 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2913 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2917 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2918 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2919 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2920 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2922 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2923 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2928 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2931 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2932 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2935 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2939 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2942 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2943 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2944 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2946 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2947 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2950 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2954 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2955 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2956 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2958 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2962 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2966 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2967 where L::Target: Logger
2969 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2970 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2972 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2973 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2975 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2976 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2979 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2981 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2983 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2984 let commitment_txid = {
2985 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2986 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2987 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2989 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2990 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2991 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2992 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2993 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2994 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2998 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3000 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3001 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3002 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3003 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3006 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3007 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3008 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3009 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3012 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3014 if self.is_outbound() {
3015 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3016 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3017 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3018 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3019 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3020 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3021 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3022 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3023 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3024 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3030 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3031 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3034 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3035 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3036 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3037 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3038 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3039 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3040 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3042 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3043 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3044 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3045 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3046 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3047 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3048 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3049 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3051 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3053 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3057 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3058 commitment_stats.tx,
3060 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3061 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3062 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3065 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3066 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3067 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3068 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3070 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3071 let mut need_commitment = false;
3072 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3073 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3074 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3075 need_commitment = true;
3079 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3080 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3081 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3082 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3083 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3084 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3088 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3089 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3090 Some(forward_info.clone())
3092 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3093 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3094 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3095 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3096 need_commitment = true;
3099 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3100 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3101 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3102 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3103 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3104 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3105 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3106 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3107 need_commitment = true;
3111 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3112 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3113 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3114 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3116 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3117 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3118 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3119 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3120 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3121 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3122 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3123 // includes the right HTLCs.
3124 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3125 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3126 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3127 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3128 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3129 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3131 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3132 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3133 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3136 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3137 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3138 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3139 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3140 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3141 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3142 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3143 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3144 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3148 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3149 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3151 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3152 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3153 per_commitment_secret,
3154 next_per_commitment_point,
3155 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3158 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3159 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3160 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3161 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3162 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3163 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3164 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3165 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3168 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3169 /// for our counterparty.
3170 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3171 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3172 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3173 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3174 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3176 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3177 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3178 updates: Vec::new(),
3181 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3182 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3183 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3184 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3185 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3186 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3187 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3188 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3189 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3190 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3191 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3192 // to rebalance channels.
3193 match &htlc_update {
3194 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3195 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3196 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3199 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3200 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3201 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3202 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3203 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3204 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3205 // into the holding cell without ever being
3206 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3207 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3208 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3211 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3217 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3218 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3219 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3220 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3221 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3222 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3223 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3224 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3225 (msg, monitor_update)
3226 } else { unreachable!() };
3227 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3228 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3230 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3231 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3232 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3233 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3234 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3235 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3236 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3237 // for a full revocation before failing.
3238 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3241 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3243 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3250 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3251 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3253 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3254 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3259 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3260 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3261 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3262 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3263 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3265 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3266 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3267 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3269 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3271 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3273 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3276 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3278 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3282 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3283 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3284 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3285 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3286 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3287 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3288 where L::Target: Logger,
3290 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3291 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3293 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3296 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3300 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3302 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3303 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3308 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3309 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3310 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3311 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3312 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3313 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3314 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3315 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3319 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3321 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3322 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3325 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3326 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3328 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3330 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3331 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3332 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3333 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3334 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3335 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3336 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3337 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3341 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3342 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3343 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3344 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3345 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3346 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3347 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3348 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3350 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3351 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3354 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3355 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3356 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3357 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3358 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3359 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3360 let mut require_commitment = false;
3361 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3364 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3365 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3366 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3368 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3369 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3370 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3371 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3372 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3373 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3378 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3379 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3380 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3381 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3382 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3384 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3385 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3386 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3391 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3392 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3394 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3398 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3399 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3401 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3402 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3403 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3404 require_commitment = true;
3405 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3406 match forward_info {
3407 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3408 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3409 require_commitment = true;
3411 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3412 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3413 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3415 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3416 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3417 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3421 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3422 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3423 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3424 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3430 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3431 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3432 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3433 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3435 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3436 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3437 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3438 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3439 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3440 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3441 require_commitment = true;
3445 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3447 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3448 match update_state {
3449 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3450 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3451 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3452 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3453 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3455 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3456 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3457 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3458 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3459 require_commitment = true;
3460 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3461 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3466 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3467 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3468 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3469 if require_commitment {
3470 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3471 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3472 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3473 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3474 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3475 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3476 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3477 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3478 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3480 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3481 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3482 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3483 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3484 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3485 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3486 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3488 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3492 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3493 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3494 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3495 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3496 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3498 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3499 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3500 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3503 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3504 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3505 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3506 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3509 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3510 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3511 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3512 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3514 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3517 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3518 if require_commitment {
3519 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3521 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3522 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3523 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3524 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3526 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3527 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3529 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3530 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3531 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3533 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3537 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3538 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3539 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3542 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3544 commitment_update: None,
3545 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3546 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3547 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3554 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3555 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3556 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3557 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3558 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3559 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3560 if !self.is_outbound() {
3561 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3563 if !self.is_usable() {
3564 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3566 if !self.is_live() {
3567 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3570 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3571 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3572 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3573 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3574 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3575 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3576 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3577 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3578 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3579 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3583 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3584 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3585 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3586 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3587 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3590 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3591 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3595 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3596 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3600 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3601 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3603 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3604 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3609 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3610 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3611 Some(update_fee) => {
3612 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3613 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3619 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3620 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3622 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3624 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3625 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3626 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3627 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3631 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3632 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3633 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3637 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3638 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3641 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3642 // will be retransmitted.
3643 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3644 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3645 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3647 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3648 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3650 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3651 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3652 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3653 // this HTLC accordingly
3654 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3657 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3658 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3659 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3660 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3663 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3664 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3665 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3666 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3667 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3668 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3673 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3675 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3676 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3677 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3678 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3682 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3683 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3684 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3685 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3686 // the update upon reconnection.
3687 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3691 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3692 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3695 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3696 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3697 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3698 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3699 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3700 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3702 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3703 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3704 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3705 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3706 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3707 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3709 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3710 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3711 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3712 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3713 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3714 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3715 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3718 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3719 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3720 /// to the remote side.
3721 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3722 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3723 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3725 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3726 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3727 // first received the funding_signed.
3728 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3729 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3730 self.funding_transaction.take()
3732 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3733 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3734 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3735 funding_broadcastable = None;
3738 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3739 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3740 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3741 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3742 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3743 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3744 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3745 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3746 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3747 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3748 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3749 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3750 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3751 next_per_commitment_point,
3752 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3756 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3758 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3759 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3760 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3761 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3762 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3763 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3765 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3766 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3767 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3768 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3769 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3770 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3774 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3775 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3777 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3778 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3781 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3782 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3783 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3784 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3785 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3786 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3787 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3788 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3789 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3793 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3794 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3796 if self.is_outbound() {
3797 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3799 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3802 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3803 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3805 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3806 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3807 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3808 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3809 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3810 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3811 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3812 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3813 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3814 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3815 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3816 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3817 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3819 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3820 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3821 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3827 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3828 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3829 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3830 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3831 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3832 per_commitment_secret,
3833 next_per_commitment_point,
3837 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3838 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3839 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3840 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3841 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3843 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3844 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3845 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3846 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3847 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3848 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3849 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3850 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3851 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3856 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3857 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3859 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3860 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3861 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3862 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3863 reason: err_packet.clone()
3866 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3867 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3868 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3869 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3870 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3871 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3874 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3875 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3876 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3877 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3878 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3885 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3886 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3887 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3888 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3892 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3893 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3894 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3895 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3896 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3897 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3901 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3902 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3904 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3905 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3906 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3907 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3908 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3909 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3910 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3911 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3912 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3913 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3914 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3918 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3919 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3920 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3923 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3924 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3925 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3926 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3927 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3928 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3929 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3932 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3933 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3934 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3935 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3936 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3939 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3940 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3941 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3942 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3943 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3944 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3945 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3946 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3949 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3953 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3954 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3955 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3956 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3958 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3962 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3963 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3964 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3966 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3967 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3968 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3969 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3970 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3974 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3976 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3977 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3978 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3979 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3980 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3981 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3983 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3984 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3985 channel_ready: None,
3986 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3987 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3988 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3992 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3993 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3994 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3995 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3996 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3997 next_per_commitment_point,
3998 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4000 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4001 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4002 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4006 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4007 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4008 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4010 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4011 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4012 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4015 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4018 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4021 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4022 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4023 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4024 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4025 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4027 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4028 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4029 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4030 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4031 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4032 next_per_commitment_point,
4033 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4037 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4038 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4039 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4041 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4044 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4045 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4046 raa: required_revoke,
4047 commitment_update: None,
4048 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4050 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4051 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4052 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4054 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4057 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4058 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4059 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4060 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4061 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4062 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4065 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4066 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4067 raa: required_revoke,
4068 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4069 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4073 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4077 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4078 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4079 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4080 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4082 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4084 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4086 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4087 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4088 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4089 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4090 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4091 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4093 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4094 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4095 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4096 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4097 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4099 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4100 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4101 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4102 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4105 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4106 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4107 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4108 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4109 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4110 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4111 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4112 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4113 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4114 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4115 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4116 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4117 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4118 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4119 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4121 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4124 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4125 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4128 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4129 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4130 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4131 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4132 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4133 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4134 self.channel_state &
4135 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4136 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4137 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4138 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4141 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4142 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4143 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4144 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4145 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4146 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4149 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4155 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4156 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4157 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4158 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4160 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4161 return Ok((None, None));
4164 if !self.is_outbound() {
4165 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4166 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4168 return Ok((None, None));
4171 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4173 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4174 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4175 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4176 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4178 let sig = self.holder_signer
4179 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4180 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4182 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4183 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4184 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4185 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4187 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4188 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4189 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4194 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4195 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4196 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4197 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4199 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4202 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4203 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4204 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4205 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4208 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4209 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4213 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4215 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4216 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4219 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4220 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4224 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4227 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4228 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4229 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4230 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4232 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4235 assert!(send_shutdown);
4236 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4237 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4238 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4240 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4245 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4247 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4248 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4250 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4251 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4252 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4253 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4254 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4255 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4259 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4260 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4261 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4262 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4266 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4267 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4268 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4269 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4270 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4271 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4273 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4274 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4281 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4282 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4284 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4287 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4288 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4290 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4292 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4293 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4294 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4295 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4296 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4297 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4298 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4299 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4300 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4302 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4303 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4306 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4310 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4311 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4312 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4313 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4315 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4318 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4319 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4321 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4324 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4328 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4332 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4333 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4334 return Ok((None, None));
4337 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4338 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4339 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4340 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4342 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4344 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4347 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4348 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4349 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4350 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4351 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4355 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4356 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4357 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4361 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4362 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4363 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4364 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4365 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4366 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4367 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4371 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4373 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4374 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4375 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4376 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4378 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4381 let sig = self.holder_signer
4382 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4383 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4385 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4386 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4387 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4388 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4392 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4393 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4394 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4395 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4397 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4398 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4399 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4405 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4406 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4407 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4409 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4410 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4412 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4413 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4416 if !self.is_outbound() {
4417 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4418 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4419 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4420 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4422 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4423 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4424 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4426 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4427 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4430 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4431 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4432 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4433 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4434 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4435 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4436 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4437 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4439 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4442 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4443 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4444 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4445 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4447 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4451 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4452 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4453 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4454 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4456 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4462 // Public utilities:
4464 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4468 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4472 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4473 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4474 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4478 /// Gets the channel's type
4479 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4483 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4484 /// is_usable() returns true).
4485 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4486 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4487 self.short_channel_id
4490 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4491 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4492 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4495 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4496 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4497 self.outbound_scid_alias
4499 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4500 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4501 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4502 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4503 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4506 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4507 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4508 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4509 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4512 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4513 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4514 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4517 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4518 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4519 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4520 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4524 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4527 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4528 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4531 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4532 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4535 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4536 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4537 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4540 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4541 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4544 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4545 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4546 self.counterparty_node_id
4549 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4550 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4551 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4554 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4555 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4556 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4559 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4560 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4562 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4563 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4564 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4565 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4567 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4571 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4572 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4573 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4576 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4577 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4578 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4581 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4582 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4583 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4585 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4586 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4591 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4592 self.channel_value_satoshis
4595 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4596 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4599 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4600 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4603 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4604 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4607 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4608 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4609 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4612 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4613 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4614 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4617 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4618 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4619 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4622 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4623 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4624 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4625 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4626 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4629 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4631 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4632 self.prev_config = None;
4636 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4637 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4641 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4642 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4643 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4644 let did_channel_update =
4645 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4646 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4647 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4648 if did_channel_update {
4649 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4650 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4651 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4652 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4654 self.config.options = *config;
4658 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4659 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4660 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4661 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4662 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4663 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4664 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4666 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4667 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4670 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4672 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4673 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4679 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4680 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4681 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4682 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4683 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4684 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4685 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4687 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4688 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4695 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4699 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4700 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4701 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4702 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4703 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4704 // which are near the dust limit.
4705 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4706 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4707 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4708 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4709 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4711 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4712 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4714 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4717 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4718 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4721 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4722 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4725 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4726 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4730 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4735 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4737 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4738 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4739 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4740 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4741 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4742 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4744 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4746 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4754 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4755 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4759 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4760 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4761 self.update_time_counter
4764 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4765 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4768 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4769 self.config.announced_channel
4772 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4773 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4776 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4777 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4778 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4779 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4782 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4783 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4784 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4787 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4788 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4789 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4790 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4791 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4794 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4795 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4796 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4797 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4798 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4801 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4802 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4803 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4804 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4807 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4808 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4809 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4812 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4813 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4814 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4816 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4817 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4818 if self.channel_state &
4819 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4820 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4821 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4822 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4823 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4826 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4827 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4828 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4829 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4830 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4831 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4833 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4834 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4835 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4837 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4838 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4839 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4840 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4841 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4842 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4848 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4849 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4850 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4853 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4854 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4855 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4858 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4859 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4860 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4863 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4864 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4865 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4866 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4867 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4868 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4873 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4874 self.channel_update_status
4877 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4878 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4879 self.channel_update_status = status;
4882 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4884 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4885 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4886 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4890 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4891 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4892 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4895 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4899 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4900 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4901 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4903 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4904 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4905 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4907 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4908 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4911 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4912 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4913 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4914 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4915 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4916 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4917 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4918 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4919 self.channel_state);
4921 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4925 if need_commitment_update {
4926 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4927 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4928 let next_per_commitment_point =
4929 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4930 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4931 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4932 next_per_commitment_point,
4933 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4937 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4943 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4944 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4945 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4946 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4947 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4948 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4949 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4950 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4951 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4952 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4953 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4954 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4955 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4956 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4957 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4958 if self.is_outbound() {
4959 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4960 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4961 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4962 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4963 // channel and move on.
4964 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4965 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4967 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4968 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4969 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4971 if self.is_outbound() {
4972 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4973 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4974 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4975 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4976 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4977 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4981 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4982 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4983 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4984 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4985 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4989 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4990 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4991 // may have already happened for this block).
4992 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4993 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4994 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
4995 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4998 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4999 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5000 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5001 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5009 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5010 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5011 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5012 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5014 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5015 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5018 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5020 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5021 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5022 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5025 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5026 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5027 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5028 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5029 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5031 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5032 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5034 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5035 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5036 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5044 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5046 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5047 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5048 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5050 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5051 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5054 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5055 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5056 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5057 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5058 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5059 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5060 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5061 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5062 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5065 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5066 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5067 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5068 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5070 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5071 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5072 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5074 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5075 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5076 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5077 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5079 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5080 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5081 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5082 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5083 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5084 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5085 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5088 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5089 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5091 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5094 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5095 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5096 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5097 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5098 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5099 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5100 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5101 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5102 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5103 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5104 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5105 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5106 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5107 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5108 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5109 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5110 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5116 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5121 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5122 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5124 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5125 if !self.is_outbound() {
5126 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5128 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5129 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5132 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5133 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5136 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5137 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5141 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5142 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5143 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5144 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5145 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5146 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5147 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5148 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5149 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5150 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5151 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5152 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5153 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5154 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5155 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5156 first_per_commitment_point,
5157 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5158 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5159 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5160 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5162 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5166 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5167 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5170 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5171 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5172 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5173 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5176 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5177 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5179 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5180 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5181 if self.is_outbound() {
5182 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5184 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5185 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5187 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5188 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5190 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5191 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5194 self.user_id = user_id;
5195 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5197 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5200 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5201 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5202 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5204 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5205 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5206 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5207 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5209 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5210 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5211 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5212 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5213 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5214 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5215 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5216 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5217 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5218 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5219 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5220 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5221 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5222 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5223 first_per_commitment_point,
5224 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5225 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5226 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5228 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5232 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5233 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5235 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5237 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5238 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5241 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5242 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5243 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5244 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5245 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5246 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5249 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5250 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5251 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5252 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5253 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5254 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5255 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5256 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5257 if !self.is_outbound() {
5258 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5260 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5261 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5263 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5264 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5265 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5266 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5269 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5270 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5272 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5275 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5276 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5281 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5283 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5285 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5286 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5287 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5289 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5290 temporary_channel_id,
5291 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5292 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5297 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5298 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5299 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5300 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5302 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5305 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5306 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5307 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5308 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5310 if !self.is_usable() {
5311 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5314 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5316 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5317 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5319 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5320 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5321 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5322 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5323 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5324 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5330 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5331 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5332 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5336 if !self.is_usable() {
5340 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5341 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5345 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5349 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5350 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5353 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5357 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5359 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5364 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5366 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5367 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5368 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5369 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5370 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5374 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5376 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5377 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5378 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5380 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5381 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5382 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5383 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5384 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5385 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5386 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5387 contents: announcement,
5390 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5394 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5395 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5396 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5397 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5398 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5400 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5402 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5403 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5404 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5405 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5407 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5408 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5409 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5410 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5413 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5414 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5415 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5416 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5419 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5422 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5423 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5424 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5425 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5428 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5430 Err(_) => return None,
5432 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5433 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5438 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5439 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5440 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5441 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5442 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5443 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5444 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5445 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5446 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5447 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5448 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5449 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5450 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5451 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5452 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5453 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5454 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5455 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5456 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5459 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5460 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5461 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5462 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5465 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5466 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5467 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5468 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5469 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5470 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5471 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5472 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5474 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5475 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5476 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5477 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5478 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5479 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5480 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5481 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5482 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5484 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5490 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5492 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5493 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5494 /// commitment update.
5496 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5497 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5498 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5499 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5500 self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5501 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5504 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5505 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5507 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5509 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5510 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5512 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5513 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5514 /// regenerate them.
5516 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel if
5517 /// `force_holding_cell` is false.
5519 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5520 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5521 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5522 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5523 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5524 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5526 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5527 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5528 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5531 if amount_msat == 0 {
5532 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5535 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5536 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5539 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5540 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5541 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5542 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5543 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5544 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5545 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5546 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5549 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5550 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5551 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5552 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5554 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5555 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5556 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5559 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5560 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5561 if !self.is_outbound() {
5562 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5563 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5564 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5565 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5566 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5567 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5571 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5574 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5575 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5576 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5578 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5579 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5580 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5581 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5582 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5583 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5587 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5588 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5589 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5590 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5591 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5592 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5596 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5597 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5598 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5601 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5602 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5603 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5604 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5606 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5607 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5610 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5611 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5612 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5613 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5614 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5617 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5618 force_holding_cell = true;
5621 // Now update local state:
5622 if force_holding_cell {
5623 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5628 onion_routing_packet,
5633 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5634 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5636 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5638 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5642 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5643 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5644 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5648 onion_routing_packet,
5650 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5655 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5656 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5657 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5658 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5659 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5660 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5661 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5663 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5664 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5666 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5667 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5669 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5670 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5672 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5673 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5674 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5675 have_updates = true;
5677 if have_updates { break; }
5679 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5680 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5681 have_updates = true;
5683 if have_updates { break; }
5686 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5688 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5690 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5691 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5692 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5693 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5694 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5696 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5697 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5698 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5700 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5701 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5705 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5706 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5707 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5708 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5709 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5710 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5711 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5714 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5715 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5716 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5717 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5718 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5719 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5722 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5724 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5725 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5726 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5727 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5728 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5729 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5731 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5734 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5735 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5738 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5739 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5740 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5741 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5742 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5743 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5744 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5745 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5748 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5749 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5752 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5753 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5754 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5755 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5756 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5757 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5758 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5760 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5762 if !self.is_outbound() {
5763 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5764 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5765 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5766 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5767 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5768 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5769 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5770 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5771 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5772 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5779 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5780 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5784 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5785 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5787 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5789 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5790 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5791 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5792 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5794 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5795 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5796 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5797 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5798 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5799 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5803 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5804 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5807 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5810 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5811 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5812 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5814 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5815 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5816 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5817 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5818 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5824 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5825 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5826 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5829 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5830 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5833 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5834 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5835 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5836 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5842 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5843 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5844 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5845 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5846 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5847 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5848 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5849 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5852 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5853 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5854 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5856 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5857 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5860 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5861 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5862 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5865 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5868 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5869 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5870 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5872 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5877 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5878 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5879 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5880 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5882 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5884 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5886 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5887 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5888 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5889 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5890 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5891 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5895 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5896 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5897 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5900 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5901 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5902 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5903 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5904 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5906 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5907 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5914 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5917 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5918 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5919 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5920 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5921 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5922 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5923 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5924 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5925 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5926 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5927 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5929 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5930 // return them to fail the payment.
5931 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5932 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5933 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5935 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5936 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5941 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5942 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5943 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5944 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5945 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5946 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5947 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5948 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5949 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5950 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5951 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5952 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5953 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5958 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5959 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5960 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5963 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&HTLCSource> {
5964 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5965 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5967 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, .. } => { Some(source) }
5971 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| &htlc.source))
5975 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5976 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5978 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5984 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5985 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5986 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5987 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5988 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5990 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5991 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5992 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5993 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5999 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6000 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6001 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6002 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6003 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6004 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6009 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6010 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6011 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6012 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6014 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6015 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6016 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6017 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6022 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6023 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6024 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6025 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6026 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6027 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6032 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6033 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6034 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6037 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6039 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6040 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6041 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6042 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6043 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6045 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6046 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6047 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6048 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6050 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6051 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6052 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6054 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6056 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6057 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6058 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6059 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6060 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6061 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6063 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6064 // deserialized from that format.
6065 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6066 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6067 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6069 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6071 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6072 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6073 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6075 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6076 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6077 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6078 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6081 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6082 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6083 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6086 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6087 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6088 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6089 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6091 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6092 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6094 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6096 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6098 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6100 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6103 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6105 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6110 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6112 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6113 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6114 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6115 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6116 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6117 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6118 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6120 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6122 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6124 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6127 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6128 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6129 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6132 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6134 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6135 preimages.push(preimage);
6137 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6138 reason.write(writer)?;
6140 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6142 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6143 preimages.push(preimage);
6145 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6146 reason.write(writer)?;
6151 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6152 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6154 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6156 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6157 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6158 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6159 source.write(writer)?;
6160 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6162 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6164 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6165 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6167 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6169 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6170 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6175 match self.resend_order {
6176 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6177 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6180 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6181 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6182 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6184 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6185 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6186 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6187 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6190 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6191 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6192 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6193 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6194 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6197 if self.is_outbound() {
6198 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6199 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6200 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6202 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6203 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6204 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6206 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6208 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6209 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6210 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6211 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6213 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6214 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6215 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6216 // consider the stale state on reload.
6219 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6220 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6221 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6223 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6224 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6225 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6227 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6228 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6230 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6231 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6232 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6234 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6235 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6237 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6240 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6241 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6242 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6244 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6247 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6248 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6250 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6251 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6252 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6254 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6256 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6258 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6260 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6261 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6262 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6263 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6264 htlc.write(writer)?;
6267 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6268 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6269 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6271 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6272 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6274 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6275 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6276 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6277 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6278 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6279 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6280 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6282 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6283 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6284 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6285 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6286 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6288 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6290 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6291 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6292 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6293 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6295 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6296 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6297 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6298 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6299 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6300 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6301 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6303 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6304 (2, chan_type, option),
6305 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6306 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6307 (5, self.config, required),
6308 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6309 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6310 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6311 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6312 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6313 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6314 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6315 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6316 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6317 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6318 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6325 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6326 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6327 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6328 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6329 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6330 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6332 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6333 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6334 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6335 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6337 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6339 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6340 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6341 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6342 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6343 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6345 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6346 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6349 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6350 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6351 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6353 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6355 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6356 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6357 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6358 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6359 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6360 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6361 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6362 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6364 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6366 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6367 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6368 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6371 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6373 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6374 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6375 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6377 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6378 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6379 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6380 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6381 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6382 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6383 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6384 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6385 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6386 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6387 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6388 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6389 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6390 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6395 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6396 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6397 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6398 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6399 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6400 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6401 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6402 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6403 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6404 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6405 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6406 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6408 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6409 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6412 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6413 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6416 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6417 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6419 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6424 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6425 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6426 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6427 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6428 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6429 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6430 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6431 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6432 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6433 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6435 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6436 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6437 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6439 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6440 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6441 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6443 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6447 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6448 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6449 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6450 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6453 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6454 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6455 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6458 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6459 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6460 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6463 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6465 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6466 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6469 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6474 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6475 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6476 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6478 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6479 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6480 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6481 // consider the stale state on reload.
6482 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6485 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6487 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6492 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6493 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6494 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6496 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6497 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6498 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6499 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6501 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6502 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6504 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6505 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6507 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6508 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6509 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6511 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6513 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6514 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6516 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6517 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6520 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6522 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6523 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6524 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6525 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6527 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6530 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6531 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6533 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6535 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6536 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6538 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6539 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6541 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6543 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6544 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6545 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6547 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6548 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6549 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6553 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6554 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6555 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6557 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6563 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6564 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6565 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6566 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6567 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6568 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6569 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6570 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6571 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6572 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6574 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6575 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6576 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6577 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6578 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6579 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6581 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6583 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6584 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6585 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6586 (2, channel_type, option),
6587 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6588 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6589 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6590 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6591 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6592 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6593 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6594 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6595 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6596 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6597 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6598 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6599 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6600 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6603 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6604 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6605 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6607 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6608 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6610 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6611 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6616 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6617 if iter.next().is_some() {
6618 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6622 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6623 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6624 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6625 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6626 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6629 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6630 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6631 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6634 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6635 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6637 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6638 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6639 // separate u64 values.
6640 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6645 config: config.unwrap(),
6649 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6650 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6651 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6655 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6657 channel_value_satoshis,
6659 latest_monitor_update_id,
6662 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6665 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6666 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6669 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6670 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6671 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6675 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6676 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6677 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6678 monitor_pending_forwards,
6679 monitor_pending_failures,
6680 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6683 holding_cell_update_fee,
6684 next_holder_htlc_id,
6685 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6686 update_time_counter,
6689 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6690 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6691 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6692 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6694 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6695 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6696 closing_fee_limits: None,
6697 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6699 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6701 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6702 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6704 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6706 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6707 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6708 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6709 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6710 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6711 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6712 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6713 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6714 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6717 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6719 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6720 funding_transaction,
6722 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6723 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6724 counterparty_node_id,
6726 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6730 channel_update_status,
6731 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6735 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6736 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6737 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6738 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6740 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6742 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6743 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6744 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6746 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6748 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6749 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6751 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6759 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6760 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6761 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6762 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6763 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6765 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6766 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6767 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6768 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6769 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6770 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6771 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6772 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6773 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6774 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6775 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6776 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6777 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6778 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6779 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6780 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6781 use crate::util::test_utils;
6782 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6783 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6784 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6785 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6786 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6787 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6788 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6789 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6790 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6791 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6792 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6793 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6794 use crate::prelude::*;
6796 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6799 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6800 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6806 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6807 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6808 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6809 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6813 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6814 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6815 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6816 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6817 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6818 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6819 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6823 signer: InMemorySigner,
6825 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6826 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6828 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6829 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6830 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6831 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6832 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6833 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6834 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6835 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6838 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6839 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6840 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6841 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6844 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6847 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6848 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6849 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6852 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6853 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6854 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6858 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6859 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6860 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6861 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6863 let seed = [42; 32];
6864 let network = Network::Testnet;
6865 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6866 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6867 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6870 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6871 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6872 let config = UserConfig::default();
6873 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6874 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6875 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6877 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6878 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6882 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6883 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6885 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6886 let original_fee = 253;
6887 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6888 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6889 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6890 let seed = [42; 32];
6891 let network = Network::Testnet;
6892 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6894 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6895 let config = UserConfig::default();
6896 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6898 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6899 // same as the old fee.
6900 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6901 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6902 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6906 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6907 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6908 // dust limits are used.
6909 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6910 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6911 let seed = [42; 32];
6912 let network = Network::Testnet;
6913 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6914 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6916 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6917 // they have different dust limits.
6919 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6920 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6921 let config = UserConfig::default();
6922 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6924 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6925 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6926 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6927 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6928 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6930 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6931 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6932 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6933 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6934 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6936 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6937 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6938 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6940 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6941 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6942 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6943 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6946 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6948 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6949 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6950 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6951 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6952 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6954 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6955 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6956 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6957 payment_secret: None,
6958 payment_params: None,
6962 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6963 // the dust limit check.
6964 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6965 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6966 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6967 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6969 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6970 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6971 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6972 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6973 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6974 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6975 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6979 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6980 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6981 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6982 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6983 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6984 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6985 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6986 let seed = [42; 32];
6987 let network = Network::Testnet;
6988 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6990 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6991 let config = UserConfig::default();
6992 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6994 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6995 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6997 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6998 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6999 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7000 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7001 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7002 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7004 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7005 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7006 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7007 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7008 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7010 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7012 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7013 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7014 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7015 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7016 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7018 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7019 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7020 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7021 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7022 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7026 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7027 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7028 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7029 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7030 let seed = [42; 32];
7031 let network = Network::Testnet;
7032 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7033 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7034 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7036 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7038 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7039 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7040 let config = UserConfig::default();
7041 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7043 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7044 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7045 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7046 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7048 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7049 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7050 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7052 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7053 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7054 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7055 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7057 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7058 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7059 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
7061 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7062 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
7064 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7065 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7066 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7067 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7068 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7069 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7070 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7071 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7072 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7077 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7079 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7080 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7081 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7082 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7083 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7084 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7085 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7092 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7093 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7094 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7095 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7096 let seed = [42; 32];
7097 let network = Network::Testnet;
7098 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7099 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7100 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7102 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7103 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7104 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7105 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7106 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7107 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7108 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7109 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7111 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7112 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7113 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7114 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7115 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7116 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7118 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7119 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7120 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7121 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7123 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7125 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7126 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7127 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7128 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7129 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7130 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7132 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7133 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7134 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7135 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7137 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7138 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7139 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7140 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7141 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7143 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7144 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7146 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7147 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7148 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7150 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7151 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7152 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7153 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7154 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7156 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7157 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7159 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7160 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7161 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7165 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7167 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7168 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7169 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7171 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7172 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7173 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7174 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7176 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7177 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7178 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7180 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7182 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7183 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7186 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7187 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7188 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7189 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7190 let seed = [42; 32];
7191 let network = Network::Testnet;
7192 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7193 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7194 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7197 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7198 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7199 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7201 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7202 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7204 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7205 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7206 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7208 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7209 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7211 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7213 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7214 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7216 // Channel Negotiations failed
7217 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7218 assert!(result.is_err());
7223 fn channel_update() {
7224 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7225 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7226 let seed = [42; 32];
7227 let network = Network::Testnet;
7228 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7229 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7231 // Create a channel.
7232 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7233 let config = UserConfig::default();
7234 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7235 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7236 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7237 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7239 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7240 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7241 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7243 short_channel_id: 0,
7246 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7247 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7248 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7250 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7251 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7253 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7255 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7257 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7258 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7259 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7260 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7262 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7263 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7264 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7266 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7270 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7272 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7273 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7274 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7275 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7276 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7277 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7278 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7279 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7280 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7281 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7282 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7283 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7284 use crate::sync::Arc;
7286 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7287 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7288 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7289 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7291 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7293 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7294 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7295 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7296 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7297 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7298 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7300 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7301 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7306 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7307 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7308 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7310 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7311 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7312 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7313 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7314 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7315 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7317 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7319 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7320 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7321 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7322 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7323 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7324 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7326 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7327 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7328 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7329 selected_contest_delay: 144
7331 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7332 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7334 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7335 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7337 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7338 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7340 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7341 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7343 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7344 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7345 // build_commitment_transaction.
7346 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7347 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7348 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7349 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7350 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7352 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7353 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7354 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7355 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7359 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7360 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7361 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7362 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7366 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7367 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7368 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7370 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7371 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7373 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7374 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7376 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7378 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7379 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7380 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7381 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7382 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7383 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7384 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7386 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7387 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7388 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7389 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7391 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7392 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7393 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7395 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7397 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7398 commitment_tx.clone(),
7399 counterparty_signature,
7400 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7401 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7402 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7404 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7405 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7407 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7408 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7409 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7411 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7412 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7415 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7416 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7418 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7419 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7420 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7421 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7422 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7423 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7424 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7425 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7427 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7430 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7431 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7432 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7436 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7439 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7440 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7441 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7443 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7444 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7445 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7446 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7447 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7448 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7449 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7450 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7452 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7456 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7457 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7459 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7460 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7461 "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", {});
7463 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7464 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7465 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7466 "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", {});
7468 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7469 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7471 amount_msat: 1000000,
7473 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7474 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7476 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7479 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7480 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7482 amount_msat: 2000000,
7484 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7485 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7487 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7490 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7491 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7493 amount_msat: 2000000,
7495 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7496 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7497 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7499 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7502 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7503 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7505 amount_msat: 3000000,
7507 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7508 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7509 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7511 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7514 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7515 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7517 amount_msat: 4000000,
7519 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7520 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7522 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7526 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7527 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7528 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7530 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7531 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7532 "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", {
7535 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7536 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7537 "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" },
7540 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7541 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7542 "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" },
7545 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7546 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7547 "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" },
7550 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7551 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7552 "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" },
7555 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7556 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7557 "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" }
7560 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7561 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7562 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7564 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7565 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7566 "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", {
7569 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7570 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7571 "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" },
7574 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7575 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7576 "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" },
7579 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7580 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7581 "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" },
7584 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7585 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7586 "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" },
7589 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7590 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7591 "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" }
7594 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7595 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7596 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7598 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7599 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7600 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7603 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7604 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7605 "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" },
7608 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7609 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7610 "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" },
7613 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7614 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7615 "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" },
7618 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7619 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7620 "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" }
7623 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7624 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7625 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7626 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7628 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7629 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7630 "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", {
7633 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7634 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7635 "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" },
7638 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7639 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7640 "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" },
7643 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7644 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7645 "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" },
7648 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7649 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7650 "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" }
7653 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7654 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7655 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7656 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7658 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7659 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7660 "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", {
7663 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7664 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7665 "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" },
7668 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7669 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7670 "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" },
7673 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7674 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7675 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e001473044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c1801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7678 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7679 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7680 "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" }
7683 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7684 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7685 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7687 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7688 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7689 "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", {
7692 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7693 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7694 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7697 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7698 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7699 "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" },
7702 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7703 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7704 "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" }
7707 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7708 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7709 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7711 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7712 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7713 "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", {
7716 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7717 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7718 "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" },
7721 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7722 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7723 "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" },
7726 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7727 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7728 "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" }
7731 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7732 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7733 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7735 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7736 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7737 "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", {
7740 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7741 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7742 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7745 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7746 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7747 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7750 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7751 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7752 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7753 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7755 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7756 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7757 "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", {
7760 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7761 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7762 "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" },
7765 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7766 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7767 "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" }
7770 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7771 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7772 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7773 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7775 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7776 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7777 "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", {
7780 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7781 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7782 "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" },
7785 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7786 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7787 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7790 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7791 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7792 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7794 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7795 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7796 "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", {
7799 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7800 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7801 "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" }
7804 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7805 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7806 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7807 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7809 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7810 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7811 "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", {
7814 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7815 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7816 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7819 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7820 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7821 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7822 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7824 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7825 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7826 "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", {
7829 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7830 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7831 "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" }
7834 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7835 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7836 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7837 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7839 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7840 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7841 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7843 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7844 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7845 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7846 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7848 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7849 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7850 "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", {});
7852 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7853 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7854 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7855 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7857 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7858 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7859 "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", {});
7861 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7862 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7863 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7865 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7866 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7867 "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", {});
7869 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7870 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7871 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7872 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7874 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7875 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7876 "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", {});
7878 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7879 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7880 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7881 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7883 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7884 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7885 "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", {});
7887 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7888 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7889 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7890 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7891 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7892 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7894 amount_msat: 2000000,
7896 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7897 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7899 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7902 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7903 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7904 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7906 amount_msat: 5000000,
7908 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7909 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7910 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7912 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7915 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7916 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7918 amount_msat: 5000000,
7920 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7921 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7922 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7924 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7928 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7929 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7930 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a79f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f014730440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7933 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7934 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7935 "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" },
7937 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7938 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7939 "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" },
7941 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7942 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7943 "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" }
7946 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7947 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7948 "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", {
7951 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7952 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7953 "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" },
7955 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7956 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7957 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe290300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb83483045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b501008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
7959 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7960 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7961 "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" }
7966 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7967 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7969 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7970 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7971 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7972 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7974 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7975 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7976 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7978 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7979 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7981 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7982 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7984 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7985 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7986 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7990 fn test_key_derivation() {
7991 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7992 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7994 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7995 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7997 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7998 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8000 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8001 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8003 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
8004 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8006 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
8007 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8009 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
8010 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8012 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
8013 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8017 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8018 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8019 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8020 let seed = [42; 32];
8021 let network = Network::Testnet;
8022 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8023 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8025 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8026 let config = UserConfig::default();
8027 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8028 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8030 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8031 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8033 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8034 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8035 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8036 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8037 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8038 assert!(res.is_ok());