1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
74 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
228 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
229 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
230 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
234 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
236 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
237 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
238 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
241 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
246 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
250 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
251 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
252 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
253 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
254 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
255 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
256 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
258 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
259 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
260 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
261 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
262 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
263 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
264 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
266 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
267 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
268 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
270 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
271 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
272 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
273 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
274 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
275 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
277 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
278 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
280 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
282 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
283 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
284 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
285 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
286 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
287 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
288 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
290 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
291 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
292 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
293 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
294 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
295 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
297 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
298 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
299 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
300 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
301 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
303 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
304 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
306 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
308 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
310 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
313 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
317 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
319 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
323 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
324 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
325 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
326 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
327 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
329 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
330 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
332 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
334 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
335 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
337 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
338 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
339 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
340 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
341 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
342 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
344 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
345 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
347 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
348 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
349 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
350 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
351 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
353 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
354 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
356 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
357 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
359 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
360 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
361 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
362 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
368 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
369 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
371 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
378 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
379 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
381 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
382 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
388 macro_rules! secp_check {
389 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
392 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
397 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
398 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
399 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
400 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
401 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
402 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
403 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
404 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
406 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
408 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
410 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
414 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
416 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
417 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
418 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
420 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
421 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
423 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
424 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
425 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
426 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
427 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
429 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
430 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
434 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
440 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
443 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
444 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
445 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 holding_cell_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
450 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
451 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
452 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
453 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
454 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
455 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
456 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
457 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
458 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
462 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
463 struct HTLCCandidate {
465 origin: HTLCInitiator,
469 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
477 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
479 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
481 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
482 htlc_value_msat: u64,
483 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
488 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
489 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
490 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
491 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
492 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
494 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
495 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
496 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
497 htlc_value_msat: u64,
499 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
500 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
504 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
505 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
506 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
507 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
508 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
509 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
510 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
511 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
512 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
513 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
514 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
517 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
518 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
519 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
520 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
521 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
522 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
523 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
524 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
527 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
529 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
530 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
531 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
532 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
533 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
534 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
537 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
538 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
539 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
540 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
541 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
542 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
543 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
544 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
545 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
546 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
547 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
548 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
549 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
550 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
551 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
553 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
554 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
555 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
556 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
558 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
559 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
560 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
561 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
563 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
564 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
565 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
566 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
567 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
569 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
570 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
571 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
572 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
574 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
575 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
576 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
578 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
579 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
580 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
581 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
582 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
584 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
585 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
588 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
589 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
591 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
592 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
593 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
594 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
596 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
597 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
600 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
601 (0, update, required),
604 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
605 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
606 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
607 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
608 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
610 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
611 /// in a timely manner.
612 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
615 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
616 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
617 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
619 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
620 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
621 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
622 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
626 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
627 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
628 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
630 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
631 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
632 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
633 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
635 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
639 channel_id: [u8; 32],
640 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
643 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
644 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
646 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
647 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
648 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
650 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
651 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
652 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
653 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
655 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
656 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
658 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
660 holder_signer: Signer,
661 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
662 destination_script: Script,
664 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
665 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
666 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
668 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
669 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
670 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
671 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
672 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
673 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
675 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
676 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
677 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
678 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
679 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
680 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
682 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
684 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
685 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
686 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
688 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
689 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
690 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
691 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
692 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
693 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
694 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
696 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
698 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
699 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
700 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
701 // HTLCs with similar state.
702 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
703 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
704 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
705 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
706 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
707 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
708 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
709 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
710 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
713 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
714 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
715 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
717 update_time_counter: u32,
719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
720 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
721 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
722 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
723 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
724 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
726 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
727 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
729 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
730 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
731 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
732 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
734 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
735 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
737 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
739 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
741 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
742 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
743 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
744 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
745 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
746 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
748 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
749 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
750 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
751 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
752 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
754 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
755 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
756 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
757 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
758 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
759 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
760 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
761 channel_creation_height: u32,
763 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
766 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
768 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
771 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
773 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
776 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
778 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
780 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
781 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
784 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
786 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
788 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
789 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
791 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
793 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
794 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
795 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
797 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
799 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
800 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
802 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
803 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
804 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
806 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
808 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
810 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
811 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
812 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
813 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
815 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
816 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
817 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
819 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
820 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
821 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
823 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
824 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
825 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
826 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
827 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
828 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
829 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
830 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
832 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
833 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
834 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
835 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
836 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
838 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
839 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
841 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
842 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
843 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
844 /// unblock the state machine.
846 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
847 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
848 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
850 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
851 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
852 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
855 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
856 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
857 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
858 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
859 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
860 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
861 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
863 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
864 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
866 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
867 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
868 // the channel's funding UTXO.
870 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
871 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
872 // associated channel mapping.
874 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
875 // to store all of them.
876 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
878 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
879 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
880 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
881 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
882 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
884 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
885 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
887 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
888 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
890 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
891 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
892 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
894 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
895 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
896 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
899 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
900 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
901 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
902 self.update_time_counter
905 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
906 self.latest_monitor_update_id
909 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
910 self.config.announced_channel
913 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
914 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
917 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
918 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
919 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
920 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
923 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
924 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
925 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
928 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
929 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
930 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
931 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
932 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
935 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
936 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
937 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
938 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
940 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
941 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
943 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
944 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
946 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
947 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
949 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
952 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
953 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
954 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
955 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
957 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
958 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
959 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
960 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
963 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
964 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
965 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
966 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
967 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
972 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
976 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
978 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
979 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
980 self.temporary_channel_id
983 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
987 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
988 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
989 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
993 /// Gets the channel's type
994 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
998 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1000 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1001 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1002 self.short_channel_id
1005 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1006 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1007 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1010 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1011 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1012 self.outbound_scid_alias
1015 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1016 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
1017 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1018 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1019 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1022 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1023 /// get_funding_created.
1024 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1025 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1028 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1029 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1030 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1033 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1034 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1035 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1036 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1040 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1043 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1044 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1047 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1048 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1051 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1052 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1053 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1056 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1057 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1060 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1061 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1062 self.counterparty_node_id
1065 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1066 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1067 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1070 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1071 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1072 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1075 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1076 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1078 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1079 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1080 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1081 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1083 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1087 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1088 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1089 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1092 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1093 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1094 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1097 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1098 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1099 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1101 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1102 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1107 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1108 self.channel_value_satoshis
1111 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1112 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1115 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1116 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1119 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1120 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1121 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1123 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1124 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1125 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1126 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1127 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1129 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1133 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1134 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1135 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1138 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1139 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1140 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1143 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1144 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1145 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1148 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1149 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1150 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1153 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1154 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1155 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1158 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1159 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1160 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1163 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1164 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1165 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1166 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1167 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1170 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1172 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1173 self.prev_config = None;
1177 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1178 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1182 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1183 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1184 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1185 let did_channel_update =
1186 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1187 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1188 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1189 if did_channel_update {
1190 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1191 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1192 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1193 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1195 self.config.options = *config;
1199 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1200 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1201 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1204 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1205 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1206 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1207 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1208 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1210 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1211 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1212 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1213 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1214 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1215 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1216 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1218 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1219 where L::Target: Logger
1221 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1222 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1223 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1225 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1226 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1227 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1228 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1230 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1231 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1232 if match update_state {
1233 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1234 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1235 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1236 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1237 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1239 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1243 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1244 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1245 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1246 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1248 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1249 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1250 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1252 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1253 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1254 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1255 transaction_output_index: None
1260 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1261 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1262 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1263 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1264 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1267 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1269 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1270 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1271 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1273 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1274 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1277 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1278 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1281 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1283 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1284 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1285 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1287 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1288 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1294 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1295 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1296 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1297 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1298 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1299 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1300 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1304 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1305 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1307 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1309 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1310 if generated_by_local {
1311 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1312 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1321 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1323 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1324 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1325 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1326 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1327 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1328 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1329 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1332 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1333 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1334 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1335 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1339 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1340 preimages.push(preimage);
1344 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1345 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1347 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1349 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1350 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1352 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1353 if !generated_by_local {
1354 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1362 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1363 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1364 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1365 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1366 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1367 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1368 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1369 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1371 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1373 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1374 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1375 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1376 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1378 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1380 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1381 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1382 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1383 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1386 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1387 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1388 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1389 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1391 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1394 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1395 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1396 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1397 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1399 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1402 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1403 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1408 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1409 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1414 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1416 let channel_parameters =
1417 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1418 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1419 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1426 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1429 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1430 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1431 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1432 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1434 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1435 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1436 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1444 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1445 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1451 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1452 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1453 /// our counterparty!)
1454 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1455 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1456 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1457 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1458 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1459 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1460 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1462 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1466 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1467 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1468 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1469 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1470 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1471 //may see payments to it!
1472 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1473 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1474 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1476 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1479 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1480 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1481 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1482 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1483 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1486 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1487 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1490 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1494 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1495 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1496 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1497 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1498 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1499 // which are near the dust limit.
1500 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1501 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1502 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1503 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1504 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1506 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1507 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1509 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1512 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1513 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1514 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1517 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1518 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1520 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1521 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1522 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1523 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1524 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1525 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1526 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1529 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1532 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1533 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1534 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1536 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1537 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1538 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1539 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1540 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1541 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1543 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1544 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1550 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1551 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1553 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1554 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1555 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1556 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1557 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1558 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1559 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1562 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1565 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1566 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1567 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1569 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1570 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1571 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1572 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1573 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1574 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1576 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1577 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1581 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1582 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1583 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1584 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1585 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1586 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1587 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1589 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1590 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1592 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1599 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1600 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1601 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1602 /// corner case properly.
1603 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1604 -> AvailableBalances
1605 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1607 let context = &self;
1608 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1609 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1610 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1612 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1613 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1615 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1617 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1619 if context.is_outbound() {
1620 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1621 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1623 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1624 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1626 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1627 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1628 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1629 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1632 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1633 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1634 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1635 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1637 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1638 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1639 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1640 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1641 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1642 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1643 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1644 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1645 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1646 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1648 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1651 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1652 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1653 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1654 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1655 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1658 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1659 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1661 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1662 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1663 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1665 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1666 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1667 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1668 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1672 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1674 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1675 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1676 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1677 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1678 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1679 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1680 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1682 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1683 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1685 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1686 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1687 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1689 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1690 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1691 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1692 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1693 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1696 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1697 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1698 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1699 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1700 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1701 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1704 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1705 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1706 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1708 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1712 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1713 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1715 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1716 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1720 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1721 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1722 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1723 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1725 outbound_capacity_msat,
1726 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1727 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1731 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1732 let context = &self;
1733 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1736 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1737 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1739 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1740 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1742 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1743 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1745 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1746 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1747 let context = &self;
1748 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1750 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1753 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1754 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1756 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1757 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1759 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1760 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1762 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1763 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1767 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1768 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1774 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1775 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1776 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1779 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1780 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1781 included_htlcs += 1;
1784 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1785 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1789 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1790 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1791 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1792 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1793 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1794 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1799 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1801 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1802 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1807 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1808 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1812 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1813 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1814 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1817 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1818 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1820 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1821 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1822 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1824 total_pending_htlcs,
1825 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1826 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1827 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1829 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1830 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1831 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1833 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1835 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1840 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1841 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1843 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1844 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1846 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1847 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1849 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1850 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1851 let context = &self;
1852 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1854 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1857 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1858 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1860 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1861 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1863 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1864 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1866 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1867 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1871 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1872 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1878 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1879 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1880 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1881 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1882 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1883 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1886 included_htlcs += 1;
1889 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1890 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1893 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1894 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1896 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1897 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1898 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1903 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1904 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1905 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1908 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1909 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1911 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1912 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1914 total_pending_htlcs,
1915 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1916 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1917 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1919 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1920 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1921 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1923 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1925 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1930 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1931 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1932 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1933 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1939 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1940 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1941 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1942 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1943 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1944 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1945 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1946 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1947 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1948 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1949 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1951 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1952 // return them to fail the payment.
1953 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1954 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1955 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1957 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1958 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1963 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1964 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1965 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1966 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1967 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1968 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1969 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1970 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1971 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1972 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1973 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1974 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1975 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1980 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1981 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1982 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1986 // Internal utility functions for channels
1988 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1989 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1990 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1992 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1994 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1995 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1996 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1998 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2001 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2003 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2006 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2007 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2008 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2010 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2012 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2013 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2014 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2015 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2016 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2019 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2020 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2021 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2022 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2023 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2024 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2025 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2028 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2029 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2031 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2032 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2035 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2036 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2037 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2038 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2039 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2040 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2043 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2044 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2045 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2048 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2049 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2050 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2051 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2054 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2055 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2057 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2058 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2059 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2063 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2064 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2065 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2066 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2067 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2069 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2070 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2071 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2072 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2073 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2074 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2075 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2076 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2077 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2078 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2079 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2083 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2084 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2085 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2086 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2087 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2088 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2090 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2092 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2093 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2094 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2095 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2096 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2097 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2098 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2099 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2101 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2102 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2112 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2113 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2114 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2115 // outside of those situations will fail.
2116 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2120 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2125 1 + // script length (0)
2129 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2130 2 + // witness marker and flag
2131 1 + // witness element count
2132 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2133 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2134 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2135 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2136 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2137 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2139 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2140 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2141 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2147 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2148 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2149 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2150 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2152 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2153 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2154 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2156 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2157 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2158 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2159 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2160 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2161 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2164 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2165 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2168 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2169 value_to_holder = 0;
2172 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2173 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2174 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2175 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2177 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2178 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2181 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2182 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2185 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2188 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2189 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2191 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2193 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2194 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2195 where L::Target: Logger {
2196 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2197 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2198 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2199 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2200 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2201 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2202 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2203 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2207 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2208 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2209 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2210 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2212 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2213 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2215 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2217 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2219 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2220 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2221 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2223 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2224 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2225 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2226 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2227 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2229 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2230 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2231 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2233 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2234 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2236 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2239 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2240 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2244 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2248 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2249 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2250 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2251 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2252 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2253 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2256 // Now update local state:
2258 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2259 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2260 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2261 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2262 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2263 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2264 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2268 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2269 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2270 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2271 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2272 // do not not get into this branch.
2273 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2274 match pending_update {
2275 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2276 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2277 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2278 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2279 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2280 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2281 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2284 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2285 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2286 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2287 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2288 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2289 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2290 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2296 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2297 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2298 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2300 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2301 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2302 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2304 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2305 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2308 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2309 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2311 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2312 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2314 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2315 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2318 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2321 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2322 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2323 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2324 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2329 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2330 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2331 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2332 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2333 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2334 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2335 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2336 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2337 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2338 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2339 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2340 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2341 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2342 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2343 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2345 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2346 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2347 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2348 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2349 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2352 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2353 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2354 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2360 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2361 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2363 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2367 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2368 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2369 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2370 /// before we fail backwards.
2372 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2373 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2374 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2375 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2376 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2377 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2378 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2381 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2382 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2383 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2384 /// before we fail backwards.
2386 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2387 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2388 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2389 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2390 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2391 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2392 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2394 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2396 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2397 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2398 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2400 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2401 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2402 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2404 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2405 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2406 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2408 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2413 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2414 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2420 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2421 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2422 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2423 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2424 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2428 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2429 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2430 force_holding_cell = true;
2433 // Now update local state:
2434 if force_holding_cell {
2435 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2436 match pending_update {
2437 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2438 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2439 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2440 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2444 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2445 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2446 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2447 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2453 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2454 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2455 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2461 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2463 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2464 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2467 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2468 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2469 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2474 // Message handlers:
2476 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2477 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2478 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2479 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2480 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2482 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2485 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2486 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2488 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2489 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2491 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2492 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2493 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2494 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2497 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2499 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2500 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2501 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2502 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2504 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2505 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2507 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2508 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2510 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2511 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2512 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2513 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2514 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2515 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2519 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2520 initial_commitment_tx,
2523 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2524 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2527 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2528 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2531 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2532 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2533 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2534 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2535 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2536 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2537 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2538 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2539 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2540 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2541 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2542 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2544 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2546 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2548 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2549 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2550 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2551 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2553 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2555 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2556 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2560 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2561 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2563 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2564 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2565 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2566 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2568 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2571 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2572 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2573 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2576 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2577 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2578 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2579 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2580 // when routing outbound payments.
2581 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2585 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2587 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2588 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2589 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2590 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2591 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2592 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2593 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2594 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2595 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2597 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2598 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2599 let expected_point =
2600 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2601 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2603 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2604 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2605 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2606 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2607 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2608 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2610 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2611 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2612 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2613 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2614 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2616 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2617 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2624 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2625 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2627 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2629 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2632 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2633 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2634 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2635 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2636 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2637 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2639 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2640 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2641 if local_sent_shutdown {
2642 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2644 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2645 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2646 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2649 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2652 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2653 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2655 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2656 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2658 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2659 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2662 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2663 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2664 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2667 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2670 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2671 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2672 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2673 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2674 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2675 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2676 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2677 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2678 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2679 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2680 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2682 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2683 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2684 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2685 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2686 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2687 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2691 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2692 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2695 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2696 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2697 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2699 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2700 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2701 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2702 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2703 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2704 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2705 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2709 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2710 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2711 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2712 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2713 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2714 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2715 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2719 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2720 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2721 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2722 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2723 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2724 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2727 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2728 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2729 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2730 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2731 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2733 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2734 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2737 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2741 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2742 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2743 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2744 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2745 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2746 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2747 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2748 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2749 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2750 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2751 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2752 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2753 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2754 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2755 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2756 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2759 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2760 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2761 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2762 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2766 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2767 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2769 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2770 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2773 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2774 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2775 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2779 // Now update local state:
2780 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2781 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2782 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2783 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2784 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2785 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2786 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2791 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2793 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2794 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2795 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2796 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2797 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2798 None => fail_reason.into(),
2799 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2800 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2801 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2802 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2804 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2808 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2809 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2810 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2811 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2813 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2819 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2822 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2823 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2824 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2826 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2830 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2833 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2834 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2837 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2841 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2845 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2846 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2847 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2849 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2853 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2857 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2858 where L::Target: Logger
2860 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2863 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2866 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2870 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2872 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2874 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2875 let commitment_txid = {
2876 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2877 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2878 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2880 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2881 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2882 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2883 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2884 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2889 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2891 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2892 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2893 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2894 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2897 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2898 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2899 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2903 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2905 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2906 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2907 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2908 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2909 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2910 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2911 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2912 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2913 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2914 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2915 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2921 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2922 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2925 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2926 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2927 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2928 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2929 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2930 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2931 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2932 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2933 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2934 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2935 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2936 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2937 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2940 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2941 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2942 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2943 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2944 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2945 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2946 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2948 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2949 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2950 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2951 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2952 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2953 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2954 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2957 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2958 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2961 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2963 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2964 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2965 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2968 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2971 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2972 commitment_stats.tx,
2974 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2975 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2976 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2979 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2980 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2982 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2983 let mut need_commitment = false;
2984 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2985 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2986 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2987 need_commitment = true;
2991 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2992 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2993 Some(forward_info.clone())
2995 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2996 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2997 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2998 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2999 need_commitment = true;
3002 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3003 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3004 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3005 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3006 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3007 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3008 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3009 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3010 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3011 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3012 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3013 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3014 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3015 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3017 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3019 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3020 need_commitment = true;
3024 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3025 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3026 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3027 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3028 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3029 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3031 nondust_htlc_sources,
3035 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3036 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3037 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3038 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3040 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3041 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3042 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3043 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3044 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3045 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3046 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3047 // includes the right HTLCs.
3048 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3049 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3050 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3051 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3052 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3053 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3055 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3056 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3057 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3060 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3061 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3062 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3063 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3064 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3065 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3066 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3067 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3068 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3072 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3073 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3074 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3075 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3078 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3079 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3080 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3081 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3082 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3083 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3084 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3086 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3087 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3088 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3089 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3092 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3093 /// for our counterparty.
3094 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3095 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3096 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3097 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3099 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3100 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3101 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3102 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3104 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3105 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3106 updates: Vec::new(),
3109 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3110 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3111 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3112 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3113 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3114 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3115 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3116 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3117 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3118 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3119 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3120 // to rebalance channels.
3121 match &htlc_update {
3122 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3123 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3124 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3126 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3127 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3129 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3132 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3133 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3134 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3135 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3136 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3137 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3138 // into the holding cell without ever being
3139 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3140 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3141 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3144 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3150 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3151 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3152 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3153 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3154 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3155 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3156 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3157 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3158 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3159 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3160 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3161 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3163 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3164 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3165 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3166 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3167 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3168 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3169 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3170 // for a full revocation before failing.
3171 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3172 update_fail_count += 1;
3175 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3177 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3184 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3185 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3187 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3188 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3193 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3194 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3195 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3196 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3197 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3199 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3200 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3201 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3203 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3204 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3210 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3211 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3212 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3213 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3214 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3215 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3216 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3217 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3218 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3220 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3223 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3226 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3230 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3232 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3233 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3238 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3239 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3240 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3241 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3242 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3243 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3244 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3245 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3249 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3251 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3252 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3255 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3256 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3258 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3260 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3261 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3262 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3263 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3264 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3265 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3266 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3267 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3271 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3272 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3273 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3274 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3275 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3276 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3277 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3278 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3279 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3281 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3282 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3285 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3286 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3287 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3288 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3289 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3290 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3291 let mut require_commitment = false;
3292 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3295 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3296 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3297 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3299 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3300 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3301 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3302 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3303 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3304 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3309 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3310 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3311 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3312 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3313 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3315 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3316 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3317 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3322 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3323 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3325 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3329 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3330 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3332 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3333 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3334 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3335 require_commitment = true;
3336 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3337 match forward_info {
3338 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3339 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3340 require_commitment = true;
3342 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3343 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3344 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3346 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3347 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3348 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3352 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3353 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3354 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3355 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3361 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3362 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3363 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3364 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3366 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3367 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3368 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3369 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3370 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3371 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3372 require_commitment = true;
3376 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3378 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3379 match update_state {
3380 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3381 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3382 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3383 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3384 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3386 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3387 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3388 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3389 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3390 require_commitment = true;
3391 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3392 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3397 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3398 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3399 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3400 if require_commitment {
3401 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3402 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3403 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3404 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3405 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3406 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3407 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3408 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3409 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3411 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3412 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3413 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3414 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3415 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3418 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3419 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3420 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3421 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3422 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3423 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3425 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3426 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3428 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3429 if require_commitment {
3430 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3432 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3433 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3434 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3435 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3437 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3438 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3439 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3440 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3442 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3443 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3444 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3450 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3451 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3452 /// commitment update.
3453 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3454 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3455 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3457 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3458 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3461 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3462 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3463 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3464 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3466 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3467 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3468 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3469 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3470 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3471 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3472 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3474 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3475 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3477 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3478 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3480 if !self.context.is_live() {
3481 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3484 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3485 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3486 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3487 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3488 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3489 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3490 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3491 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3492 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3493 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3497 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3498 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3499 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3500 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3501 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3502 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3505 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3506 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3510 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3511 force_holding_cell = true;
3514 if force_holding_cell {
3515 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3519 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3520 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3522 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3523 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3528 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3529 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3531 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3533 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3534 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3535 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3536 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3540 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3541 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3542 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3546 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3547 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3550 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3551 // will be retransmitted.
3552 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3553 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3554 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3556 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3557 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3559 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3560 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3561 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3562 // this HTLC accordingly
3563 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3566 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3567 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3568 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3569 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3572 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3573 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3574 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3575 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3576 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3577 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3582 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3584 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3585 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3586 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3587 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3591 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3592 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3593 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3594 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3595 // the update upon reconnection.
3596 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3600 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3602 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3603 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3606 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3607 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3608 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3609 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3610 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3611 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3612 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3614 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3615 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3616 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3617 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3618 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3619 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3620 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3622 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3623 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3624 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3625 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3626 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3627 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3628 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3631 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3632 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3633 /// to the remote side.
3634 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3635 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3636 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3637 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3640 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3642 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3643 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3645 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3646 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3647 // first received the funding_signed.
3648 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3649 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3650 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3652 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3653 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3654 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3655 funding_broadcastable = None;
3658 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3659 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3660 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3661 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3662 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3663 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3664 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3665 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3666 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3667 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3668 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3669 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3670 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3671 next_per_commitment_point,
3672 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3676 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3678 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3679 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3680 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3681 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3682 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3683 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3685 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3686 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3687 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3688 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3689 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3690 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3694 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3695 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3697 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3698 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3699 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3702 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3703 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3704 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3705 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3706 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3707 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3708 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3709 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3710 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3714 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3715 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3717 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3718 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3720 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3721 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3723 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3724 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3726 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3727 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3728 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3729 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3730 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3731 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3732 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3733 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3734 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3735 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3736 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3737 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3738 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3739 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3741 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3742 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3743 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3749 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3750 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3751 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3752 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3753 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3754 per_commitment_secret,
3755 next_per_commitment_point,
3757 next_local_nonce: None,
3761 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3762 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3763 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3764 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3765 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3767 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3768 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3769 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3770 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3771 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3772 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3773 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3774 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3775 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3776 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3781 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3782 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3784 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3785 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3786 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3787 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3788 reason: err_packet.clone()
3791 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3792 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3793 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3794 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3795 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3796 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3799 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3800 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3801 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3802 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3803 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3810 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3811 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3812 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3813 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3817 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3818 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3819 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3820 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3821 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3822 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3826 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3827 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3829 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3830 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3831 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3832 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3833 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3834 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3835 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3836 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3839 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3841 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3842 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3843 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3844 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3848 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3849 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3853 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3854 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3855 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3856 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3857 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3860 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3861 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3862 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3863 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3864 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3867 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3868 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3869 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3870 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3871 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3872 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3873 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3874 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3878 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3879 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3880 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3881 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3883 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3887 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3888 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3889 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3890 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3892 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3893 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3894 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3895 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3896 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3900 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3902 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3903 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3904 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3905 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3906 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3907 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3909 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3910 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3911 channel_ready: None,
3912 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3913 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3914 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3918 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3919 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3920 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3921 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3922 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3923 next_per_commitment_point,
3924 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3926 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3927 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3928 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3932 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3933 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3934 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3936 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3937 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3938 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3941 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3944 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3947 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3948 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3949 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3950 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3951 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3952 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3953 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3955 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3957 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3958 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3959 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3960 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3961 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3962 next_per_commitment_point,
3963 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3967 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3968 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3969 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3971 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3974 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3975 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3976 raa: required_revoke,
3977 commitment_update: None,
3978 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3980 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3981 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3982 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3984 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3987 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3988 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3989 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3990 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3991 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3992 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3995 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3996 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3997 raa: required_revoke,
3998 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3999 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4003 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4007 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4008 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4009 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4010 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4012 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4014 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4016 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4017 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4018 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4019 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4020 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4021 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4023 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4024 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4025 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4026 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4027 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4029 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4030 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4031 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4032 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4035 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4036 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4037 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4038 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4039 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4040 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4041 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4042 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4043 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4044 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4045 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4046 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4047 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4048 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4049 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4051 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4054 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4055 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4058 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4059 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4060 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4061 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4062 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4063 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4066 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4067 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4068 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4069 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4070 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4071 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4074 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4080 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4081 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4082 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4083 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4085 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4086 return Ok((None, None));
4089 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4090 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4091 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4093 return Ok((None, None));
4096 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4098 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4099 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4100 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4101 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4103 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4104 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4105 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4107 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4108 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4109 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4110 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4112 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4113 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4114 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4119 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4120 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4122 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4123 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4126 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4127 /// within our expected timeframe.
4129 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4130 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4131 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4134 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4137 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4138 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4141 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4142 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4143 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4144 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4146 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4149 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4150 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4151 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4152 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4155 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4156 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4160 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4162 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4163 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4166 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4167 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4168 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4171 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4174 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4175 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4176 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4177 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4179 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4182 assert!(send_shutdown);
4183 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4184 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4185 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4187 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4190 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4195 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4197 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4198 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4200 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4201 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4202 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4203 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4204 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4205 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4208 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4209 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4211 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4212 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4213 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4214 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4218 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4219 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4220 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4221 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4222 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4223 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4225 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4226 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4233 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4234 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4236 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4239 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4240 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4242 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4244 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4245 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4246 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4247 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4248 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4249 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4250 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4251 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4252 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4254 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4255 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4258 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4262 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4263 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4264 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4265 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4267 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4270 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4273 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4276 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4280 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4284 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4285 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4286 return Ok((None, None));
4289 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4290 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4291 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4294 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4296 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4299 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4300 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4301 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4302 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4303 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4307 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4308 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4313 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4314 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4315 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4316 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4317 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4318 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4319 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4323 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4325 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4326 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4327 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4328 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4330 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4333 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4334 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4335 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4337 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4338 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4339 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4340 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4344 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4345 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4346 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4347 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4349 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4350 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4351 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4357 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4358 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4361 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4362 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4364 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4365 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4368 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4369 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4370 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4371 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4372 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4374 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4375 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4376 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4378 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4379 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4382 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4383 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4384 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4385 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4386 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4387 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4388 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4389 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4391 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4394 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4395 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4396 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4397 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4399 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4403 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4404 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4405 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4406 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4408 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4414 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4415 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4416 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4417 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4418 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4419 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4420 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4422 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4423 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4426 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4428 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4429 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4435 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4436 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4437 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4438 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4439 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4440 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4441 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4443 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4444 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4451 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4452 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4455 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4456 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4459 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4460 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4464 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4465 &self.context.holder_signer
4469 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4471 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4472 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4473 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4474 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4475 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4476 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4478 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4480 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4488 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4489 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4493 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4494 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4495 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4496 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4499 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4500 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4501 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4502 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4505 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4506 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4507 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4508 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4509 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4510 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4513 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4514 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4515 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4516 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4517 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4518 if !release_monitor {
4519 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4528 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4529 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4532 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4533 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4534 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4536 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4537 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4538 if self.context.channel_state &
4539 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4540 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4541 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4542 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4543 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4546 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4547 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4548 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4549 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4550 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4551 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4553 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4554 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4555 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4557 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4558 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4559 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4560 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4561 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4562 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4568 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4569 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4570 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4573 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4574 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4575 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4578 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4579 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4580 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4583 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4584 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4585 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4586 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4587 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4588 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4593 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4594 self.context.channel_update_status
4597 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4598 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4599 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4602 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4604 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4605 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4606 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4610 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4611 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4612 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4615 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4619 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4620 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4621 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4623 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4624 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4625 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4627 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4628 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4631 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4632 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4633 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4634 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4635 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4636 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4637 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4638 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4639 self.context.channel_state);
4641 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4645 if need_commitment_update {
4646 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4647 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4648 let next_per_commitment_point =
4649 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4650 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4651 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4652 next_per_commitment_point,
4653 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4657 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4663 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4664 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4665 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4666 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4667 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4668 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4669 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4671 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4674 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4675 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4676 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4677 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4678 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4679 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4680 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4681 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4682 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4683 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4684 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4685 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4686 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4687 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4688 // channel and move on.
4689 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4690 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4692 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4693 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4694 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4696 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4697 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4698 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4699 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4700 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4701 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4702 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4706 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4707 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4708 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4709 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4710 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4714 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4715 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4716 // may have already happened for this block).
4717 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4718 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4719 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4720 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4723 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4724 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4725 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4726 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4734 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4735 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4736 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4737 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4739 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4740 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4743 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4745 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4746 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4747 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4748 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4750 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4753 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4756 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4757 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4758 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4759 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4761 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4764 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4765 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4766 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4768 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4769 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4771 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4772 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4773 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4781 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4783 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4784 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4785 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4787 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4788 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4791 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4792 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4793 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4794 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4795 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4796 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4797 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4798 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4799 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4802 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4803 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4804 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4805 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4807 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4808 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4809 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4811 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4812 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4813 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4814 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4816 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4817 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4818 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4819 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4820 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4821 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4822 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4825 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4826 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4828 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4831 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4832 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4833 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4834 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4835 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4836 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4837 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4838 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4839 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4840 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4841 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4842 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4843 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4844 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4845 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4846 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4847 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4853 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4858 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4859 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4861 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4862 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4863 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4864 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4866 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4869 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4871 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4872 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4873 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4874 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4875 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4876 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4878 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4879 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4882 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4883 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4884 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4885 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4886 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4887 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4889 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4890 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4893 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4894 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4895 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4896 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4897 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4903 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4904 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4905 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4906 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4908 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4911 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4915 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4919 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4920 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4924 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4928 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4929 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4932 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4936 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4938 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4943 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4945 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4950 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4952 None => return None,
4955 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4957 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4958 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4960 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4961 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4965 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4967 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4968 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4969 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4970 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4971 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4972 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4973 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4975 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4976 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4977 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4978 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4979 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4980 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4981 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4982 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4983 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4984 contents: announcement,
4987 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4991 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4992 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4993 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4994 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4995 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4996 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4997 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4998 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5000 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5002 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5004 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5005 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5007 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5009 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5010 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5013 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5014 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5015 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5016 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5019 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5022 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5023 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5024 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5025 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5026 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5027 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5030 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5032 Err(_) => return None,
5034 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5035 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5040 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5041 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5042 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5043 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5044 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5045 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5046 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5047 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5048 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5049 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5050 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5051 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5052 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5053 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5054 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5055 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5058 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5061 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5062 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5063 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5064 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5065 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5066 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5067 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5068 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5069 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5071 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5072 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5073 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5074 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5075 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5076 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5077 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5078 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5079 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5081 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5082 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5083 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5084 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5085 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5086 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5087 next_funding_txid: None,
5092 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5094 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5095 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5096 /// commitment update.
5098 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5099 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5100 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5101 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5102 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5103 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5104 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5107 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5108 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5109 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5111 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5112 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5117 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5118 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5120 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5122 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5123 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5125 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5126 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5127 /// regenerate them.
5129 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5130 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5132 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5133 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5134 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5135 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5136 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5137 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5138 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5140 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5141 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5143 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5144 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5145 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5148 if amount_msat == 0 {
5149 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5152 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5153 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5154 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5155 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5158 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5159 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5160 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5163 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5164 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5165 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5166 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5167 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5168 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5169 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5170 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5173 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5174 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5175 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5176 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5177 else { "to peer" });
5179 if need_holding_cell {
5180 force_holding_cell = true;
5183 // Now update local state:
5184 if force_holding_cell {
5185 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5190 onion_routing_packet,
5196 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5197 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5199 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5201 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5206 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5207 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5208 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5212 onion_routing_packet,
5215 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5220 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5221 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5222 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5223 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5225 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5226 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5227 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5229 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5230 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5234 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5235 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5236 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5237 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5238 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5239 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5240 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5243 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5244 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5245 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5246 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5247 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5248 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5251 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5253 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5254 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5255 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5257 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5258 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5261 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5262 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5263 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5264 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5265 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5266 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5267 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5268 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5271 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5275 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5276 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5277 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5278 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5280 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5282 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5283 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5284 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5285 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5286 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5287 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5288 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5289 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5290 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5291 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5292 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5298 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5301 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5302 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5303 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5304 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5305 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5306 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5308 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5309 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5310 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5311 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5314 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5315 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5319 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5320 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5322 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5324 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5325 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5326 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5327 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5329 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5330 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5331 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5332 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5333 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5334 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5338 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5339 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5343 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5344 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5347 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5348 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5350 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5351 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5352 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5353 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5354 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5355 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5356 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5357 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5359 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5360 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5361 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5364 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5365 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5366 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5372 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5373 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5376 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5377 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5378 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5379 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5385 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5386 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5388 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5389 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5390 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5391 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5392 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5393 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5394 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5395 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5396 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5399 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5400 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5401 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5403 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5404 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5407 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5408 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5410 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5411 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5412 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5415 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5416 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5417 let mut chan_closed = false;
5418 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5422 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5424 None if !chan_closed => {
5425 // use override shutdown script if provided
5426 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5427 Some(script) => script,
5429 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5430 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5431 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5432 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5436 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5437 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5439 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5445 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5446 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5447 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5448 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5450 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5452 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5454 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5455 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5456 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5457 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5458 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5459 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5462 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5463 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5465 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5466 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5467 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5470 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5471 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5472 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5473 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5474 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5476 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5477 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5484 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5485 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5487 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5490 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5491 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5492 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5494 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5495 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5499 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5503 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5504 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5505 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5506 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5509 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5510 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5511 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5512 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5513 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5514 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5515 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5516 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5517 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5519 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5520 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5521 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5522 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5524 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5525 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5527 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5528 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5530 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5531 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5532 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5534 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5535 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5537 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5538 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5539 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5540 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5541 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5544 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5545 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5547 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5548 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5550 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5552 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5554 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5555 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5556 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5557 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5560 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5561 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5563 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5564 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5565 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5566 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5570 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5571 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5572 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5576 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5577 Ok(script) => script,
5578 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5581 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5584 context: ChannelContext {
5587 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5588 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5589 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5590 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5595 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5597 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5598 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5599 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5600 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5602 channel_value_satoshis,
5604 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5607 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5610 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5611 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5614 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5615 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5616 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5617 pending_update_fee: None,
5618 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5619 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5620 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5621 update_time_counter: 1,
5623 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5625 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5626 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5627 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5628 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5629 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5630 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5632 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5633 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5634 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5635 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5637 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5638 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5639 closing_fee_limits: None,
5640 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5642 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5644 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5645 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5646 short_channel_id: None,
5647 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5649 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5650 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5651 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5652 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5653 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5654 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5658 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5659 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5660 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5662 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5664 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5665 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5666 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5667 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5668 counterparty_parameters: None,
5669 funding_outpoint: None,
5670 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5672 funding_transaction: None,
5674 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5675 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5676 counterparty_node_id,
5678 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5680 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5682 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5683 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5685 announcement_sigs: None,
5687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5688 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5690 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5692 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5693 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5695 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5696 outbound_scid_alias,
5698 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5699 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5701 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5702 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5707 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5709 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5713 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5714 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5715 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5716 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5717 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5718 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5721 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5722 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5723 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5724 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5725 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5726 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5727 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5728 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5729 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5730 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5731 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5733 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5734 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5736 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5737 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5738 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5739 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5742 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5743 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5745 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5748 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5749 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5750 return Err((self, e));
5754 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5756 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5758 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5759 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5760 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5762 let channel = Channel {
5763 context: self.context,
5766 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5767 temporary_channel_id,
5768 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5769 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5772 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5774 next_local_nonce: None,
5778 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5779 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5780 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5781 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5782 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5783 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5784 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5785 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5786 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5787 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5790 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5791 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5792 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5793 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5794 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5795 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5801 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5802 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5803 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5804 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5805 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5806 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5808 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5810 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5811 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5812 // We've exhausted our options
5815 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5816 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5819 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5820 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5821 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5822 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5824 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5825 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5826 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5827 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5828 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5829 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5831 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5833 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5834 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5837 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5838 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5839 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5841 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5842 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5845 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5846 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5849 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5850 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5854 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5855 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5856 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5857 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5858 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5859 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5860 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5861 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5862 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5863 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5864 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5865 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5866 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5867 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5868 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5869 first_per_commitment_point,
5870 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5871 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5872 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5873 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5875 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5880 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5881 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5883 // Check sanity of message fields:
5884 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5887 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5890 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5891 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5893 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5894 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5896 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5897 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5899 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5900 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5901 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5903 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5904 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5905 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5907 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5908 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5909 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5911 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5912 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5914 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5915 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5918 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5919 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5920 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5922 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5923 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5925 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5926 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5928 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5929 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5931 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5932 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5934 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5935 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5937 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5938 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5941 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5942 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5945 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5946 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5948 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5949 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5950 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5952 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5953 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5956 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5957 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5958 &Some(ref script) => {
5959 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5960 if script.len() == 0 {
5963 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5964 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5966 Some(script.clone())
5969 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5976 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5977 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5978 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5979 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5980 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5982 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5983 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5985 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5988 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5989 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5990 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5991 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5992 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5993 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5996 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5997 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5998 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6001 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6002 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6004 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6005 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6011 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6012 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
6013 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
6014 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6017 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
6018 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6019 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6020 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6021 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6022 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6023 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6024 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
6025 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
6026 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6027 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6028 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6031 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6033 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6034 // support this channel type.
6035 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6036 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6040 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6041 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6042 // `static_remote_key`.
6043 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6044 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6046 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6047 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6050 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6053 channel_type.clone()
6055 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6056 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6057 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6062 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6063 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6064 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6065 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6066 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6067 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6068 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6069 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6070 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6073 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6077 // Check sanity of message fields:
6078 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6079 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6081 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6082 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6084 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6087 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6088 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6091 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6094 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6097 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6099 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6100 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6101 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6103 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6106 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6107 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6110 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6111 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6114 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6117 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6120 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6123 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6126 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6129 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6133 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6135 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6136 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6141 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6142 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6143 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6144 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6147 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6150 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6151 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6152 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6154 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6158 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6159 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6160 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6161 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6162 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6166 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6167 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6168 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6169 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6173 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6174 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6175 &Some(ref script) => {
6176 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6177 if script.len() == 0 {
6180 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6183 Some(script.clone())
6186 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6193 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6194 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6195 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6196 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6200 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6201 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6206 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6207 Ok(script) => script,
6208 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6211 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6212 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6215 context: ChannelContext {
6218 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6219 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6221 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6226 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6228 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6229 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6230 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6231 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6234 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6237 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6240 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6241 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6242 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6244 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6245 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6246 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6247 pending_update_fee: None,
6248 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6249 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6250 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6251 update_time_counter: 1,
6253 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6255 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6256 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6257 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6258 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6259 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6260 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6262 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6263 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6264 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6265 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6267 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6268 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6269 closing_fee_limits: None,
6270 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6272 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6274 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6275 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6276 short_channel_id: None,
6277 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6279 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6280 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6281 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6282 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6283 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6284 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6285 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6286 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6287 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6288 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6289 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6290 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6291 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6293 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6295 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6296 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6297 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6298 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6299 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6300 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6301 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6303 funding_outpoint: None,
6304 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6306 funding_transaction: None,
6308 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6309 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6310 counterparty_node_id,
6312 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6314 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6316 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6317 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6319 announcement_sigs: None,
6321 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6322 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6323 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6324 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6326 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6327 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6329 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6330 outbound_scid_alias,
6332 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6333 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6335 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6336 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6341 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6343 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6349 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6350 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6353 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6354 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6355 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6356 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6359 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6360 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6362 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6363 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6364 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6365 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6367 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6368 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6370 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6371 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6373 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6374 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6377 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6378 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6380 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6383 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6384 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6385 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6387 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6388 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6389 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6390 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6392 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6393 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6394 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6395 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6396 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6397 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6398 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6399 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6400 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6401 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6402 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6403 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6404 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6405 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6406 first_per_commitment_point,
6407 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6408 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6409 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6411 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6413 next_local_nonce: None,
6417 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6418 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6420 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6422 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6423 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6426 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6427 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6429 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6430 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6432 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6433 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6434 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6435 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6436 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6437 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6438 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6439 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6440 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6443 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6444 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6446 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6447 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6448 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6449 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6451 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6452 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6454 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6455 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6458 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6459 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6460 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6462 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6465 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6466 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6468 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6469 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6470 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6472 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6474 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6475 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6477 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6478 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6479 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6480 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6483 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6484 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6485 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6486 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6487 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6489 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6491 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6492 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6493 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6496 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6497 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6498 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6502 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6503 initial_commitment_tx,
6506 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6507 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6510 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6511 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6514 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6516 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6517 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6518 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6519 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6520 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6521 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6522 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6523 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6524 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6525 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6526 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6528 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6530 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6532 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6533 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6534 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6535 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6537 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6539 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6540 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6541 let mut channel = Channel {
6542 context: self.context,
6544 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6545 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6546 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6548 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6552 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6553 }, channel_monitor))
6557 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6558 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6560 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6566 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6567 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6568 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6569 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6570 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6572 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6573 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6574 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6575 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6581 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6582 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6583 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6584 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6585 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6586 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6591 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6592 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6593 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6594 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6596 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6597 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6598 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6599 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6604 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6605 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6606 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6607 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6608 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6609 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6614 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6615 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6616 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6619 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6621 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6622 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6623 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6624 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6625 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6627 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6628 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6629 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6630 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6632 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6633 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6634 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6636 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6638 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6639 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6640 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6641 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6642 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6643 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6645 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6646 // deserialized from that format.
6647 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6648 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6649 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6651 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6653 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6654 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6655 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6657 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6658 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6659 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6660 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6663 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6664 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6665 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6668 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6669 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6670 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6671 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6673 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6674 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6676 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6678 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6680 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6682 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6685 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6687 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6692 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6693 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6695 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6696 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6697 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6698 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6699 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6700 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6701 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6703 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6705 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6707 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6710 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6711 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6712 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6715 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6717 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6718 preimages.push(preimage);
6720 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6721 reason.write(writer)?;
6723 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6725 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6726 preimages.push(preimage);
6728 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6729 reason.write(writer)?;
6732 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6733 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6734 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6736 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6737 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6738 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6742 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6743 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6744 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6746 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6747 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6751 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6752 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6753 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6754 source.write(writer)?;
6755 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6757 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6758 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6759 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6761 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6762 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6764 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6766 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6767 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6769 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6771 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6772 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6777 match self.context.resend_order {
6778 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6779 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6782 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6783 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6784 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6786 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6787 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6788 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6789 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6792 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6793 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6794 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6795 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6796 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6799 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6800 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6801 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6802 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6804 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6805 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6806 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6808 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6810 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6811 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6812 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6813 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6815 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6816 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6817 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6818 // consider the stale state on reload.
6821 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6822 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6823 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6825 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6826 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6827 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6829 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6830 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6832 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6833 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6834 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6836 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6837 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6839 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6842 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6843 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6844 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6846 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6849 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6850 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6852 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6853 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6854 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6856 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6858 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6860 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6862 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6863 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6864 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6865 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6866 htlc.write(writer)?;
6869 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6870 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6871 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6873 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6874 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6876 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6877 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6878 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6879 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6880 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6881 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6882 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6884 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6885 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6886 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6887 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6888 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6890 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6891 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6893 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6894 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6895 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6896 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6898 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6900 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6901 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6902 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6903 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6904 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6905 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6906 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6908 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6909 (2, chan_type, option),
6910 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6911 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6912 (5, self.context.config, required),
6913 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6914 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6915 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6916 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6917 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6918 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6919 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6920 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6921 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6922 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6923 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6924 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6925 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6926 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6927 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6928 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6929 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6930 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6937 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6938 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6940 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6941 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6943 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6944 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6945 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6947 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6948 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6949 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6950 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6952 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6954 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6955 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6957 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6958 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6960 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6961 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6964 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6965 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 let mut keys_data = None;
6972 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6973 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6974 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6975 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6976 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6977 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6978 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6979 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6980 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6981 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6985 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6986 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6987 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6990 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6992 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6996 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6998 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6999 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7000 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7001 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7002 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7003 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7004 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7005 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7006 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7007 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7008 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7009 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7010 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7015 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7017 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7018 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7019 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7020 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7021 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7022 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7023 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7024 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7025 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7026 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7028 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7029 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7032 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7033 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7036 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7039 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7041 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7045 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7046 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7047 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7048 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7049 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7050 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7051 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7052 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7053 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7054 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7055 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7057 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7058 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7059 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7061 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7062 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7063 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7065 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7069 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7070 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7071 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7072 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7075 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7076 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7077 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7079 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7080 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7081 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7082 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7085 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7086 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7087 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7088 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7091 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7093 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7095 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7096 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7097 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7098 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7100 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7101 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7102 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7103 // consider the stale state on reload.
7104 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7107 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7108 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7109 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7111 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7114 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7115 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7116 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7118 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7119 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7120 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7121 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7123 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7124 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7126 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7127 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7129 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7130 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7131 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7133 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7135 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7136 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7138 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7139 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7142 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7144 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7145 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7146 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7147 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7149 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7152 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7153 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7155 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7157 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7158 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7160 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7161 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7163 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7165 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7166 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7167 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7169 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7170 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7171 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7175 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7176 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7177 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7179 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7185 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7186 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7187 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7188 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7189 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7190 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7191 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7192 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7193 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7194 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7196 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7197 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7198 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7199 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7200 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7201 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7202 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7204 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7205 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7206 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7207 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7209 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7211 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7212 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7214 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7215 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7216 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7217 (2, channel_type, option),
7218 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7219 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7220 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7221 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7222 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7223 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7224 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7225 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7226 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7227 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7228 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7229 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7230 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7231 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7232 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7233 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7234 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7235 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7236 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7237 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7238 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7241 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7242 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7243 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7244 // required channel parameters.
7245 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7246 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7247 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7249 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7251 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7252 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7253 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7254 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7257 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7258 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7259 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7261 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7262 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7264 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7265 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7270 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7271 if iter.next().is_some() {
7272 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7276 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7277 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7278 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7279 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7280 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7283 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7284 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7285 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7287 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7288 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7290 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7291 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7292 // separate u64 values.
7293 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7295 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7297 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7298 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7299 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7300 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7302 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7303 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7305 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7306 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7307 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7308 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7309 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7312 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7313 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7317 context: ChannelContext {
7320 config: config.unwrap(),
7324 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7325 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7326 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7329 temporary_channel_id,
7331 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7333 channel_value_satoshis,
7335 latest_monitor_update_id,
7338 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7341 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7342 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7345 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7346 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7347 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7348 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7352 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7353 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7354 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7355 monitor_pending_forwards,
7356 monitor_pending_failures,
7357 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7360 holding_cell_update_fee,
7361 next_holder_htlc_id,
7362 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7363 update_time_counter,
7366 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7367 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7368 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7369 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7371 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7372 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7373 closing_fee_limits: None,
7374 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7376 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7378 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7379 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7381 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7383 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7384 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7385 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7386 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7387 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7388 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7389 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7390 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7391 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7394 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7396 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7397 funding_transaction,
7399 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7400 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7401 counterparty_node_id,
7403 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7407 channel_update_status,
7408 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7412 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7413 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7415 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7417 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7418 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7420 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7421 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7422 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7424 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7425 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7427 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7428 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7430 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7433 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7442 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7443 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7444 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7445 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7446 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7448 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7449 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7450 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7451 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7452 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7453 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7454 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7455 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7456 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7457 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7458 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7459 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7460 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7461 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7462 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7463 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7464 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7465 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7466 use crate::util::test_utils;
7467 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7468 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7469 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7470 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7471 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7472 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7473 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7474 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7475 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7476 use crate::prelude::*;
7478 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7481 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7482 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7488 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7489 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7490 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7491 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7495 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7496 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7497 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7498 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7499 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7500 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(
7501 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7502 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7506 signer: InMemorySigner,
7509 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7510 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7513 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7514 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7516 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7517 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7520 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7524 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7526 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7527 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7528 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7529 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7530 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7533 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7534 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7535 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7536 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7540 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7541 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7542 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7546 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7547 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7548 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7549 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7551 let seed = [42; 32];
7552 let network = Network::Testnet;
7553 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7554 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7555 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7558 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7559 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7560 let config = UserConfig::default();
7561 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7562 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7563 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7565 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7566 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7570 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7571 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7573 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7574 let original_fee = 253;
7575 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7576 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7577 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7578 let seed = [42; 32];
7579 let network = Network::Testnet;
7580 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7582 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7583 let config = UserConfig::default();
7584 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7586 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7587 // same as the old fee.
7588 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7589 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7590 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7594 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7595 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7596 // dust limits are used.
7597 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7598 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7599 let seed = [42; 32];
7600 let network = Network::Testnet;
7601 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7602 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7603 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7605 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7606 // they have different dust limits.
7608 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7609 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7610 let config = UserConfig::default();
7611 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7613 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7614 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7615 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7616 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7617 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7619 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7620 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7621 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7622 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7623 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7625 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7626 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7627 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7628 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7630 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7631 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7632 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7634 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7635 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7637 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7638 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7639 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7641 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7642 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7643 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7644 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7647 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7649 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7650 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7651 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7652 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7653 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7654 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7655 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7656 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7657 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7659 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7662 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7663 // the dust limit check.
7664 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7665 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7666 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7667 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7669 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7670 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7671 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7672 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7673 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7674 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7675 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7679 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7680 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7681 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7682 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7683 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7684 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7685 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7686 let seed = [42; 32];
7687 let network = Network::Testnet;
7688 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7690 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7691 let config = UserConfig::default();
7692 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7694 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7695 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7697 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7698 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7699 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7700 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7701 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7702 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7704 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7705 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7706 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7707 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7708 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7710 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7712 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7713 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7714 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7715 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7716 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7718 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7719 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7720 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7721 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7722 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7726 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7727 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7728 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7729 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7730 let seed = [42; 32];
7731 let network = Network::Testnet;
7732 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7733 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7734 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7736 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7738 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7739 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7740 let config = UserConfig::default();
7741 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7743 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7744 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7745 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7746 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7748 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7749 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7750 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7752 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7753 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7754 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7755 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7757 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7758 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7759 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7761 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7762 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7764 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7765 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7766 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7767 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7768 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7769 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7770 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7772 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7774 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7775 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7776 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7777 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7778 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7782 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7783 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7784 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7785 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7786 let seed = [42; 32];
7787 let network = Network::Testnet;
7788 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7789 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7790 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7792 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7793 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7794 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7795 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7796 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7797 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7798 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7799 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7801 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7802 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7803 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7804 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7805 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7806 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7808 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7809 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7810 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7811 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7813 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7815 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7816 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7817 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7818 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7819 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7820 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7822 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7823 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7824 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7825 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7827 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7828 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7829 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7830 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7831 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7833 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7834 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7836 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7837 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7838 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7840 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7841 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7842 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7843 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7844 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7846 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7847 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7849 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7850 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7851 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7855 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7857 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7858 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7859 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7861 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7862 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7863 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7864 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7866 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7867 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7868 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7870 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7872 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7873 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7876 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7877 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7878 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7879 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7880 let seed = [42; 32];
7881 let network = Network::Testnet;
7882 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7883 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7884 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7887 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7888 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7889 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7891 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7892 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7894 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7895 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7896 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7898 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7899 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7901 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7903 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7904 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7906 // Channel Negotiations failed
7907 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7908 assert!(result.is_err());
7913 fn channel_update() {
7914 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7915 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7916 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7917 let seed = [42; 32];
7918 let network = Network::Testnet;
7919 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7920 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7921 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7923 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7924 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7925 let config = UserConfig::default();
7926 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7928 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7929 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7930 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7931 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7932 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7934 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7935 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7936 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7937 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7938 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7940 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7941 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7942 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7943 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7945 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7946 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7947 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7949 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7950 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7952 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7953 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7954 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7956 short_channel_id: 0,
7959 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7960 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7961 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7963 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7964 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7966 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7968 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7970 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7971 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7972 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7973 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7975 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7976 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7977 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7979 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7983 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7985 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7986 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7987 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7988 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7989 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7990 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7991 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7992 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7993 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7994 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7995 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7996 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7997 use crate::sync::Arc;
7999 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8000 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8001 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8002 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8004 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8006 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8007 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8008 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8009 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8010 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8012 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8013 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8019 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8020 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8021 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8023 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8024 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8025 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8026 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8027 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8028 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8030 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8032 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8033 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8034 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8035 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8036 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8037 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8039 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8040 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8041 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8042 selected_contest_delay: 144
8044 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8045 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8047 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8048 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8050 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8051 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8053 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8054 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8056 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8057 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8058 // build_commitment_transaction.
8059 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8060 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8061 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8062 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8063 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8065 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8066 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8067 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8068 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8072 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8073 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8074 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8075 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8079 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8080 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8081 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8083 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8084 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8086 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8087 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8089 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8091 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8092 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8093 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8094 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8095 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8096 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8097 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8099 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8100 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8101 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8102 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8104 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8105 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8106 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8108 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8110 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8111 commitment_tx.clone(),
8112 counterparty_signature,
8113 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8114 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8115 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8117 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8118 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8120 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8121 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8122 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8124 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8125 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8128 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8129 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8131 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8132 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8133 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8134 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8135 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8136 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8137 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8138 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8140 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8143 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8144 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8145 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8149 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8152 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8153 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8154 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8156 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8157 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8158 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8159 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8160 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8161 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8162 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8163 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8165 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8169 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8170 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8171 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8172 "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", {});
8174 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8175 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8177 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8178 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8179 "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", {});
8181 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8182 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8183 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8184 "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", {});
8186 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8187 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8189 amount_msat: 1000000,
8191 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8192 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8194 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8197 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8198 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8200 amount_msat: 2000000,
8202 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8203 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8205 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8208 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8209 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8211 amount_msat: 2000000,
8213 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8214 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8215 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8216 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8218 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8221 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8222 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8224 amount_msat: 3000000,
8226 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8227 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8228 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8229 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8231 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8234 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8235 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8237 amount_msat: 4000000,
8239 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8240 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8242 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8246 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8247 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8248 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8250 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8251 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8252 "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", {
8255 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8256 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8257 "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" },
8260 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8261 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8262 "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" },
8265 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8266 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8267 "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" },
8270 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8271 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8272 "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" },
8275 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8276 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8277 "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" }
8280 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8281 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8282 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8284 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8285 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8286 "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", {
8289 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8290 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8291 "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" },
8294 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8295 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8296 "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" },
8299 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8300 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8301 "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" },
8304 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8305 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8306 "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" },
8309 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8310 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8311 "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" }
8314 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8315 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8316 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8318 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8319 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8320 "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", {
8323 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8324 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8325 "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" },
8328 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8329 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8330 "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" },
8333 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8334 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8335 "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" },
8338 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8339 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8340 "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" }
8343 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8344 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8345 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8346 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8348 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8349 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8350 "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", {
8353 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8354 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8355 "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" },
8358 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8359 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8360 "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" },
8363 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8364 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8365 "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" },
8368 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8369 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8370 "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" }
8373 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8374 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8375 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8376 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8378 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8379 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8380 "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", {
8383 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8384 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8385 "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" },
8388 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8389 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8390 "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" },
8393 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8394 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8395 "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" },
8398 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8399 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8400 "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" }
8403 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8404 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8405 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8407 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8408 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8409 "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", {
8412 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8413 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8414 "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" },
8417 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8418 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8419 "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" },
8422 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8423 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8424 "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" }
8427 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8428 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8429 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8431 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8432 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8433 "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", {
8436 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8437 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8438 "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" },
8441 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8442 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8443 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8446 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8447 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8448 "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" }
8451 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8452 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8453 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8455 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8456 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8457 "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", {
8460 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8461 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8462 "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" },
8465 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8466 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8467 "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" }
8470 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8471 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8472 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8473 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8474 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8475 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8477 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8478 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8479 "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", {
8482 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8483 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8484 "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" },
8487 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8488 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8489 "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" }
8492 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8493 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8494 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8495 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8496 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8498 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8499 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8500 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8503 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8504 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8505 "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" },
8508 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8509 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8510 "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" }
8513 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8514 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8515 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8517 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8518 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8519 "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", {
8522 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8523 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8524 "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" }
8527 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8528 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8529 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8530 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8531 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8533 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8534 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8535 "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", {
8538 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8539 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8540 "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" }
8543 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8544 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8545 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8546 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8547 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8549 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8550 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8551 "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", {
8554 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8555 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8556 "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" }
8559 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8560 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8561 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8562 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8564 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8565 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8566 "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", {});
8568 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8569 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8570 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8571 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8572 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8574 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8575 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8576 "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", {});
8578 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8579 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8580 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8581 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8582 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8584 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8585 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8586 "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", {});
8588 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8589 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8590 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8592 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8593 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8594 "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", {});
8596 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8597 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8598 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8599 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8600 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8602 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8603 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8604 "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", {});
8606 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8607 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8608 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8609 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8610 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8612 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8613 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8614 "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", {});
8616 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8617 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8618 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8619 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8620 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8621 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8623 amount_msat: 2000000,
8625 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8626 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8628 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8631 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8632 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8633 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8635 amount_msat: 5000001,
8637 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8638 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8639 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8640 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8642 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8645 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8646 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8648 amount_msat: 5000000,
8650 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8651 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8652 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8653 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8655 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8659 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8660 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8661 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8664 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8665 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8666 "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" },
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8669 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8670 "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" },
8672 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8673 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8674 "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" }
8677 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8678 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8680 "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", {
8683 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8684 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8685 "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" },
8687 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8688 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8689 "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" },
8691 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8692 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8693 "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" }
8698 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8699 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8701 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8702 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8703 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8704 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8706 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8707 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8708 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8710 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8711 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8713 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8714 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8716 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8717 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8718 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8722 fn test_key_derivation() {
8723 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8724 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8726 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8727 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8729 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8730 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8732 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8733 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8735 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8736 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8738 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8739 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8741 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8742 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8744 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8745 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8749 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8750 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8751 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8752 let seed = [42; 32];
8753 let network = Network::Testnet;
8754 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8755 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8757 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8758 let config = UserConfig::default();
8759 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8760 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8762 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8763 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8765 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8766 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8767 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8768 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8769 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8770 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8771 assert!(res.is_ok());
8775 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8776 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8777 // resulting `channel_type`.
8778 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8779 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8780 let network = Network::Testnet;
8781 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8782 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8784 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8785 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8787 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8788 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8790 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8791 // need to signal it.
8792 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8793 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8794 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8797 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8799 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8800 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8801 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8803 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8804 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8805 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8808 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8809 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8810 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8811 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8812 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8815 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8816 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8820 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8821 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8822 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8823 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8824 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8825 let network = Network::Testnet;
8826 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8827 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8829 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8830 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8832 let config = UserConfig::default();
8834 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8835 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8836 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8837 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8838 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8840 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8841 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8842 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8845 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8846 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8847 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8849 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8850 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8851 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8852 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8853 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8854 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8856 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8860 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8861 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8863 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8864 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8865 let network = Network::Testnet;
8866 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8867 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8869 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8870 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8872 let config = UserConfig::default();
8874 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8875 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8876 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8877 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8878 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8879 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8880 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8881 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8883 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8884 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8885 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8886 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8887 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8888 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8891 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8892 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8894 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8895 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8896 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8897 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8899 assert!(res.is_err());
8901 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8902 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8903 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8905 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8906 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8907 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8910 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8912 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8913 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8914 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8915 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8918 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8919 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8921 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8922 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8924 assert!(res.is_err());